JUDGMENT : Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present civil application is filed by the applicants seeking leave to appeal to the applicants to prefer an appeal under Section 72(3) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) challenging the impugned judgment and order in Revision Application No. 10 of 2003 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad, dated 9.11.2004 and also the judgment and order in Civil Misc. Application No. 83 of 2004 passed by the Fast Track Court, Ahmedabad (Rural), allowing the application, Exh.11 under O. 7 R. 11 as well as Civil Misc. Application No. 83 of 2004 on the grounds stated in the application. 2. Heard learned advocate Shri MTM Hakim for learned advocate S.S. Saiyed for the applicants, learned Sr. Counsel Shri K.G. Vakharia appearing with learned advocate Shri SK Patel for respondent No. 2, learned AGP Shri P.P. Banaji for respondent No. 3 and learned advocate Shri M.I. Merchant for respondent No. 4. 3. Learned advocate Shri Hakim referred to the background of facts and the impugned order at Annexure-A with the First Appeal, that is, the order in Revision Application No. 10/2003 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad. The applicants filed an application under sec. 70-A before the Charity Commissioner that respondent No. 1 Trust which has been registered as category "E" in the register of the trust may be registered as category "B." Learned advocate Shri Hakim submitted that as contended in the application the applicants are the trustees and beneficiaries who were not party to the proceedings either before the Charity Commissioner or the District Judge. He submitted that both the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad as well as before the District Judge are seriously prejudicial to the rights of the applicants and other beneficiaries of the trust. He submitted that the people are having religious faith in Dargah of Hazrat Pir Saiyed Imamshah Bawa Roja and therefore the present application has been filed seeking leave to appeal challenging the impugned order. He emphasised that as the applicants were not a party to the proceedings the present first appeal is sought to be filed as opponent No. 4 original applicant has not challenged the impugned order. Learned advocate Shri Hakim submitted that respondent No. 1 is a religious trust and therefore it should be registered in "B" category. He emphasised that as the applicants were not a party to the proceedings the present first appeal is sought to be filed as opponent No. 4 original applicant has not challenged the impugned order. Learned advocate Shri Hakim submitted that respondent No. 1 is a religious trust and therefore it should be registered in "B" category. He tried to submit that as per the order passed in Civil Suit No. 168 of 1931 it is a religious institution and it has been registered as category "E" trust and therefore the application is made seeking leave to appeal the aforesaid appeal. It is also contended that the respondent trust was registered as a wakf in the year 1952 as at that time the trust was registered as a wakf under the provisions of the Act. However, when Wakf Act 1955 was brought into force the proceedings were required to be conducted under the Wakf Act. 4. Learned advocate Shri Hakim submitted that the trust has been set up for the benefit of the heirs and other beneficiaries. He also tried to submit that as per the provisions of sec. 2(13) of the Act, Wakf is included and therefore any such Muslim religious trust could be formally registered under the Act. However, as the Wakf Act has been enacted it could be registered. He also submitted that the orders passed below Annexure-A as well as the application exh. 11 in Civil Misc. Application No. 83 of 2004 refer to the aspect of delay. However, he submitted that both the Charity Commissioner and the Court below have failed to appreciate that the applicants are interested and any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner regarding the nature of the trust whether it is a public trust or not an application could prefer an application and there cannot be any limitation or there is no question of any res judicata also. He emphasised that the application should have been read as a whole and the Civil Court is required to decide on merits rather than considering such an application under O. 7 R. 11. 5. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Shri Hakim has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 3349 in the case of Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Mahant Harnam Singh C. (dead) M.N. Singh and Others. 6. 5. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Shri Hakim has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 3349 in the case of Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Mahant Harnam Singh C. (dead) M.N. Singh and Others. 6. Per contra, learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia appearing with learned advocate Shri SK Patel referred to the additional affidavit-in-reply on behalf of respondent No. 2 in this application. He submitted that as stated in the application the applicants Nos. 1, 2 & 3 are trustees of respondent No. 1 trust and applicants Nos. 4 & 5 are the beneficiaries. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia submitted that respondent No. 4 had filed an application before the Charity Commissioner and the Shariat committee also included applicants Nos. 4 & 5 who are also the members of Sadat Committee and therefore they have knowledge about the proceedings and it cannot be said that they were not aware and therefore the aspect of locus standi as well as delay are required to be considered. He referred to the order of the District Court below Exh.11 in an application under O. 7 R. 11 and submitted that as observed the applicants had approached the Charity Commissioner after more than 50 years. 7. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia referred to the background of the case and also submitted that Civil Suit No. 168/1931was filed under sec. 92 for faming the scheme for administration of the trust and respondent No. 1 trust has been registered as a public charitable and religious institution which would mean that it is a non-Wakf trust. He further referred to the approach while deciding the application under O. 7 R. 11 and submitted that it cannot be said that there is any jurisdictional error. He submitted that apart from maintainability of the first appeal at the instance the locus of the applicants who are seeking leave to appeal is required to be considered. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia submitted that the applicants who are seeking leave to appeal have no locus standi or right to file any such proceedings particularly when there is no reason or justification for approaching at such a belated stage and in fact it is sought to be pursued only as and by way of abuse of process of law at such belated stage. He emphasised, therefore, that the District Court while considering the submissions and the background of facts has passed an order O. 7 R. 11 below Exh.11. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia submitted that in Civil Suit No. 168/1931 the judgment is in rem and it is applicable and binding to all. 8. In support of his contention he pointedly referred to the observations made in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2013 SC 3349 (Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Mahant Harnam Singh C. (dead) M.N. Singh and Others). He submitted that the judgment in rem binds not only the party through whom one is claiming but to all those who share common interest. He emphasised that the applicants who are claiming to have any interest as beneficiaries are bound by the same and therefore even on principles analogous to res judicata any such proceedings are barred and therefore the order passed below Exh.11 under O. 7 R. 11 by the court may not be disturbed and no such permission could be granted seeking leave to appeal. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia again referred to the background of facts as well as the judgment of the District Court and submitted that it has clearly observed, "27. Upon perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Charity Commissioner, State of Gujarat, Ahmedabad on 9th November, 2004, Learned Charity Commissioner has observed as well as held that present Trust was being registered under Bombay Public Trust Act, in view of the order in Regular Civil Suit No. 168/1931. Further, it was observed in the judgment Hon'ble District Court is the appellate authority upon the finding of learned Charity Commissioner. Further in the present case (as per learned Charity Commissioner) the order passed by the Civil Court cannot be challenged before Charity Commissioner, therefore, application of Saiyed Rafuddin Baxali in Revision Application No. 10/2003 before Charity Commissioner was not tenable. Further learned Charity Commissioner has also given his findings are almost 30 years having passed and thereafter such application is filed by applicant. Therefore, also, it is not tenable of the basis of law of limitation. 28. Further learned Charity Commissioner has also given his findings are almost 30 years having passed and thereafter such application is filed by applicant. Therefore, also, it is not tenable of the basis of law of limitation. 28. It is further observed by the learned Charity Commissioner in his judgment that applicant had challenged the nature of Trust, i.e., change of status of Trust from "E" category into "B" category, but the learned Charity Commissioner had observed that there is no such provision in force under the Bombay Public Trust Act, for change of the nature as well as status of the trust, but it is only for the convenience of the office, such categories were classified, therefore, learned Charity Commissioner has observed that application of applicant was not tenable in the eyes of law.. It is further observed by learned Charity Commissioner that applicant had not prayed for establishment of Wakf Trust, therefore, also when such prayer is not called for, no relief can be granted in favour of applicant but on the basis of merit of the application. Present Trust cannot be treated as Wakf since all the property in Wakf is normally to be surrendered before almighty (Allah), whereas, in case of "Santpanthi" they are keeping their faith upon "Guru" and their "Guru" are known as "Kaka" but there is no such Guru Parambara/tradition of "guru" in Muslim religion, therefore, also applicant prayed for holding present Trust as 'Wakf' is also not tenable in the eyes of law." 9. Similarly, learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai and submitted that the plaint is liable to be rejected only on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of action. He submitted that O. 7 R. 11(d) refers to this aspect that if averments in the plaint shows that apparently the suit is barred by law, meaning thereby limitation, the same could be rejected. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 in the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by LRs vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, which refers to the aspect of limitation which would be considered from the date of knowledge. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 in the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by LRs vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, which refers to the aspect of limitation which would be considered from the date of knowledge. He strenuously submitted that in the facts of the case the applicants cannot say that they had no knowledge and therefore such a huge delay of 50 years cannot be said to have been explained particularly when applicants Nos. 4 & 5 were already members of the Sadat Committee who had taken the proceedings originally. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Vakharia, therefore, submitted it requires to be dismissed with cost and no such leave could be granted. 10. In rejoinder, learned advocate Shri Hakim again referred to the papers and submitted that though the suit is said to have been decided in 1931, however, it has to be considered in background of the provision. For that he referred to section 2(13) r/w section 2(19) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. He submitted that as per the provisions of sec. 63 of the Act, the finding cannot be said to be in rem. He referred to the judgment of the District Court. He also submitted that the applicants came to know about the proceedings on the basis of the order of the Charity Commissioner. Learned advocate Shri Hakim therefore submitted that the exercise of discretion under O. 7 R. 11 is erroneous and in fact it is all the more reason to grant permission seeking leave to appeal. He tried to submit that only the judgment of the court could be applicable in rem and not an order in the proceedings before the authority. He has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah (supra). 11. Learned AGP Shri Banaji referred to the affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the Charity Commissioner, respondent No. 2 and pointedly referred to the aspect of locus standi as well as the limitation with the background of the case. He submitted that how the present proceedings are filed, in what capacity, has not been explained. He submitted that the applicants could claim at the most to be descendant beneficiaries and therefore have failed to establish the locus to pursue such remedy. He submitted that how the present proceedings are filed, in what capacity, has not been explained. He submitted that the applicants could claim at the most to be descendant beneficiaries and therefore have failed to establish the locus to pursue such remedy. He emphasised that the application and the first appeal is bad for non-joinder of parties. Again, referring to the background he submitted that as stated in the affidavit-in-reply the trust was registered on 28.12.1952. In the year 1993, one Dilavar Hussain Meersabmiya Saiyed and others filed Misc. Application No. 59 of 1993 before the Jt. Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, under sec. 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act against the Imamshah Baba Roja Sansthan Committee Trust for some directions which came to be disposed of. The said order was challenged by the Imamshah Bava Roja Sanstan Committee Trust, Reg. No. E-738, by way of Special Civil Application No. 7133 of 1998 and as stated in the affidavit the judicial Misc. Application No. 50/1993 was disposed of. He submitted that the said order passed on 10.12.2002 is not challenged by anyone. He again submitted that one Saiyed Raffiuddin Bassheyali filed Revision Application No. 10 of 2003 against Hazrat Pir Saiyed Imamshah Bava Roza Sansthan Trust (Regn. No. E-738, Ahmedabad) before the State of Charity Commissioner, State of Gujarat under sec. 70-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act contending that the trust in question should be transferred from registration of "E" category to "B" category trust. The said application was rejected by the Charity Commissioner vide order dated 9.11.2004. A copy of the order passed in Revision Application No. 10/2003 is also produced with the affidavit filed on record. The said order was also challenged by Saiyed Raffiuddin Baksheyali before the District Court, Ahmedabad (Rural), by Misc. Application No. 83 of 2004 and the said application also came to be rejected by the Addl. District Judge vide order dated 19.10.2006. The said order has also not been challenged and therefore it has attained finality. Learned AGP Shri Banaji therefore submitted that there is no locus to file the present proceedings and such proceedings filed as and by way of abuse of process of court may be dismissed with cost. 12. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the leave as prayed for could be granted. 13. Learned AGP Shri Banaji therefore submitted that there is no locus to file the present proceedings and such proceedings filed as and by way of abuse of process of court may be dismissed with cost. 12. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the leave as prayed for could be granted. 13. That would again require consideration of the aspect of limitation as well as locus standi. The main emphasis of learned advocate Shri Hakim that after the Wakf Act has been brought into force it could have been registered under the Wakf Act and further as it is a religious trust it should have been registered under category "B" and not "E" as originally registered much earlier about 50 years back. These submissions on a little scrutiny sounds that persons like the applicants desire to indulge in legal proceedings not only by way of abuse of process but it appears that there is an impression that by pursuing legal proceedings it can be a gainful proposition which is reflected from the attitude and the averments. As the background has been referred to and discussed hereinabove while recording the submissions the things which have taken place 50 years back pursuant to the scheme framed as per the order passed in Civil Suit No. 118/31, the trust which is said to have been registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act as category "E" is now sought to be claimed that it is a religious trust and therefore it should be in a particular category of "B". As recorded hereinabove, the office of the Charity Commissioner seems to have explained which has also been quoted in the order where the Charity Commissioner has clarified that there is no such provision under the Act for change of nature as well as status of the trust but it is only for the convenience of the office the categories were classified. Apart from this, the applicants have not explained their locus standi as to the right or the basis on which they can claim any such prayer and can claim the leave to appeal to file the appeal after such a belated stage challenging the orders which have been passed much earlier. Apart from this, the applicants have not explained their locus standi as to the right or the basis on which they can claim any such prayer and can claim the leave to appeal to file the appeal after such a belated stage challenging the orders which have been passed much earlier. Again, the order which is sought to be challenged below Exh.11 passed under O. 7 R. 11 itself refers to the aspect of limitation contending that there is no cause of action and therefore the court is under an obligation to consider the plaint at the face value. The provisions of O. 7 R. 11(d) provide, "Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law." In other words, O. 7 R. 11(d) itself casts an obligation upon the court to verify and satisfy itself whether any such proceedings are barred by law which would include the law of limitation. 14. The law of limitation is founded on a public policy that an issue could be kept alive for a specified period and the concept of judicial discretion is governed by the rules of reasons and justice. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in (2013) 2 SCC 649 in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, has referred to this aspect and quoted from the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy as follows: "The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." Again, in the said judgment in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) it has been observed that "At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate." 15. It is required to be stated that while exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act what needs to be emphasised is that even if liberal approach is required, it cannot be oblivious of the fact that a successful litigant has also acquired certain right coupled with the fact that the litigation cannot be kept alive indefinitely. Therefore, it is the sufficient cause or the justification offered for the delay which is relevant for the purpose of exercise of discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act while considering such aspect of delay. The word sufficient cause should be understood in proper perspective referring to the fact-situation which has been prevailing. Thus, there cannot be any straitjacket formula as it will have to be considered on case to case basis depending upon the explanation or justification. It is in these circumstances the broad guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) have to be considered while exercising discretion. 16. It is in this background the legislature has by O. 7 R. 11(d) provided that such litigations which are sought to be pursued dishonestly for other purposes should not be encouraged and should be disposed of. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137 in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Asstt. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137 in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Asstt. Charity Commissioner where it has been observed, "The basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get around Order 7 Rule 11. The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint is manifestly vexatious and merit-less in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11(a) taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. It is true that by ingenious drafting a cause of action in the nature of red herrings cannot be brought into the judicial arena." 17. One more aspect which has been emphasised by both the sides relying upon the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Mahant Harnam Singh C. (dead), M.N. Singh and Others (supra) is that the judgment of the court would be a judgment in rem as observed in the aforesaid judgment. On one hand the applicants seek leave to appeal contending that they are beneficiaries and having some interest. On the other hand, the judgment which is delivered and which would bind all including the beneficiaries cannot be brushed aside. Therefore, the applicants who seek to challenge the order which is hopelessly time-barred and again without any locus standi cannot be granted any such leave. Therefore, it is not only the aspect of limitation or delay, but the applicants have to first satisfy about the locus standi itself which as discussed above they have failed to show any locus standi to pursue such proceedings which has attained finality. Therefore, it is not only the aspect of limitation or delay, but the applicants have to first satisfy about the locus standi itself which as discussed above they have failed to show any locus standi to pursue such proceedings which has attained finality. It is also required to be noted that if the applicants claim that they are interested, it would be for them to explain why the proceedings were not initiated in time or pursued when orders were passed as back as in the year 2006 or 2000 having attained finality. It appears that the applicants are trying to catch a straw to suit their requirement and make the submissions without any basis or foundation. The person who claims any right, title, interest must come and show the court that he has been vigilantly pursuing the remedy within the time frame and even if there is some delay he can explain the delay that he was not negligent or careless or indifferent. It is in these circumstances the applicants desire to pursue such proceedings by abusing the process by filing such proceedings under some misconception or ignorance. Therefore, if such leave is granted it would be counterproductive to the established principles and it would amount to endorsing perpetuity in the litigation. Therefore, no leave could be granted and such application deserves to be dismissed with cost. 18. Accordingly the application for leave to appeal stands dismissed and accordingly First Appeal St. No. 2493 of 2014 shall also stand dismissed. Notice discharged. Appeal Dismissed.