ORDER : S.K. AWASTHI, J. 1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 11.07.2014 passed in Criminal MJC No. 62/2014 by Family Court, District Bhind (M.P.) whereby the application preferred by applicant under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. has been dismissed. 2. The facts as presented by the applicants are that the applicant No. 1 solemnized marriage with respondent in the month of April, 2008 by following Hindu rituals, consequently, the applicants started residing with the respondent, however, after some period the respondent developed hostility towards the applicants leading to material discord and also deliberate failure of respondent to maintain the present applicants. For the purpose of adjudication of present application, it is pertinent to highlight certain factual aspect of the matter which will have bearing on the outcome of the present case. 3. According to the applicant No. 1, she was married to one Hanif Khan for some period of time. Although the marriage ended on 22.05.2010, when Hanif Khan divorced the applicant. Subsequently, the applicant No. 1 solemnized marriage with the respondent. Although, the pleading with respect to divorce by Hanif Khan was modified and it was indicated that the applicant divorced Hanif Khan by pronouncing triple "Talak" directed to him. Therefore, the responsibility to maintain the applicants rests on respondent with whom marriage has been consummated. 4. The application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was preferred and the respondent was invited to file reply by the Family Court. The respondent moved an application for dismissal of entire proceedings drawn at the instance, on the ground that the applicant No. 1 is not his wife to have locus to move application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. This application was accepted by the court below on the ground that the narration of fact made in the application are enough to conclude that the applicant has not validly dissolved her first marriage, accordingly, the subsequent marriage will be nullity and will render the application under section 125 as not maintainable. This finding is challenged in the present criminal revision. 5. This finding is challenged in the present criminal revision. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant in sum and substance contended that the Family Court did not consider the factum of consummation of marriage which had already taken place between the applicant No. 1 and respondent and the dissolution of first marriage by the applicant No. 1 was in terms of muslim law and was validly done, therefore, the dismissal of application is improper. Apart from it, no other ground has been canvassed. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the reasons given in the impugned order. 7. I have considered the rival contention of the parties and have perused the record. 8. The respondent has invited this court to examine broadly two prepositions. Firstly, whether a Muslim woman can divorce her husband by pronouncing triple Talak? Secondly, whether the consummation of marriage alone is declaring the marriage as valid? 9. Now this court will deal with the first preposition, however, before recording conclusion it will be appropriate to refer to the judicial pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Zohara Khatoon vs. Mohd. Ibrahim, 1981 (2) SCC 509 , wherein the following has been observed: 21. After the Act of 1939, a wife thus had a statutory right to obtain divorce from the husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act. The Act provided for the wife an independent remedy which could be resorted to by her without being subjected to a pronouncement of divorce by the husband. It is, therefore, in the background of this Act that the words has obtained a divorce from her husband in clause (b) of the Explanation have to be constructed. Thus the High Court in considering the effect of these words seems to have overlooked the dominant object of the statutory remedy that was made available to the wife under the Act of 1939 by which the wife could get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds mentioned in the 1939 Act by petitioning the civil court without any overt act on the part of the husband in divorcing her. The High Court also failed to consider the legal consequences flowing from the decree passed by the court dissolving the marriage, viz. a legal divorce under the Mahomedan law. 22. The High Court also failed to consider the legal consequences flowing from the decree passed by the court dissolving the marriage, viz. a legal divorce under the Mahomedan law. 22. In these circumstances we are therefore, satisfied that the interpretation put by the High Court on the second limb of clause (b) is not correct. This seems to be borne out from the provisions of Mahomedan law itself. It would appear that under the Mahomedan law there are three distinct modes in which a muslim marriage can be dissolved and the relationship of the husband and the wife terminated so as to result in an irrevocable divorce. (1) Where the husband unilaterally gives a divorce according to any of the forms approved by the Mahomedan law, viz. Talaq ahsan which consiss of a single pronouncement of divorce during tuhar (Period between menstruations) followed by abstinence from sexual intercourse for the period of iddat; or Talak hasan which consists of three pronouncement made during the successive tuhrs, no intercourse taking place between three tuhrs and lastly Talak-ulbidaat or talalk-i-badai which consists of three pronouncements made during a single tuhr either in one sentence or in three sentences signifying a clear intention to divorce the wife, for instance, the husband saying I divorce thee irrevocably or I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee. The third form referred to above is however not recognised by the Shiah law. In the instant case, we are concerned with the appellant who appears to be a Sunni and governed by the Hanafi law (vide Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, Section 311, p. 297). A divorce or talaq may be given orally or in writing and it becomes irrevocable if the period of iddat is observed though it is not necessary that the woman divorced should come to know of the fact that she has been divorced by her husband. (2) By an agreement between the husband and the wife whereby a wife obtains divorce by relinquishing either her entire or part of the dower. This mode of divorce is called khula or Mubarat. This form of divorce is initiated by the wife and comes into existence if the husband gives consent to the agreement and releases her from the marriage tie. Where, however, both parties agree and desire a separation resulting in a divorce, it is called mubarat. This mode of divorce is called khula or Mubarat. This form of divorce is initiated by the wife and comes into existence if the husband gives consent to the agreement and releases her from the marriage tie. Where, however, both parties agree and desire a separation resulting in a divorce, it is called mubarat. The gist of these mode is that it comes into existence with the consent of both the parties particularly the husband because without his consent this mode of divorce would be incapable of being enforced. A divorce may also come into existence by virtue of an agreement either before or after the marriage by which it is provided that the wife should be at liberty to divorce herself in specified contingencies which are of a reasonable nature and which again are agreed to be the husband. In such a case the wife can repudiate herself in the exercise of the power and the divorce would be deemed to have been pronounced by the husband. This mode of divorce is called Tawfeez (vide Mulla's Mohmedan Law, Section 314. p. 300). (3) By obtaining a decree from a civil court for dissolution of marriage under Section 2 of the Act of 1939 which also amounts to a divorce (under the law) obtained by the wife. For the purpose of maintenance, this mode is governed not by clause (b) but by clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 127 of the 1973 Code; whereas the divorce given under modes (1) and (2) would be covered by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 127. 23. These are the three distinct modes in which a dissolution of marriage can be brought about. It is, therefore, manifest that clause (b) Explanation to Section 125 (1) envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or where she obtains divorce under mode numbers 2 and 3, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under Section 125 of the 1973 Code. In these circumstance the High Court was not at all justified in taking the two separate clauses 'who has been divorced' and 'has obtained a divorce from her husband' conjunctively so as to indicate a divorce proceeding from the husband and the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce. In these circumstance the High Court was not at all justified in taking the two separate clauses 'who has been divorced' and 'has obtained a divorce from her husband' conjunctively so as to indicate a divorce proceeding from the husband and the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce. We might like to mention here that the 1973 Code has by extending the definition of wife, not excluded the various modes of divorce but has merely abrogated that part of the Mahomedan law under which the wife ceased to get maintenance if the conjugal relationship of the husband and wife came to an end. Nevertheless, the personal law is applied fully and kept alive by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 127 which may be extracted thus: (b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was pay able on such divorce, cancel such order:- (i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, from the date on which such order was made. (ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman.” 10. The reproduced portion of the judgment makes it clear that the dissolution of marriage at the instance of Muslim wife can only be in terms of section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 and therefore, the only conclusion which can be recorded with respect to his preposition is that the Muslim wife cannot dissolve marriage by pronouncing triple Talak. It is now well settled that the grounds prescribed by the several statute for dissolution of marriage are not inclusive provision and new grounds cannot be added which are otherwise non-existent. This observation by this court finds support from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Reynold Rajamani and Another vs. Union of India and Another, 1982 (2) SCC 474 , in which it was held: 4. This observation by this court finds support from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Reynold Rajamani and Another vs. Union of India and Another, 1982 (2) SCC 474 , in which it was held: 4. It cannot be denied that society is generally interested in maintaining the marriage bond and preserving the matrimonial state with a view to protecting societal stability, the family home and the proper growth and happiness of children of the marriage. Legislation for the purpose of dissolving the marriage constitutes a departure from that primary principle, and the Legislature is extremely, circumspect in setting forth the grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved. The-history of all matrimonial legislation will show that at the outset conservative attitudes influenced the grounds on which separation or divorce could be granted. Over the decades, a more liberal attitude has been adopted, fostered by a recognition of the need for the individual happiness of the adult parties directly involved. But although the grounds for divorce have been liberalised, they nevertheless continue to form an exception to the general principle favouring the continution of the marital tie. In our opinion, when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted they constitute the only conditions on which the court has jurisdiction to grant divorce. If grounds need to be added to those already specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the Legislature and not of the courts. It is another matter that in construing the language in which the grounds are incorporated the courts should give a liberal construction to it. Indeed, we think that the courts must give the fullest amplitude of meaning to such a provision. But it must be meaning which the language of the section is capable of holding. It cannot be extended by adding new grounds not enumerated in the section. 5. When therefore Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act specifically sets forth the grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved, additional grounds cannot be included by the judicial construction of some other section unless that section plainly intends so. That, to our mind, Section 7 does not. 5. When therefore Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act specifically sets forth the grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved, additional grounds cannot be included by the judicial construction of some other section unless that section plainly intends so. That, to our mind, Section 7 does not. We may point out that in M. Barnard vs. G.H. Barnard the Calcutta High Court repelled a similar contention and held that Section 7 could not be construed so as to "import into Indian Divorce Jurisprudence any fresh ground for relief other than those set forth in Section 10" and that "the only grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved are those set forth in Section 10 of the Act..." The Punjab High Court in Miss Shireen Mall vs. John James Taylor has also taken the view that the grounds set forth in Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act cannot be enlarged by reference to Section 7 of the Act. So also has a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in T.M. Bashiam vs. M. Victor and a Single Judge of that Court in A. George Cornelius vs. Elizabeth Dopti Samadanam. 11. The answer to first preposition spelt out above leads this court to now deal with the second preposition which is also of some significance in the context of the matter. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, 2002 (2) SCC 73 , has recorded the following with respect to consummation of marriage to confer validity: There is another aspect of the matter which disentitles the appellant from seeking the relief of divorce on the ground of desertion in this case. As desertion in matrimonial cases means the withdrawal of one party from a state of things, i.e. a marital status of the party, no party to the marriage can be permitted to allege desertion unless he or she admits that after the formal ceremonies of the marriage, the parties had recognised and discharged the common obligation of the married life which essentially requires the cohabitation between the parties for the purpose of consummating the marriage. Cohabitation by the parties is an essential of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to further the perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for procreation of children. Cohabitation by the parties is an essential of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to further the perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for procreation of children. In other words, there can be no desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties. The basis for this theory is built upon the recognised position of law in matrimonial matters that no-one can desert who does not actively or wilfully bring to an end the existing state of cohabitation. However, such a rule is subject to just exceptions which may be found in a case on the ground of mental or physical incapacity or other peculiar circumstances of the case. However, the party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is required to show that he or she was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong. In the instant case the appellant herself pleaded that there had not been cohabitation between the parties after the marriage. She neither assigned any reason nor attributed the non-resumption of cohabitation to the respondent. From the pleadings and evidence led in the case, it is apparent that the appellant did not permit the respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the marriage. In the absence of cohabitation between the parties, a particular state of matrimonial position was never permitted by the appellant to come into existence. In the present case, in the absence of cohabitation and consummation of marriage, the appellant was disentitled to claim divorce on the ground of desertion. 12. In the context of present case and in order to answer the contention of the applicants, it can safely be observed that consummation of marriage undoubtedly one of the criteria to decide the validity of marriage. However, by no stretch of imagination, it cannot be concluded that the same is the only criteria as the statutory provisions relevant to the present case via-a-viz the alleged marriage between the applicant No. 1 and respondent contained in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is also to be complied in letter and spirit. Whereas in the present case there is clear violation of Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, therefore, this preposition can be answered by observing that consummation of marriage is relevant, however, is not a sole criteria to determine the validity of marriage. 13. Whereas in the present case there is clear violation of Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, therefore, this preposition can be answered by observing that consummation of marriage is relevant, however, is not a sole criteria to determine the validity of marriage. 13. On cumulative consideration of the facts of this case and legal preposition narrated above no indulgence can be shown in this case in favor of the applicant as the court below has not committed any error in observing that the applicant No. 1 in her application itself has narrated the manner in which she dissolved the marriage with her first husband i.e. by pronouncing triple "Talak" which is contrary to section 2 of the Act of 1939. 14. Taking this view of the matter, there is no requirement to dwell further into the question of validity of marriage with the respondent as it is suffice to observe that the allege marriage with respondent is contrary to Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 15. Consequently, the present revision petition is, hereby, dismissed being devoid of merits.