JUDGMENT : I.P. Mukerji, J. 1. This is a common judgment and order disposing of the three writ applications filed by the writ petitioners and the connected contempt petition. The facts are these. 2. In these islands there was in force, in the past, the Land Tenure Regulation, 1926. Under section 4A the Commissioner had the power to make a grant or in other words, grant a lease of land to any person for a period not exceeding 30 years. There was an option available to the lessee to obtain one more renewal. 3. During the continuance of these regulations, the writ petitioner company (hereinafter referred to as the writ petitioner) was granted a lease of 30 years of substantial tracts of land in some revenue villages in North Bay, Bambooflat village, Minnie Bay and Mithakhari, by the Commissioner. 4. In 1956 this lease was renewed by the Administration for a further period of 30 years. 5. Then came the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1966. Section 146 of these Regulations was more or less similar to section 4A the 1926 Regulations. The Commissioner was vested with the power of making grants/leases of land, for a period not exceeding 30 years. The lessee had the option of obtaining its renewal "for a like period". 6. The real controversy arose out of a further grant made in 1987, by the Administration in favour of the petitioner with effect from 1st January, 1985 for 30 years. It was stated that it was being granted under the 1966 Regulations. 7. Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submits that on expiry of this grant in December, 2014, the writ petitioner has the right of obtaining another renewal for a further period of 30 years. 8. Mr. Mandal submits that the lease of 1987 was a renewal of the 1956 lease which is to be taken as the only permissible renewal of the lease. On its expiry in December, 2014 there could not be any further renewal. He says that the writ petitioner is a trespasser and is liable to deliver peaceful and vacant possession to the Administration. In default they are liable to be evicted. 9. On its expiry in December, 2014 there could not be any further renewal. He says that the writ petitioner is a trespasser and is liable to deliver peaceful and vacant possession to the Administration. In default they are liable to be evicted. 9. The Deputy Commissioner issued a notice on 2nd July, 2015 in purported exercise of his power under regulation 24 asking the petitioner to show cause as to why the land should not be vacated. Then on 16th September, 2016 this notice was withdrawn by him. 10. It is necessary at this stage to set out regulation 24 which is in the following terms:- "24. Where an order to deliver possession of any land has been passed under this Regulation against any person such order shall be executed in the following manner, namely"-- (a) by serving a notice on the person or persons in possession of the land requiring such person or persons within such time as may appear reasonable after receipt of the side notice to vacate the land; and (b) if such notice is not obeyed, by removing or deputing an officer to remove any person who may refused to vacate the same; and (c) if the officer removing any such person is resisted or obstructed by any person the revenue office shall hold a summary inquiry in to the facts of the case, and if satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was without any just cause, and that such resistance or obstruction still continues, may without prejudice to any proceedings to which such person may be liable under any law for the time being in force for the punishment of such resistance or obstruction, take or cause to taken, such steps and use or cause to be used, such force as may, in the opinion of such officer, he reasonably necessary for securing compliance with the order." 11. Mr. Choudhury submits that there was no order of any authority directing the writ petitioner to deliver possession. Therefore, this notice under section 24 dated 2nd July, 2015 seeking to enforce an imaginary order is non est and a nullity in the eye of law. Furthermore, learned counsel submits that the said notice contains a threat of resumption of possession. 12. Mr. Mandal concedes the point that there was no situation under regulation 24. That is why the notice was withdrawn. Furthermore, learned counsel submits that the said notice contains a threat of resumption of possession. 12. Mr. Mandal concedes the point that there was no situation under regulation 24. That is why the notice was withdrawn. He submits that upon withdrawal of the notice there was extinguishment of the cause of action of the writ petitioner and that no further order is required from this Court. 13. Mr. Choudhury submits and in my opinion, rightly that although the 2nd July, 2015 notice has been withdrawn, it does not mean that the Administration will take no other step for eviction of the petitioner and for resuming possession of the subject land. The writ petitioner apprehends further action by the Administration, of a similar nature to resume the possession of the land. 14. If the Administration is to claim a declaration that the lease has expired and an order for eviction of the writ petitioner, they have to obtain a proper decree or order of a Court or an authority making the said declaration and order. Without such a declaration or order, in my opinion, the Administration shall not disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner with regard to the said property. Hence, the impugned notification in the writ application No. 399 of 2016 directing the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the cases for resumption of land should only be so read and understood that the Deputy Commissioner has got no power to himself order the eviction of a lessee and could only to implement under Regulation 24 any lawful order or decree passed by a Court or authority. 15. The above directions disposes of the writ applications (WP No. 399 of 2016 and WP No. 252 of 2016). 16. The writ application (WP No. 328 of 2015) relates to tsunami compensation claimed by the petitioner. The writ petitioner says that 1300 acres of the demised land were affected by the natural calamity. Rs. 11 crores were claimed by them. Only Rs. 7 lacs were granted by the Administration as ex-gratia. That too was claimed back by the Administration. In those circumstances, the writ petitioner preferred a writ application (WP No. 1304(W) of 2010) before this Court when Tapen Sen, J. on 13th July, 2012 ordered that the writ was allowed. Rs. 11 crores were claimed by them. Only Rs. 7 lacs were granted by the Administration as ex-gratia. That too was claimed back by the Administration. In those circumstances, the writ petitioner preferred a writ application (WP No. 1304(W) of 2010) before this Court when Tapen Sen, J. on 13th July, 2012 ordered that the writ was allowed. I find that in the prayers of that writ petition, the Administration has been asked to assess and pay the compensation claimed by the petitioner. 17. In that view of the matter, let the order dated 13th July, 2012 be implemented by the Administration by considering and reassessing the claim for compensation as claimed in the said writ application of 2010, in accordance with law by allowing the parties to produce evidence, hearing them and by a reasoned order within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As far as the contempt matter (CPAN No. 1565 of 2016 is concerned) Mr. Mandal hands over a copy of the current records to Mr. Choudhury. He submits that the order of which contempt is alleged has been complied with by the administration by reinstating the name of the petitioner in the relevant records. I think that there is substantial compliance with the said order. However, some inadvertent insertion remains in the record (column 12) to suggest resumption of land by the Administration. The alleged contemnors give an undertaking to this Court through Mr. Mandal that the necessary rectifications will be made in the revenue records, forthwith.