ORDER : This petition is filed under Sec.482 of Cr.P.C. seeking to expunge the remarks made against the petitioner herein in paragraphs-29 & 30 of the judgment passed by the Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) & JMFC., Srirangapatna dated 4.1.2013 in CC No. 674/2011. By the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has issued direction to the Superintendent of Police, Mandya to take action against the petitioner, which reads as under: “The learned Superintendent of Police, Mandya is hereby directed to take appropriate disciplinary or other action in accordance with law against the Investigation Officer, Sri. M.K. Jagadish, then PSI, Srirangapatna for deliberate dereliction of duty for not taking appropriate action on the information given by the 1st accused Smt. Lakshmi vide NCR No.102/2011 and failed to give protection to the aggrieved as per the Court Order dated 20. 1.2011 on the file of Crl.Mis.No.101/2010 and thereby committed breach of professional standard and defective investigation and caused prejudicial to the case of prosecution. If appropriate action is not taken in accordance to law it shall be contempt of court order. The office shall send the copy of this order to the learned Superintendent of Police, Mandya. The office shall supply free copy of this judgment to the 2nd accused forthwith.” 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that he took over the investigation in the matter on 27.6.2011 and in the course of the investigation recorded the statement of CW3 and laid the charge-sheet, but the learned Magistrate, in the impugned order has held him guilty of lapses and dereliction of duty in respect of the incident which is alleged to have taken place on 19.3.2011. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for the respondents. 4. It is not in dispute that on 19.3.2011, R2 herein Sri. Krishnappa lodged a complaint before Srirangapatna police alleging that without there being any order from the court, A1 & A2 broke open his house and started residing therein. Based on the said complaint, charge sheet was laid against A1 & A2 for the alleged offences punishable under Sec.447 & 427 R/w 34 of IPC.. In the impugned judgment, learned Magistrate has observed that on 19.3.2011, A1 was thrown out of the house and the said fact was within the knowledge of the petitioner herein and inspite of it he failed to take any action to extend protection to A1. In the impugned judgment, learned Magistrate has observed that on 19.3.2011, A1 was thrown out of the house and the said fact was within the knowledge of the petitioner herein and inspite of it he failed to take any action to extend protection to A1. Undisputedly, there was no complaint by A1 alleging that she was thrown out of the house. There is also no material whatsoever to show that A1 complained either to the petitioner herein or to the jurisdictional police that protection order given to her was violated by any one. On the other hand, the records reveal that the petitioner took over investigation only on 27.6.2011, which fact has remained undisputed. Under the said circumstances, petitioner could not have been expected to extend any protection to A1. The issue taken up by the lower court is totally extraneous to the investigation undertaken by the petitioner. In the impugned judgment, trial court has not noted any lapses in so far as the investigation into the offences alleged under Sec.447 & 427 of IPC is concerned. That being the case, there was absolutely no occasion or basis for the trial court either to pass any remarks against the petitioner or to direct the Superintendent of Police to initiate disciplinary action against him. 5. In this context, it is also pertinent to note that either during the examination of the petitioner, who was examined as PW6 before the lower court, his notice has been drawn to the alleged lapses nor the trial court has issued any notice to the petitioner calling for his explanation before ordering for any action against the petitioner. As such, there is serious violation of the principles of natural justice. In this regard, reference could be made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.K. VISWAMBARAN Vs. E.KOYAKUNJU AND OTHERS [(1987) 2 S.C.C.109] wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. Yet another serious infirmity contained in the impugned order is that the High Court has failed to hear in mind the well settled principles of law laid down by this Court in more than one case that should govern the courts before disparaging remarks are made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases arising before them for decision. In State of U.P. vs. Mohd. In State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Naim it was held as follows: If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of Justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time, it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. This ratio has been followed in R.K. Lakshmanan Vs. A.K. Srinivasan and Niranjan Patnaik V. Sashibhusan Kar (to which one of us was a party). Judged in the light of the above tests, it may be seen that none of the tests is satisfied in this case. It is indeed regrettable that the High Court should have lightly passed adverse remarks of a very serious nature affecting the character and professional competence and integrity of the appellant in purported desire to render justice to respondents 2 and 3 in the petition filed by them for expunction of adverse remarks made against them.” It is also apt to refer to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DAYAL SINGH Vs. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL [(2012) 8 S.C.C.263] wherein it is observed as under: “19. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL [(2012) 8 S.C.C.263] wherein it is observed as under: “19. Now we will deal with the question of defective or improper investigation resulting from the acts of omission and/or commission, deliberate or otherwise, of the investigating officer or other material witnesses, who are obliged to perform certain duties in discharge of their functions and then to examine its effect. In order to examine this aspect in conformity with the rule of law and keeping in mind the basis principles of criminal jurisprudence, and the questions framed by us at the very outset of this judgment, the following points need consideration: (i) Whether there have been acts of omission and commission which have resulted in improper or defective investigation. (ii) Whether such default and/or acts of omission and commission have adversely affected the case of the prosecution. (iii) Whether such default and acts were deliberate, unintentional or resulted from unavoidable circumstances of a given case. (iv) If the dereliction of duty and omission to perform was deliberate, then is it obligatory upon the court to pass appropriate directions including directions in regard to taking of penal or other civil action against such officer/witness.” 5. In the absence of any finding of omission or commission by the petitioner, the trial court was not justified in making disparaging remarks on the conduct of the petitioner and to issue any direction to his appointing authority to initiate disciplinary action against him. The direction issued by the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction and ex-facie illegal and is in stark violation of the principles of natural justice. As a result, the remarks made against the petitioner in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the impugned judgment are hereby expunged and consequently the direction issued to the Superintendent of Police in the operative portion of the impugned judgment dated 4.1.2013 are set aside. Petition is allowed accordingly.