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2017 DIGILAW 531 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Badha Soda Harijan

2017-03-07

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant - State has filed the present appeal against the judgment and order, dated 27.3.2006, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Mahuva in Sessions Case No. 162 of 1992 whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondents accused from the charges for which they have been tried. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.5.1992 at about 12.00 O'clock at village Kulsar, the accused No. 1 along with other accused persons, who were armed with deadly weapons, assembled and with a view to commit an offence, formulated an unlawful assembly and thereby, had caused serious injuries on the side of complainant. It is further the case of prosecution that with a view to commit such an offence, the accused persons, who were armed with Axe, Dhariya, Pipe and Sticks, attacked on the complainant side in which one Nanji Laxmanbhai Harijan was murdered and thereby, an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. Section 149 of the IPC is registered. 2.1 It appears that out of the said scuffle which took place, cross case has also arisen in which side of the accused persons had also sustained serious injuries. But then further charge of Sections 323 and 324 r/w. Section 149 of the IPC has also been registered before the concerned police station. 2.2 The incident in question which occurred on 23.5.1992 which resulted into filing of FIR before the Talaja Police Station being C.R. No. 66 of 1992 against the respondents accused and pursuant to filing of the said complaint, the Investigating Officer had conducted the investigation by taking necessary steps of drawing panchnama, recovery of muddamal, P.M. Examination as also other steps which were required, have also been undertaken and after finding prima facie material against the respondents accused, the charge-sheet came to be submitted by the Investigating Officer before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. 2.3 Since the offence which has been alleged are triable by the court of sessions, in exercise of power under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. the same was committed to the court of sessions at Mahuva which came up for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Mahuva and the case was registered as Sessions Case No. 162 of 1992. 2.4 After committal of the case, the charge came to be framed against the respondents - accused vide Exh. 6 and their plea came to be recorded vide Exh. 7 to Exh. 10. Since the respondents - accused pleaded not guilty and offered themselves for trial, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- Sr. No. PW No. Name Exh. No. 1 PW-1 Bijalbhai Laxmanbhai 14 2 PW-2 Sonaben Virabhai 16 3 PW-3 Arjanbhai Dudabhai 17 4 PW-4 Rupabhai Sondabhai 19 5 PW-5 Jagdishchandra Chandushankar 21 6 PW-6 Pravinbhai Jerambhai 22 7 PW-7 Najabhai Kalubhai 24 8 PW-8 Hamabhai Premjibhai 25 9 PW-9 Narshibhai Tapubhai 41 10 PW-10 Vallabhbhai Rajabhai 43 11 PW-11 Kishorsinh Narsinh Ghelda, PSI 49 Evidence led by prosecution 1 Order as to investigation M-13/1 2 Complaint M-13/2 3 Report as to heavy offence M-13/3 4 Wireless message M-13/4 5 Inquest Panchnama of dead body of deceased M-13/5 6 Postmortem form M-13/6 7 PM Report M-13/7 8 Medical certificate of injured Sonaben M-13/8 9 Medical certificate of injured Arjan Duda M-13/9 10 Panchnama as to recovery of clothes M-13/10 11 Panchnama of place of offence M-13/11 12 Panchnama as to clothes and physical condition of injured Sonaben M-13/12 13 Panchnama of physical condition of accused Arjan Duda M-13/13 14 Panchnama as to recovery of weapon M-13/14 15 Arrest Panchnama M-13/15 16 Discovery panchnama of weapon M-13/16 17 Copy of letter as to sending of muddamal for analysis M-13/17 2.5 After the said evidence being led, a closure pursis came to be given by the prosecution and after recording the further statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the case was put up for trial. The trial court had framed the issues for which adjudication is to take place in sessions case and after considering in detail the evidence led by the prosecution and after considering the further statement, the trial court was pleased to pass an order of acquittal. It is this judgment and order dated 23.3.2006 is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellant - State. 3. Ms. It is this judgment and order dated 23.3.2006 is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellant - State. 3. Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State has contended that the trial court has committed a serious error in exercising jurisdiction under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C. for passing an order of acquittal especially when the evidence as a whole has not been appreciated in its true perspective. Ms.Punani, learned APP has further submitted that the material witnesses who have supported the case of the prosecution, their evidences have also not been properly considered and thereby, there appears to be a clear error on the part of the trial court. Learned APP has further submitted that the medical evidence has supported the case of the prosecution which is in consonance with the documentary evidence led by the prosecution and therefore, to discard such evidence, the order of acquittal is hardly possible to sustain in the eye of law. Learned APP has further submitted that looking to the material which has been collected during the course of investigation which has been proved by independent witnesses and therefore, the case ought not to have been resulted in passing an order of acquittal and for that purpose, learned APP has drawn our attention to some of the depositions of the witnesses and thereby, contended that these witnesses have clearly established the guilt of the respondents accused and therefore, in no circumstance, an order of acquittal is sustainable in the eye of law. 3.1 Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP has submitted that looking to the medical evidence which has been in the form of postmortem examination, it cannot be said that the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are germane to law and therefore, such kind of exercise of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected. Learned APP has further submitted that the appellate court has ample power to reassess the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion and such error committed by the trial court. Learned APP has, therefore, ultimately contended that looking to overall circumstances prevailing on record, the order of acquittal is not sustainable in the eye of law and therefore, she requested the court to allow the appeal filed by the State. 4. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Ms. Learned APP has, therefore, ultimately contended that looking to overall circumstances prevailing on record, the order of acquittal is not sustainable in the eye of law and therefore, she requested the court to allow the appeal filed by the State. 4. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Ms. Subhadra G. Patel, learned advocate representing the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Manraj A. Barot, learned advocate representing respondent Nos. 2 to 4 have vehemently contended that the prosecution has not established the guilt of the respondents accused beyond the reasonable doubt. Mr. Barot, a lead advocate representing the entire case has submitted that all the witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution. In addition thereto, Mr. Barot has submitted that there is no independent evidence available on record to prove the case against the respondents accused beyond the reasonable doubt. 4.1 In addition thereto, Mr. Barot has submitted that even the collection of blood is also not established to be that of the deceased and the prosecution has not taken any step to prove the guilt of the respondents accused beyond the reasonable doubt. Even the cross case which has emerged out of this incident in question, no doubt the presence can be said to be proved but, at the same time, there appears to be no circumstantial chain completing to establish the guilt of the respondents accused. Mr. Barot has submitted that in the absence of any other independent corroboration, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case beyond the reasonable doubt against the respondents accused. Mr. Barot has drawn our attention to evidence of some of the witnesses and then, contended that there appears no independent corroboration and the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not perverse which would permit the Court to reverse the order of acquittal. Mr. Barot has then submitted that the reasons and conclusion which have been arrived at by the trial court are based upon the evidence on record and does not reflect any wrong reading of the evidence which may turn out to be a perverse exercise of jurisdiction. 4.2 Mr. Mr. Barot has then submitted that the reasons and conclusion which have been arrived at by the trial court are based upon the evidence on record and does not reflect any wrong reading of the evidence which may turn out to be a perverse exercise of jurisdiction. 4.2 Mr. Barot, learned advocate for the respondents submitted that looking to the limited scope of appellate jurisdiction of dealing with the acquittal appeal, no different view is possible to be substituted and therefore, in consideration of aforesaid material on record, learned advocates appearing for the respondents accused have requested the Court that there appears to be no merit in the appeal filed by the State and accordingly, requested the Court to dismiss the same. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the reasons assigned by the trial court and the conclusion contained therein and upon independent analysis of evidence on record, the following circumstances are prevailing on record which cannot be overlooked to consider the appeal even on independent analysis of evidence. It appears from the record that all the witnesses who have been pressed into service for establishing the case of the prosecution have not supported the case of the prosecution and they have been declared hostile. In addition thereto, whatever witnesses have been pressed into service by the prosecution are the relatives of the deceased and no independent witnesses have been examined to prove the case against the respondents accused. In addition thereto, a serious flow in establishing the case of prosecution is that there is no medical officer examined to prove the injuries which are reflecting on postmortem examination and further all panchas have turned hostile and therefore, recovery panchnama and panchnama of scene of offence and other material is not established and therefore, in the absence of such cogent material, it cannot be said, as contended by learned advocates, that any error is committed by the trial court. 5.1 We have also examined the evidence and assessed independently also so as to ensure that findings arrived at by the trial court are in consonance with the testimony of the witnesses or not. For that purpose, we have examined the testimony of Bijal Laxmanbhai - PW-1, who is examined at Exh. 5.1 We have also examined the evidence and assessed independently also so as to ensure that findings arrived at by the trial court are in consonance with the testimony of the witnesses or not. For that purpose, we have examined the testimony of Bijal Laxmanbhai - PW-1, who is examined at Exh. 14 and from her deposition, we have found that she has not supported the case of prosecution and upon analysis of the cross-examination also, nothing incriminating is found which would warrant us to dislodge the finding arrived at by the trial court. In addition thereto, similar is the case with PW-2 - Sonaben w/o. Vira Dudha, who also has chosen not to support the case of prosecution and yet another witness - Arjan Duda (PW-3) who is examined at Exh. 17 has also not supported the case of prosecution. From overall reading of testimony of these witnesses, there appears to be no stinking circumstance reflecting which would permit us to dislodge the finding arrived at by the trial court. The other witnesses i.e. Rupa Sonda, who is examined at Exh. 19, Jagdishchandra Joshi (PW-5), who is examined at Exh. 21 and other relative witnesses who have been chosen by the prosecution to establish the case beyond the reasonable doubt but, it appears unfortunately that none of the witnesses have cogently supported the case of prosecution and therefore, in this context, to give sole reliance to the police witness would not find to be safe to convert an order of acquittal into a conviction and therefore, the analysis which has been undertaken by the trial court is reflecting no irregularity, no legal infirmity nor any perversity which may turn out to be a miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of such kind of circumstance, it appears that no serious error is committed which may warrant interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction more particularly while dealing with an order against an acquittal. 6. On overall view of the matter, apart from the fact that all witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution, a further material is also not available on record that FSL examination indicates that there appears to be blood stains on the axe which has been recovered during the course of investigation. 6. On overall view of the matter, apart from the fact that all witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution, a further material is also not available on record that FSL examination indicates that there appears to be blood stains on the axe which has been recovered during the course of investigation. Now, this blood group which has been found in the FSL examination, whether it belongs to the accused or the deceased, no attempt is made by the prosecution to prove the same and therefore, simply because the blood is found on the axe which is said to have been utilized, cannot lead the case of prosecution any further and therefore, when medical evidence is also not supporting in addition to the ocular evidence not clearly suggesting the guilt of the respondents accused, there is hardly any circumstance available on record to establish and connect the respondents accused to the commission of crime. Therefore, from overall reading of the judgment, it appears that there is no illegality is emerging. On the contrary, from the record it appears that possible view is taken by the trial court. From the further material on record and reading of the judgment of the trial court, we found that the trial court has considered each evidence and dealt with the same and then, arrived at the satisfaction and therefore, the conclusion arrived at in exercise of the jurisdiction, we are unable to disturb or dislodge the finding in the absence of any extraordinary distinguishable circumstance and therefore, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court can be said to be possible view and therefore, the same is not illegal nor can be said to be perverse which would result in miscarriage of justice and therefore, on overall consideration of material on record, we are of the considered opinion that there appears to be no error committed by the trial court based upon such kind of weak piece of evidence which the prosecution has led before the trial court. 7. 7. We are mindful of the fact that to deal with the order of acquittal in an appellate jurisdiction, even if any possible view is reflecting from the material, the same cannot be substituted more particularly when the trial court has considered the material and then, analyzed the evidence and arrived at a finding and therefore, looking to the following proposition laid down by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. Some of them are deserve to be narrated hereinafter: 7.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 7.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 7.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside"." 7.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 7.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 7.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 7.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 8. From the aforesaid position prevailing on record and upon due consideration to the evidence as a whole and looking to the proposition of law on the issue, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal filed by the appellant - State has no merit which can permit us to interfere with the finding of the trial court and accordingly, the appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 9. In view of the above. The judgment and order, dated 27.3.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 162 of 1992, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Mahuva, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.