JUDGMENT : SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA, J. 1. Heard learned counsels for both the parties. 2. Brief facts which have culled out from the petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed as LDC vide order dated 05.05.2000 after having been selected through the RPSC. He was confirmed on the said post with effect from 06.05.2002 vide order dated 09.05.2002. The petitioner came to be involved in a criminal case lodged by one Om Prakash for offences under sections 420, 406, 120B IPC. He was arrested and thereafter released on bail but was suspended in view of rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (herein after 'the Rules of 1958') vide order dated 06.10.2004. 3. In the criminal case, charge sheet was filed and during trial the case was compounded so far as offence under section 420 IPC is concerned and with regard to offences punishable under sections 406 and 120B IPC, the trial court granted benefit under section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act holding that under section 12 of the Act releasing the petitioner on probation of one year shall not affect the government service of the petitioner. The judgment was passed on 06.08.2007. 4. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging order dated 25.10.2007 which has been passed by the respondents, wherein it has been mentioned that the petitioner has been suspended on 06.10.2004 on account of having been arrested and has been absent from duty during the period of suspension, with a statement therein mentioning his absence in the months of October, November, December 2004, some months of year 2005, some months of year 2006 and some months of the year 2007 and in all 14 instances have been mentioned in the order. The order also mentions about the petitioner having been convicted under sections 406 and 120B IPC and considering the aforementioned delinquencies, namely, being absent from duty during suspension period and also on having been convicted and relying upon a preliminary inquiry report, the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order on the ground that the same has been passed without conducting departmental inquiry. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order on the ground that the same has been passed without conducting departmental inquiry. It has been submitted that even the powers as contained under rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 could not have been exercised for the purpose of delinquencies of being absent from duty during suspension. It is submitted that there is no rule providing for marking daily attendance by employee who is under suspension and had the petitioner been given an opportunity, he would have contested the matter before the competent authority. 6. It is further argued that the order is bad in law as even the conviction part could not have been taken into consideration in view of specific provision contained under section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act whereby petitioner's services were ordered to be protected by the competent court while passing the judgment dated 06.08.2007 (supra). 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has stated that even if there is no mention of rule 19 in the impugned order, it is to be assumed that the order has been passed under section 19 of the Rules of 1958 and there was no requirement of inquiry because independently the petitioner could have been dismissed from service as he has been convicted for offence under sections 406 and 120B IPC. It is submitted that so far as delinquency relating to absence from duty is concerned, the same was considered a relevant factor for the purpose of passing the dismissal order. 8. During pendency of previous writ petition No.543/2009, this Court directed the respondent authorities to decide the appeal of petitioner which was pending, however, the appeal has been dismissed on 28.02.2013 which has been placed on record with the present writ petition and therein same reiteration has been done of the impugned order dated 25.10.2007. It may be relevant to mention that in the appellate order also much stress has been laid on the fact that the petitioner was absent from duty during suspension but of course, no reference has been made with regard to whether there was any departmental inquiry conducted in reference to the same. 9. I reflected over the matter and find myself unable to accept the impugned dismissal order dated 25.10.2007 and the appellate order dated 28.02.2013. 9. I reflected over the matter and find myself unable to accept the impugned dismissal order dated 25.10.2007 and the appellate order dated 28.02.2013. From the facts which have culled out it is apparent that the petitioner was not required to mark his attendance daily during suspension period. No such order has been placed on record by the respondent authorities. Even if it is stated that such an order is available with the respondents, it is an admitted position that there was no departmental inquiry conducted with regard to such allegation. The delinquency has been accepted by the respondents merely on basis of a preliminary inquiry conducted by them at their own level. The procedure, which is required to be followed under rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 for the purpose of dismissal from service, has not been followed. 10. So far as argument relating to rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 is concerned, suffice it to state that neither rule 19 has been quoted nor taken into consideration for the purpose of passing the impugned order dated 25.10.2007 nor same has been put into operation by the appellate authority and therefore, this Court can not assume that the power has been exercised under rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. For ready reference, rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 is quoted herein below: "19. Special procedure in certain cases.– Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18, (i) where a penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of conduct which has led to him conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure, the disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. Note:–If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss, or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be subject to only one appeal to the next higher authority." 11. In view of the aforesaid position under rule 19 of the Rules of 1958, it is incumbent upon the authority to examine and reach to conclusion whether an order of dismissal is required to be passed or any other order of punishment is to be passed and it is not necessary that in each & every matter a person is to be dismissed from service. Thus, there was no application of mind with regard to rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. 12. Another aspect which requires to be examined is whether the Disciplinary Authority or for that matter, Appointing Authority had examined the issue with reference to rule 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The rules 12 as well as rule 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act are quoted herein below: "4. 12. Another aspect which requires to be examined is whether the Disciplinary Authority or for that matter, Appointing Authority had examined the issue with reference to rule 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The rules 12 as well as rule 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act are quoted herein below: "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond." "12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence." 13. From the above, it is clear that the power is available and vested with the concerned judicial authority who records conviction not to give effect the conviction so far as services of an employee is concerned. From the above, it is clear that the power is available and vested with the concerned judicial authority who records conviction not to give effect the conviction so far as services of an employee is concerned. It is in exclusive domain of the judicial authority to see what will be the effect of conviction relating to services of an employee who is also an accused in a case. The Disciplinary Authority can not ignore or over-ride the order which has already been passed by a judicial forum. 14. In the present case, it is seen that the administrative authorities have even not examined this aspect. In view thereof, both the impugned orders dated 25.10.2007 and 28.02.2013 (supra) can not be allowed to be sustained and the same are set aside with consequential benefit of reinstatement. However, the respondents would be at liberty to take appropriate action, if they so choose, within the framework of law; which of course would be free to be assailed by the petitioner if he so chooses. 15. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.