JUDGMENT : Sonia Gokani, J. 1. Petitioner is the Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Act, 1949, which seeks to assail the award and order passed by the Industrial Tribunal at Vadodara in Reference (IT) No. 8 of 1999 in the following factual background:- 1.1 The demand claiming moped allowance for the ladies working as female worker in Health Department was made by the Union from the date of confirmation in the service. The same was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad by Reference (IT) No. 8 of 1999. The statement of claim made by the Union inter alia contends that the female workers are performing their duties since 1989. 100% grant is given through the Health and Family Welfare Department by the State Government. The entire expenditure of salary, allowances, bonus and revised pay-scales, LTC, higher pay-scale etc. are borne by the State. 2. It was also their say that other employees working under the projects funded by the Government were paid moped allowance at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month or fuel allowance at the rate of 15 liters per month and maintenance allowance of Rs. 500/- per year. 3. The Corporation contested the reference by filing written statement and submitted that female workers were performing their duties since 1989. No grant was paid qua medical allowance or vehicle allowance and therefore, the demand of the Union was not justifiable. Post of female worker, according to the petitioner Corporation, had been sanctioned in the revamping centres as per the standards fixed by the Government. The population block of 50,000 has been allotted per centre. Their duties have been fixed by the Family Welfare Programme of the Government. One worker is allotted the population block of 10,000. Staff pattern is sanctioned in each Municipal Corporation by the State and except the sanctioned grant, no other grant is paid to the Corporation. The Health Department, according to the petitioner, since runs on the funds given by the Government and as vehicle allowance is not given by the State and when sanction also has not been given for grant of vehicle allowance to the employees, they are not entitled to the prayers made in the reference. 4. Before the Labour Court 11 affidavits have been filed treating them as examination-in-chief. Cross-examination was done of all those respondents. 4. Before the Labour Court 11 affidavits have been filed treating them as examination-in-chief. Cross-examination was done of all those respondents. Mainly it had been the argument of the petitioner Corporation that neither any service rule nor any policy decision permits justification of such demand of vehicle allowance. 5. The Tribunal allowed the reference by judgment and award dated 23.1.2008, which was published on 14.2.2008 directing the Corporation to pay the moped allowance or the actual expenditure incurred by them whichever is less with effect from 1.1.2008. 6. The Corporation against the order and award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 8 of 1999 has preferred this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. It is the say of the petitioner that the employee cannot ask for any allowance outside the purview of the scheme or project of the State Government. The payment of salary and or allowance could be covered by the scheme or the project for awarding extra benefit as prayed for. The demand was outside the scope and purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. A serious error is committed in allowing the Reference. There are no instances cited of the employees working in other Corporation in the said project to justify the payments. The Tribunal ought to have appreciated that the projects and the scheme of the State Government are handed over to the respondent authorities with limited objects and plan outlays. Such adjudication would add to the planned outlays and that amounts to adjudication upon the budgetary provision. It is further contended that the presence of the State Government was absolutely necessary and in its absence, no such reference would have been decided. The Tribunal has also misdirected itself by travelling beyond the terms of reference and it ought to have decided the same within four corners of the claim. The petitioner has thus prayed for the following reliefs:- "6. The Tribunal has also misdirected itself by travelling beyond the terms of reference and it ought to have decided the same within four corners of the claim. The petitioner has thus prayed for the following reliefs:- "6. The petitioner, therefore, prays that:- (A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari or a Writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Direction or Order calling for the record and proceedings of reference IT No. 8 of 1999 dated 23rd January 2008 passed by the Industrial Tribunal at Vadodara and after pursuing the same, be pleased to quash and set aside the Award and Order passed in reference IT No. 8 of 1999 dated 23rd January 2008. (B) Be pleased to pass such other and further Orders as may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (C) Be pleased to Award costs of this petition. (D) During the admission, pendency, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the Award and Order passed in reference IT No. 8 of 1999 dated 23rd January 2008." 8. General Secretary of the Union Mr. Manojkumar Pandit has filed affidavit-in-reply denying all averments set out in the petition. It is urged that the Court may not re-appreciate the evidence nor would it entertain new plea raised for the first time before this Court. It is also further stated that by giving oral evidence, the female workers of the health department have proved incurring of expenses. The petitioner Corporation has not produced any evidence oral or documentary to prove their stand in the written statement. These health workers have not been appointed by the Government but their selection is by the Corporation. They worked as desired by the Corporation and their job is also transferable. For hosts of other programmes of Corporation under Health Department, these female workers have functioned and their work is not limited to the work of family welfare programme. They work under the supervision and control of the Corporation. Therefore, it is not for the Corporation to contend that if the moped allowance is not given by the State Government, they cannot pay to their workers. 8.1. It is further contended that everyday female workers need to travel by incurring their own expenses. They are being paid Rs. They work under the supervision and control of the Corporation. Therefore, it is not for the Corporation to contend that if the moped allowance is not given by the State Government, they cannot pay to their workers. 8.1. It is further contended that everyday female workers need to travel by incurring their own expenses. They are being paid Rs. 75/- fixed sum towards conveyance allowance for reaching office and going back. However, they need to travel 15 to 20 kms. in the field as per the admitted position for which the moped allowance has been granted by the Tribunal which does not require any interference. It is further the say of the respondent that when project staff and workers are given moped allowance in malaria-filaria, ICDS and UBS project, there is no reason why the respondents be not given such allowance. 8.2 Even their superiors who are doctors and medical officers are given car allowance though they have less field work. Female workers of the health department are deprived and discriminated. 8.3 It is further his say that as per the Circular No. 1069-99-2000, the moped allowance is required to be given as per pay scales and the respondents before this Court have basic pay of over Rs. 5000/-, and therefore, as per the Corporation's policy, they need to be given moped allowance. Therefore, the award of the Tribunal is just and fair. It is further urged that the Government circular dated 26.12.2001 provided for fixed amount of Rs. 1333/- per month towards permanent transfer allowance to meet with travelling in the surrounding of the office and the District. However, the same has not been implemented by the Corporation and the petitioner does not want to give effect to the award of the Industrial Tribunal anyhow. 9. The rival contentions of the parties are heard at length. 10. Learned advocate Mr. G.M. Joshi appearing for the Corporation has strenuously argued before this Court that in absence of either any policy or rule, the Tribunal ought not to have awarded any amount of moped allowance. He further has argued that in no other Corporation, such moped allowance for female workers of health department is allowed. In absence of any such policy of the State Government or any rules of the Corporation, the Industrial Tribunal ought not to have granted any amount to the respondents. He further has argued that in no other Corporation, such moped allowance for female workers of health department is allowed. In absence of any such policy of the State Government or any rules of the Corporation, the Industrial Tribunal ought not to have granted any amount to the respondents. He also urged that the fixed amount of grant is given by the State Government to the Corporation for implementing the scheme in the which the respondents are working. No extra amount can be spent by the Corporation as such grant is not made available by the State. 11. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. R.D. Raval appearing for the respondent Union vociferously argued that in the Labour Reference, which has been made to the Tribunal even when there are no policy decision, the Tribunal if is of the opinion that unfair labour practices are being adopted or there will be any need for adopting a just approach to alleviate the difficulties experienced by the workmen on account of unfair labour practice, it can direct the employer to give relief to the respondents employees. He has urged that all female workers of the health department are paid paltry amount of Rs. 75/- per month as conveyance allowance. He has also argued that in case of the very petitioners who are the employee of to the Corporation, the scheme of granting benefit of higher pay-scale on completing 9, 18 and 27 years by the employees had been adopted, even though the State has not been paying any grant to the Corporation. This Court in Special Civil Application No. 4577 of 2005 in challenge to the award of Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 26 of 2000 had directed the petitioner Corporation to give all benefits of higher pay-scale on completing the period of 9, 18 and 27 years to the concerned employees from the date of publication of the award on notional basis upto a particular date. They were also directed to give actual effect after a particular period. It directed the State Government to consider request of grant of amount. He also has further argued that in Reference (IT) No. 26 of 2000 before the Tribunal, the application was also given to make the State Government a party. The Court had denied the same on the ground that industrial dispute is between the Corporation and its employees. It directed the State Government to consider request of grant of amount. He also has further argued that in Reference (IT) No. 26 of 2000 before the Tribunal, the application was also given to make the State Government a party. The Court had denied the same on the ground that industrial dispute is between the Corporation and its employees. The recruitment and appointment of the employees so also the allotment work and supervision also is of Corporation. The relationship of employer and employee is between the petitioner and the respondent, and therefore, when the respondents are the employees of the Corporation, they were also given benefit of higher pay-scale at the end of 9, 18 and 27 years. 12. It is not in dispute that the respondents are the employees of the petitioner Corporation. This factum has not been challenged by the petitioner. It is also uncontroverted that the recruitment of the respondents had been done by the petitioner Corporation and the appointment of female workers in health department has been given by the petitioner. The relationship of the employer and employee is also in no manner disputed nor challenged. 13. When the question in the past arose of non-grant of higher pay-scale on completion of 9, 18 and 27 year period, the challenge was made by way of Reference (IT) No. 26 of 2000 and Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara held in favour of these respondents allowing the reference and granted the benefit of higher pay-scale popularly known as 9, 18 and 27 vide judgment and award dated 6.10.2004. 14. This was challenged by way of preferring Special Civil Application No. 4577 of 2005 by the Municipal Corporation, Vadodara. It was argued before this Court that the respondent female workers of the health department are permanent employees of petitioner Corporation who are deprived of higher pay-sale. In the reference of Labour Commissioner to the Industrial Tribunal by way of Reference (IT) No. 26 of 2000 which was allowed by the Tribunal, this Court held thus:- "3.0 The issue is in a narrow compass with regard to the term of reference and financial burden and other aspects was not important. 4.0 Mr. R.D. Raval, learned advocate appearing for the respondent submitted an additional reply which is taken on record. 4.0 Mr. R.D. Raval, learned advocate appearing for the respondent submitted an additional reply which is taken on record. In the affidavit-in-reply it is stated that other Corporations which include Ahmedabad and Surat have been giving the benefits of higher pay scale after 9-18-27 of service to all the female health workers which is revealed from the letter dated 12.08.2011, from Surat Municipal Corporation and resolution dated 15.11.1980 of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation with General Board resolution etc. 5.0 Mr. Desai, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner respondent stated that there will be huge financial burden on the petitioner-Corporation and that the State Government will not sanction or will not approve such expenses and such burden may not be accepted. 5.1 The Industrial Tribunal held that female health workers are employees of the Corporation and the Corporation has already adopted the scheme of 9-18-27 for all its employees. From the additional reply filed by the respondent it is established that other Corporations which include Ahmedabad and Surat Municipal Corporations have been giving the benefits of higher pay scale after 9-18-27 of service to all the female health workers which is revealed from the letter dated 12.08.2011, from Surat Municipal Corporation and resolution dated 15.11.1980 of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation with General Board resolution etc. 5.2 Even otherwise, the learned Industrial Tribunal made elaborate discussions in paras 11, 12 and 13 which are just and proper. Mr. Manoj Kumar Pandit. General Secretary of the respondent Union who is present in the Court stated that if the effect is given from the date of publication of award of the Industrial Tribunal, the employee of the respondent will not claim arrears prior to that date and that period will be treated as notional. 6.0 In that view of the matter, the petitioner is directed to give all the benefits of 9-18-27 to the concerned employees from the date of publication of the award i.e. from 06.10.2004 on notional basis. It is clarified that concerned employee will be given notional benefit upto 01.11.2004 and they will be given actual effect with effect from 01.11.2004. Such arrears from 01.11.2004 to 28.02.2013 will be paid within a period of six months from today. If the petitioner makes an application for grant of amount from the State Government, the State Government shall consider the same. The award of the Tribunal is modified to the aforesaid extent. Such arrears from 01.11.2004 to 28.02.2013 will be paid within a period of six months from today. If the petitioner makes an application for grant of amount from the State Government, the State Government shall consider the same. The award of the Tribunal is modified to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent." 15. Thus when the challenge was made to the terms of reference and the issue of huge financial burden as also the non-grant of approval by the State Government arose, the Court granted notional pay upto 1.11.2004 and with effect from 1.11.2004 permitted the Corporation to make a request for giving the grant to the State Government and directed the State to consider the same. No further challenge has been made to the said decision. Likewise, in Special Civil Application No. 6262 of 2004 the Vadodara Municipal Corporation challenged the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 54 of 1995, whereby the Tribunal directed the petitioner Corporation to pay employee of respondent Union i.e. auxiliary nurse/midwives in accordance with law and in compliance of the conditions prescribed in the Government resolution dated 30.3.1991 issued by the Health and Family Welfare Department. 16. The auxiliary nurse/mid-wife employed by the petitioner Corporation raised demand claiming conveyance allowance at Rs. 260/- per month with effect from 30.3.1991. The Union claimed that the petitioner Corporation ran Integrated Child Development Scheme under the auspices of Government and with the financial aid from the Government. The expenses of the scheme are also borne by the State Government. It was their claim that they needed to go to different places and villages to perform their duty, and therefore, to meet with the travelling and conveyance expenditure, they should be paid Rs. 260/- per month towards such conveyance allowance. The resolution was issued by the Government for its employees which was also made applicable to the panchayat employees and it was argued by the petitioner Corporation that demand made under the resolution should be rejected. This Court (Coram: K.M. Thakkar, J.) dismissed the petition of the Corporation on the ground that there was no justification to interfere against the decision of the Tribunal by giving following reasons:- "7. This Court (Coram: K.M. Thakkar, J.) dismissed the petition of the Corporation on the ground that there was no justification to interfere against the decision of the Tribunal by giving following reasons:- "7. From the evidence on record, it has emerged that the factual aspects and the relevant factual details, more particularly the fact that the employees in the said scheme have to travel from one place to another and from one village to another, are undisputed facts. 8. Any evidence contrary to the said fact is not shown from the record by the learned advocate for the petitioner corporation. 9. From the submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner corporation and the respondent union, it has also emerged that the petitioner corporation admitted the fact that there are 100 employees and they have to go to 120 Aanganwadi Centres. According to the petitioner corporation, employees are not required to visit 20 Aanganwadi Centres per day and they have not to travel beyond or outside their area, i.e. Paani Gate area and that total distance which is to be covered by the employees is not more than 2 kms. 10. On examination of the award, it has also emerged that the learned Tribunal has examined the demand of the respondent union for the concerned employees in light of the justification and supporting material placed on record for consideration by the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal has also conducted the comparative examination of the duties performed by the employees of the corporation with the employees of panchayat who are paid said benefit and also with the government employees and on detailed comparison and analysis of the justification, the learned Tribunal found that the demand raised by the union, is just and reasonable. After considering the evidence on record, the learned Tribunal also reached to the conclusion that the demand deserves to be granted and the union has made out a case in support of the demand and has also offered proper justification to support and justify the demand and that the corporations objection against the demand was unjustified and unreasonable and the corporation has failed to make out any ground to convince the learned Tribunal to reject the demand. 11. 11. When the learned Tribunal has reached to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence and record that the demand raised by the union is just, proper and reasonable and having reached to such conclusion and when the learned Tribunal partly accepted the demand and allowed the same with effect from 2.1.2003 instead of 30.3.1991 as claimed by the respondent union then in view of this Court, there is no justification or strong reason to interfere with the said direction. 12. The Tribunal has not committed any error in law or of jurisdiction while accepting and granting the demand raised by the union for the employees working under the said scheme. The Tribunal has granted such benefit after taking into account relevant facts and circumstances and the nature of duties and functions to be performed by the employees and that, therefore, also this Court does not find any strong and convincing reason to interfere with the said decision of the learned Tribunal." 17. (a) In wake of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the foregoing discussion, when the judgment and award of the Tribunal is examined closely, this Court does not find any error in the law or jurisdiction while allowing the demand raised by the Union employees working in the scheme as female health workers. By giving cogent and valid reasons and on holding that the demand raised by the Union is justifiable and proper, the Tribunal has accepted the demand and allowed the same with effect from 1.1.2008. While allowing the reference, Industrial Tribunal has granted moped allowance for all those working in the field from 1.1.2008 as is given to other employees or the actual expense that may be made by them whichever is less. 17. (b) It is a well settle law that while exercising the powers under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court need not interfere with the award of the Tribunal or Labour Court, unless it finds material evidence in exercise of jurisdiction by the Court below. 17. (b) It is a well settle law that while exercising the powers under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court need not interfere with the award of the Tribunal or Labour Court, unless it finds material evidence in exercise of jurisdiction by the Court below. In the findings and observations of the Apex Court in the case in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others, AIR 1964 SC 477 , the Apex Court held that the writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting an error of jurisdiction committed by the inferior Court or the Tribunal, where, the orders are passed by the Tribunal or the Court without jurisdiction or is in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. A writ can be issued by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, when the decision taken by the inferior Court or tribunal is legal or impermissible. Wherein, the Apex Court observed and held thus: "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the 69 dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manliest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly rounded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases. the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened." 18. Applying the law discussed above to the facts of the instant case, no interference would be warranted. 18. (a) Respondents gave their depositions and were cross-examined by the petitioner Corporation. Applying the law discussed above to the facts of the instant case, no interference would be warranted. 18. (a) Respondents gave their depositions and were cross-examined by the petitioner Corporation. None was examined by the Corporation and they could not establish the expenses they needed to make month by month. Some of these respondents were also the petitioners in the petition where this Court confirmed award of grant of higher pay-scale although there was no rule nor any policy to grant them. 18. (b) In the instant case, seniors of the respondents are, under the rules, entitled to get such vehicle allowance and over the period of time, employees of all other departments are also granted the same. Respondents being the employees of the petitioner Corporation and their inter-departmental transfer is a routine administrative exercise, Petitioner Corporation's denial to grant them such allowance is impermissible. Neither on the ground of non-availability of fund nor absence of rule can preclude the Court to grant such amount in wake of above referred decisions and the facts and circumstances as they emerge. 19. (a) Learned advocate Mr. Joshi on seeking instructions from the petitioner Corporation submits at this stage that every other employee similarly situated in the Corporation is presently getting Rs. 1333/- every month towards the vehicle allowance. 19. (b) The respondents shall need to be paid the amount paid to other similarly situated employees as may be paid from 1.1.2008 and the amount of vehicle allowance as may have changed from time to time. This shall be paid within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 20. Petition stands disposed of with the above terms. Considering the facts that the Corporation has been receiving the grant from the State Government, the Corporation, if makes an application for reimbursement of such grant, the State Government shall consider the request of the Corporation. 21. The award is modified to the above extent. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.