JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. 1. In the instant writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing the impugned order as contained in letter No.JHALSA/4056 dated 11.03.2008, pertaining to termination of his services from the post of Driver under JHALSA, issued by the Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Ranchi during the period of probation on the ground of unsatisfactory service, and the petitioner has further prayed for commanding upon the respondents to produce the relevant records relating to termination of the petitioner and for a direction upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service to the post of Driver with all consequential benefits. 2. The brief facts, as emanated in the writ application, is that the petitioner applied for the post of Driver under JHALSA, Ranchi in pursuance to advertisement published on 25.03.2007 in Hindi Daily News Paper under the signature of Member Secretary, JHALSA, Ranchi. Since the petitioner fulfilled all the terms and conditions and was found suitable for the post, he was duly appointed on the permanent post of Driver for a period of probation of two years vide letter dated 29.05.2007 wherein it has been stipulated that the services of the petitioner would be confirmed after satisfactory completion of probation period and the service conditions of the petitioner will be governed by the Rules governing Civil Courts Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his joining on 01.06.2007. It has been averred in the writ application that the then Member Secretary, JHALSA, Ranchi terminated the services of the petitioner by a letter of termination simpliciter at the time when the then Member Secretary, JHALSA was already under order of transfer to the post of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh. Being aggrieved by the order of termination simpliciter, the petitioner approached the respondents for consideration of his matter on sympathetic ground but the authorities did not take action on his representations. 3. In the supplementary affidavit dated 08.03.2010, it has been averred that the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority JHALSA vide application dated 11.01.2010 and the appellate authority JHALSA in reply vide letter dated 04.02.2010 provided two warning letters dated 29.10.2007 and 06.02.2008 issued under the signature of Joint Secretary, JHALSA Ranchi, in which serious allegations relating to dereliction of duty has been levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner further states that two aforesaid warning letters were never served upon the petitioner. 4. Another supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner on 20.07.2010, wherein it has been submitted that as per the information the petitioner was terminated on the allegation that firstly the petitioner was absent from his duty on 02.10.2007 without any information to anybody and secondly the petitioner left the office for home in the evening on 03.12.2007, though he had been asked to take the respondent no.4 to some legal awareness camp. 5. Another supplementary affidavit dated 13.12.2010 wherein it has been submitted that the log book provided to the petitioner vide letter No.JHALSA/900 dated 25.10.2010. The petitioner on 03.12.2007 had driven the official car total upto 43 Kilometers starting from kilometer 45273 and ending at kilometer 45316. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the impugned order of termination of the petitioner during period of probation by casting stigma on the ground of unsatisfactory services, amounts to removal of services by way of punishment being breach of principles of natural justice, on that score the impugned order of termination is not legally sustainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is governed by Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the then Member Secretary, JHALSA, who was under the order of transfer just prior to two days of his relieve, issued the impugned order of termination which smacks of mala fide, arbitrary and discriminatory action. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioner has been passed in violation of provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is also against the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in leading case of Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ). Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order of termination is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct without providing any reasonable opportunity of hearing and the same is liable to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has produced the records pertaining to termination of the petitioner from services. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order of termination is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct without providing any reasonable opportunity of hearing and the same is liable to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has produced the records pertaining to termination of the petitioner from services. Learned counsel for the respondents ultimately opposes the prayer of the counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the service of the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory service. Since during the period of probation he has been terminated, no full dressed enquiry was required to be conducted. In this respect, learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (1999) 2 SCC 21 (Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Anr.) wherein at paragraphs 11 and 13 it has been held as under: “11. Now, there are two lines of cases decided by this Court which deal with the question in issue. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers, this Court has taken the view that if the ex-parte enquiry or report is the motive for the termination order, then the termination is not to be called punitive merely because the principles of natural justice have not been followed. On the other hand, there is another line of cases, where this Court has held that the facts revealed in the enquiry are not the motive but the foundation for the termination of the services of the temporary servant or probationer, and hence punitive as the principles of natural justice have not been followed, and such orders are to be declared void. This Court has held that for finding out whether a given case falls within either of these two categories, it is permissible for the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal to go behind the order and look into the record of the proceedings, the antecedent and attendant circumstances culminating in the order of termination. 13. In fact, Krishna Iyer, J. in his characteristic style described the words “form”, “substance”, “motive” and “foundation” as the faces of an inscrutable sphinx, baffling lawyers and judges alike. 13. In fact, Krishna Iyer, J. in his characteristic style described the words “form”, “substance”, “motive” and “foundation” as the faces of an inscrutable sphinx, baffling lawyers and judges alike. (See Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab at p.889.) According to him, the need in this branch of law is to lay down a simple test which can be grasped by the administrator or the civil servant without much subtlety.” 8. After bestowing my anxious consideration to the submissions at the Bar and on perusal of the records, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order of termination dated 11.03.2008 vide Annexure-8, on the following grounds: (I) Admittedly, the petitioner who was appointed as a Driver in pursuance to advertisement, has been terminated during the period of probation. Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules is applicable in case of the petitioner. Before adverting to the moot questions, as to whether the petitioner’s termination is simpliciter or by way of stigma or punitive or by way of punishment, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules: 4. These Rules shall be supplemental and in addition to the existing Rules and/or orders, governing the conditions of service of Class-III and Class-IV employees employed in the Civil Courts in the State of Bihar. 46. All persons appointed to any category shall from the date on which he joins duty shall be on probation for the period as follows: (a) If recruited directly for a total period of two years duty within a continuous period of three years. (b) If appointed from other service for a total period of one year on duty within a continuous period of two years. Provided that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended unless his services are expressly confirmed; Provided further that the decision regarding the said confirmation shall ordinarily be taken within a period of three years from the date of his initial joining of the post. 54. The District Judge shall be the disciplinary authority of Class III and IV employees. 54. The District Judge shall be the disciplinary authority of Class III and IV employees. The District Judge may suspend, initiate any disciplinary proceeding, issue a charge-sheet, enquire into the charges against the delinquent employees himself or cause the same to be done by any other Judicial Officer and impose any of the penalties specified in Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935. (II) In the case in hand, on perusal of the order dated 11.03.2008 vide Annexure-8, it would be crystal clear that the services of the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory services. In order to ascertain the performance rendered by the petitioner during probation, the record produced by the respondents has been thoroughly scanned by this Court and on close scrutiny of the records, I am of the considered view that the services of the petitioner has been reported to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, the respondents have terminated the petitioner from services, since it was a termination simpliciter, therefore, it was not incumbent upon the respondents to provide reasonable opportunity in initiating departmental proceeding for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner. 9. In that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order dated 11.03.2008 vide Annexure-8 to the writ petition. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition sans merit is dismissed.