JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari and or Mandamus or any other appropriate writ and or order or direction of the like nature directing the respondents to up-grade the posts of existing Assistant Sub-Inspectors to the post of Sub-Inspectors in the Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organization w.e.f. 27.05.2014, and also to direct the respondents to convert the promotion of 64 Havildars of the same organization to the post of ASI including the petitioners No. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21 vide order No. PHQ(VI)21/WRLS/2003/121, No. PHQ(VI)21/WRLS/2003/122 and No. PHQ(VI)21/WRLS/2003/123, dated 04.06.2014, to the post of SI and also to set aside the appointment of the respondents No. 5 to 24 to the post of SI, and to direct the State respondents to divide 25 existing SI posts among the Operators, Technicians and Cryptographers in the ratio of 75:15:10 and to fill up the vacancies by direct recruitment and promotion in the proportion of 33% and 67% respectively. 2. Heard Mr. Tongpok Pongener, learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners and also heard Ms. S. Mere, learned Government Advocate, on behalf of the State respondents. I have also heard Mr. Wati Jamir, learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the private respondents. During the pendency of the case, the petitioner Nos. 1, 11 & 12 filed I.A.(C) No. 71(K) of 2016 praying for permission to withdraw the case as far as they are concerned. The prayer of the petitioners was allowed by order dated 21.06.2016, passed in the I.A. Accordingly, their names were deleted. Similarly, the petitioner Nos. 3, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, and 30 also filed an I.A. being I.A.(C) No. 126(K) of 2016 praying for permission to withdraw the petition as far as they are concerned. Their prayer was also allowed by an order passed on 18.11.2016. In view of withdrawal of the above petitioners, the petitioners who are left in this case are only petitioner Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 24, 27, 28, 31 & 32. The petitioners Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15 & 17 are ASI and the petitioners No. 24, 27, 28, 31 and 32 are Havildars in NPTO. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 24, 27, 28, 31 & 32. The petitioners Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15 & 17 are ASI and the petitioners No. 24, 27, 28, 31 and 32 are Havildars in NPTO. 3. The case of the petitioners as submitted by the learned counsel of the petitioners is as follows; (i) That Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organization (which shall hereafter be referred to as NPTO) came into existence on the issuance of a Notification by the Government of Nagaland being No. POL-16/PR/8/83, dated 20.07.1995, wherein and whereby the erstwhile Nagaland Police Radio Organization and the Nagaland Armed Police Wireless were amalgamated. Thereafter, an Office Memorandum was issued by the Director General of Police, Nagaland being Memorandum No. PHQ(B-IV)9/3/89, dated 29.06.1996, whereby certain norms regulating the service conditions of the NPTO was laid down. However, the same was replaced by the NPTO Subordinate Service Rules, 2013 which was published in the Nagaland Gazette, dated 13.12.2013, (which shall hereinafter be referred to as 2013 Rules). The same was later amended by NPTO (Subordinate Service) (1st Amendment) Rules, 2014 (which shall be referred to as Amendment Rules, 2014). According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, NPTO Subordinate Service has been classified into 3 (three) categories under Rule 5(b) of the 2013 Rules as follows:- (i). Sub-Inspector (Operator/Technician/Cryptographer) (ii). Havildar (Operator/Technician/Cryptographer) (iii). Constable (Operator/Technician/Cryptographer) And in view of this classification of the NPTO Subordinate Service Rule, the post of ASI (Operator/Technician/Cryptographer) which existed as per the old rule has to be deemed abolished, therefore, the posts of ASI which were in existence just before the Notification of the 2013 Rules should have been upgraded or merged with the first category of the service i.e. Sub-Inspector. But instead of doing that and in violation of the said rule the State respondents promoted 37 ASIs out of the 87 serving ASIs to the post of SI (29 ASI Operator, 4 ASI Technician and 4 ASI Cryptographer) vide Order No. PHQ(B-V)4/W RLS/2004/38, 39 and 40, dated 27.05.2014, leaving behind the petitioner Nos. 3, 4, 5, 9, 18, 19, 22 and 23. In violation of the same 2013 Rules the State respondents also promoted 64 senior most Havildars (45 Havildar Operator, 13 Havildar Technician and 6 Havildar Cryptographer) including the petitioner Nos. 3, 4, 5, 9, 18, 19, 22 and 23. In violation of the same 2013 Rules the State respondents also promoted 64 senior most Havildars (45 Havildar Operator, 13 Havildar Technician and 6 Havildar Cryptographer) including the petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20 and 21 to the post of ASI vide order No. PHQ.(VI)21/WRLS/2003/121, 122 and 123, dated 04.06.2014 instead of promoting them straight to the post of SI. These promotions according to the learned counsel were in violation of the Rule 5(b) of the 2013 Rules, as the post of ASI is deemed to have been abolished, therefore, the first group i.e. those persons in the post of ASI should have been treated as amalgamated to category-I of the NPTO and no one should have been left behind and the second group should have been promoted straight to the post of SI. (ii) Further, the case of the petitioners according to their learned counsel is also that by Amendment Rule, 2014 which was published in the Nagaland Gazette, dated 15.12.2014, the Schedule-II to the 2013 Rules has been amended as follows:- “5. Amendment to Schedule-II: The existing entry under Sl. No. 1 & II of Schedule-II of the Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organization (Subordinate Service) Rules, 2013 shall be substituted by the following entry: Sl. No. Grade/Name Percentage of post to be filled up by Eligibility for promotion/qualification for Direct Recruitment Direct Recruitment Departmental Promotion 1 2 3 4 5 I Sub-Inspector (Opr.) 33% 67% Promotion from amongst the Havildar(Opr) possessing Police Wireless Operator Grade-II (PWO-II) and who have put in minimum 5(five) years of services as Havildar (Opr). For Direct Recruitment the minimum qualification shall be graduates in any discipline from a recognized University. II Sub-Inspector (Tech.) 33% 67% Promotion from amongst the Havildar (Tech) possessing Police Wireless Technician Grade-II (PWT-II) and who have put in minimum 5(five) years of service as Havildar (Tech). For Direct Recruitment the minimum qualification shall be 3(three) years diploma in Electronic, Computer, Mechanical or Electrical Engineering or equivalent. This has the approval of the Cabinet vide No. CAB-2/2013 dated 28-11-2014. Sd/- L.SINGSIT Special Secretary to the Govt. For Direct Recruitment the minimum qualification shall be 3(three) years diploma in Electronic, Computer, Mechanical or Electrical Engineering or equivalent. This has the approval of the Cabinet vide No. CAB-2/2013 dated 28-11-2014. Sd/- L.SINGSIT Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland.” According to the learned counsel the amended Schedule II of the Rule of 2014 read together with Memorandum No. 11/APA/1/66, dated 09.06.1966, issued by the Home Department, Government of Nagaland makes it amply clear that the determination of percentage for direct recruitment and the departmental promotion must be calculated and fixed from the number of vacancies available at the relevant time. The paragraph-4 of the Memorandum which according to the learned counsel is relevant is reproduced here below:- “RELATIVE SENIORITY OF PROMOTEES AND DIRECT RECRUITS: 1. The relative seniority of directs and promotes shall be determined according to the rotation of vacancies between direct recruits and promotes which shall be based on the quotas of vacancies reserved for direct recruitment and promotion respectively in the recruitment Rules. EXPLANATION (I) Where reservation for each source is 50% the order of seniority shall be (i) promotes (ii) direct recruitment and so on. (II) Where 75% vacancies are reserved for promotes and 25% for direct recruitment each direct recruit shall rank in seniority below three promotes. If for any reasons, a direct recruit or a promote ceases to hold the appointment in grade the seniority shall be re-arranged merely for the purpose of ensuring the proportion referred above.” The learned counsel further submitted that in the matter of direct recruitment the Notification No. AR-8/26/81(Pt), dated 24.09.2004, issued by the Government of Nagaland, P&AR department (Administrative Reforms Branch) is also to be followed. The Notification cited by the learned counsel is given here below:- “NOTIFICATION No. AR-8/26/81(Pt) : In relaxation of Regulation 3(a)(i) of the Nagaland Public Service Commission (Limitation of Function) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2001, notified vide this Department’s Notification No. PAR-5/1/84 dated 23/04/2001 the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to delegate to the Director General of Police, the power of recruitment to UBSI/ABSI in the Nagaland Police under Police Department with immediate effect. The Director General of Police will conduct the recruitment through a Selection Committee, consisting of representation of Home and P&AR Department.” 4. The Director General of Police will conduct the recruitment through a Selection Committee, consisting of representation of Home and P&AR Department.” 4. The case of the petitioners as summarized by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that all the ASI posts should have been merged with the cadre of SI as on the coming into force of the 2013 Rules since the cadre of ASI is deemed to have been abolished. And in consequence, all the persons holding the post of ASI should have been merged into the cadre of SI, and the promotion of some of the petitioners (Havildar) to the post of ASI should also have been to the post of SI. And that the appointments of the respondents No. 5 to 24, deserves to be set aside since it was done through back door and not as per the rules. The learned counsel submitted the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of his submission. (i) The of State of Punjab & Others –versus- Dr. R.N. Bhatnagar & Another reported in (1999) 2 SCC 330 . The relevant paragraph-11 is reproduced here below:- “11. On the other hand, the situation which has fallen for our consideration in the present case in the light of Article 16(1) is squarely covered by a decision of this Court in Paramjit Singh's case (supra) as clarified by a latter decision in the very same case reported in [1982] 3 SCC 191. In the aforesaid main case, D.A. Desai, J, speaking for a bench of two learned Judges of this Court, had to consider in paragraph 11 of the Report a recruitment rule which permitted fixed percentage of posts to be filled up in the given cadre from two different sources, namely, promotees and direct recruits. Rule 6 of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, which came for consideration in that case provided for a method of recruitment from two different sources i.e. 80% by promotion from the rank of Inspectors and 20% by direct recruitment. Rule 6 of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, which came for consideration in that case provided for a method of recruitment from two different sources i.e. 80% by promotion from the rank of Inspectors and 20% by direct recruitment. Examining the working of the aforesaid quota rule for recruitment in the light of the relevant rotational scheme of vacancies in the cadre to which such recruitment was to be made, the following pertinent observations were made in paragraph 11 of the Report: "Where recruitment to a cadre is from two sources and the Service Rules prescribe quota for recruitment for both sources a question would always arise whether the quota rule would apply at the initial stage of recruitment or also at the stage of Confirmation, Ordinarily, if quota is prescribed for recruitment to a cadre, the quota rule will have to be observed at the recruitment stage. The quota would then be co-related to vacancies to be filled in by recruitment but after recruitment is made from two different sources they will have to be integrated into a common cadre and while so doing, the question of their inter se seniority would surface.....:.." As there was some doubt about the observations found in the aforesaid paragraph 11 and as to how the recruitment rule in question was to be operated in the light of the quota prescribed therein and the rotational method of achieving the said quota of recruitment from two sources, a later Bench clarified the position in the subsequent judgment in the case of Paramjit Singh (supra). Another bench of two learned Judges, wherein D.A.Desai, J., was common, clarified the observation in paragraph 11 of the earlier Report as under : "6. In our opinion there is no ambiguity in the judgment. Ordinarily speaking, where recruitment is from two sources with a view to integrating recruits from both sources after the recruitment seniority is determined from the date of entry into the cadre except where there has been a substantial violation of the quota giving undeserved advantage to one or the other source. Seniority ordinarily speaking is determined with reference to the date of entry into the cadre which in service jurisprudence is styled the date of continues officiation. Seniority ordinarily speaking is determined with reference to the date of entry into the cadre which in service jurisprudence is styled the date of continues officiation. These notions of service jurisprudence may have to yield place to the specific rules and the fact situation with reference to Rule 10 did compel this Court to depart from the normal concept in service jurisprudence. However, introduction of a roster system is very well known in service jurisprudence. What this Court meant while saying that when a quota rule is prescribed for recruitment to a cadre it meant that quota should be co-related to the vacancies which are to be filled in. Who retired and from what source he was recruited may not be very relevant because retirement from service may not follow the quota rule. Promotees who came to the service at an advanced age may retire, early and direct recruits who enter the service at a comparatively young age may continue for a long time. If, therefore, in a given year larger number of promotees retire and every time the vacancy is filled in by referring to the source from which the retiring person was recruited it would substantially disturb the quota rule itself. Therefore, while making recruitment quota rule is required to be strictly adhered to. That was what was meant by this Court when it said : "The quota rule would apply to vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. The quota in the present case is 4:1 that is, four promotees to one direct recruit. Therefore, whenever vacancies occur in the service the appointing authority has to go on recruiting according to quota. In other words, whenever vacancies occur, first recruit four promotees irrespective of the factors or circumstances causing the vacancies and as soon as four promotees are recruited bring in a direct recruit. That was what was meant by this Court when it said that a roster has to be introduced and this roster must continue while giving confirmation. The sentence which seems to have created a difference of opinion reads as under : "A roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and recruit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source," 7. The sentence which seems to have created a difference of opinion reads as under : "A roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and recruit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source," 7. The sentence cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read with the earlier sentence that the quota rule would apply to me vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. The Court then proceeded to say that if the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation." The aforesaid decision which squarely applies to the facts of the present case, therefore, leaves no room for doubt that when under the recruitment Rule 9 in question there is no reservation of any given category of candidates like SCs, STs or BCs to the posts in the cadre of Professors, appointments to the posts in the cadre have to be made in the light of the percentage of vacancies in the posts to be filled in by promotees or direct recruits. The quota of percentage of departmental promotees and direct recruits has to be worked out on the basis of the roster points taking into consideration vacancies that fall due at a given point of time. As stated earlier, as the roster for 3 promotees and one direct recruit moves forward, there is no question of filling up the vacancy created by the retirement of a direct recruit by a direct recruit or the vacancy created by a promotee by a promotee. Irrespective of the identity of the person retiring, the post is to be filled by the onward motion of 3 promotees and one direct recruit Consequently, learned counsel for the appellant and learned senior counsel for the intervenor were right when they contended that the High Court in its impugned judgment had patently erred in invoking the ratio of decision of this Court in R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra) which was rendered in an entirely different context for resolving an entirely different controversy which did not arise on the facts of the present case. They were also right in contending that the ratio of the decision of this Court in Paramjit Singh's case (supra) read with the decision of this Court in the same case reported in [1982] 3 SCC 191 would get squarely attracted in the facts of the present case. Once that conclusion is reached, the result becomes obvious. Whenever in the cadre of Professors of Ophthalmology, vacancies arise for being filled in at any given point of time, those vacancies in the posts have to be filled in by operating the roster in such a way that available vacancies get filled up by allotting 75% of them to departmental promotees and 25% to direct recruits. Exactly in this way, the roster in the present case was operated by the appellant- State to regulate entry in the cadre of Professors. The factual position in the present case, in the light of operation of the roster for appointing candidates in the cadre of Professors of Ophthalmology projects the following picture: AS PER THE STATE GOVERNMENT ROSTER POINT: 1. Dr. Dhanwant Singh 3.5.67 Promotion 2. Dr. Ranbir Singh 9.10.68 Promotion 3. Dr. Sohan Lal Sharma 10.9.69 Promotion 4. Dr. M.R.Chadha 13.12.71 Direct recruitment 5. Dr. Daljit Singh 26.6.74 Promotion 6. Dr. K.K. Khanna 29.6.81 Promotion 7. Dr. D.C. Bansal 9.1.82 Promotion 8. Dr. Charanjit Lal 2.2.85 Direct recruitment 9. Dr. S.S. Rudra 1.11.83 Promotion 10. Dr. D.C. Aggarwal 26.9.85 Promotion 11. Dr.M.S.Hora 3.10.85 Promotion 12. Dr. S.S. Shergill 8.7.94 Direct recruitment 13. Dr. Pawanjit Singh Sandhu 20.10.90A 1.10.93R Promotion 14. Dr. M.S.Bhatia 6.12.96 Promotion 15. Dr. Stal Paul 7.12.96 Promotion As noted earlier, we are concerned with the disputed vacancy no. 16 which occurred at the roster point no. 16. As the percentage for recruitment of Professors from departmental candidates was 75% and 25% of the appointments to posts were reserved for direct recruits, the first three vacancies in the cadre would go to promotees and fourth vacancy would go to a direct recruit, similarly 5th, 6th and 7th were to be filled in by departmental candidates and the 8th vacancy go to direct recruit, 9th, 10th and 11th would go to departmental promotees and the 12th vacancy would go to a direct recruit 13th, 14th and 15th vacancies would go to departmental promotees. Therefore, the disputed 16th vacancy would necessarily go to a direct recruit. Therefore, the disputed 16th vacancy would necessarily go to a direct recruit. That is how the roster points were worked out by the appellant for regulating the recruitment from two sources i.e. promotees and direct recruits. Though the word "post" is used in Rule 9 of the rules it cannot be said that it must necessarily refer to total posts in the cadre and not to vacancies. It is obvious that recruitment to fill up the vacancies as may be existing from time to time in the cadre is controlled by the quota or percentage of posts earmarked for promotees as compared to direct recruits. As laid down by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions rendered by the Division Benches of two learned Judges, speaking through D.A. Desai, J., it has to be held that for working out the rule of recruitment envisaging appointments from two sources of promotees and direct recruits vacancies in the cadre of Professors had to be kept in view and not the posts themselves. Learned counsel for the appellant and learned senior counsel for the intervenor were right when they contended that if the view which appealed to the High Court is to be accepted the very Rule 9 and the scheme envisaged by it for effecting appointments to the cadre in the ratio Of 75% for promotees and 25% for direct recruits would get stultified and frustrated. It was rightly submitted that if four vacancies are filled in from promotees and only one vacancy is to be kept for a direct recruit on the basis that there are-total five posts in the cadre, then 75% of five posts would work out at 3.75 and have to be rounded up as four for the promotees and the remaining 1.25 posts have to be rounded up as only one being less than 1.50. Thus, in substance, the source of recruitment for promotees would get enhanced to 80% and that of direct recruits would be reduced to 20%, That would fly in the face of the statutory rule which does not envisage such percentage of reservation for promotees and direct recruits. It was also rightly contended that the rule in question controls the recruitment to entire Punjab Medical Education Service (Class 1). This service consist of various categories of posts as specified in Appendix 'B' to the rules. It was also rightly contended that the rule in question controls the recruitment to entire Punjab Medical Education Service (Class 1). This service consist of various categories of posts as specified in Appendix 'B' to the rules. Rule 4 provides that the service shall comprise the posts shown in Appendix 'B'. When we turn to Appendix 'B', we find that there are number of posts of Professors sanctioned as on 1st September, 1974 in various disciplines. For example, in the Department of Pharmacology there are only 2 posts, while in the Department of Forensic Medicine there is only one post of Professor. Now, if the reasoning adopted by the High Court is pressed in service for applicability of Rule 9 of the recruitment rules then a very curious and anomalous situation would arise. In the Department of Pharmacology out of the two posts of Professor if 75% of the total posts in the cadre are to be earmarked for being filled in by departmental promotees then it would result in earmarking of 1.50 posts for promotees and only 0.50% posts for direct recruits. Ignoring these digits it would result in earmarking one post for promotee and one post for a direct recruit in the entire cadre of Professors of Pharmacology. If that happens, then earmarking would reflect an entirely different scheme of recruitment rules namely, 50% of posts of Professor would be available to be filled up by promotees and 50% of posts would be available to be filled up by direct recruits. That is not the scheme of Rule 9. Similarly, in case of Forensic Medicine there is only one post of Professor. Adopting the line of reasoning which appealed to the High Court for working out Rule 9 if 75% of the said posts of Professor is earmarked for promotees it would result into one as more than 0.50% has to be rounded up to one. Similarly, in case of Forensic Medicine there is only one post of Professor. Adopting the line of reasoning which appealed to the High Court for working out Rule 9 if 75% of the said posts of Professor is earmarked for promotees it would result into one as more than 0.50% has to be rounded up to one. Therefore, there being only one post of Professor in the cadre of Professor of Forensic Medicine, it will always to go to a promotee and there will be no direct recruitment for that post Meaning thereby, Rule 9 in its applicability for regulating recruitment to the post of Professor in Forensic Medicine would result in earmarking the post for a departmental promotee only by way of 100% reservation and there will be no direct recruitment to the said post at any time in future making 0% reservation for that service. This would stultify the operation of Rule 9 so far as the cadre of Professors in Forensic Medicine goes. It must, therefore, be held that Rule 9 which regulates appointments to the posts in the Punjab Medical Education Service (Class-I) has to be applied uniformly for recruitment of Professors in all the cadres of disciplines. In such cases, the method followed by the appellant-State for recruitment of Professors in diverse cadres of discipline as shown in Appendix 'B' to the rules remains the only workable one. It is to the effect that as and when vacancy arises in the concerned cadre of posts in any of the discipline first three future vacancies would go to departmental promotees and the fourth future vacancy would go to a direct recruit. Meaning thereby, even in the cadre of Professor of Forensic Medicine where only one post of Professor is for the first time to be filled in, it will go to a promotee and as and when such promotee retires or resigns or unfortunately dies in harness the second vacancy would also go to a promotee, similarly, the third one but the fourth vacancy would go to a direct recruit. That is how Rule 9 laying down quota and rota for monitoring recruitment from two sources of departmental promotees and direct recruits can work uniformly in all the departments for recruitment of Professors where the (ii) The case of Dipak Babaria & Another –versus- State of Gujarat & Others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 520. That is how Rule 9 laying down quota and rota for monitoring recruitment from two sources of departmental promotees and direct recruits can work uniformly in all the departments for recruitment of Professors where the (ii) The case of Dipak Babaria & Another –versus- State of Gujarat & Others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 520. The relevant para-61 of the judgment is reproduced here below:- “61. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor Vs. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426,431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Vs. King Emperor reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and then followed by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 322 . This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh by a bench of three Judges reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 in the following words:- “8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted….” This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad reported in 1999 (8) SCC 266 , Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Essar Power Limited reported in 2008 (4) SCC 755 ”. 5. Ms. S. Mere, learned Government Advocate submitted that the post of ASI has not been abolish, the department had only contemplated to do the same, but, since the proposal was not approved by the P&AR department it has remained as such. It was with the hope and expectation that the proposal would be accepted the post of ASI was deliberately not mention in the NPTO Service Rules, 2013. 6. It was with the hope and expectation that the proposal would be accepted the post of ASI was deliberately not mention in the NPTO Service Rules, 2013. 6. The learned counsel also submitted that according to Rule-18 of NPTO Service Rules, 2013, only those rules which are corresponding to the same and which were in force immediately before its commencement have been repealed. Since, the post of ASI was not covered by the 2013 Rules the same is not applicable in their case. The learned counsel also referred to official communications between the PHQ and the Home Commissioner and within the Police department which reveals that there was a proposal for conversion of 50% of the existing 118 posts of ASI to SI and downgrading of the same number of the cadre to the cadre of Havildar in the same organization. The learned counsel also referred to the correspondence which reveals that the Government of Nagaland had intimated its regret for its inability to accept the proposal as stated above. 7. The learned counsel for the private respondents, Mr. Wati Jamir submitted that the respondents No. 5 to 24 were appointed in the direct recruitment quota and their appointment order does not affect the petitioners at all as their claim is from promotion quota. The learned counsel also submitted that Rule-5(b) of 2013 Rules mentions only 3(three) categories of post in the service of NPTO, therefore, ASI are not one of the cadre of NPTO. And, the rule also does not provide for promotion of ASI to SI, therefore, they cannot claim for promotion under the same. The learned counsel further submitted that some of the petitioners who were in the post of ASI have been promoted to SI in the quota allotted for promotion and some of the petitioners who were Havildars have also been promoted to ASI as per the rule, therefore, they have no locus standi to challenge the appointment of the private respondents to the post of SI. The learned counsel finally submitted that the private respondents have completed their training and they have been given postings, therefore, they should not be unsettled by quashing their appointments at this stage. The learned counsel finally submitted that the private respondents have completed their training and they have been given postings, therefore, they should not be unsettled by quashing their appointments at this stage. In support of his submission he cited the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the cases given here below;- (i) B. Srinivas Reddy –versus- Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees’ Association & Others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 73 (II). The relevant para- 51 of the judgment is given here below;- “51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses prescribed qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K. Jain vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119 was pleased to hold that the evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, it may be open to be considered. It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non- appointee to assail the legality or correctness of the action and that third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was declared that only public law declaration would be made at the behest of a public spirited person coming before the Court as a petitioner having regard to the fact that the neither of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were or could have been candidates for the post of Managing Director of the Board and the High Court could not have gone beyond the limits of Quo Warranto so very well delineated by a catena of decisions of this Court and applied the test which could not have been applied even in a certiorari proceedings brought before the Court by an aggrieved party who was a candidate for the post”. (ii). Ayaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 . The relevant paragraphs- 9, 10 & 12 of the judgment is reproduced here below;- “9. (ii). Ayaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 . The relevant paragraphs- 9, 10 & 12 of the judgment is reproduced here below;- “9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 ; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736 ; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784 ). 10. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. 10. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 ; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1977 SC 1361 ). 12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A. P., AIR 2011 SC 3031 , this Court held: “25…..The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” (iii) Sanjay Sitaram Khemka –versus- State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 255 . The relevant portions of the judgment is reproduced here in below:- “4. The criminal writ petition filed by the petitioner being Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2004 was dismissed for default on 27.1.2005. The petitioner made his Advocate Mr. Akhilesh Singh responsible for dismissal of the said writ petition, for which he is said to have filed a complaint against him under Section 35 of the Advocates Act. However, on the premise that no action had been taken by the authorities concerned, he again filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court praying for various reliefs which had been referred to in detail in the impugned judgment. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay dismissed the said writ petition stating:- "The petitioner appears in person and submits that action against the respondents is liable to be taken and the above quoted prayers are liable to be granted. For each of the prayers mentioned above, the petitioner has effective remedy in appropriate courts. If he has grievance of he being maliciously treated the remedy for him to file a complaint is open. For each of the prayers mentioned above, the petitioner has effective remedy in appropriate courts. If he has grievance of he being maliciously treated the remedy for him to file a complaint is open. If he is harassed by the police officials, criminal complaint against such police officials can be lodged in appropriate criminal court. If he has been defamed action for defamation can be taken in appropriate criminal court. If he has been defamed, action for defamation can be taken in appropriate Court. If he wants damages for lost of prestige he has adequate remedy to claim such damages by way of a suit. Thus, for each prayer an independent efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. Instead the petitioner has chosen to come under Article 226 with these omnibus prayers that there be investigation into the conduct of police department and appropriate action including award of compensation be given to the petitioner" The Petitioner is, thus, before us. 8. Having regard to the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties before us, we are of the opinion that no relief can be granted to the Petitioner in this petition. The writ petition has rightly been held by the High Court to be involving disputed questions of fact. The petitioner has several causes of action wherefor he is required to pursue specific remedies provided therefore in law. 9. A Writ Petition, as has rightly been pointed out by the High Court, for grant of the said reliefs, was not the remedy. A matter involving a great deal of disputed questions of fact cannot be dealt with by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. As the High Court or this Court cannot, in view of the nature of the controversy as also the disputed questions of fact, go into the merit of the matter; evidently no relief can be granted to the Petitioner at this stage. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court does not contain any factual or legal error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution”. 8. After having considered the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners in its entirety, it is clear that the main thrust of the petitioners’ case is on non-implementation of the 2013 Rules in letter and spirit. 8. After having considered the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners in its entirety, it is clear that the main thrust of the petitioners’ case is on non-implementation of the 2013 Rules in letter and spirit. The introduction of Rule-1 of NPTO (Subordinate Service) Rules, 2013 reads as follows:- “In exercise of powers conferred by the provision to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to make the following rules regulating the method of recruitment and conditions of service of person appointed to the Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organization for Class-II Non-Gazetted Posts.” In exercise of powers conferred by the provision of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to make the following rules; regulating method of regulation and conditions of service of person appointed to the NPTO for Class-III Non-Gazette Posts. Rule-1 Short Title & Commencement ; (a) These Rules shall be called the Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organization Subordinate Service Rules, 2013. (b) These Rules shall come into force from the date of publication in the Nagaland Gazette. 9. Admittedly, the said rules was published in the Nagaland Gazette dated 13.12.2013, Part-IIA. As such, there is nothing to doubt that the 2013 Rules was published in the Nagaland Gazette after the same was taken through all the required processes. A rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India has the force of law subject only to the provisions of the constitution and the act if there is any relating to the subject pass by the Parliament or State legislature. It may not be out of place to reproduce here the contains of Article 309 of the Constitution of India. “Article 309. It may not be out of place to reproduce here the contains of Article 309 of the Constitution of India. “Article 309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.--Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.” The contains of the Article makes it clear that a rule framed under Article 309 is interim in nature and is subject only to the provisions of the Constitution and the Act passed by the appropriate legislature. The second part of the Article empowers the President in the case of the employees employed in the affairs of the Union, the Governor relating to employees employed in the affairs of the State to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees under their respective domain or direct such person or persons as they may deemed necessary or appropriate to make such rules until an act in that behalf is made by the appropriate legislature i.e. Parliament in the case of employees of the Union, State Legislature in the case of employees of the State. This provision of the Constitution leaves no ambiguity as to the fact that a rule made under Article 309 is a law until it is replace by an act of Parliament or State Legislature in that behalf. As stated above, the 2013 Rules is made under Article 309 of the Constitution and it is already published in the State Gazette. This provision of the Constitution leaves no ambiguity as to the fact that a rule made under Article 309 is a law until it is replace by an act of Parliament or State Legislature in that behalf. As stated above, the 2013 Rules is made under Article 309 of the Constitution and it is already published in the State Gazette. As such, as per Rule-1(b) of the same rule, the rules has come into effect from the day it was published and it has to be accepted as the law regulating the method of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the NPTO, Class-III Non-Gazette services. And since, no mention has been made of any act passed by the State Legislature regarding the recruitment and service conditions of persons in the services of NPTO, it has to be presumed that this is the only existing rules governing the method of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the NPTO, Class-III Non-Gazette. 10. Keeping in view the provisions of Rule-5 of NPTO (Subordinate Service) Rules, 2013 particularly, Sub-Rule-b which classified the service of NPTO into 3(three) cadres viz, SI, Havildar and Constable, and also keeping in view the fact that the post of ASI has always been a part of the NPTO, it can only be concluded that the framers of the rule had deliberately excluded the post of ASI from the 3(three) cadres with the intention and object of up-grading or merging the cadre of ASI to or with the cadre of SI in the NPTO. The fact that this was one of the intentions and objectives of the department while framing the 2013 Rules is stated in the affidavit of the respondents No. 1 to 4. The same is also sufficiently revealed in the internal communications of the respondents, copies of which are filed by the respondents. Since the intention has been carried to the extent of making and notifying the rules under Article 309 of the Constitution, the respondents cannot now go back in their intention and say otherwise as they have stated in their affidavit that the up-gradation of the cadre of ASI or merging of the same to the cadre of SI was contemplated but could not be materialized as the same was not approved by the Government. Because, that would not be a sound argument as the rule was framed, approved by the Government and only thereafter it was notified. No such rule could have been notified without the approval of the State Government. Therefore, to say that though the rule has been made it cannot be implemented because the Government has some other idea or ideas or has changed its mind cannot be accepted. If that is the way how a Government functions the people will be always left or kept in uncertainty, the consequence of which can only be chaos, which can never be the intention of a democratically elected Government. Besides, when such laws are made and notified its sanctity must be respected and guarded. Further, indecisiveness or lack of precision in decision making process of a Government would lead to lost of faith and trust of the people it governs which this Court hopes will not happen. It has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in other branches of the Police department the post of ASI has been abolished or up-graded to the post of SI and it is only in this organization i.e. NPTO that the State Government has remained short of translating its intention into action even though it has gone to the extent of making and notifying the 2013 Rules. If that be so, this Court finds no reason why the service or cadre of the petitioners should be treated differently. To do so would amount to discrimination. There should not be discrimination among the Government employees, each one must be given what is due to him or what is given to people who are similarly situated. Government has to be a model employer in every way and it cannot and should not act to the determine of the interest of its own employees. To expect and to get the best out its employees, it must also be fair in its dealing with them. It cannot promise one thing today and do otherwise tomorrow. It would only lead to frustration and demoralization of its employees. One cannot expect anything much from a person in frustration or who is demoralized. In view of what has been stated above, the respondents must go ahead and implement the NPTO (Subordinate Service) Rules, 2013 in letter and spirit to achieve all the objectives intended to be achieved through it. 11. One cannot expect anything much from a person in frustration or who is demoralized. In view of what has been stated above, the respondents must go ahead and implement the NPTO (Subordinate Service) Rules, 2013 in letter and spirit to achieve all the objectives intended to be achieved through it. 11. The second prayer of the petitioners is for quashing and setting aside the appointment orders of the respondents No. 5 to 24 to the post of SI being, No. PHQ (A-II/172/2011/357/360/365/illegible/375, dated 01.06.2015, No. PHQ(A-II)172/2011/377/376/374/375, dated 08.06.2015, No. PHQ(A-II)172/2011/378/381/379, dated 10.06.2015, No. PHQ(B-I)1/24/2003/382, dated 10.06.2015, No. PHQ (A-II)172/2011/384/380/383/380, dated 10.06.2015, No. PHQ(A-II)172/2011/470/466, dated 01.07.2015, No. PHQ(A-II)172/2011/486, dated 02.07.2015. This Court is not inclined to go into it because the petitioners have not shown or stated in their petition how and in what manner the private respondents have been recruited through back door. Without such specific allegation or allegations supported by documents it is not possible to go into such issue. On the other hand, the respondents have shown in a very cogent manner that they have been appointed under the direct recruitment quota and the same has not been refuted by the petitioners. As such, it has to be accepted that they have been appointed as per the rule under direct recruitment quota. Under such fact situation, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge their recruitment. However, it must be stated here that no recruitment should be carried out in the Police department of the State of Nagaland without issuing advertisement. Because this is the law of the land pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of cases, keeping in view the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of our Country. To mention a few, the following pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases given here below are reproduced:- (i) In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others –versus- Umadevi & Others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 1 . The relevant paras-38, 40 & 41. “38. In Union Public Service Commission Vs. To mention a few, the following pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases given here below are reproduced:- (i) In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others –versus- Umadevi & Others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 1 . The relevant paras-38, 40 & 41. “38. In Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Others [ 2006 (2) SCALE 115 ], this Court answered the question, who was a Government servant and stated:- "Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words "employment" or "appointment" cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution (See B.S. Minhas Vs. Indian Statistical Institute and others AIR 1984 SC 363 )." 40. At this stage, it is relevant to notice two aspects. In Kesavananda Bharati Vs. State of Kerala (1973 Supp. S.C.R. 1), this Court held that Article 14, and Article 16, which was described as a facet of Article 14, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. At this stage, it is relevant to notice two aspects. In Kesavananda Bharati Vs. State of Kerala (1973 Supp. S.C.R. 1), this Court held that Article 14, and Article 16, which was described as a facet of Article 14, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. The position emerging from Kesavananada Bharati (supra) was summed up by Jagannatha Rao, J., speaking for a Bench of three Judges in Indira Sawhney Vs. Union of India (1999 Suppl. (5) S.C.R. 229). That decision also reiterated how neither the Parliament nor the Legislature could transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16 (1) is a facet. This Court stated, "The preamble to the Constitution of India emphasises the principle of equality as basic to our constitution. In Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, it was ruled that even constitutional amendments which offended the basic structure of the Constitution would be ultra vires the basic structure. Sikri, CJ. laid stress on the basic features enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution and said that there were other basic features too which could be gathered from the Constitutional scheme (para 506 A of SCC). Equality was one of the basic features referred to in the Preamble to our Constitution. Shelat and Grover, JJ. also referred to the basic rights referred to in the Preamble. They specifically referred to equality (paras 520 and 535A of SCC). Hegde & Shelat, JJ. also referred to the Preamble (paras 648,652). Ray, J. (as he then was) also did so (para 886).Jaganmohan Reddy, J. too referred to the Preamble and the equality doctrine (para 1159). Khanna, J. accepted this position (para 1471). Mathew, J. referred to equality as a basic feature(para 1621). Dwivedi, J. (paras 1882, 1883) and Chandrachud, J.(as he then was) (see para 2086) accepted this position. What we mean to say is that Parliament and the legislatures in this Country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16(1) is a facet." 41. In the earlier decision in Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India [1992 Supp. What we mean to say is that Parliament and the legislatures in this Country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16(1) is a facet." 41. In the earlier decision in Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India [1992 Supp. (2) S.C.R. 454), B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for the majority, while acknowledging that equality and equal opportunity is a basic feature of our Constitution, has explained the exultant position of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in the scheme of things. His Lordship stated:- "6. The significance attached by the founding fathers to the right to equality is evident not only from the fact that they employed both the expressions 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' in Article 14 but proceeded further to state the same rule in positive and affirmative terms in Articles 15 to 18. 7. Inasmuch as public employment always gave a certain status and power --- it has always been the repository of State power---besides the means of livelihood, special care was taken to declare equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment by Article 16. Clause (1), expressly declares that in the matter of public employment or appointment to any office under the state, citizens of this country shall have equal opportunity while clause (2) declares that no citizen shall be discriminated in the said matter on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. At the same time, care was taken to, declare in clause (4) that nothing in the said Article shall prevent the state from making any provision for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizen which in the opinion of the state, is not adequately represented in the services under the state.."(See paragraphs 6 and 7 at pages 544 and 545) These binding decisions are clear imperatives that adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment”. (ii) In the case of State of Orissa & Anr. –vs- Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 . The relevant paragraphs- 35 and 36. “APPOINTMENT/EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT ADVERTISEMENT: 35. (ii) In the case of State of Orissa & Anr. –vs- Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 . The relevant paragraphs- 35 and 36. “APPOINTMENT/EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT ADVERTISEMENT: 35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the names from Employment Exchange would curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment. But, later on, came to the conclusion that some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. Even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from Employment Exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in Radio and Television as merely calling the names from the Employment Exchange does not meet the requirement of the said Article of the Constitution. (Vide: Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 789 ; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Piara Singh & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 2130 ; Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam, Krishna District, A.P.v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 216 ; Arun Tewari & Ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 331; Binod Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Ram Ashray Mahoto & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2103 ; National Fertilizers Ltd. & Ors. v. Somvir Singh, AIR 2006 SC 2319;Telecom District Manager & Ors. v. Keshab Deb, (2008) 8 SCC 402 ; State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 65 ; and State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Mohd. Ibrahim, (2009) 15 SCC 214 ). 36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance of the said Constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit”. 12. It would be seen from the above pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that recruitment to public employment or Government service should be preceded by well circulated advertisement so that every person eligible and interested in such post or posts will have a chance of applying and competing for the same, and to do otherwise would amount to violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. This Court has no doubt that the Police department of Nagaland is well aware of the law pronounced by the Apex Court and it will follow the same in all the future recruitments in the department. 13. In view of what has been stated above, the respondents are hereby directed to take steps for up-gradation of the existing posts/cadre of ASI in NPTO to the posts/cadre of SI in the same organization. The whole process should be completed within the period of 5(five) months from today. With this, the writ petition is disposed.