JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has preferred present appeal feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 14.02.2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court in Sessions Case No. 64 of 2005. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 11.7.2005 at about 19 : 00 hours, the respondent accused has given Dhariya blow to son of complainant on the head and on account of that the deceased succumbed to injuries. The detail narration of the incident is mentioned in the FIR on account of which, the complaint came to be registered, which was lodged before the Radhanpur Police Station being I.C.R. No. 102 of 2005 for the offences punishable under Section 302 of IPC read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. The said complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer, who carried out the inquest panchnama and also drawn the panchnama of scene of offence, has also collected necessary muddamal articles from the scene of offence and sent it to FSL for further examination, has also recorded the statement of some of witnesses and after undertaking all necessary requisite inquiry, chargesheet came to be filed before the Court of learned JMFC at Radhanpur, which was registered as Criminal Case No. 661 of 2005. 3. The offence, which was registered, was triable by the Court of Sessions, on 20.09.2005, learned Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 209 was pleased to commit the case to the Session at Patan and learned Judge thereafter has registered the case as Sessions Case No. 64 of 2005. Since the accused persons denied the offence being committed, the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 3, and accused have claimed to be tried, resultantly the statements came to be recorded at Exh. 4. The prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses and have also produced the documentary evidence to prove the case and after closure purshis, having been given the further statement of accused persons came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal procedure and pursuant to which, since the accused persons have denied to have committed the offence, the case was put up for trial. 4. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the case and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under: 5. 4. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the case and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under: 5. During the course of trial, the depositions have been analyzed by learned Sessions Judge and upon examination of the documentary evidence as well as oral evidence, the issues were framed and after considering the overall material on record, learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court, Patan, was pleased to pass impugned judgment and order dated 14.2.2006, whereby, in exercise of powers under Section 235 of the Cr.P.C., the accused persons are acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of challenge in the present Criminal Appeal filed by State. The present Criminal Appeal appears to have been admitted on 1.5.2008, which came up for final disposal. 6. Learned Addl. P.P Mrs. Hansa B. Punani has vehemently submitted that the learned Judge has committed grave error in appreciating the evidence in its true prospective. It has been contended by Ms. Punani that at the best the medical evidence and injury certificate, which are correlated to medical evidence, the case of prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, such evidence which is specifically figuring towards the narration of case, ought to have been considered by learned Judge. It has also been contended by Ms. Punani that the reasons which have been assigned by learned Judge are not sufficient enough to justify the order of acquittal. 7. Ms. Punani, has further contended that simply because the parents of deceased have not supported the case of prosecution, it cannot be inferred by learned Judge that no offence is made out. On the contrary, the history and the initial version, which has been given before the doctor, where the deceased was brought for treatment, specifically indicates that the deceased sustained injuries on the head and that is the root cause for death of deceased and therefore, when the initial version before the Doctor who treated the deceased, informed that the injury that mentioned in the column No. 17 of the PM report and the medical report in correlation with the injury which are inflicted, there appears to be sufficient mark available on record to justify the guilt of respondent accused. Having not appreciated these vital aspect of the matter, learned Judge has committed grave error in exercising the jurisdiction. 8. It has also been contended by Ms. Punani that the panch witnesses, though have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution, none the less the Investigating Officer in his deposition has clearly established not only the recovery but also the panchnamas which have been drawn during the course of investigation. It has also been pointed out that when control sand, which was sent during the course of investigation, material is supported by the FSL report and therefore, simply because the weapon does not contain blood stain, it cannot be said that no offence has been committed by respondent accused. By appreciating all these evidences, which are proved by the prosecution, learned Judge has arbitrarily not exercised the jurisdiction and therefore, such error of jurisdiction requires to be corrected by granting reliefs prayed for in present Appeal. 9. Mrs. Punani has further submitted that the blow, which has been given by the respondent accused on the deceased, was from the front side of the deceased, on the head and therefore, such blow was on vital part of the body and which shows the intention of respondent accused to commit murder and therefore, when the medical evidence is supporting the case of prosecution, other evidences ought not to have been ignored by learned Judge while passing order of acquittal and therefore, this error of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the same. No other submissions are made. 10. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Hardik K. Raval, learned advocate appearing for the respondent accused has contended that no error is committed by learned Judge and on the contrary, bare reading of the order, which has been passed, clearly indicates that each and every evidence have been led and has been properly construed and considered while arriving at findings contained in the order. The order is supported by cogent reasons and therefore, in absence of any infirmity or illegality or any perversity, order of acquittal may not be reversed. 11. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further submitted that the case of prosecution shows proximate reason for the offence is that there is animosity pertaining to land between the parties and said dhariya, which has been recovered does not contain any blood stain. 11. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further submitted that the case of prosecution shows proximate reason for the offence is that there is animosity pertaining to land between the parties and said dhariya, which has been recovered does not contain any blood stain. Not only that, in the FSL report, no blood stain has been found specifically and therefore, when the medical evidence is not supporting the case of prosecution, it cannot be said that any infirmity is committed by learned Judge. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further submitted that on the contrary, looking to evidence on record, even parents of deceased are not supporting the case of prosecution. Not only that version of his uncle Ramabhai Devabhai Thakor, who brought the deceased to the hospital for treatment, has also not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, on basis of these pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that any perversity has been committed by learned Judge while recording order of acquittal. 12. Mr. Raval, learned advocate further contended that there is material contradiction in the medical evidence as well as the evidence given by Doctor Pareshbhai Kanubhai, PW-1, who has deposed that patient himself has given the history, whereas, in the evidence of uncle of deceased namely Ramabhai Devabhai, has deposed that he has given history to the doctor and therefore, there appears to be material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and therefore, Mr. Raval, learned advocate submitted that learned Judge has clearly justified in passing the order of acquittal. 13. Mr. Raval, learned advocate submitted that learned Judge has clearly justified in passing the order of acquittal. 13. Mr. Raval, learned advocate further contended that there are no eye witnesses to the incident in question and in additional thereto, the dhariya, which has been produced by respondent accused contained no blood stain, on the contrary, from the control sand, which was collected, has also not reflected any blood, as could be seen from the FSL report, therefore, when all these material, adduced by prosecution, is not supporting the case of prosecution, it cannot be said that any error is committed by learned Judge and therefore, by referring all these facts and record, learned advocate has brought us to the reasons, which are assigned by learned Judge, more particularly in para-19 of the judgment impugned and requested the Court that it cannot be said that prosecution has proved the case proved beyond reasonable doubt against respondent accused and therefore, in this background of such nature and in absence of any perversity or any illegality or any material irregularity, which has resulted into miscarriage of justice, no order of acquittal, normally be reversed and therefore, by pointing out some of the decisions of the Apex Court, learned advocate for respondent is requesting the Court not to interfere with the judgment and order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge. 14. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the evidence on record, we find no error committed by learned Judge in appreciation of evidence on record. On the contrary, the contradictions, which are pointed out by learned advocate for respondent are apparent, looking to the analysis of version of Doctor - prosecution witness No. 1 as well as from the version of uncle of deceased Ramaji and these two material evidences if to be viewed on the face of certificate, which have been issued by Doctor, which would establish that there appears to be some contradiction, which can be said to have influence learned Judge while passing the order. In addition thereto, we have also seen the evidence on record in which, at one point of time, Doctor, who treated the deceased, has indicated that history has been given by the deceased himself, whereas certificate which has been reflected at page-125 of the paper book compilation, couple with version of Mr. In addition thereto, we have also seen the evidence on record in which, at one point of time, Doctor, who treated the deceased, has indicated that history has been given by the deceased himself, whereas certificate which has been reflected at page-125 of the paper book compilation, couple with version of Mr. Ramabhai, who is uncle of deceased, who brought the deceased to hospital, has also not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, in absence of any cogent material proved by the prosecution proving guilt of respondent accused, there appears to be no perversity in the examination by learned Judge about evidence on record. In addition thereto, we have also examined the FSL report as well as the muddamal weapon, which are not supported by panch witnesses and in addition thereto, the father as well as mother of the deceased are also not supporting the case of prosecution and therefore, there appears to be no cogent material to establish the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, while going through the reasonings, which are assigned by learned Judge, more particularly para-19, we are of the considered opinion that there appears to be no illegality or infirmity in appreciating the evidence at the hands of learned Judge and further we find no other perversity in the reasoning assigned by learned Judge. 15. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid evidences. We have carefully gone through the decision delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and reasons assigned therein and we also found no distinguishable circumstance, which may lead us to disturb the order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Session Judge. 16. From the aforesaid material on record and the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Judge, we see no circumstance distinguishable to disturb the findings arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the order of acquittal. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence and therefore, we found that the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence and therefore, we found that the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. 17. To arrive at this conclusion, we are further mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: "17.1 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 17.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i). The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii). The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii). The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv). The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v). The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi). The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii). The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv). The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v). The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi). The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii). This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 17.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850)". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 17.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 17.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : ( AIR 2003 SC 3601 ), wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2907 ), "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 17.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 18. Looking to the reasoning assigned by learned trial Court and looking to fact that learned Judge has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion, which we see no reason to interfere. We are of the considered view that there is no extra ordinary circumstance, which would warrant us to interfere by order passed by learned Judge and accordingly, we find that appeal being merit-less, same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 19. In view of the above position prevailing on record and in view of the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and accordingly appeal filed by the State being merit-less, deserves to be dismissed. 20. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 14.02.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 64 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court, Patan is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Records and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith. Appeal Dismissed