JUDGMENT : HARISH TANDON, J. 1. This matter is referred to me by the Hon'ble Chief Justice because of the difference of opinion between the two Hon'ble Judges constituting the Division Bench on factual matrix whether the facts and circumstances narrated in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 2. The instant appeal i.e. FMA 4481 of 2016 is filed by the applicant/petitioner challenging the judgment and order/award dated 8th December, 2015 passed by the Commissioner, Worksmen's compensation, Durgapur in Claim Case No. 36 of 2006 after a delay of 141 days. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the salient facts emerging from the instant case are adumbrated as under:- One Bijoy Kumar Chatterjee was an employee of the appellant company as explosive carrier and breathed last on 15.11.1997 being murdered by miscreants and his body was found within the premises of the colliery. A criminal case was started under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The said employee was drawing the monthly wages at Rs. 2000/- and was aged about 46 years. 5. The widow of the deceased employee, who is the respondent in the instant appeal filed an appeal on 25.09.2006 claiming death compensation of Rs. 1,66,290/-. Since the application was filed after nearly nine years from the date of death of her husband, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed seeking condonation of delay. 6. The respondent no. 1 states that the compensation application could not be filed as a verbal assurance was all along given to her by the appellant herein that the death compensation would be extended to her but later on the appellant refused and failed to pay such compensation 7. The compensation application is resisted and contested by the appellant by filing the written statement taking a plea of a locus standi of the respondent to maintain and file the compensation application primarily on the ground that the death is not related to employment. A plea of limitation was also taken as and by way of demurer. 8. Three issues were framed by the Compensation Court, which are quoted under :- "I. For that the Learned Commissioner in the facts and circumstances of the case should have dismissed the case but erred in not doing the same. II. A plea of limitation was also taken as and by way of demurer. 8. Three issues were framed by the Compensation Court, which are quoted under :- "I. For that the Learned Commissioner in the facts and circumstances of the case should have dismissed the case but erred in not doing the same. II. For that the Learned Commissioner erred in law by passing the award dated 8th December, 2015 by not following the provisions as contained in Section-3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; III. For that the Learned Commissioner failed to appreciate the fact that admittedly the husband of the respondent was murdered after and/or outside the duty hours;" 9. Several documents were produced and marked exhibits by the respective witnesses which include the First Information Report, charge sheet, death certificate, identity card, attendance register for the month of November, 1996, cap lamp register etc. The Compensation Court found that the deceased employee was murdered and his dead body was found within the colliery area after coming out to surface from the underground mine upon finishing his duty at 12 midnight. It was ultimately held that the dead body of the deceased employee was found at sand bunker used by the colliery to fill up excavated mine area, which is admittedly within the premises of the colliery. 10. On the aforesaid findings the Compensation Court granted the compensation of Rs. 79,900/- and refused to award interest as the claim petition was filed belatedly and there was no satisfactory explanation in this regard. 11. The appellant challenged the impugned judgment/order/award after a delay of 141 days and further filed an application for condonation of delay. 12. The matter appeared before the Division Bench and a direction for service was passed but the claimants/respondent did not respond to the said notice and the application for condonation of delay was heard ex parte. 13. Both the Hon'ble Judges constituting the Division Bench differed on the point of sufficient cause having made out by the appellant as a consequence whereof the matter is referred to me as a third Judge. 14. The only point which this Court is required to answer is whether the grounds narrated and/or set forth in the application for condonation of delay constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning thereof under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14. The only point which this Court is required to answer is whether the grounds narrated and/or set forth in the application for condonation of delay constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning thereof under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Both the Hon'ble Judges have relied upon and in fact quoted the relevant statements made in the said application in separate judgment which this Court feels necessary to refer in to in order to answer the point as framed herein above. Paragraph 7(a) to (o) of the application for condonation of delay are reproduced as under:- "7. Your petitioner states that the reasons for delay in preferring the appeal are set out herein below for the kind consideration of this Hon'ble court:- (a) Immediately after the award passed by the Learned Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Durgapur, your petitioner instructed their learned advocate to take necessary steps for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned award the same to the authority for taking necessary action. (b) Sri Gopal Chandra Banerjee, Learned Advocate by his letter dated 30th December, 2015 forwarded the certified copy of the impugned award to the Agent, Kalidaspur Project which was received by the despatch department on 9th January, 2016. (c) After due process the despatche department of the colliery forwarded the aforementioned certified copy of the award to the Agent, Kalidaspur Project on 18th January, 2016. (d) After receipt of the certified copy of the impugned award the agent on 21st January, 2016 forwarded the same to the concerned officer for taking necessary steps. (e) On 25th January, 2016 the concerned officer tried to contact their learned advocate on record in the court below to collect all the papers connecting to the said case but unfortunately the learned advocate was not available and consequently he was unable to collect the papers from the said learned advocate. (f) On 2nd February, 2016 the concerned officer went to Calcutta in connection with other court cases pending before the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta and in between 4th February, 2016 to 16th February, 2016 he was very often went to Calcutta in connection with the different court cases pending before the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta and consequently he was unable to take any step in regard to the instant matter. (g) From time to time the concerned officer tried to contact their learned advocate-on-record in the court below and the learned advocate handed over the court papers to the concerned officer connecting to the above case on 15th March, 2016. (h) After arranging all the papers the concerned officer on 18th March, 2016 placed the entire papers before the agent for necessary instruction and the agent after considering the said papers on 24th March, 2016 instructed the concerned officer to take to prefer an appeal and also advised the concerned officer to obtain necessary approval from the headquarters before taking steps against the said award. Be it mentioned here that due to the pre-occupation in other jobs in connection with mines the Agent could not take steps in regard to the appeal at an early date. (i) The concerned officer in course of arranging all the papers before sending to the headquarters he found certain papers such as evidence of the parties adduced before the Learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation court was not forwarded by the learned advocate on record in the court below and as such he tried to contact him on 26th March, 2016 for collection of the said papers but he was unable to contact the said learned advocate. Subsequently, on 31st March, 2016 the concerned officer was able to collect the necessary papers from the learned advocate on record in the court below. (j) The concerned officer after preparation of the notes relating to the case and also arranging all the papers on 6th April, 2016 forwarded the same to the headquarters for necessary instruction. (k) The concerned officer on 12th April, 2016 received the instruction from the headquarters whereby they instructed the concerned officer to take steps to prefer an appeal. (l) Accordingly, on 18th April, 2016 the concerned officer contacted their learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta and instructed him to take steps to prefer an appeal. (m) The said learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta fixed a conference on 24th April, 2016 and in course of conference the learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta made it clear that the appeal has already been time barred. (m) The said learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta fixed a conference on 24th April, 2016 and in course of conference the learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta made it clear that the appeal has already been time barred. (n) Thereafter, on 25th April 2016 the concerned officer referred the matter to the headquarters for necessary instruction and the headquarters instructed the concerned officer to prefer an appeal with an application for condonation of delay and such instruction was forwarded to the learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta on 26th April, 2016. (o) The learned advocate in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta of your petitioner prepared a memorandum of appeal, stay petition and connecting application for condonation of delay and the same were handed over to the concerned officer for their approval and the concerned officer handed over on the following day i.e., on 27th April, 2016 all the drafts with the approval." 15. The gist of the aforesaid statements are that immediately upon passing the award by the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, an instruction was given to the Advocate on Record to obtain certified copy of the impugned award so that appropriate steps may be taken. Certified copy was forwarded to the agent on 30th December, 2015, which was duly received by the department on 9th January, 2016. The said certified copy was then sent by the despatch department of the colliery to the appellant on 18th January, 2016, which was further forwarded to the concerned officer on 21st January, 2016 for taking necessary steps. The officer tried to contact the learned Advocate of the Compensation Court on 25th January, 2016 to collect all the papers and documents connected to the case but due to unavailability of the said advocate the relevant papers and documents could not be collected. Between the period from 2nd February, 2016 to 16th February, 2016 the officer frequently visited the city of Kolkata in connection with other Court cases pending before the Hon'ble High Court and was therefore unable to take any steps in the matter. The officer could contact with the advocate on 15th March, 2016 who handed over all the concerned documents relatable to the instant case to the said officer. The officer could contact with the advocate on 15th March, 2016 who handed over all the concerned documents relatable to the instant case to the said officer. After arranging all the papers, the concerned officer placed the same to the agent for necessary instructions on 18th March, 2016 and received the instruction on 24th March, 2016 to prefer an appeal after taking necessary approval and sanction from the headquarters. While arranging the papers for its onward transmission to the headquarter, the officer detected that the evidence of the parties adduced before the Compensation Court was not given by the advocate and attempted to contact the learned Advocate on 26th March, 2016 but he was unavailable. Those documents could only be collected on 31st March, 2016 from the learned Advocate, and entire papers were forwarded to the headquarter on 6th April, 2016. An instruction was received by the officer on 12th April, 2016 from the headquarter directing him to take steps for preferring an appeal before this Court. 16. After receiving such instruction, the concerned officer contacted the learned Advocate of this Court on 18th April, 2016 and a conference was fixed on 24th April, 2016. During the conference it was indicated by the said learned Advocate that the appeal is time barred and if filed should be preceded with an application of condonation of delay. Since, a further instruction in this regard was felt necessary, the concerned officer referred the matter to headquarter on 25th April, 2016 for further instruction which was received on the next day and thereafter the Memorandum of Appeal and the application for condonation of delay was prepared by the said learned Advocate and was filed on 28th April, 2016. 17. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submits that all precaution, care and steps were taken by the appellant for preferring the instant appeal against the impugned judgment/award and because of the procedures and formalities required to be performed in a government organization the delay occurred which cannot be said to be intentional and deliberate. He further submits that the explanations have been offered in the application with precision wherefrom it would appear that the authority acted with promptitude and no negligence can be attributed to them for delayed filing of the instant appeal. By placing the reliance a judgment of the Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. He further submits that the explanations have been offered in the application with precision wherefrom it would appear that the authority acted with promptitude and no negligence can be attributed to them for delayed filing of the instant appeal. By placing the reliance a judgment of the Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , he would contend that Court must interpret the sufficient cause with latitude and should adopt a liberal approach as no litigant would gain by filing the belated appeal. 18. He further relies upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in case of State of UP v. Harish Chandra & Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 2173 wherein it is held that if the delay has occurred in processing the matter through official channel and such delay has been sufficiently explained by reasons, the Court should condone the delay. He ardently submits that the principles for condonation of delay has been succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court in case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 wherein it is unequivocally stated that the meritorious matter should not be thrown at the very threshold and the substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. Mr. Banerjee emphasises that though the discretion is vested upon the Court to condone the delay or refuse to condone the delay but such discretion should not be swayed by the mere fact of its enormity and no hard and fast rule can be fastened. In other words, Mr. Banerjee submits that the expression "sufficient cause" must be interpreted to advance the cause of substantial justice than to nib in bud the meritorious matter and relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in case Vedabai @ Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 SCC 106 . He thus submits that the delay in filing the instant appeal was beyond the control of the appellant and it cannot be said that he was reluctant, negligent and lethargic in proceeding with the matter. On the other hand, all reasonable care, precaution and steps required to be taken was resorted to and therefore the application for condonation of delay deserves to be allowed. 19. On the other hand, all reasonable care, precaution and steps required to be taken was resorted to and therefore the application for condonation of delay deserves to be allowed. 19. At the very outset, this Court must record that despite the service the respondent is not appearing and naturally he is not contesting the application for condonation of delay. Though the simplest course the Court can adopt in absence of any denial to the statements made in the said application to proceed by applying the principle and doctrine of non-traverse yet such principle does not absolve the Court to consider the matter on merit more particularly when the appellant has to make out any plausible cause and the facts if goes unchallenged meets all the requirements of law for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. The aforesaid observations can be fructified from the provision of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 postulating the dismissal of the suit, appeal or application made after the prescribed period of limitation even if the limitation has not been set up as a defence. Such provision starts with the expression "subject to the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive)" and therefore empowers the Court to dismiss the suit/appeal and application if the same apparently lacks material explanation. By virtue of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the power has been extended to the Court to condone the delay or in other words extend the time of limitation in preferring an appeal or application provided a sufficient cause is shown and proved to the satisfaction of the Court. 20. On harmonious reading of both the provisions it may be said that Section 5, in effect is in the nature of exception to Section 3 and the Section 3 is subject to the said provision and therefore its rigidity is somewhat diluted. To summarize, the suit, appeal or application can be dismissed by the Court even when no plea of limitation is taken as by way of defence but the time enshrined under the Limitation Act for such category can be extended by applying the provisions contained under Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act. To summarize, the suit, appeal or application can be dismissed by the Court even when no plea of limitation is taken as by way of defence but the time enshrined under the Limitation Act for such category can be extended by applying the provisions contained under Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be loosely said to be an exception to Section 3 and imbued the Court to admit the appeal or any application other than an application under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be admitted after prescribed period, subject however to the satisfaction of the Court on sufficient cause. The authoritative pronouncements under the hierarchical system of Court in the country have uniformly interpreted the expression "sufficient cause" to be judged on the parameters of each case on well recognised judicial principles. 21. Though the Courts are vested with judicial discretion in finding out the sufficient cause but avoidance to unduly reject or over-struck view should be safeguarded. The scope of enquiry while exercising such discretionary power shall be limited only to the facts as the Court may regard as relevant removing or erasing the irrelevant facts. While exercising judicial discretion, the Court shall be vigilant and circumscribed and proceed in accordance with justice, common sense and sound judgment and all precaution and care should be against the arbitrary, vague and fanciful approach. 22. The Apex Court in case of Mst. Katiji (Supra) brings the theory of liberal approach to be adopted by the Court in an application for condonation of delay and succinctly laid down five broad principles to be adhered to in these words:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk." 23. The theory of each day's delay should not be used in a pedantic manner but in rational and pragmatic way so as to advance the substantial justice. The Apex Court over-weighed the substantial justice against technical considerations when both the aspects are pitted against each other. No litigant would gain by resorting delay and exposed himself to a serious risk and consequences. Another striking feature discernable from the above noted decision is that the refusal to condone delay would result in throwing out the meritorious matter causing defeat to extending justice. It has not been laid down in the said report that the Court would go by the ipse dixit of the statements made in the application without venturing to find out the lapses, negligence and carelessness in taking steps in the matter. The judicial discretion should not be exercised with mathematical precision or Euclid's Theorem but must be considered and judged on the facts pleaded therein and its clear nexus with the stand which a man in his ordinary prudence would consider to be reasonable and rational. The word "sufficient cause" therefore should receive a liberal and lenient construction so as to advance the substantial justice if no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed by the appellant. 24. The language employed in Section 5 neither creates artificial distinction nor apparent discretion between a government and the private individuals. The Doctrine of Equality before law demands all litigations, be it State or private individuals to be subject to same treatment and administration of law in even handed manner. 24. The language employed in Section 5 neither creates artificial distinction nor apparent discretion between a government and the private individuals. The Doctrine of Equality before law demands all litigations, be it State or private individuals to be subject to same treatment and administration of law in even handed manner. The State is neither a favoured child nor deserves a step motherly treatment under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The reference in this regard can be made to the observation recorded in paragraph 6 in case of Mst Katiji (Supra) in the following :- "6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 25. The aforesaid observation in Mst Katiji (Supra) came up for consideration in case of G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142 wherein a little departure was shown when the government is approaching the Court belatedly and seeks condonation of delay. It is observed therein that the law of limitation do not make any discretion between the private citizen and the government but for the purpose of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the said Act it would be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration the factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. It is further observed therein that the governmental decisions are proverbially slow, encumbered as they are by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. It would be apt to quote the observance recorded in the said judgment which runs thus:- "15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 17. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. [LR (1899) 2 Ch 629, 673] observed, though in a different context : "Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them." In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the government to realise that the law officers failed that trust. 18. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, - unmindful of time and impersonally". 18. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, - unmindful of time and impersonally". Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court ? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after January 20, 1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in office till December 15, 1970 had applied for certified copies on July 20, 1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader. In a similar context where delay had been condoned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and observed [Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. B.M. Krishna Murthy, (1985) 1 SCC 469 ] : (SCC p. 472, para 5)" 26. Subsequently, the three Judges of the Apex Court in case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 elaborately discussed the above aspect taking note of the above referred decisions and observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism with justice oriented approach render the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining each day's delay. It in unequivocal terms held that no separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant should be put to prove strict standard of sufficient cause and held that the State cannot be put on a same pedestal that of the individual litigant. It in unequivocal terms held that no separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant should be put to prove strict standard of sufficient cause and held that the State cannot be put on a same pedestal that of the individual litigant. The observations made in paragraph 11 of the said report are quoted hereunder:- "11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." 27. The aforesaid decision is applied with approval in case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao & Ors. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 observing that the adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to project to be just and may result in to mischief. In case of Kameshwar Prasad Singh (Supra) the Apex Court held that the technicalities of law should not act as a deterrent to substantial justice and uprooting the illegalities committed in the impugned order. 28. What can be seen from the law enunciated in the above noted decisions that though Limitation Act do not create artificial or real distinction between the State and the private individual yet the approach while judging the sufficient cause may stand on a different footing. The governmental action would effect the community at large and it has been highlighted in the above noted decisions that the officer responsible therefor should show its allegiance to its duty and a proper mechanism to eradicate such lethargic and dormant decisions, should be adopted. The governmental action would effect the community at large and it has been highlighted in the above noted decisions that the officer responsible therefor should show its allegiance to its duty and a proper mechanism to eradicate such lethargic and dormant decisions, should be adopted. There is no doubt that the private individual would take steps with promptitude to defend his legal right and hardly allow himself to the risk and peril in delayed filing of the appeal. The approach of the Court should be liberal and lenient in both the cases to advance the substantial justice if there is no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is seen. It is no longer res-integra that the length of delay is not fatal. What the Court is required to consider is whether the application contains plausible explanations constituting "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay or extension of time in filing an appeal. Even a delay of shorter period may not be condoned in absence of sufficient cause. What the Court is required to see whether the explanations offered in the said application is plausible, reasonable and the nexus between the circumstances and events constituting sufficient cause has been elaborately established. 29. From the pleadings made in paragraph 7 ('A' to 'O') of the application, the petitioner was aware of the judgment/order/award having passed on 8th December, 2015 by the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Durgapur. The application for certified copy was supplied within the limitation and was obtained on 30th December, 2015 as the copy whereof was forwarded to the appellant and received by the despatch department on 9th January, 2016. There appears to be some lapse on the part of the despatch department in forwarding the certified copy on 18th January, 2016 to the respondent no. 1. No negligence can be attributed to the respondent no. 1 as he immediately forwarded the same to the concerned officer on 21st January, 2016. The story goes further that the said officer tried to contact the advocate of the Trial Court as all the papers connected to the said case was not forwarded by him but he could not make any contact with him. 30. 1 as he immediately forwarded the same to the concerned officer on 21st January, 2016. The story goes further that the said officer tried to contact the advocate of the Trial Court as all the papers connected to the said case was not forwarded by him but he could not make any contact with him. 30. It is not in dispute that the said officer visited Kolkata between 2nd February, 2016 to 16th February, 2016 and could have taken up the issue with the present Advocate on Record but it cannot be treated as a lapses and/or negligence on his part as he was not provided all the Court-Papers by the advocate who was conducting the case before the Workmen's Compensation Court. There is definitely a gap between the 25th January, 2016 and the 15th March, 2016 when the concerned officer could contact the said advocate and was handed over the Court-Papers. The entire papers were placed before the agent on 18th March, 2016 within three days therefrom for necessary instruction and such instruction was received on 24th March, 2016 in the form of an appeal to be filed subject however, to a necessary approval from the headquarter. 31. Since the depositions of the respective witnesses were not available on the record and was made available only on 31st March, 2016 the entire papers were forwarded to the headquarter on 6th April, 2016. The instruction received on 12th April, 2016 and the present Advocate on Record was contacted on 18th April, 2016 and a conference was fixed on 24th April, 2016. Since the appeal was by that time became time barred a further sanction was felt necessary, which was accordingly granted on 26th April, 2016 and the appeal was thereafter filed on 28th April, 2016. Apparently there is a delay of 141 days in preferring an appeal. Though there is a missing link between the dates indicated in the said pleading, yet on totality thereof this Court finds synchronization of the chain of events. The immovability in the government department is not unknown as the file moves from one table to another in slow pace. Yet this Court cannot overlook that the meritorious matter should not die on the anvil of limitation. 32. The immovability in the government department is not unknown as the file moves from one table to another in slow pace. Yet this Court cannot overlook that the meritorious matter should not die on the anvil of limitation. 32. I am not oblivion of the fact that the Court should not enter into the merit of the appeal as the stage of the condonation of delay yet to find out a plausible grounds on which the impugned judgment/award is challenged, the Court may enter into the merit for such limited purposes. Admittedly, the compensation application was filed 9 years after the death of the employee of the respondent no. 1. It further appears that an application for condonation of delay was also filed before the Compensation Court. 33. It is essentially a question of fact whether the murder of the husband of the respondent no. 1 can be related to the course of his duties or is completely independent thereof. Furthermore the learned Judge proceeded to decide the matter on merit keeping the application for condonation of delay pending as on the date of the judgment and by one stroke of pen held that the delay is condoned. It would be relevant to quote the observations made by the learned Judge in this regard as under:- "It is true that no satisfactory evidence and materials have come on record explaining the delay in filing the claim case. However, in the ends of justice and keeping in view the present case being under the social benevolent legislation, the delay of nine years is condoned." 34. It is therefore to be seen and decided in an appeal whether the observations recorded by the learned Judge in condoning the delay is strictly within the settled parameters and the principles laid down in the plethora of judgments, some of which has been quoted herein above. 35. This Court therefore finds that the appeal filed by the appellant cannot be thrown at the nascent stage of admission being unmeritorious but deserves to be decided on the basis of the available materials and the evidences adduced by the respective parties. 36. However, this Court cannot overlook the fact that there is some missing linkage between the events and the conduct of the appellant, which cannot be said to be above board. 36. However, this Court cannot overlook the fact that there is some missing linkage between the events and the conduct of the appellant, which cannot be said to be above board. This Court therefore feels that it is a fit case where the application for condonation of delay should be allowed but equally the respondent no. 1, who has to bear the burden of defending the case needs to be compensated. 37. The C.A.N 4347 of 2016 for condonation of delay is hereby allowed subject, however, to the payment of costs to the respondent no. 1 assessed at Rs. 30,000/- within two weeks from date. 38. In the event the learned Advocate for the appellant shows the payment of the costs to the respondent no.1, the office is directed to formally register the appeal and shall take all consequential steps required therefore.