JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution seeks quashing of order dated 12.8.2016 whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 420 IPC pursuant to the criminal complaint made by the respondent to this effect. 2. The brief facts of the case are that in the complaint filed by the respondent, it was alleged that being a non-agriculturist, he after seeking permission from the Government had purchased immoveable property comprised in Khasra Nos. 378, 379, 380 and 381, Kitas 4 at Mauza Kasumpti, Shimla-9 measuring 1926 sq.ft. on 12.09.2002 for a consideration of Rs. 5,50,000/- (hereinafter referred to as the ‘property’). The complainant was assured at the time of sale that the property was free from all encumbrances and litigation etc., and a specific clause was also incorporated in the sale deed vide Clause No.4, which reads thus: “4. That the seller assures the purchaser that the property hereby sold is free from all injunctions, litigation charges, claim, mortgage, litigation etc. and the second party/seller has subsisting right to sell, transfer and convey the same”. 3. However, the complainant was shocked to receive summons from the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge of the application dated 07.08.2003 filed for execution of a compromise decree. This execution had been filed at the instance of one Smt. Uma Devi and others against the complainant and the petitioner. It was then that after conducting inquiry, it transpired that the property was not free from all encumbrances as alleged. In fact, the petitioner had filed a suit for possession of the premises comprised in Khasra No.379 against Smt. Uma Devi and her children, who were residing in the same as tenants (hereinafter referred to as ‘tenants’). The suit was compromised in terms whereof the tenants were to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the petitioner in question on or before 30.6.1995 and also to pay the admitted arrears of rent amounting to Rs.7650/-, out of which Rs.300/- were to be paid on or before 31.1.1995 to the petitioner and the remaining amount alongwith the rent from 1.1.1995 was to be paid till the premises is vacated on or before 31.12.1995. The petitioner was to let out these premises to the tenants after its re-construction within a period of one year from the date of handing over of its vacant possession by the tenants to her. As the premises had not been delivered to the tenants, they accordingly filed execution petition on 15.9.1997. 4. It is on the aforesaid allegations that the respondent filed a complaint claiming therein that the petitioner had deliberately and intentionally in order to cheat the respondent, who is an old rustic man never apprised him about the existence of the compromise and had dishonestly induced the respondent to purchase the property by representing the property to be free from all encumbrances and litigation etc. This intention to cheat the respondent was there even at the time when the sale of the property was entered into. I have heard Mr. Sunil Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the material placed on record. 5. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 6. The offence of cheating is defined under Section 415 of IPC to mean: (i) There is an inducement of a person by deceiving him fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; (ii) when a person is induced intentionally to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he was not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, and; (iii) dishonest concealment of facts amounts to deception. 7. The parameters for quashing proceedings in criminal complaint or FIR are well known. 7. The parameters for quashing proceedings in criminal complaint or FIR are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. 8. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 , Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out the following principles for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code:- “(1) To give effect to an order under the Code. (2) To prevent abuse of the process of court. (3) To otherwise secure the ends of justice. (4) Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. (5) Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. (6) It would be an abuse of process of court to allow any action which would result in injustice. (7) In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts t abuse of the process of court. (8) When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. (9) When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it acquisition would not be sustained-That is the function of the trial Judge. (10) Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. (11) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. (12) If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same. (12) If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same. (13) When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance-It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person-The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot be itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.” 9. In Amit Kapoor versus Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly with regard to quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 and same are summarized as follows:- “1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 5. 4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. 12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [ AIR 1988 SC 709 ]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [ AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 754 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2003 SC 1069 ]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde vs. Bangarappa & Ors. [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors. [ AIR 2005 SC 9 ]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors. [ AIR 2005 SC 9 ]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 ]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ]; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [ AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 ]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 ]; and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ]}. 16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance of the requirements of the offence.” 10. In C.P. Subhash vs. Inspector of Police Chennai and others (2013) 11 SCC 599, it was once again reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that where complaint prima facie makes out commission of offence, High Court in ordinary course should not invoke its powers to quash such proceedings, except in rare and compelling circumstances and it was observed as under:- “[7] The legal position regarding the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court in relation to pending criminal proceedings including FIRs under investigation is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. Suffice it to say that in cases where the complaint lodged by the complainant whether before a Court or before the jurisdictional police station makes out the commission of an offence, the High Court would not in the ordinary course invoke its powers to quash such proceedings except in rare and compelling circumstances enumerated in the decision of this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp1 SCC 335. 8. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State, NCT of Delhi, 1999 3 SCC 259 where this Court observed: "...If factual foundation for the offence has been laid down in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence." 9. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, 2004 1 SCC 691 where this Court said: “11...The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code" 10. Decisions of this Court in V.Y. Jose and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., 2009 3 SCC 78 and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley etc., 2011 3 SCC 351 reiterate the above legal position.” 11. Thus, what can be considered to be settled on the basis of the exposition of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, High Court has to be both cautious as also circumspect. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint/FIR/charge-sheet etc. discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. 12. Mr. Sunil Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is illegal and vitiated on the ground that there is lack of averment on the complaint with regard to the offence regarding cheating and, therefore, the proceedings before the learned Magistrate should be quashed and set-aside as has been prayed for in the instant petition. 13. 13. Adverting to the contentions raised by the petitioner, it would be noticed that specific allegations of cheating have been made in the complaint as would be evidently clear from the averments made in paragraphs 18 to 21 thereof and the relevant portions reads as under: “18. That the accused by deceiving the complainant with fraudulent and dishonest intentions sold the property to the complainant without disclosing the factum of litigation and compromise decree pending between her and the tenants. The complainant would not have purchased the property if the fact of litigation and compromise decree would have disclosed to him by the accused. The act of not disclosing this important fact has caused damage and harm to the complainant in mind, reputation and property. 19. That the accused cheated the complainant dishonestly and the complainant was induced by the accused to purchase the property by representing that the property is free from all encumbrances and litigation etc. The intention to cheat the complainant was there at the time of the sale as the property was sold to complainant by deception. 20. That the measure of the cheating orchestrated by the accused persons is made out in the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove. It will not be out of order to submit here that the accused persons have deliberately and intentionally concealed the factum of Annexure P-2 from the complainant alongwith the fact of the civil suit of the year 1993 qua the property which the accused persons have sold for a due consideration to the complainant. This very fact has been duly admitted and acknowledged by the accused persons in Annexure P-6, in which accused had specifically averred that the complainant was never aware about the pendency of the civil suit and Annexure P-2. It would be appropriate to submit here that the accused was under a bounden duty to apprise the complainant about the existence of the civil suit of 1993 and Annexure P-2 either before the purchase of the property by the complainant or at least at the time of the purchase of the property by the complainant. 21. That the accused persons therefore have deliberately and intentionally in order to cheat the complainant, who is an old rustic man never apprised the complainant about the existence of Annexure P-2 and, therefore, have positively made themselves criminally liable for committing offences of cheating.” 14. 21. That the accused persons therefore have deliberately and intentionally in order to cheat the complainant, who is an old rustic man never apprised the complainant about the existence of Annexure P-2 and, therefore, have positively made themselves criminally liable for committing offences of cheating.” 14. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid allegations, it cannot be said that the basic ingredients of cheating have not been made out. 15. For an offence of cheating, it must be proved that: (i) The complainant has been induced fraudulently or dishonestly and (ii) by reason of such deception, the complainant has not done or omitted to do anything he would not do or omit to do if he was not deceived or induced by the accused. 16. Confronted with this position, learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue that at best, a case of civil wrong is made out for which the respondent would essentially have to take resort to civil remedy and, therefore, criminal proceedings cannot be maintained and deserves to be quashed. 17. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong and as also criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test in the aforesaid case is as to whether the allegation in the complaint discloses criminal offence or not. 18. In the present case, there is enough material available on record to show that at the very inception there was an intention on part of the petitioner to cheat the respondent and thus, the same cannot be quashed at this stage. 19. Having said so, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending application.