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2017 DIGILAW 517 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Kalabhai Dhanabha Khant

2017-03-06

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment and order dated 2nd June 2004 passed by the learned Joint District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Modasa at Sabalpur, in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2004 whereby the learned Sessions Judge pleased to pass an order of acquittal in favor of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 364, 324, 506(2) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that on 4th January 2004 at about 4:00 hours in the night in the sim of village Vadagam, the accused persons had gathered with a common intention to commit murder of Raju @ Jesa Dhana Khant. In furtherance of this object, respondent No. 1 had given a blow with iron rod and respondent No. 2 had given knife blows, whereby Raju @ Jesa Dhana Khant succumbed to the injuries and died. So much so that even respondent No. 3 had caught hold of Suryaben Jesabhai and another witness Lilaben Jesaji Ramaji to prevent them from intervening by administering threat of death. With respect to this episode, the complainant had tried to save Raju @ Jesa Dhana Khant by intervening, but she also sustained knife blow on her left hand by respondent No. 2 accused and resultantly the complaint came to be filed on account of this incident in question. 3. By ascertaining the aforesaid factual details, the complaint came to be filed before the Dhansura Police Station being Cr.R. No. I-2 of 2004 and pursuant to the said lodging of the complaint the investigating officer had undertaken steps of investigation by executing the inquest panchnama by recording statement of witnesses, recovered the clothes from the body of the deceased and sent the same for analysis, as also drawn the panchnama of scene of offence. The investigating officer has also executed panchnama of the body of the accused persons and recovered muddamal by drawing panchnama and after recovering the muddamal, some of the articles were sent to FSL for further examination and after taking thorough investigation a charge-sheet came to be filed by investigating officer before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Modasa at Sabalpur. The investigating officer has also executed panchnama of the body of the accused persons and recovered muddamal by drawing panchnama and after recovering the muddamal, some of the articles were sent to FSL for further examination and after taking thorough investigation a charge-sheet came to be filed by investigating officer before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Modasa at Sabalpur. Since the case in question was triable by the Court of Sessions, in exercise of power under Section 209 of Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate was pleased to commit the case to the Court of Sessions, which has come-up for consideration before the learned Joint District Judge and Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Modasa at Sabalpur, which was then registered as Sessions Case No. 70 of 2004. 4. Pursuant to the case having registered as Sessions Case No. 70 of 2004, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was pleased to frame the charge vide Exh. 2 on 17th May 2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 364, 324, 506(2) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. After framing the charge, the plea was recorded of the respondents accused vide Exh. 3, 4 and 5 respectively and since the offence was not admitted by the respondents accused, the case was put-up for further adjudication. 5. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has given an opportunity to the prosecution to lead the evidence and accordingly the prosecution has led oral as well as documentary evidence in the following form. Sr. No. Exhibit Name Remarks 1 Exh.7 Suryaben Jesingbhai Complainant 2 Exh.9 Lilaben Jesaji Ramaji 3 Exh.10 Bhikhabhai Chunilal Darji Panch 4 Exh.12 Arjunsinh Lalsinh Panch 5 Exh.14 Babubhai Gopalbhai Patel Panch 6 Exh.18 Dr. Alkaben Bhimjibhai Vaghela Doctor 7 Exh.23 Dr. Narendrakumar Sevantilal Kothari Doctor 8 Exh.25 Laxmanbhai Bhemabhai Damor Panch 9 Exh.27 Yusufbhai Rasulbhai Shaikh Panch 10 Exh.28 Ajitbhai Mangalbhai Raval 11 Exh.29 Ishwarbhai Purshottamdas Prajapati 12 Exh.30 Dhanjibhai Muljibhai 13 Exh.31 Ashwinkumar Vitthaldas Panch 14 Exh.32 Jesaji Ramaji Rathod 15 Exh.34 Chaherabhai Galabhai 16 Exh.35 Arjanbhai Hirabhai Rathod 17 Exh.37 Kiritbhai Maganbhai Patel Panch 18 Exh.38 Mr. V.R. Bajpai I.O. Documentary Evidence :- Sr. V.R. Bajpai I.O. Documentary Evidence :- Sr. No. Exhibit Description 1 Exh.8 Complaint 2 Exh.11 Inquest panchnama of the dead body 3 Exh.13 Panchnama of scene of offence 4 Exh.15 Panchnama of body of accused 5 Exh.16 Recovery Panchnama of muddamal knife 6 Exh.17 Recovery Panchnama of muddamal Jack 7 Exh.19 Medical Certificate of complainant 8 Exh.20 & 21 Medical Certificate of both the accused 9 Exh.22 Case papers of complainant Suryaben 10 Exh.24 Postmortem notes of deceased Rajubhai Dhanabhai Khant 11 Exh.26 Recovery panchnama of the clothes of the accused 12 Exh.33 Letter written by Jesaji Ramaji Rathod 13 Exh.36 Panchnama of body of the accused 14 Exh.39 Panchnama of clothes on the dead body 15 Exh.41 F.S.L. Report 16 Exh.42 & 43 Recovery panchnama of muddamal 6. After leading the evidence in the aforesaid form, the closure purshis has been given by the prosecution at Exh. 24. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has granted an opportunity to the respondents accused to defend in which a further statement of the respondent - accused came to be recorded under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. and since the respondents accused have denied the offence being committed by the respondents - accused, the case was then further proceeded for final adjudication by framing issues. 7. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge after analyzing the evidence on record and after considering the material adduced by the prosecution has examined the case of the prosecution and by judgment and order dated 2nd June 2004, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, was pleased to grant benefit of doubt to the accused, and acquit the respondents - accused for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 364, 324, 506(2) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 232 and 235(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure vide judgment and order dated 2nd June 2004 thereafter, the Sessions Case came to be disposed of. 8. It is this judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which is a subject matter of present criminal appeal by the State. The criminal appeal appears to have been admitted by order dated 4th February 2008. 9. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant - State has contended that there is a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which is a subject matter of present criminal appeal by the State. The criminal appeal appears to have been admitted by order dated 4th February 2008. 9. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant - State has contended that there is a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in passing an order of acquittal and while passing the order of acquittal the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has not properly considered the evidence, which has been led by the prosecution. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has contended that the prosecution with a view to prove the charge has examined several witnesses i.e. 16 in numbers and as many as 18 documentary evidence have also been led before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and prosecution has by leading these evidence proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, there appears to be a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in granting the benefit of doubt. Mr. Poojari, learned APP further contended that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in granting the benefit of doubt are not germen to law nor are cogent enough to substantiate or corroborate the material on record and therefore, since there appears to be complete missing of evidence, the finding arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge appears to be perverse and therefore, this is a fit case in which by exercising appellate jurisdiction the order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned APP further contended that the allegations, which are contained in the FIR are specifically corroborated by the version of prosecution witnesses and the PW-1 as well as other witnesses are specifically deposing before the trial Court, which completely supports the case of prosecution and therefore, in such a situation the granting of benefit without any justifiable reason is a serious error of jurisdiction and therefore, the learned Addl. Session Judge has committed grave error in passing the order of acquittal. Learned APP has further contended that all the witnesses might have become hostile, but from cross-examination of these witnesses, there appears to be support to the case of prosecution and therefore, simply because some of the witnesses have turned hostile, it cannot be said that no case is established against the respondents-accused. Learned APP has further contended that all the witnesses might have become hostile, but from cross-examination of these witnesses, there appears to be support to the case of prosecution and therefore, simply because some of the witnesses have turned hostile, it cannot be said that no case is established against the respondents-accused. In fact, medical evidence is also supporting completely and found to be in consonance with the ocular evidence and therefore, in absence of any contradiction between them, no order of acquittal can be passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. He for this purpose taken us to a specific charge, which has been framed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge reflecting from the paper-book's compilation and has also taken us to the version of deposition of PW-1 Suryaben Jesingbhai. He contended that no doubt this PW-1 as well as another PW-2 Lilaben Jesaji Ramaji have turned hostile, from their depositions it is a case made-out which can be corroborated from the other documentary evidence viz. the panchnamas, which have been executed of the scene of offence, as well as the recovery panchnama and their cross-examination, if to be corroborated with other documentary evidence, which has revealed the truth, it cannot be said that the granting of benefit of doubt is a justifiable ground on the part of learned Addl. Sessions Judge and therefore, he requested the Court to set aside the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. 10. Learned APP further drawn our attention to the medical evidence in the form of Dr. Narendrakumar S. Kothari, examined as PW-7 reflecting on page No. 45 of paper-book's compilation and correspondingly drawn our attention to the postmortem report, which is at page No. 48 of paper-book's compilation and has contended that this medical evidence completely fortify the case of the prosecution and therefore, in such a situation the granting of benefit of doubt would be nothing but a miscarriage of justice. Learned APP further drawn our attention to the deposition of Investigating Officer at Exh. 38 and who is examined as PW-18 and from that version, it has been contended that the case has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Learned APP further drawn our attention to the deposition of Investigating Officer at Exh. 38 and who is examined as PW-18 and from that version, it has been contended that the case has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are far from the gist of material on record and therefore, it can easily be said to be perverse to the record and therefore, in this background, he has contended that granting of benefit of doubt is nothing but a clear example of error of jurisdiction at the end of learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Learned APP has further drawn our attention to the other part of the record viz. FSL examination and from that it has been pointed-out that on item No. 12 of the said FSL examination, which is reflecting at page No. 90 of paper-book, knife has been found with blood stains and this evidence, which is a corroborated version of prosecution, the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are vague and cannot be said to be supported with the cogent material and therefore, the order of learned Addl. Sessions Judge is required to be corrected as it is in the miscarriage of justice and therefore, he vehemently contended that from the conjoint effect of record as well as for establishing the guilt of the accused, the order in question is required to be reversed by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. No other submissions have been made. 11. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Atit Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the respondents - accused has vehemently contended that all the witnesses in the present case have turned hostile and nobody has supported the case of the prosecution. Learned advocate for the respondents - accused further contended so much so that the main star witness of the case of prosecution i.e. Suryaben as well as Lilaben, who were examined as PW-1 and PW-2 have also not supported the case of the prosecution. In addition thereto Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents-accused contended before the Court that panchnamas, which have been executed viz. In addition thereto Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents-accused contended before the Court that panchnamas, which have been executed viz. panchnama of scene of offence, recovery of muddamal, panchas have not supported the case of prosecution and all are become hostile and therefore, the panchnamas, which have been drawn to prove the case have also not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Thakore, learned advocate has contended that may be that panchas have not been supported, but even the investigating officer's version if is to be looked into, it transpires that he has also not established the panchnamas or the manner in which it is to be established and therefore, this being a case of no evidence, no order of conviction can be passed and therefore, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has rightly granted the benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents further drawn our attention to the medical evidence in which Dr. Alkaben Vaghela, who has examined Suryaben, one of the star witness of the prosecution, in which the doctor has clearly in cross-examination has opined that no such Medical Certificate of opinion is given that this kind of injuries are possible in scuffle. In addition thereto, Mr. Thakore, learned advocate has also drawn our attention to the panchnama of scene of offence, which has been drawn and from that Mr. Thakore, learned advocate has stated that no incriminating material is made available on record by the prosecution and correspondingly he drawn our attention to the FSL examination report reflecting on page No. 90 and has stated that even if assuming that incriminating material is found, the same is not put to the knowledge of the respondents accused even in 313 statement and that infirmity, which has been lying in the case of prosecution is not proving the case of prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Learned advocate for the respondents accused submitted that on overall leading of evidence on record, it is quite clear that none of the witnesses have supported the case of prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and learned Addl. Sessions Judge has rightly exercised jurisdiction in granting benefit of doubt. He further drawn our attention to the findings, which have been arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has rightly exercised jurisdiction in granting benefit of doubt. He further drawn our attention to the findings, which have been arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge more particularly from paragraph No. 34 onwards reflecting on page No. 116 of paper-book's compilation in which upon analysis of each and every material on record, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has specifically comes to the conclusion that the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. On the contrary, a specific conclusion arrived at that the version of PW-1 and PW-2, who sought to be an eye witnesses are not supporting the case of the prosecution and therefore, simply because the eye witnesses have not supported the case, the Court has to examine the issue from the point of view that the case is based on circumstantial evidence and for that purpose, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge concluded upon examination and there appears to be no change of circumstantial evidence is completing and therefore, specific conclusion reflecting by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in order, is based upon the analysis on record as discussed above. 12. From reading of the judgment, Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents has further drawn our attention to the specific conclusion that the writing, which has been said to be reflecting at Exh. 33 is also not proved and on the contrary not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondents has stated that the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has rightly exercised jurisdiction. The entire reading was brought to our notice in which there appears to be specific finding supported by the evidence and thereby contended that since no case is made-out there appears to be no error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and therefore, requested the Court that as the said appeal has no merit, the same deserves to be dismissed. 13. Having heard learned advocates representing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record, more particularly the reasons assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, the following circumstances cannot be ignored even while assessing and reassessing the evidence on record. 13. Having heard learned advocates representing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record, more particularly the reasons assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, the following circumstances cannot be ignored even while assessing and reassessing the evidence on record. (1) From the record there is a specific charge of Section 302 read with other Sections, which are mentioned in it, but then reading the narration of the two star witnesses viz. Suryaben, where it appears from the reading that she has deposed contradictory with narration of case of the prosecution and therefore, she was declared hostile upon the request. Her cross-examination appears to be not that stinking by virtue of which a strong inference can be drawn against the respondents accused. Similarly, is the case with respect to the evidence of Lilaben another PW, who was examined at Exh. 9. This witness has not completely ruled-out possibilities of the case being proved beyond reasonable doubt against the respondents accused and therefore, from this witness the case of the prosecution has not been strengthened in any manner. (2) Similarly, the evidence of panch witnesses related to the inquest panchnama, the panchnama of scene of offence, as well as recovery panchnama are not establishing the guilt as those panchnamas have not been supported by the panch witnesses and therefore, the very base of the case of the prosecution has become weakened in consideration of record of the case any further. We found the version of the Medical Officer Dr. Alkaben Vaghela, whose evidence is self-contradictory. No doubt this Medical Officer has narrated the injuries, but then has conveyed that Suryaben gave the history and accordingly the history was recorded. Now, this very Suryaben has turned hostile and has not supported the case of prosecution and in addition thereto this Medical Officer has clearly opined in the chief examination that in scuffle which type of injuries can take place, whereas in cross-examination, she has categorically stated that no such medical opinion has been given by her in Medical Certificate and therefore, the version of this witness is also not putting the case of the prosecution on front flow. Similarly, further examination of the evidence revealed that Medical Certificates, which issued are indicating that assault given by somebody and therefore, there appears to be no specific attribution to the respondents accused as can be seen from the medical papers reflecting on page No. 43 of paper-book's compilation. In the context of this medical evidence, a further examination is undertaken by us in the form of evidence of Dr. Kothari, who is said to be PW-7. In his evidence also, there is no clear opinion emerging, which can sound confidence in case of prosecution. In chief examination, this Medical Officer is deposing that with the muddamal knife this kind of injuries, which are analysis by the doctor can take place. Whereas in cross-examination, this Medical Officer has specifically deposed that some of the injuries can take place by blunt substance and therefore, on analysing this evidence with ocular evidence, there appears to be a clear conflict and the ocular evidence led by the prosecution has derailed the case of the prosecution and that appears to have been analysis of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in granting the benefit of doubt. A further fact is revealing from the record is that other witnesses viz. Ajit Raval PW-10, Ishwarbhai PW-11, whose evidence are not possible to be pressed into service to reverse the findings arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, as these witnesses are not the witnesses, who can be said to be eye-witnesses to the incident in question. In addition thereto, the prosecution has made attempts to rely heavily upon the writing of letter at Exh. 33, but then again this has found to be clearly a doubtful writing, which has not been established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, such finding upon analysis on record is not possible to be dislodge in absence of any specific material contrary to it and therefore, what is left to the Court is to examine the evidence of Investigating Officer. Now, the Investigating Officer is duty bound to prove each of the circumstance, which have been investigated by him and established the same to be reasonable before the Court. Now, the evidence of this police witness has indicated that for the purpose of lodging the complaint, the complainant had not come personally. Now, the Investigating Officer is duty bound to prove each of the circumstance, which have been investigated by him and established the same to be reasonable before the Court. Now, the evidence of this police witness has indicated that for the purpose of lodging the complaint, the complainant had not come personally. In addition thereto from cross-examination of this Investigating Officer, it has been revealed that there was no animosity or there was no quarrel between the deceased and his brothers nor it has been revealed from the investigation conducted by him and the cross-examination has further revealed the fact that from the evidence of other witnesses, it has been found that the complainant had several relations with more than one male persons and therefore, pointed-out finger towards character of the deceased. On careful consideration of the entire evidence of Investigating Officer, we found no material sufficient enough to dislodge the finding arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge from the FSL examination simply because the blood found from the articles whether the blood is that of the deceased is not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and even apart from that this kind of incriminating circumstance when appearing on record, it is a duty to put the same to the knowledge of the respondents accused and this finding of blood on the muddamal articles appears to have not been placed in 313 examination of the respondents accused. The further statements, which are recorded under Section 313 if to be looked into, which are contained in paper-book's compilation, it would clearly indicate that no incriminating circumstance is put to respondents accused for their defence and it is fatal in proving the case against the respondents accused and therefore, conjoint reading of this entire material on record would indicate that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are not that much laconic by virtue of which we can dislodge as specifically each and every evidence is dealt with by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by arriving at a subjective satisfaction. The conclusion appears to be based upon the complete reading of evidence on record and therefore such possible view arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is under normal circumstance and not to be disturbed in view of the catena of decisions. Sessions Judge by arriving at a subjective satisfaction. The conclusion appears to be based upon the complete reading of evidence on record and therefore such possible view arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is under normal circumstance and not to be disturbed in view of the catena of decisions. On the basis of such material, if another plausible view is also emerging then, the view, which has been taken by learned Addl. Sessions Judge is given to be predominance as the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had an opportunity to see the demeanour of the witnesses and therefore, such finding, which has been arrived at is not to be normally disturbed in absence of any extraordinary distinguishable material. We are of the considered opinion that no such distinguishable material is reflecting from the evidence on record, which insisted us to consider and examine the conclusion, which has been arrived at. 14. On going through the decision delivered by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, there is a specific finding arrived at that the prosecution has after recovery of muddamal in the form of clothes of deceased, in the form of clothes of accused persons, the muddamal knife, jack as well as iron road everything was recovered in which on the clothes of deceased blood group 'O' has been found, but then again these articles on which 'O' blood group is found, the prosecution has not attempted seriously to prove whether, which blood group is that of respondents accused persons. No blood samples have been collected for ascertaining the blood group of accused persons and this has a serious consequence upon proving the medical analysis. In absence of any such step by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt on account of such kind of serious infirmities in conducting analysis. A very sorry state of affairs is reflected from the material on record that no effective steps have been taken to examine each and every aspect to prove the case from the stand point of view of circumstantial evidence. 15. In addition to this infirmity specifically found by the learned Addl. A very sorry state of affairs is reflected from the material on record that no effective steps have been taken to examine each and every aspect to prove the case from the stand point of view of circumstantial evidence. 15. In addition to this infirmity specifically found by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which has generated the benefit of doubt in favour of the respondents, yet another circumstance, the panchnama, which have been drawn have also not been proved nor supported by any of the panch witnesses and the manner in which the panchnama is to be established even by the investigating officer. The entire version of investigating officer reveals that in such a manner the investigating officer has not established the panchnamas and no panchas have supported the panchnamas. A very cursory glance at the investigating officer would clearly indicate that the investigating officer has not conjointly made any attempt to prove the case against the respondents accused by leading cogent evidence. In addition to this, from reading the order it appears that the writing at Exh. 33 upon which the prosecution witness is relying, that writing has also not been proved as clearly found by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Such kind of writing not supported by any of the independent witness available on record and therefore, in absence of any such writing being proved, the story of demand of amount is not believable. On the contrary, the witness Chehrabhai Galabhai at Exh. 34 as well as Arjanbhai Hirabhai at Exh. 35 have categorically stated that such writing has never taken place in their presence and therefore, the case has not been established by this witnesses about that so called document beyond reasonable doubt. In addition thereto, the record further reveals and appears to have rightly been considered that in a present case motive has not been proved. No doubt, in absence of motive also the case can be proved, but for that, there must be some reasons and material. Here no such thing is produced by the prosecution, which can establish the case independently even in absence of motive and therefore, when this piece of evidence is led in half-hearted manner of the prosecution, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has left with no other alternate but to grant benefit of doubt. Here no such thing is produced by the prosecution, which can establish the case independently even in absence of motive and therefore, when this piece of evidence is led in half-hearted manner of the prosecution, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has left with no other alternate but to grant benefit of doubt. However, the finding with respect to the blood group, which has been found on the knife, which is said to have been used, as we have said earlier that no sample collection of the blood of accused have taken by prosecution to establish this and therefore, there are all possibilities of case being blunted against the respondents accused as the evidence is not conjointly supported the case of the prosecution. All these findings have been arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are as stated above based upon the examination of each and every evidence on record and we see no other extraordinary circumstance on the basis of independent analysis of such evidence to dislodge the finding, which have been arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. From overall consideration and from independent analysis and examination of the evidence, we find no reason to disturb the finding of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and accordingly we see no such error, which can be said to be a miscarriage of justice or such error by which benefit of doubt, which has been given can be disturbed. 16. We are mindful of the fact that there are self-imposed limitations of exercising appellate jurisdiction merely sitting in an appeal against the order of acquittal and we are also having an assistance of some of the decisions delivered by the apex Court, whereby it has been culled-out that if two views are possible, the view which has been lean in favour of the accused is to be taken rather to substitute the plausible view taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 16.1 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 16.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 16.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 16.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 16.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State, reported in 2016 AIR(SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 17. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, which are prevailing on record and in view of the independent analysis of evidence on record and relying on the finding arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, we see no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. We see no perversity, we see no illegality or irregularity, which can result into miscarriage of justice and therefore, on overall consideration of the matter we are of the considered view that the present impugned order does not call for any interference as such in absence of any such merit. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge requires no interference and we find no merits in the appeal filed by the State and the same deserves to be dismissed. 18. In the result, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 2nd June 2004 passed in Sessions Case No. 70 of 2004 by the learned Joint District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Modasa at Sabalpur is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.