JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. 1. In terms of order dated 1.9.2016, passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. in CMA No. 198/6 of 2016/2015 (Civil Suit No. 116/1 of 2015), titled as Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited vs. Ranjeet Singh, application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), stands dismissed. 2. Certain facts are not in dispute:- (a) On 12.4.2013, an agreement for loan-cum-hire purchase of vehicle, came to be executed by the plaintiff, Ranjeet Singh (respondent herein) with defendant, Shri Ram Transport Finance Company Limited (petitioner herein). In terms of the agreement, plaintiff continued to pay the monthly installments for a period of two years (approximately). (b) Sometime in the month of September, 2015, plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and injunction, praying for an order of restrain against the defendant, to the effect that the nature of the agreement be not changed and money allegedly recovered in excess, in terms of the agreement, be not recovered from the plaintiff. Also, in the alternative, plaintiff be not dispossessed from the suit property, purportedly mortgaged as a security towards the transaction. 3. With these admitted fact s, on behalf of the plaintiff, it is contended that on the asking of the defendant, he signed the agreement on the dotted line, without agreeing to or understanding the terms thereof. Also, relevant clauses of the agreement were left blank. However, such contention is vehemently opposed by the defendant. 4. Upon receipt of summon in the suit, defendant filed an application under Section 8 of the Act, which stands dismissed in terms of the impugned order, for the following reasons:- (i) Plaintiff’s suit revealed serious allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. (ii) It would not be in the interest of justice to refer the parties to arbitration. (iii) It would be open for the defendant to take recourse to the provisions of Sub-Section 3 of Section 8 of the Act. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, as also perused the record, so made available, during the course of hearing, this Court is of the considered view that the Court below, committed grave illegality in dismissing the defendant’s application. The order passed is not based on correct interpretation of the statutory provisions, as also, application of principles of law laid down by the apex Court. The order passed is not based on correct interpretation of the statutory provisions, as also, application of principles of law laid down by the apex Court. The Court ought to have decided the application on the basis of factual matrix, rather than concluding, by presumption, disputed facts of allegations of fraud and misrepresentation to be true. 6. Bare perusal of the agreement reveals that parties had mutually agreed to the terms with regard to the payment of interest. The page, where the rate of interest and equated monthly installments, is specified, though filled in by hand, but then it is signed not only by the borrower but also the guarantor. Noticeably, agreement came to be executed in the year 2013 and without any denial or objection, plaintiff continued to pay the installments in consonance with the mutually agreed terms and the amount specified therein, till the filing of the suit. 7. The alleged threats of the vehicle being taken away forcibly, is an issue which requires adjudication, but prima facie in the absence of any written protest, no Court can pre-suppose existence of such fact. 8. Significantly, most recently the apex Court, while re-visiting its earlier decision in N. Radhakrishnan vs. Maestro Engineers and Others, 2010 (1) SCC 72 , in A. Ayyasamy vs. A. Paramasivam and Others, 2016 (10) SCC 386 , has elaborately discussed as to what would be the meaning of expression ‘fraud’ for the purpose of deciding an application of instant nature, so filed under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. The Court proceeded to further discuss the type of cases which would be non arbitrable. It clarified that when a case involves serious allegations of fraud, the dicta laid down in Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin Babere vs. Madhav Prabhakar Oak and Another, AIR 1962 SCC 406, needs to be considered and applied by the Court. But then, mere allegations of fraud in the pleadings by one party against the other cannot be a ground to hold that the matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration and should be decided by the civil Court. Further allegations of fraud should be such that they are serious and in normal course may also constitute criminal offence but also are complex and the decision of such issues demands extensive evidence for which the civil Court should appear to be more appropriate forum than the arbitral Tribunal. Further allegations of fraud should be such that they are serious and in normal course may also constitute criminal offence but also are complex and the decision of such issues demands extensive evidence for which the civil Court should appear to be more appropriate forum than the arbitral Tribunal. The Court cautioned that the party in default may adopt a convenient mode of avoiding the process of arbitration by simply using the device of making the allegations of fraud and pleading that the issue of fraud be decided by a civil Court. In fact, they did not stop there, but went ahead to hold that:- “45.2 Allegations of fraud are not alien to ordinary civil courts. Generations of judges have dealt with such allegations in the context of civil and commercial disputes. If an allegation of fraud can be adjudicated upon in the course of a trial before an ordinary civil court, there is no reason or justification to exclude such disputes from the ambit and purview of a claim in arbitration. The parties who enter into commercial dealings and agree to a resolution of disputes by an arbitral forum exercise an option and express a choice of a preferred mode for the resolution of their disputes. The parties in choosing arbitration place priority upon the speed, flexibility and expertise inherent in arbitration adjudication. Once parties have agreed to refer disputes to arbitration, the court must plainly discourage and discountenance litigative strategies designed to avoid recourse to arbitration. Any other approach would seriously place in uncertainty the institutional efficacy of arbitration. Such a consequence must be eschewed.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. Now in the instant case, save and except, for mere pleading, at this stage, prima facie, there is nothing to establish the element of fraud/ misrepresentation on the part of the defendant. In any event, such fact is required to be established by leading evidence and the arbitral Tribunal is precluded from adjudicating such fact based on the evidence, documentary or ocular, which the parties may produce. 10. The trial Court committed a grave error in dismissing the application. The order is perverse, illegal and erroneous. Hence, the Court below erred in coming to the conclusion that based on the averments made in the plaint, the element of fraud/misrepresentation stood established on record. 11. 10. The trial Court committed a grave error in dismissing the application. The order is perverse, illegal and erroneous. Hence, the Court below erred in coming to the conclusion that based on the averments made in the plaint, the element of fraud/misrepresentation stood established on record. 11. Also, for the very same reason, the Court erred in holding that interest of justice lies with the continuance of the suit. In fact, parties themselves chose a forum where adjudication, undoubtedly, would be quick and speedy. As such, interest of justice would be the other way. 12. The application, so filed under sub-section 1 of Section 8 of the Act, cannot be rejected merely for the reason that the applicant has a remedy under sub-section 3 of the said Section. In fact it confers a right upon a party for continuance of both the proceedings. But then it would only be applicable upon the party choosing to resort to such remedies. Hence, the Court below also erred in coming to such conclusion. 13. For all the aforesaid reasons, impugned order dated 1.9.2016, passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. in CMA No. 198/6 of 2016/2015 (Civil Suit No. 116/1 of 2015), titled as Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited vs. Ranjeet Singh, is quashed and set aside. Petition is allowed and the dispute, inter se parties, is referred to the arbitration in terms of the Clause 15 of the Agreement. 14. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.