JUDGMENT : Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. This revisional application, at the instance of Union of India (Ministry of Railways) represented by the General Manager, Metro Railway, Calcutta is directed against the order dated April 12, 2013 passed by the competent authority under the Metro Railway Authority (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1978") in claim case No. 1 of 1997. By the impugned order, the competent authority allowed the application of the opposite party no. 1 for substituting itself in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3, the original claimant in the claim case under Section 25 of the Act of 1978. 2. The opposite party nos. 2 and 3 filed the aforementioned claim case, before the competent authority, under Section 25 of the Act of 1978 claiming damages against the General Manager, Metro Railways (hereinafter referred to as "the Metro Railway Authority") alleging that while proceeding with the work in the city of Kolkata, the Metro Railway Authority caused damage to their multi-storied building at Premises No. 170B Chittaranjan Avenue, Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as "the said building"). The said claim case is being contested by the Metro Railway Authority. 3. In the said claim case, the opposite party no. 1 filed an application before the competent authority alleging that by a registered conveyance dated September 24, 2004 the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 transferred the said Premises No. 170B Chittaranjan Avenue (hereinafter referred to as "the said premises") together with the said building and prayed for being substituted as the claimant in the said claim case, in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3, the original claimants. 4. Before the competent authority the opposite party no. 1 contended that as in a case for compensation on account of the acquisition of a property under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short "the Act of 1894") or any other similar enactment, as a subsequent purchaser of the said premises together with the said building, it is entitled to receive damages from the Metro Railway Authority in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. It appears that in support of such contention, before the competent authority the opposite party no. 2 and 3. It appears that in support of such contention, before the competent authority the opposite party no. 1 relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of The General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra v. Wahab Uddin and Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 866 and Karanpura Development Company v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 1478 . The opposite party no. 1 also relied on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Seethalakshmi Ammal v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1993 Mad 1 , a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of V. Lakkanna v. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 1990 Kant 192 and the Division Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Gandhamoyee Devi v. Collector of Kamrup reported in AIR 1982 Gau 63 . Before the competent authority, the Metro Railway Authority raised objection with regard to the maintainability of the said substitution application. They contended that in the instant case, the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 filed the claim case, claiming damages on account of the alleged damage caused to the said building during the metro railway project and as such, the opposite party no. 1 as the subsequent transferee of the said premises cannot claim to be substituted in the claim case, in place and stead of the original claimants. The Metro Railway Authority, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the application of the opposite party no. 1. 5. By the impugned order dated April 12, 2013 the competent authority held that this is a case for claim of damages, the damage caused is to be proved by the claimants in the trial of the suit and after proving of damage caused by the Metro Railway, certainly the person interested in the property is entitled to get compensation on the ground of damage; it may either be the original claimants or the proposed claimants, but the Metro Railway cannot by-pass its liability of paying compensation for causing damage to the said building, if any. The competent authority further held that if the original claimants had sold the property to the proposed party on low consideration on the ground of damaged property, then the original claimants are entitled to get such compensation and on the other hand, if the proposed party purchased the property in damaged condition, then they may incur expenditure for removal/repair of such damage and in that case the proposed party may be entitled to get compensation on the ground of damage, if any. With these findings, the competent authority repelled the aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the Metro Railway Authority and allowed the application filed by the opposite party no. 1 by substituting it as the claimant in place of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. 6. Assailing the impugned order passed by the competent authority, Mr. Partha Sarathi Bose, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner Metro Railway Authority submitted that in the instant case the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 as the owners of the said building filed in the claim case under Section 25 of the Act of 1978, claiming damages from the petitioner Railway Authority on account of the alleged damage caused to the said building. It was urged that a bare reading of the provisions in Section 25 of the Act of 1978 makes it abundantly clear that it is the person who has an interest in the property in question at the time of the damage caused by the Metro Railway Authority can only maintain a claim for damages against the Metro Railway Authority. He next contended that in the present case, undisputedly even as on the date of filing of the claim case before the competent authority, the opposite party no. 1 had no interest in the said premises or any part thereof and by purchasing the said premises subsequent to the filing of the claim case by the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 before the competent authority, the opposite party no. 1 cannot claim itself to be a 'person interested' to claim damages from the Metro Railway Authority under Section 25 of the Act of 1978. 2 and 3 before the competent authority, the opposite party no. 1 cannot claim itself to be a 'person interested' to claim damages from the Metro Railway Authority under Section 25 of the Act of 1978. It was strongly contended for the petitioner Metro Railway Authority that in the present case the competent authority fell into an error of law to pass the impugned order on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of The General Government Servants Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Agra (supra) and Karanpura Development Company (supra), the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Seethalakshmi Ammal (supra) and the Division Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Gandhamoyee Devi (supra) dealing with the right of a person to claim compensation from the State for acquisition of an immovable property under the Act of 1894 and other relevant statutes, where the expression 'person interested' has been defined to include any person having interest in the compensation money as a 'person interested' who had interest in the compensation amount as per the definition of the term 'person interested' under the relevant enactment. On these grounds, the petitioner Metro Railway Authority pressed for setting aside of the impugned order passed by the competent authority. It was also submitted by the petitioner Metro Railway Authority that the said building has since been demolished and a new multi-storied building has been constructed at the said premises. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Jaydip Kar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 1 submitted that it is the damage caused to the said building which gave rise to the cause of action of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 to file the claim case against the Metro Railway Authority under Section 25 of the Act of 1978 and as the subsequent purchaser of the damaged building, the opposite party no. 1 is entitled to be substituted in the claim case in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. 2 and 3 to file the claim case against the Metro Railway Authority under Section 25 of the Act of 1978 and as the subsequent purchaser of the damaged building, the opposite party no. 1 is entitled to be substituted in the claim case in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. He argued that in the present case, the competent authority was absolutely correct to rely on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of The General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra (supra) and Karanpura Development Company (supra) as well as the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Seethalakshmi Ammal (supra), Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of V. Lakkanna (supra) and the decision of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Gandhamoyee Devi (supra) and to allow the prayer of the opposite party no. 1. Mr. Kar further submitted that by the said registered deed of conveyance dated September 24, 2004 the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 also assigned all their right to claim damages against the Metro Railway Authority in the claim case. It was urged that the competent authority was correct to uphold the right of the petitioner to be substituted in the said claim case in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 and there is no merit in the present revisional application. 8. I have carefully considered the materials on record, as well as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Metro Railway Authority and the opposite party no. 1, respectively. Since the right of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 to file the said claim case against the petitioner Metro Railway Authority arose out of Section 25 of the Act of 1978 it would be convenient to consider the provisions contained in the said Section which reads as follows: "25. 1, respectively. Since the right of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 to file the said claim case against the petitioner Metro Railway Authority arose out of Section 25 of the Act of 1978 it would be convenient to consider the provisions contained in the said Section which reads as follows: "25. Amount Payable for damage, loss or injury-(1) Where the metro railway administration exercises any power conferred on it by or under this Act and in consequence thereof any damage, loss or injury is sustained by any person interested in any land, building, street, road or passage, the metro railway administration shall be liable to pay to such person for such damage, loss or injury such amount as may be determined by the competent authority. (2) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount payable shall, on an appeal preferred by either of the parties, within sixty days from the date of the order of the competent authority, to the appellate authority, be determined by an order of the appellate authority. (3) The competent authority or the appellate authority while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall have due regard to the damage, loss or injury sustained by any person interested in the land, building, street, road or passage by reason of - (i) the removal of trees or standing crops, if any; (ii) the temporary severance of the land, building, street, road or passage; (iii) any injury to any other property whether movable or immovable. (4) The procedure and the manner of deposit and payment of the amount payable for acquiring any land, building, street, road or passage or any right of user in or any right in the nature of easement on any land, building, street, road or passage shall be followed in the case of procedure and the manner of deposit and payment of the amount determined by the competent authority or the appellate authority under this section." 9. From a careful reading of the above provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act of 1978 it is clear that while exercising of power under the said Act, if the Metro Railway Authority causes any damage or injury to any land or building it is the person having subsisting interest in such land or building who can claim damages from the Metro Railway Authority. In view of the clear and unambiguous language of the provisions contained in Section 25(1) of the Act of 1978 as quoted above and in the absence of any definition of the expression 'person interested' in the Act of 1978, I find force in the contention of the petitioner Metro Railway Authority that it is only the persons having subsisting interest in the land or building as on the date of damage suffered by the said building who is entitled to claim damages from the Metro Railway Authority and any subsequent transferee acquiring interest in the damaged building or property cannot claim damages against the Metro Railway Authority. I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that being the subsequent purchaser of the said premises together with the said building, it is entitled to claim damages from the Metro Railway Authority in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. 10. In the cases of The General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a person who had purchased a property in auction and also obtained the sale certificate, but before he obtained possession of the property a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 for acquisition of the same property. The said person filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the steps taken by the State for acquisition of the said property. The question arose in that case as to whether the writ petitioner having obtained sale certificate in respect of the property in question could file the writ petition to challenge the acquisition proceeding. The said person filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the steps taken by the State for acquisition of the said property. The question arose in that case as to whether the writ petitioner having obtained sale certificate in respect of the property in question could file the writ petition to challenge the acquisition proceeding. While deciding such question in the said case, the Supreme Court noted the definition of the expression 'person interested' appearing in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894 to include all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of acquisition of the land under the Act and held that the writ petitioner having already obtained the sale certificate in respect of the property in question and a notice under Section 9(3) of the Act of 1984 being issued to him to prefer his claim, if any for compensation of the property acquired had the locus standi to file the writ petition. At this juncture, it may be noted that considering the aforementioned inclusive definition of the expression 'person interested' in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894, in the case of Sundarlal v. Paramsukhdas reported in (1968) 1 SCR 362 : AIR 1968 SC 366 the Supreme Court held that in order to claim compensation under the said Act of 1894 it is not necessary that the person must claim an interest in the land which has been acquired, but it is sufficient if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded on account of acquisition of the property. In the case of Karanpura Development Company (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the claim of a lessee for compensation on account of vesting of its lease in respect of the coal bearing land, in the Central Government, under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (in short "the Act of 1957"). Section 13 of the Act of 1957 provided that where a prospecting licence ceases to have effect under Section 5, there shall be paid to the person interested compensation. Now, under Section 2(d) of the Act of 1957 the expression 'person interested' was also defined to include all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land, or of the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of any rights in or over land under the said Act. Now, under Section 2(d) of the Act of 1957 the expression 'person interested' was also defined to include all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land, or of the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of any rights in or over land under the said Act. The language of the definition of the expression 'person interested' in the said Act of 1957 is in terms substantially similar to the definition of that expression in the Act of 1894. Accordingly, following the Court's earlier decision in the case of Sundarlal (supra), the Supreme Court held that a head lessee, who had granted a sub-lease of its coal bearing land, is entitled to claim compensation from the Central Government on account of vesting of his lease hold interest in the Central Government under the said Act of 1957. In the case of Gandhamoyee Devi (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, while interpreting the expression 'person interested' appearing in Sections 5A, 9 and 11 of the Act of 1894 followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sundarlal (supra). In the case of V. Lakkanna (supra), the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sundarlal (supra) and held that the expression 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894 has a wider meaning, in that not only the person who has got an interest in the immovable property acquired but also a person who, though not having any interest in the immovable property acquired, has an interest to claim compensation, would have to be regarded as a person interested for the purpose of compensation proceeding. However, in view of the clear and unambiguous language of the provisions contained in Sections 25(1) of the Act of 1978 and in the absence of any definition of the term 'person interested' in the Act of 1978, similar in terms with the expression 'person interested' as laid down in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894, or in Section 2(d) of the Act of 1957 none of the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court or the Karnataka High Court or the Gauhati High Court has any application in the present case. In the case of Seethalakshmi Ammal (supra), the Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that under the Act of 1894 as the ownership is not transferred until the possession of the property sought to be acquired is taken under Section 16 and there is no absolute vesting of the land in the Government free from all encumbrances until the Collector, after making the award under Section 11, takes possession of the land, it can be said that a purchaser after notification under Section 4 or even declaration under Section 6 can be a 'person interested' within the meaning of the said Act. Therefore, even the said decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court also has no application in the present case. For all these reasons, I am unable to accept the argument for the opposite party no. 1 that the competent authority was correct to rely on the aforementioned decisions. 11. I am even unable to accept the contention of the opposite party no. 1 that inasmuch as by the said registered conveyance dated September 24, 2004 the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 assigned all their right to claim damages against the Metro Railway Authority, the opposite party no. 1 is entitled to be substituted in the claim case before the competent authority in place and stead of the opposite party nos. 2 and 3. This is for the settled principle of law that a claim for damages cannot be assigned in law. If an authority for such view is looked for, the same can be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1810 (para-24). 12. In view of the above findings which I have already arrived at, none of the reasons disclosed by the competent authority in the impugned order to allow the application filed by the opposite party no. 1 can be sustained. Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds and the impugned order dated April 12, 2013 passed by the competent authority stands set aside. 13. However, there shall be no order as to costs.