JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal challenging the judgment and order of first appellate court dated 21.10.1995 passed in First Appeal No. 83/1980 was filed by the Municipal Board, Vikas Nagar in the Allahabad High Court, where such appeal no. 102/1996 was admitted on 31.1.1996 for hearing. I assume that such appeal was admitted on all substantial questions of law, which were suggested in the memo of appeal by the learned Counsel of the appellant and I would like to reproduce the same at later stage. After carving out of this province, such appeal stood transferred to this Court and was allotted the new number, as indicated above. Since then for one reason or the other, it could not be decided. 2. Having heard learned Counsels for the parties extensively, I feel that the effective and convincing adjudication of the controversy between the parties would not be possible until the chequered history of the facts is surfaced ever since the litigation started way back in 1972. 3. I think that in exercise of the powers vested in Section 103 of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court is competent to take up for consideration even the issues of facts during the course of hearing in the second appeal. 4. In the very beginning, Original Suit No. 268/1972 was instituted by late Sri Laxmi Chand Gupta (father of respondents no. 1 and 2) against the Municipal Board, Vikas Nagar seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their employees from constructing any street through the property of the plaintiff, which is more fully described in the schedule given at the foot of the plaint. In such schedule, the property was indicated as “a plot of land forming part of Khasra No. 2279 situated in Mauja Enfield Grant Pargana Pachwa, Dehradun bounded as below: On the North— Hospital Road On the South— Property of the defendant On the East— Property of the District Board School On the West— Road” 5. In such schedule, the property was indicated as “a plot of land forming part of Khasra No. 2279 situated in Mauja Enfield Grant Pargana Pachwa, Dehradun bounded as below: On the North— Hospital Road On the South— Property of the defendant On the East— Property of the District Board School On the West— Road” 5. It appears from the pleadings of the plaintiff that he was denying the existence of any public street in the east of such property and averred that the whole of adjoining area belonged to Maharaja of Sirmaur (Nahan) and he was in peaceful possession of such plot of land ever since 1951 and the defendant public body was striving to construct a public street towards the east of the plot of the land whereon the plaintiff was claiming the peaceful uninterrupted possession since 1951 and he also intended to show as if he has acquired the title rights on the basis of adverse possession. Such suit was dismissed on merits on 30.9.1974 by the learned Munsif Mr. G.S. Pande, whereagainst Civil Appeal No. 86/1974 was presented by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta and such appeal was allowed decreeing the suit on 18.3.1975 by the First Additional Civil Judge Sri K.D. Shahi. 6. Learned appellate court reproduced the statement of the witnesses and also mentioned that the title deed of plaintiff Ex. 1 was on the record. He had been sold the plots no. 130 and 131 and also the “dandi” alongside the street facing the east. Thus the plaintiff had been transferred some land in the east of plots no. 130 and 131, which is admittedly “dandi”. 7. It appears that by the time the first appellate court rendered its judgment dated 18.3.1975, two sale deeds dated 29.12.1962, which Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta produced pertaining to two plots each measuring 45 x 90 and 45 x 90 plus eastern Dandi were available on the record. So, the total area of the plot was 8100 sq. ft. plus some area of “dandi” towards the east of these plots. I have gathered the date of these two sale deeds in the first appellate court judgment dated 21.10.1995 rendered by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Mr. Subhash Chandra (in the appeal file no. 83/1980, which shall be referred later and such judgment is also impugned one before this Court in this second appeal). 8. Learned Judge Mr. I have gathered the date of these two sale deeds in the first appellate court judgment dated 21.10.1995 rendered by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Mr. Subhash Chandra (in the appeal file no. 83/1980, which shall be referred later and such judgment is also impugned one before this Court in this second appeal). 8. Learned Judge Mr. Shahi has also reproduced the statement of DW Mr. Satendra Singh which shows that these plots were being used by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta in order to run the tall of woods and certain portion of these plots towards the east has been overreached by him. Besides, in the north-east corner out of these plots, one Mr. Govind Singh also had his tea kiosk, which was ad measuring 20 ft. x 12 ft. 9. It may be relevant to mention here that Mr. Govind Singh sold such land, whereon his kiosk was settled, to Mr. Sarvendra Singh and Gurvachan Singh by the sale deed dated 12.2.1999. So, the son of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta, namely, Pramod Kumar Gupta instituted Original Suit No. 620/2000 for cancellation of that sale deed and recovery of possession, wherein Nagar Palika, Vikas Nagar was also a party. Such suit was decreed on 9.2.2005. Against such decree, a civil appeal no. 15/2005 was preferred by Nagar Palika which was also dismissed on 31.10.2012 by the learned appellate court. 10. So, in the above backdrop, probably in order to avoid any further controversy, sons of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta (respondents no. 1 and 2) executed the sale deed of the whole land, which their father had purchased vide sale deed dated 29.12.1962 from Maharaja, Nahan/Sirmaur along “dandi” as well as certain other barren land, which he had occupied by way of adverse possession, to Mr. Himkar Gupta, Mr. Anil Bansal, Mr. Avinesh Bansal and Smt. Sushma Bansal, who are respondents no. 3 to 6 herein. Thus, the total area of land which was sold by them to these four respondents vide sale deed dated 20.10.2006 was more than their father had himself purchased from Maharaja, Nahan/Sirmaur because it included such barren land which was taken by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta in his adverse possession way back from 1951, as he claimed. 11. Mr. Thus, the total area of land which was sold by them to these four respondents vide sale deed dated 20.10.2006 was more than their father had himself purchased from Maharaja, Nahan/Sirmaur because it included such barren land which was taken by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta in his adverse possession way back from 1951, as he claimed. 11. Mr. Shahi, the learned Judge of the appellate court, also reproduced the statement of DW Satendra Singh that the disputed road had been constructed by the Municipal Board uptill southern corner of the plot no. 130 owned by the plaintiff. However, the learned Judge Mr. Shahi was of the view that the plaintiff was at least the occupier of the disputed land. He is admittedly in possession and the defendant has got no right to construct the road upon the said disputed land. This judgment was challenged by the Municipality by way of filing the second civil appeal no. 1367/1975. But during the pendency of such appeal, Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta died on 25.9.1987 and the employees of the public body (Municipal Board) could not take any conscious care about the death of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta as well as the requirement of moving the substitution application in the Allahabad High Court. So, such appeal stood abated vide order dated 16.5.1989 passed by the Court. 12. Now, second set of litigation started that after allowing the first appeal no. 86/1974, Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta, it appears, started occupying another vast piece of land towards the south of the plots so his attempt was resisted by Municipal Board. Another Original Suit No. A-99/1975 was filed by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta on 25.8.1975 seeking the decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and its employees from demolishing any construction or from occupying any part of the land of the plaintiff situated in the south of hospital road and in the north of plot no. 131. 13. It is evident that the injunction was being sought only for such land, as highlighted above, and there was no land owned or possessed by the plaintiff towards the south of these plots. Such picture is clear from the averments of the plaintiffs him self and the details of the property described by him in the schedule of Suit No. 268/1972. Such picture is clear from the averments of the plaintiffs him self and the details of the property described by him in the schedule of Suit No. 268/1972. Boundaries of the property has been shown as below: On the north— Hospital Road On the south— Property of the defendant On the east— Property of the District Board School On the west— Road 14. This surrounding and schedule of the property are also proved by the map of the proposed shed of Laxmi Saw Mill and Wood Work, Vikas Nagar, as submitted by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta in the Municipal Board which is available as A-3 in the file of Original Suit No. 268/1972 and such map when placed for approval was sanctioned subject to the area given in the sale deeds of Mr. Gupta. In that map too, it is clearly visible that towards north of these purchased lands, an open land was shown which was for the wood stocking and that land was none other but only the barren land which was originally owned by Maharaja of Nahan/Sirmaur and such land was in the adverse possession by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta because the total land whereon the map was sought to be approved runs 125 feet towards the north-south and 90 feet towards east-west. This 125 feet must not have been possible without the adverse possession beyond the area of 8100 ft. (purchased by him from Maharaja Nahan). In that map too, towards south, Mr. Gupta has himself shown the property of municipality having the motor stand. This map also bears the signature of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta appended on the right corner. This fact is again ratified from the copy of the same proposed shed, which was produced by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta under his own signature in the same fashion wherein in the south of this whole plot ad measuring 125 ft. x 90 ft., the land of municipality has been shown. 15. It is evident that since in the south of such plot, as aforementioned, Mr. Gupta began to claim his possession and ownership by way of adverse possession, hence, now the schedule of the land in suit had been different. x 90 ft., the land of municipality has been shown. 15. It is evident that since in the south of such plot, as aforementioned, Mr. Gupta began to claim his possession and ownership by way of adverse possession, hence, now the schedule of the land in suit had been different. Although the injunction was sought only on the plot, which was previously numbered as 130 and 131, and even adding the land of adverse possession and “dandi” (street), it was not more than 124 x 90 ft., but this time the schedule of the property was shown as below: On the north— Hospital Road -- measuring130 ft. On the south— Other land of the plaintiff – measuring 130 ft On the east— Property of the District Board School -- measuring 110 ft. On the west— Road -- measuring 51 ft. 16. So, it can be noticed that previously in all the maps, which Mr. Gupta submitted for approval, the land of municipality was shown in the south by himself under his own signatures, but this time while instituting the suit no. A-99/1975, Mr. Gupta cunningly displayed that on the south there is other land of the plaintiff, which is against his own averments and pleadings and that is why, the suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif Mr. Rakesh Dutt on 28.4.1980, but the first appeal no. 83/1980 was preferred by the Municipal Board on 5.7.1980, which was allowed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) vide the impugned judgment and order dated 21.10.1995, wherein the possession over the property, in question, was accepted since 1975 (area of such property had been extended on all municipal land which was situated towards the south of the two plots purchased by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta). Hence, he held that without recoursing to the legal process, his possession and construction thereon cannot be removed because the ownership of the municipality cannot be proved over such land. It is this judgment, which was put under challenge before the Allahabad High Court, as aforementioned, and the following substantial questions of law were suggested in the memo of appeal: (A) Whether the lower appellate court erred in law as on facts in decreeing the suit by accepting the additional evidence and thereby committed manifest error of law is a substantial question of law? (B) Whether the lower appellate court erred in law in permitting the plaintiffs-respondents to lead additional evidence and to thereby plug its lacunas although the additional evidence was beyond the scope of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. and thus has committed a manifest illegality is a substantial question of law? (C) Whether the additional evidence led by the plaintiff-respondents and relied upon by the lower appellate court related to a property other than the suit property and thus was not relevant to the controversy in hand and the court below erred in law as on facts in placing reliance on them has committed a manifest error of law is a substantial question of law? (D) Whether the court below erred in law as on facts in not dismissing the suit being barred by Section 326 of the Nagar Palika Adhiniyam has committed a manifest error of law is a substantial question of law? (E) Whether the respondents being a trespasser over the land in dispute of which the defendant-appellant are owners and consequently the plaintiffs-respondents were not entitled an order of injunction and the court below erred in law in passing an order in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents committed a manifest illegality is a substantial question of law? (F) Whether the title vesting of the land in dispute in the defendant-appellant was established beyond any semblance of doubt and the court below erred in law in holding otherwise committed a manifest illegality is a substantial question of law? (G) Whether the procedure prescribed under Section 117, 212 and 221 of the Nagar Palika Adhiniyam are alternative procedure and the defendant-appellant are not required in law to take recourse to same is a substantial question of law? (H) Whether the land in dispute vests in the defendant-appellant and there is no necessity for them to take recourse to proceedings for acquisition is a substantial question of law? 17. I have heard learned Counsels of all the parties and now proceed to answer these substantial questions as under. Substantial questions A, B and C 18. Since many papers in the lower court record have been weeded out under the General Rules (Civil), even though it is accepted that the learned first appellate court did not commit any error by accepting the additional evidence produced by Mr. Substantial questions A, B and C 18. Since many papers in the lower court record have been weeded out under the General Rules (Civil), even though it is accepted that the learned first appellate court did not commit any error by accepting the additional evidence produced by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta and his successors under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, then also it is evident that the plaintiff at best could have been the owner of the land ad measuring 8100 sq. ft. on account of the sale deeds got executed by him from Maharaja, Nahan/Sirmaur in the shape of two plots no. 130 and 131. Besides, a portion of the land towards the north of these plots by way of adverse possession and after contesting the litigation of Original Suit No. 620/2000 in order to save himself from any controversy and further litigation, he sold this whole piece of land in the shape of two plots ad measuring 3001 sq. ft. and 5204 sq. ft., total 8205 sq. ft. to the aforenamed respondents no. 3 to 6, but the lower appellate court has decreed the suit for all other land, which Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta started to claim in his possession since 1975 and such was the cause of the initiation of the Original Suit No. A-99/1975 when the claim of possession by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta was interfered and resisted by the Municipal Board. Even if we look to the deposition of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta which he made in the dock of the Court on 10.4.1980 in Original Suit No. A-99/1975, it is clear that he has tried to conceal the truth and so has given confused statement. In the cross-examination, some time he is telling that the disputed land is in the measurement of 120 x 120 ft., viz. 15000 sq. ft., and in the continuation of cross-examination he tells another measurement of the disputed land as 125 x 45 ft., viz. 5625 sq. ft, and yet in the third breath, he is disclosing the measurement of disputed land as 125 x 35 ft, i.e. 4375 sq. ft. So, it can be inferred that he did not own the land more than what has been sold by his successors (sons/respondents no. 1 and 2) to the respondents no. 3 to 6 vide the sale deed dated 20.10.2006. ft. So, it can be inferred that he did not own the land more than what has been sold by his successors (sons/respondents no. 1 and 2) to the respondents no. 3 to 6 vide the sale deed dated 20.10.2006. It further makes it clear that the green shed land which has been shown in the site plan, which Mr. Kamlesh Garg has got prepared through his own architect/consultant, is 114 ft. towards east and 95 ft. towards west. It runs 124 ft. in the north towards the plot no. 130 and 131 allegedly purchased by their father Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta, although trouble has not been ever taken before this Court to produce those sale deeds or the certified copies thereof. It runs 127 ft. towards south. So, the question arises from where this land had been obtained by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta. Therefore, no question arises to accept the claim of his successors (sons) on this green shed land on the basis of adverse possession. It is more for the reason that this land was never shown in the proceedings started initially by Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta in the Original Suit No. 268/1972 in the schedule of the property exhibited by him at the foot of that plaint. Therefore, it is crystal clear that soon after allowing the civil appeal no. 86/1974 on 18.3.1975, resulting into decree of the Suit No. 268/1972, Mr. Gupta encroached and started to claim his possession on the southern land of these plots which he himself has accepted as the land of the municipality having the motor stand. 19. So, where is the question of maturing of the title rights by way of the adverse possession over this southern land of the municipality because no sooner did Mr. Gupta started to claim such land under his possession, the municipality interfered. Then how the possession can be said to be peaceful inasmuch as maturing the same in the title because the land of the municipality or a public body or government can be claimed under the title by way of adverse possession if such possession has been peaceful, amicable and without interruption for the last 30 years, as contemplated under Article 111 of the Indian Limitation Act. So, the adverse possession at best can be accepted on the barren land towards the north of these plots no. So, the adverse possession at best can be accepted on the barren land towards the north of these plots no. 130 and 131 because such barren land was the land of Maharaja, Nahan/Sirmaur, and was a private land. Although such land had also been vested in the State Government after the Zamindari Abolition Act came into operation w.e.f. 26.1.1951, but be that as it may, even if it is accepted that Mr. Gupta remained in occupation of that barren land way back since 1951, but his sons had sold all such land to respondents no. 3 to 6 for a good price by way of executing sale deed dated 20.10.2006. Therefore, I hold that the lower appellate court has erred in holding the possessory rights of Mr. Gupta on a vast land, which he has shown in green colour in the site plan (Annexure 1) filed along with the affidavit of Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Garg. These substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Substantial question D 20. As regards this substantial question of law, I think Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta felt urgency to initiate the proceedings. Hence, filing of the suit in absence of any notice under Section 326 of Nagar Palika Adhiniyam could have been waived. This question is answered accordingly. Substantial questions E and F 21. It has been discussed by me elaborately as to how Mr. Gupta trespassed over the vast piece of land which he himself accepted as the land of the municipality, not only in the proposed plan/map available as A-3 in the file of the Original Suit No. 268/1972, but also accepted the same land again as the land of municipality in the site plan (available in the Original Suit No. A-99/1975 file), put up before the municipality for approval, under his signature at the right hand side of such plan and the signature has been admitted by his Counsel in the court below on 10.4.1980 on the back of such plan. The plan was approved by the Secretary of the Municipal Board, Vikas Nagar subject to the limitation of the land dimensions shown in the sale deed. Then, how Mr. The plan was approved by the Secretary of the Municipal Board, Vikas Nagar subject to the limitation of the land dimensions shown in the sale deed. Then, how Mr. Gupta can claim the land of the municipality under his own ownership on the basis of adverse possession because as he started to put himself to adverse possession of such land, the municipality interfered and that became the cause of initiation of the Original Suit No. A-99/1975. 22. So, I hold that Mr. Gupta is nothing more than an encroacher upon such land and it is a trite that injunction of equitable relief can be issued only when the person is coming with the clean hands. An encroacher or a trespasser cannot claim an injunction against the true owner, who was none other than the municipality, as per the two plans/maps which were produced by Mr. Gupta himself for approval before the municipal authorities and also as per the details of the property shown in the schedule of the original suit no. 268/1972. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 , has held that it is settled law that no injunction could be granted against the true owner at the instance of persons in unlawful possession. Judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the court. Hon’ble Apex Court expressed similar view in Premji Ratansey Shah & Others v. Union of India & Others, (1994) 5 SCC 547 . 24. It is pertinent to mention that DW1 Mr. Trisem Lal, Tax Inspector, whose statement was recorded on 10.4.1980 in the Original Suit No. A-99/1975 and such statement is still available on the record, has deposed that he was serving in the municipality for the last 25 years. The Town Area Committee was notified by the then Government w.e.f. 1.7.1951 and later on it was converted into Nagar Palika w.e.f. 1.5.1968. It cannot be disputed that whatever land the estate of Maharaja of Nahan/Sirmaur had, it had been vested in the Government with effect from coming into operation of Zamindari Abolition Act on 26.1.1951 and thereafter the land from the State Government came into the possession/ownership of the municipality either by way of operation of the Act or by way of transfer (whatever). But certainly this disputed land (which was not even the subject matter of the property as shown in the schedule of the Original Suit No. A-99/1975), having the vast area is not at all of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta or his successors, but of the municipality. If he has raised the construction of any nature whatsoever on such land with the passage of time of past four decades, then he has done it at his own peril. 25. So, I hold that the respondents no. 1 and 2 or their predecessor were sheer trespasser and in 1975, he began to illegally occupy such land situated towards south of the plots which he had purchased from Maharaja of Nahan/Sirmaur and no injunction can be granted in favour of an encroacher against the true owner of the land. I answer this substantial question of law accordingly. Substantial questions G and H 26. I have already answered that the land which was not even the subject matter of the Original Suit No. A-99/1975 or the Original Suit No. 268/1972 is transparently the land of municipality but is being claimed by the respondents no. 1 and 2 as their father had matured the adverse possession to the extent of attaining the title. It can not be accepted as shown in the site plan submitted with the affidavit of Kamlesh Kumar Garg as the same is his own site plan. Hence, I hold that this green coloured shed property shown in the site plan of Mr. Garg is certainly the property of municipality, and not of either Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta or his successors. So, I declare that their possession and construction thereon are wholly an encroachment and the same are liable to be removed without initiating any further litigation under any law. I answer these last two substantial questions of law accordingly. 27. In view of what has been discussed and set forth above, I allow this second appeal in the terms that the municipality shall remain prohibited to interfere in the possession of respondents no. 3 to 6 because they have purchased the property from the sons of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta, although 8100 sq. ft. was on the sale deed (which father of respondents no. 1 and 2 purchased from Raja Nahan) and rest was on the basis of adverse possession. So, the municipality will feel no hesitation in permitting Mr. 3 to 6 because they have purchased the property from the sons of Mr. Laxmi Chand Gupta, although 8100 sq. ft. was on the sale deed (which father of respondents no. 1 and 2 purchased from Raja Nahan) and rest was on the basis of adverse possession. So, the municipality will feel no hesitation in permitting Mr. Himkar Gupta, Mr. Anil Bansal, Mr. Avinesh Bansal and Smt. Sushma Bansal (as they are legal owners) to utilise the land in the manner they like and render them every assistance (within the framework of their local rules and regulations) for the purpose. It is more so because the respondents no. 3 to 6 showing their large heartedness has accommodated the Nagar Palika Parishad, Vikas nagar to give way on the land purchased and owned by them to construct the road which is needed for the public good, as have been highlighted by this Court in its order dated 22.8.2016 pursuant to the compromise between the Municipal Board and the respondents no. 3 to 6. However, the Municipal Board has every right to dispossess respondent no. 1 Mr. Pramod Kumar Gupta and respondent no. 2 Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Garg from the land which their father had encroached and such is located in the south of the land purchased by respondents no. 3 to 6. Let the LCR be sent back.