JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The present writ petition calls in question the Order dated 22.06.2016 passed by 6th Additional District Judge, District Bhavnagar, below Exh.6 in Election Application No. 2 of 2015 whereby the application for condonation of delay of 13 days caused in preferring the election petition challenging the validity of election held in the year 2015 of Palitana Municipality came to be rejected. 2. The brief facts of the case culled out from the record which led to the filing of the present petition are that in the year 2015 the election of Palitana Municipality was held under the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (the Municipalities Act for short) and the results thereof were declared on 02.12.2015. The petitioners questioned the election of the private respondents herein for Ward No. 3 of Palitana Municipality by filing an election petition (application) on 03.12.2015. 3. According to the provisions of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, the validity of any election can be brought in question by any person qualified to vote at the election at any time within fifteen days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election before the District Court. It is the case of the petitioners that since there was delay of 13 days in filing the election petition, an application for condonation of delay along with the election petition was filed, inter-alia, stating the grounds and reasons thereof. By the impugned order, as stated herein above, the District Judge refused to condone the delay and did not entertain the election petition of the petitioners mainly on the ground that there is no provision in the Municipalities Act for waving the delay in filing the election petition. 4. Learned advocate Mr. V.G. Popat for the petitioners placing reliance on Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Limitation Act for short) has submitted that the same will apply to the Municipalities Act. He has submitted that the power to condone the delay emanates from Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 as there is no express exclusion of the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act. Thus, it is urged on behalf of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the delay can be condoned under the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Per contra, Ms. Thus, it is urged on behalf of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the delay can be condoned under the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Per contra, Ms. Roopal Patel learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Election Authorities submits that the Order dated 22.06.2016 passed by 6th Additional District Judge, District Bhavnagar, below Exh.6 is judicious and does not call for any interference. She has contended that according to Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, a Judge not below the grade of Assistant Judge is appointed by the State government for holding an inquiry as contemplated therein, if any validity of the election is called in question. She has urged that the Judge exercising the power under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act cannot be strictly termed as Court as envisaged under the Limitation Act, and the nature of proceedings before him cannot be termed as civil proceedings. She has stated that the present Act is a complete code in itself, hence the provisions of Limitation Act will not apply. In this connection, reference is made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukamdev Narayan Yadav vs. Lalit Narayan Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133 . She has specifically submitted that there is no provision in the Municipality Act, which confers the power of condoning the delay in filing an application or election petition. As the Municipalities Act itself contemplates a period of 15 days, any petition or application filed subsequently cannot be entertained as a necessary corollary. In this regard reference is made to the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Shri Somabhai K. Acharadas Patel vs. Patel Becharbhai Shambhubhai and Others, 1982 GLH 227 . She has drawn the attention of this Court to Rule 71 of the Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1994 ("the Rules" for short), which states that the documents relating to an election shall be retained for a period of one month and shall thereafter be destroyed. She has submitted that in case any power of condoning the delay in filing the election petition is bestowed to the Judge, the same may lead to an anomalous situation wherein Rule 71 of the Rules may become superfluous. She has submitted that in case any power of condoning the delay in filing the election petition is bestowed to the Judge, the same may lead to an anomalous situation wherein Rule 71 of the Rules may become superfluous. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned Advocate for the Respondents has urged that no interference of this Court is called for as the application under Exh.6 filed by the petitioners is rightly rejected by Additional District Judge, District Bhavnagar. 6. In rejoinder learned advocate for the petitioners Mr. Popat has submitted that Section 14 of the Municipalities Act cannot be considered to be a complete code as Section 14 provides for - (i) that election petition is to be filed within 15 days before District Court; (ii) that if an inquiry is to be made by a judge appointed by the State Government specially for such case or for a case then powers for adducing evidence akin to civil court is provided; (iii) that exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of compromise, withdrawal as well as amendment of pleadings is provided. Thus, the section does not speak about the dismissal of an election petition which is presented after a period of 15 days and, therefore, the Municipalities Act cannot be called complete code in itself unlike the provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951. To fortify his submissions, learned Advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Manguram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 , more particularly Paragraph No. 7 thereof for the proposition of law that it is only if the special law excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the same would stand displaced. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shaikh Saidulu vs. Chukka Yesu, (2002) 3 SCC 130 , more particularly paragraph 13 wherein it is stated that "the remedy provided under the statute cannot be defeated under the cloak of technicalities by adopting a hyper technical approach. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shaikh Saidulu vs. Chukka Yesu, (2002) 3 SCC 130 , more particularly paragraph 13 wherein it is stated that "the remedy provided under the statute cannot be defeated under the cloak of technicalities by adopting a hyper technical approach. The free and fair elections are a guarantee of the democratic polity and for achieving such an objective various provisions are made applicable to the election laws, most important of which is the remedy of challenging the elections on the grounds specified under the statute." He has also contended that in the decision relied on by the respondents in case of Hukamdev Narayan Yadav (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature or the subject matter and scheme of the special law excluded their operation. 7. In response to the query raised by this Court to the learned Advocate Mr. Popat whether the Judge appointed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, is a "persona designata" or a Court, he has submitted that it is well-settled that person appointed as "persona designata" cannot exercise power beyond the provisions under which he is appointed. It is further submitted that if the judge appointed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act is considered as persona designata then the provision nowhere stipulates that he will have power to dismiss the application after 15 days. In other words, persona designata can only exercise powers which are conferred upon him and he cannot assume the jurisdiction of Court. It is contended by him that; it can be seen that a court will have jurisdiction by virtue of Section 3 of the Limitation Act to dismiss an application which is not presented within the period of limitation. Thus, when the application presented by the petitioners is dismissed, the judge has acted in the capacity of court and not in private capacity as persona designata. Thus, when the application presented by the petitioners is dismissed, the judge has acted in the capacity of court and not in private capacity as persona designata. Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that Judge is appointed as persona designata, the said powers would be in addition to which a Judge possesses and the jurisdiction is exercised by the judge in the capacity as a District Judge, which is inherent with such courts. 8. We have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned Advocates for the parties to the lis. 9. The kernel of the controversy involved in the present petition is the applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and the exercise of power by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the Judge appointed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act for condoning the delay in filing an application or election petition. 10. In order to appreciate the aforesaid issue, it will be profitable to refer the relevant provisions of the Municipalities Act and the Limitation Act. 11. Relevant provisions of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act are extracted as under: "SECTION 14: Determination of validity of elections (1) If the validity of any election of a councillor is brought in question by any person qualified to vote at the election to which such question refers or by any candidate for such election such person may at any time within fifteen days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election, apply to the District Court of the district within which the election has been or should have been held, for the determination of such question. (2) An inquiry shall thereupon be held by a Judge, not below the grade of an Assistant Judge appointed by the State Government either specially for the case or for such cases generally and such Judge may, after such inquiry as he deems necessary and subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), pass an order confirming or amending the declared result of the election, or setting the election aside for the purposes of the said inquiry the said Judge may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give evidence as if he were a Civil Court, and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of any such inquiry shall be paid. Such costs shall be recoverable as if they had been awarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). The decision or order shall be conclusive. (3) All applications received under sub-section (1):- (a) in which the validity of the election of councillors elected to represent the same ward is in question shall be heard by the same judge. (b) in which the validity of the election of the same councillor elected to represent the same ward is in question shall be heard together. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), the Judge shall not permit (a) any application to be compromised or withdrawn or (b) any person to alter or amend any pleading, unless he is satisfied that such application for compromise or withdrawal or the application for such alteration or amendment is bona fide and not conclusive. (5) Declaration in case of corrupt practice by candidate:- (a) If the Judge is satisfied:- (i) that on the date of the election, the elected candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under this Act. (ii) that any corrupt practice has been committed by the elected candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the elected candidate or his election agent. (iii) that any nomination has been improperly rejected. (ii) that any corrupt practice has been committed by the elected candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the elected candidate or his election agent. (iii) that any nomination has been improperly rejected. (iv) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the elected candidate, has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the elected candidate by an agent other than his ejection agent, or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the Judge shall set aside the election of the elected candidate and where the election is set aside, on a ground mentioned in item (i) or (ii), shall declare the candidate disqualified for the purpose of such fresh election as may be held under sub- section (2) of section 42. (b) Scrutiny of votes and declaration in other cases.-If in any case to which clause (a) does not apply, the validity of an election is in dispute between two or more candidates the Judge shall, after a scrutiny and computation of the votes recorded in four of each candidate, declare the candidate who is found to have the greatest number of valid votes in his favour, to have been duly elected: Provided that for the purpose of such computation no vote shall be reckoned as valid if the Judge finds that any corrupt practice was committed by any person, known or unknown, in giving or obtaining it: Provided further that after such computation, if an equality of votes is found to exist between any candidates and the addition of one vote will entitle any of the candidates to be declared elected, one additional vote shall be added to the total number of valid votes found to have been recorded in favour of the candidate or candidates, as the case may be, selected by lot drawn in the presence of the Judge in such manner as he may determine. (6)............. (6)............. (7) Mere irregularities and informalities not to invalidate election.-If the validity of the election is brought in question only on the ground of any error by the officer or officers charged with carrying out the rules made under sub-section (5) of section 6, or under 24 sub-section (2) of section 9 or of an irregularity or informality not corruptly caused, the Judge shall not set aside the election. Explanation.-The expression "error" in this clause does not include any breach of or any omission to carry out or any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder whereby the result of the election has been materially affected. (8) Disqualification of persons committing corrupt practice.-If the Judge sets aside an election under clause (a) of sub-section (5), he may, if he thinks fit, declare any person by whom any corrupt practice has been committed within the meaning of this section to be disqualified from being a candidate in that or any other municipal borough for a term of years not exceeding seven and the decision of the Judge shall be conclusive: Provided however, that such person may, by an order which the State Government is hereby empowered to make, if it shall think fit, in that behalf, be at any time relieved from such disqualification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made in respect of any person without such person being given an opportunity to show cause why such declaration should not be made." 12. Section 5 and 29(2) of Limitation Act provides as follows: "SECTION 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. SECTION 29: Savings (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). Explanation.- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. SECTION 29: Savings (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend." The conspectus of the section 14 of Municipalities Act suggest that the Civil Judge before whom the election application or petition is filed acts as a statutory authority to carry out a fact finding inquiry or an investigation wherein any validity of election of councillor is in question. Though acting as a statutory authority the Judge possesses certain attributes or the characteristics of a "Court" under section 14 of the Municipalities Act, in stricto sensu, he does not preside as a Civil Judge heading a Civil Court. It is apparent from the reading of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act that the legislative intent was to create "Election Tribunal" and not a "Judicial Court" which is entrusted with the task of adjudicating only election disputes. The words "appointed by the State government" in the section depict that it is the inherent judicial power of the state that is conferred upon the Civil Judge to adjudicate an election dispute. 13. The words "appointed by the State government" in the section depict that it is the inherent judicial power of the state that is conferred upon the Civil Judge to adjudicate an election dispute. 13. At this juncture it will germane to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association and Another, AIR 2013 SC 107 , in which it observed thus: "Even if the person heading the Tribunal is otherwise a "judicial officer" he may merely be persona designata, but not a court, despite the fact that he is expected to act in a quasi-judicial manner. In the generic sense, a court is also a Tribunal, however, courts are only such Tribunals as have been created by the concerned statute and belong to the judicial department of the State as opposed to the executive branch of the said State. The expression court is understood in the context of its normally accepted connotation, as an adjudicating body, which performs judicial functions of rendering definitive judgments having a sense of finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating before it. Secondly, it should be in the course of exercise of the sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State. Any Tribunal or authority therefore, that possesses these attributes, may be categorized as a court. 10. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws and to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of Rules will determine whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts, which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a lis between two contesting parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority may be called as a quasi-judicial authority, i.e. a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the subject and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi judicial decision. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a court, but not all. In case certain powers under C.P.C. or Cr.P.C. have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of the State, it cannot be held to be a court." 14. The proceedings envisaged under section 14 of the Municipalities Act cannot be equated with civil proceedings so as to attract provisions of the Limitation act. The Supreme Court in case of P. Malai Chami vs. M. Andi Ambalam and Others, AIR 1973 SC 2077 , while examining the provisions of Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, has opined that Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be defeated on a mere technicality. But in deciding an election petition the High Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election dispute. Its powers are wholly the creature of the statute under which it is conferred the power to hear election petitions. An election petition, as has been pointed out again and again, is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power. 15. Similarly, the Apex Court in case of Nisar Ahmad Ibrahim Khan vs. Deolali Cantonment Board & Others, 1987 (Supp.) SCC 562 has opined that: "There is no common law of elections. The proceedings calling in question the validity of an election are purely statutory proceedings. An election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity, but is purely a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the Court possesses no common law power. It is trite proposition that in such proceedings statutory requirements must strictly be established. It is also well settled that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with." 16. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Shri Somabhai Kacharadas Patel (supra) while examining the lis under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act has held that: "In an election petition there is no question of breach of contract or proceedings for breach of contract and so far as injury is concerned, it must be legal injury from the action contemplated by the other party to the proceedings. Under section 14 the only inquiry that is permissible to the Election Tribunal is an inquiry regarding validity of election of a councillor and there is no question of any legal injury which the applicant before the Election Tribunal can suffer from and therefore even that part of Rule 2 of Order 39 which speaks of "other injury of any kind" will not be applicable to proceedings challenging the validity of an election. Under these circumstances, Order 39, Rule 2 also cannot be invoked by any party to an election petition which is instituted under section 14 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. If that is so., there is no question of invoking the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 for establishing maintainability of an appeal against the order refusing to grant an injunction during the pendency of an election petition. "We are, however, of the view that the Gujarat Municipality Act has neither invested the petitioners challenging the validity of the election with the substantive right to claim injunction or correspondingly conferred the power to grant injunction in Tribunal." ......But it is well-settled law that the doctrine of implied power can be brought into play only if it is found that a duty had been imposed or power conferred on the authority by statute and it is further found that the duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised at all unless some auxiliary or incidental power is assumed to exist." ....This principle of implied power cannot be read into the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act because all that the Tribunal has to decide is the question of the validity of that election and an injunction of the type sought for in the present case cannot be said to be necessary for the proper determination of the question before it nor can it be said that if such a relief is not granted the result of the election petition, if successful, would be rendered nugatory, nor can it be said that the jurisdiction of Election Tribunal would not be effectively exercised in the absence of any such implied power. ....All that can be said is that if an appeal had been provided by statute, this procedural provision relating to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure would become applicable but neither by implied power nor by the very nature of the proceedings can it be said that the power to grant interlocutory injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 or 2 has been conferred upon the Tribunal set up under the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. It will be apposite to take note of the opinion of the Supreme Court in case of Om Prakash vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, AIR 2010 SC 3791 : "17. Section 13B is a power given to a Non-Resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of any one ordinarily living with and dependent on him or her. The right has been limited to one application only during the life time of the owner. Section 18-A(2) of the aforesaid Act provides that after an application under Section 13B is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. The said form indicates that within 15 days of service of the summons the tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same. There is no specific provision to vest the Rent Controller with authority to extend the time for making of such affidavit and the application. The Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power." The upshot of the aforesaid observations is that the "Judge" appointed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act is a "persona designata" and does not act as a "Court" but as a "Tribunal". In Section 5 of the Limitation Act reference is made to "Court" which has power to admit an application filed beyond the prescribed period. In Section 5 of the Limitation Act reference is made to "Court" which has power to admit an application filed beyond the prescribed period. The Supreme Court in the case of Nityananda M. Joshi vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1969 (2) SCC 199 has held that u/s. 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, a Judge who acts as a "persona designata" under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act can be said to be adjudicating an election dispute as a "Tribunal" and not as a "Court" hence, the provisions of Limitation Act will not apply to such proceedings. 17. A bare perusal of section 14 of the Municipalities Act will clarify that the same does not vest any power for condonation of delay. Neither the Act, 1963 nor the (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1994 prescribe any power of condonation of delay. The contention raised by the petitioners that Section 14 of the Municipalities Act does not specifically provide for exclusion of the provision of the Limitation Act as provided under Section 29(2), hence, Section 5 of the said Act will apply, pales into insignificance as nature of the proceedings under the Municipalities Act visualizes that the Legislature intended the same to be self-contained and exhaustive code by itself. The Judge appointed by virtue of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act is a creature of statute, hence he cannot exercise the power to condone the delay which is not vested to him by the statue. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra) and Mangu Ram (supra) will not come to the rescue of the petitioners as it was emphasised by the Supreme Court that the Court has to examine to what extent the scheme or nature of the special law excluded the operation of the Limitation Act. In the case in hand, the special law enacted for the purpose of adjudication of election dispute is a complete code in itself. In the case in hand, the special law enacted for the purpose of adjudication of election dispute is a complete code in itself. The scope and object of the Municipalities Act enunciate that the Legislature intended that the election disputes can be adjudicated as expeditiously as possible. The power to condone the delay cannot be read in to said provisions. The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act will frustrate the very intention of the Legislature of speedy and assiduous disposal of such disputes. Pertinently, the very nature, scope and object of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act connote the non-applicability of the Limitation Act. We find merit in the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the respondent authorities that if power to condone the delay in filing the election petition is conferred, then the same will make Rule 71 of the Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1994 otiose as it provides for retaining the documents relating to election for a period of one month only. In a given case if an election petition is belatedly filed, and an application for condoning the delay is entertained and allowed after the expiry of the aforesaid period, i.e. one month, then the authorities will be precluded in producing the necessary documents. Such a situation will thwart the very purpose of Section 14 of the Municipalities Act. The reliance placed by the petitioners on the decision rendered by Apex Court in Shaik Saidulu (supra) is unproductive as the facts therein reveal that the provisions of the Limitation Act were made applicable for computing the period of limitation for filing an application. In the present case such a provision is conspicuously absent. The Court cannot interpret Section 14 of the Municipalities Act in such a manner so as to read in the Municipalities Act, the inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking provisions of the Limitation Act. It is trite that the function of the Court being jus discre non facere, i.e. to declare or decide law and not to fill up the gaps of statute. Thus, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the Municipalities Act does not speak of any power which empowers the Judge for condoning any delay in application or petition filed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act. 18. Thus, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the Municipalities Act does not speak of any power which empowers the Judge for condoning any delay in application or petition filed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act. 18. The foregoing observations and analysis are summarized as below: "(A) The "Judge" referred in Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, 1963 is a "persona designata" appointed for adjudicating the proceedings as a "Tribunal" and not as a "Court." (B) The proceedings before the Judge under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, 1963, cannot be termed as proceedings of "Civil" nature but the same are "statutory proceedings" in the nature of an inquiry for adjudicating the validity of election under challenge. (C) The provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the Municipalities Act, 1963. Any application or election petition filed under Section 14 of the Municipalities Act, 1963 beyond the time limit prescribed therein cannot be entertained by condoning the delay." 19. In light of the aforesaid principles, we, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the Order dated 22.06.2016 passed by 6th Additional District Judge, District Bhavnagar, below Exh.6 in Election Application No. 2 of 2015 does not require interference. 20. The petition fails, therefore, is dismissed. Petition Dismissed.