Judgment and Order : 1. Heard Mr. S. Datta. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, United India Insurance Company Ltd., insurer of the vehicle involved in the road traffic accident as well as Mr. A. Das, learned counsel appearing for respondents. 2. This is an appeal filed under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 from the judgment and award dated 03.09.2013, delivered in T. S. (MAC) No. 501 of 2011 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 5, West Tripura, Agartala. 3. The appellant, United India Insurance Company Ltd., has raised several grounds of objection including those of not noticing the contributory negligence of the employer of the victim, namely, Coastal Projects Private Limited, which according to the claim of the dependents persuaded the victim to visit the area which was known for being infested with the extremists and finally the victim felt their prey for the said negligence of the employer. 4. The said accident occurred on 31.01.2011 when the victim, namely Gopi Setty Nagamani, was travelling that area by a vehicle, Bollero bearing No. TR-01-S-0482 owned by the employer. The victim was the Site In-charge Engineer for erecting Indo-Bangladesh Border fencing and he was travelling that area for inspection of the work as such the protocol of the said employer. When the victim reached near the Border Post No. 2297 to 2299, the extremists fired indiscriminatingly at the vehicle and the said victim sustained multiple bullet injuries and succumbed in the spot. 5. The claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was raised for a compensation of Rs. 1,12,75,328/-. The tribunal by the impugned judgment and award determined the compensation in terms of the principle laid down in Sarala Verma and Another v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 and quantified the compensation at Rs. 69,20,604/- with interest @ 9% per annum from 12.12.2011 i.e. the day of filing the claim petition. 6. It is an admitted position that the appellant was not party in the said proceeding as the insurer of the said vehicle, they were served with the notice. Mr. S. Datta. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in his usual fairness has submitted that the appellant approached the tribunal by filing an application under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the CPC for impleadment and accepting their written statement. Mr. S. Datta. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in his usual fairness has submitted that the appellant approached the tribunal by filing an application under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the CPC for impleadment and accepting their written statement. The tribunal by the order dated 11.04.2013 had observed as under: “11.04.2013 Learned counsels for the claimants and the insurance company are present. Memo of appearance is filed by learned counsel for OP. Heard the learned counsel for the insurance company on the petition filed under Or. 1 r.10(2) of the CPC praying for adding the United India Insurance Company Ltd. and the State of Tripura as OP Nos. 3 & 4 on the ground that they are necessary parties. Heard the learned counsel of the insurance company who submits that the claimants instead of adding the insurance company as a party has only served notice upon it but unless impleaded as the opposite party, the insurance company cannot defend itself properly. It is being replied by learned counsel for the claimants that the insurance company was included as a noticee as per the guide line of the Shila Datta case reported as 2011 ACJ 2729 . In this regard it would be appropriate to refer to Para-11 of the judgment which runs as follows: “11. Therefore, where the insurer is a partyrespondent, either on account of being impleaded as a party by the tribunal under section 170 or being impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants in the claim petition voluntarily, it will be entitled to contest the matter by raising all grounds, without being restricted to the grounds available under section 149(2) of the Act. The claim petition is maintainable against the owner and driver without impleading the insurer as a party. When a statutory notice is issued under section 149(2) by the tribunal, it is clear that such notice is issued not to implead the insurer as a party-respondent but merely to put it on notice that a claim has been made in regard to a policy issued by it and that it will have to bear the liability as and when an award is made in regard to such claim. Therefore, it cannot, as of right, require that it should be impleaded as a party-respondent. Therefore, it cannot, as of right, require that it should be impleaded as a party-respondent. But it can however be made a party-respondent either by the claimants voluntarily in the claim petition or by the direction of the Tribunal under section 170 of the Act. Whatever be the reason or ground for the insurer being impleaded as a party, once it is a partyrespondent, it can raise all contentions that are available to resist the claim.” Under Section 170 of the M.V. Act, 1988 the insurance company can be impleaded as a party when the owner fails to appear and contest the case or when the insurer proves to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that there was collusion between the claimant and the owner of the vehicle requiring impleadment of the insurance company to unfurl the truth. In this case, owner of the vehicle has already filed written statement. The insurance company not having approached the Tribunal for impleadment U/s 170 of the M.V. Act on the ground of collusion, it cannot be added as a party. I find no ground as well to implead the State of Tripura as a party. So, the application stands rejected. For the reasons stated above, the application filed under Or. 1 r. 10(2) CPC stands rejected, the status of the insurance company shall be only that of the noticee in the light of the ratio of the judgment above referred. To 7, 5 and 13 for documents and hearing on issues.” 7. The tribunal has clearly observed that the insurance company cannot be impleaded as a party in the said proceeding as there was no allegation of the collusion between the claimantrespondent and the owner of the vehicle, the respondent No. 6 herein. 8. Mr. S. Datta. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has conceded to the fact that the said order was not challenged by the appellant bringing any further action to the superior forum. Thus, the said order dated 11.04.2013 reached its finality by efflux of time. The impugned judgment and award was passed without any resistance from the appellant as they were not made party in the said proceeding. 9. Thus, the said order dated 11.04.2013 reached its finality by efflux of time. The impugned judgment and award was passed without any resistance from the appellant as they were not made party in the said proceeding. 9. Now the fundamental question that arises for consideration at the threshold is that whether the noticee has any right to file any appeal under section 173 of the M.V. Act questioning the quantum of compensation or raising the plea of contributory negligence. The answer must be in the negative, inasmuch as, in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi And Ors, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , it has been clearly observed that if an insurer is only a noticee and not a party respondent, it can defend the claim only on the grounds provided in Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and not on any other grounds. 10. The grounds as raised by the appellant herein, do not fall within the grounds postulated in Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. Moreover, in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Datta and Others, reported in 2011 ACJ 2729 it has been enunciated that when the insurance company is only a noticee and not a party respondent, it can only oppose on the grounds as mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and not on any other grounds. The relevant passages of Shila Datta is quoted hereunder: “7. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as contained in Chapters XI (Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party risks) and XII (Claims Tribunals) proceeds on the basis that an insurer need not be impleaded as a party to the claim proceedings and it should only be issued a statutory notice under Section149(2) of the Act so that it can be made liable to pay the compensation awarded by the tribunal and also resist the claim on any one of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 149. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (7) of Section 149 clearly refer to the insurer being merely a noticee and not a party. Similarly, Sections 158(6), 166(4), 168(1) and 170 clearly provide for and contemplate insurer being merely a noticee for the purposes mentioned in the Act and not being a party respondent Section 170 specifically refers to impleading of insurer as a party to the claim proceedings. 8. Similarly, Sections 158(6), 166(4), 168(1) and 170 clearly provide for and contemplate insurer being merely a noticee for the purposes mentioned in the Act and not being a party respondent Section 170 specifically refers to impleading of insurer as a party to the claim proceedings. 8. When an insurer is impleaded as a party - Respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act, its rights are significantly different. If the insurer is only a noticee, it can only raise such of those grounds as are permissible in law under Section 149(2). But if he is a party-respondent, it can raise, not only those grounds which are available under Section 149(2), but also all other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. It therefore follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party-respondent, for whatever reason, then as such Respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and grounds which may be available to it. 9. The Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party Respondent. But if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a noticee under Section 149(2), the insurer can urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is already a Respondent (having been impleaded as a party Respondent), it need not seek the permission' of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. The entire scheme and structure of Chapters XI and XII is that the claimant files a claim petition only against the owner and driver and the tribunal issues notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) so that it can be made liable to pay the amount awarded against the insurer and if necessary, deny liability under the policy of insurance, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2). If an insurer is only a noticee and not a party Respondent, having regard to the decision in Nicolletta Rohtagi, it can defend the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) and not any of the other grounds relating to merits available to the insured-respondent. If an insurer is only a noticee and not a party Respondent, having regard to the decision in Nicolletta Rohtagi, it can defend the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) and not any of the other grounds relating to merits available to the insured-respondent. This is the position even where the claim proceedings are initiated suo moto under Sections 149(7) and 158(6) of the Act, without any formal application by the claimants, as the insurer is only a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act. 10. Section 170 of the Act does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment. Nor does it contemplate the insurer, if he is already impleaded as a party Respondent by the claimants, making any application seeking permission to contest the matter on merits. Section 170 proceeds on the assumption that a claim petition is filed by the claimants, or is registered suo moto by the tribunal, with only the owner and driver of the vehicle as the Respondents. It also proceeds on the basis that in such a proceeding, a statutory notice would have been issued by the tribunal to the insurer so that the insurer may know about its future liability in the claim petition and also resist the claim, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2). Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. Section 170 provides that if during the course of such inquiry, the tribunal finds and satisfies itself that there is any collusion between the claimant and the owner/driver or where the owner/driver has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may suo moto, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of the claim, who was till then only a notice, shall be treated as a party to the proceedings. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner.” 11. It has been further held in Shila Datta that “Section 170 does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment.” 12. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner.” 11. It has been further held in Shila Datta that “Section 170 does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment.” 12. Shila Datta has been reiterated and reaffirmed by the Apex Court in Rakha Jain vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2013 STPL (Web) 612 SC., it has been held by the Apex Court in Rekha Jain that: .....“the finding recorded by the tribunal on the basis of the legal evidence when is not challenged either by the owner of the truck or by the insurance company and it could have challenged the finding without obtaining the permission as required under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act to avail the defence of the insured to contest the case as has been held by a three Judge bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 456 .” 13. In Nicolletta Rohtagi it has been enunciated that: “15. It is relevant to note that the Parliament, while enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If the Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in Sub-section (2) of Section 149. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 16. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the statutory defences which are available to the insurer to contest a claim are confined to what are provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of 1988 Act and not more and for that reason if an insurer is to file an appeal, the challenge in the appeal would confine to only those grounds.” 14. In Rekha Jain it has also been held that: “This evidence is not challenged though the appellant was cross examined by the counsel for the respondent Insurance Company extensively without obtaining the permission for the Tribunal as required under Section 170(b) to contest in the proceeding. In the absence of such permission, the Insurance Company has got limited defence as provided under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides for the conditions which determines breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.” 15. Having strung the principles as laid down in Shila Datta and Rekha Jain it would eminently transpire that the insurer as the noticee has no locus-standi to challenge the award passed by the tribunal on questioning its legality on the ground of quantum or for not negotiating the aspect of contributory negligence inasmuch as the noticee does not have that status to carry out an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act beyond the grounds those would flow from Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Apart that, if on the premises as provided under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer is not provided with leave by the tribunal for resorting to all the defences as available to the owner of the vehicle or the driver, the insurer even as the party cannot resort to all such defence as available to the owner or the driver. Indubitably in this case, the appellant is simply a noticee. Indubitably in this case, the appellant is simply a noticee. Thus, in view of Shila Datta the appellant does not have any locus-standi to carry out this appeal on questioning the quantum or for not negotiating the aspect of the contributory negligence either directly or by implications and accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Send down the LCRs.