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2017 DIGILAW 532 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Kantilal Vallabhaji Bhogayata

2017-03-07

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present Criminal Appeal is filed by the State under Section 378(1) of Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 27.01.2006 passed by learned Presiding Officer, F.T.C. No. 6, Jam-Khambhalia in Sessions Case No. 147 of 2001. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the marriage of Ritaben, the sister of the complainant, solemnized with the son of the accused No. 1 i.e. Kantilal Vallabhaji Bhogayata on 21.11.2000 and after her marriage, within a short span of time, the accused Nos. 1 and 2 have started demanding dowry and executed mental and physical torture to the deceased Ritaben and were also asking for articles like sofa-set, bed, T.V. Etc. and on account of such demand the mental and physical torture in form of cruelty was being caused by present accused Nos. 1 and 2. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased Ritaben has committed suicide on 04.05.2001 by pouring kerosene on herself. On account of this incident in question, the brother of the deceased Deepakkumar had filed the complained before Jamjodhpur Police Station, which was registered as complaint being I-C.R. No. 16/2001 for the offences punishable under Sections 498(a), 306, 304(b) read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.1 Pursuant to the registration of the said complaint, the Investigating Officer has executed necessary panchnamas and also record statement of relevant witnesses and has taken all steps as required under investigation and after forming prima facie material against the respondents accused persons, a charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jam-Khambhalia. The incident in question which has registered for the offences under Sections 498(a), 306, 304(b) read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code was triable by the Court of Sessions in exercise of power under Section 209 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate has committed the case to Session Judge, which ultimately has come up for consideration before the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 6, Jam-Khambhalia. Upon committed of the said case, the learned Judge has framed the charge vide Exhibit-5 and after framing the charge their plea was recorded vide Exhibit-6 and 7 respectively. Since the respondents accused have pleaded not guilty, the case was put up for further adjudication. Upon committed of the said case, the learned Judge has framed the charge vide Exhibit-5 and after framing the charge their plea was recorded vide Exhibit-6 and 7 respectively. Since the respondents accused have pleaded not guilty, the case was put up for further adjudication. The prosecution with a view to prove the case against the respondents accused have laid the evidence in form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- Sr. No. P.W. No. Name of Witness/Description Exhibit No. 1 1 Deepakbhai Veljibhai Bhatt 10 2 Complaint 11 3 2 Veljibhai Premjibhai Bhatt 12 4 3 Sonalben Veljibhai Bhatt 13 5 4 Rajendrasinh Umedsinh Jadeja 14 6 Yadi of Head Constable, G.G. Hospital, Jamnagar to P.S.I. C.T.B. 15 7 Deepakkumar Premjibhai Meghprani 16 8 Ritaben's O.P.D. Case of Jamjodhpur Hospital 17 9 Certificate of Medical Officer of Jamjodhpur in respect of Ritaben 18 10 6 Vaishaliben Pravinbhai Nakrani. 21 11 7 Bharatbhai Mohanbhai Rathod 22 12 Panchnama of place of offence. 23 13 8 Rakhalchand Gopeshchand Dattani. 24 14 Yadi to Medical College, Jamnagar for postmortem. 25 15 P.M. Form. 26 16 Postmortem Report. 27 17 9 Balsinh Koyabhai Parmar. 29 18 Yadi to C.P.I. Bhanwade P.S.O. Jamjodhpur for crime registration. 30 19 Xerox copy of station diary. 31 20 Inquest panchnama of dead body of deceased Ritaben. 33 21 10 Mansukhbhai Dharmishbhai Pabari. 34 22 Arrest panchnama of accused Kantilal. 35 23 11 Sajanbhai Hardasbhai Boder. 36 24 12 Gandubhai Gokalbhai Sakariya. 37 25 13 Chaitanyaprasad Gajanandbhai Rawal. 38 26 Extract of Form 16/01 as per Cr.P.C. Section 174. 39 27 Receipt of handing over of dead body. 40 28 Xerox Bill of two Chairs. 41 29 Xerox of Bill of Cupboard. 42 30 Copy of report submitted to Judicial Magistrate, Bhadwad Court, in respect of addition of section 304(b) in F.I.R. 43 31 Closure pursis 44 2.2 After leading the evidence in the aforesaid manner, the prosecution has given a closure pursis vide Exhibit-44 and with a view to grant an opportunity to defend, the further statement was recorded of the respondents accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter, since the respondents accused have denied the offence being committed, case was put up for final adjudication. The learned Judge, with a view to appreciate the evidence on record laid by the prosecution, has framed the issues and thereafter, after detail examination of the evidence in exercise of power under Section 235 of Code of Criminal Procedure, by giving benefit of doubt, the respondents accused were acquitted from the charge under Sections 498(a), 306, 304(b) read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment and order dated 27.01.2006. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of present Criminal Appeal filed by the State. 3. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. L.R. Poojari, appearing on behalf of the State has vehemently contended that the learned Judge has committed an error of jurisdiction in granting benefit of doubt to the respondents accused by not considering the evidence, which has been laid by the prosecution in its true perspective and this being a clear violation in exercising the jurisdiction, the order of acquittal deserves to be corrected. 4. Mr. Poojari, learned APP, has further contended that there is enough material on record to justify the guilt of the respondents accused, as laid by the prosecution. Mr. Poojari has drawn our attention to the list of evidences which have been adduced by the prosecution to prove the case and on the basis of such evidences which have been laid by the prosecution, in no uncertain terms the guilt is emerging from the record, which ought to have been seen by the learned Judge. 5. Mr. Poojari, the learned APP has further submitted that on overall consideration of material, the allegation of dowry as well as ill treatment meted out, are in co-relation, and the evidence has sufficiently indicated that there was a specific demand of dowry which resulted into the commission of crime and therefore, by referring to Section 304(b) read with Section 306 and 498(A) of Indian Penal Code, Mr. Poojari, has vehemently contended that there is serious error committed by the learned Judge in appreciating the evidence. 6. Mr. Poojari, has vehemently contended that there is serious error committed by the learned Judge in appreciating the evidence. 6. Mr. poojari has further contended that the brother of the deceased Deepakkumar, who has been examined as prosecution witness No. 1 at Exhibit-10 has asserted the element of cruelty to the deceased in immediate past and the said aspect has been fructified by independent witness Vaishaliben Pravinbhai, who was prosecution witness No. 6 and therefore, from these two evidences, which are laid by the prosecution, has clearly established the guilt of the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, there appears to be a clear error in exercising jurisdiction for granting benefit of doubt. 7. Mr. Poojari, learned APP, has further drawn our attention to the specific assertion contained in First Information Report which is reflecting on page No. 333 of paper book compilation and Mr. Poojari has contended that this assertion of the First Information Report is quite in consonance with the evidence on record, which has been laid and therefore, Mr. Poojari has contended that since the specific case is made out, the grant of benefit of doubt would be a miscarriage of justice and therefore, the intervention of this Court is required in the interest of justice. 8. Mr. Poojari, learned APP, has further drawn our attention to the inquest panchnama and the panchnama of scene of offence coupled with postmortem examination note, which is very much available on record and has contended that the ocular evidence is in consonance with the medical evidence and therefore, in absence of any infirmity to grant the benefit of doubt would be perverse to the analysis of the evidence on record, and this being the case of perversity by assessing the evidence, the order in question is required to be interfered with. 9. Mr. Poojari has then contended that the appellate Courts has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence on record and hence ultimately contended that since the overall material on record is clearly establishing the guilt of respondents accused, the order of granting benefit of doubt is required to be corrected in the interest of justice and ultimately requested the Court to set aside the order and grant the relief as prayed for in the appeal. 10. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Poojari, the learned advocate Mr. 10. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Poojari, the learned advocate Mr. Hasit H. Joshi, appearing for the respondents accused, has vehemently contended that there is no independent material coming out from the record which would indicate the guilt of the respondents accused. On the contrary, the evidence is not inspiring any confidence in the case of prosecution. By referring to the evidence of the relatives, who have been examined to prove the case, Mr. Joshi has contended that no independent witness supporting such interested witnesses and therefore, there is no reason to rely such interested witnesses' deposition to convict the respondents accused more particularly when no independent corroboration is available from the record. 11. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate, has further contended that the specific history has been given while admitting the deceased to the hospital, which would clearly indicate that it is a simple case of suicide for no just reason, and there is no link connecting the respondents accused in commission of crime. 12. Mr. Joshi has further contended that had there been any circumstance pointing out the guilt of the respondents accused, the same would have been reflected from other material on record, more particularly, the panchnama of scene of offence as well as from the medical papers and the P.M. Note examination, is also reflecting no other injuries except the one. 13. Mr. Joshi has contended that the witnesses, who have been examined by the prosecution have not proved the demand of dowry beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, to facilitate and save money the request was made that furnitures can be purchased from the local area and on the contrary in the evidence it is coming out clearly that the bills have been generated in the name of the father of the deceased and therefore, the question of demand of dowry is not established beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, in absence of any such demand of dowry being established the case of prosecution is not to be stretched beyond that and therefore, there is no question of establishing the case of even 306 as well as Section 304(B). 14. Mr. 14. Mr. Joshi has submitted that the learned Judge has assigned just and proper reasons to substantiate the conclusion, which has been arrived at and on the contrary looking to the settled principle of law, even the presumption has been drawn as statutory presumption. Mr. Joshi has submitted that learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that raising of presumption is not mandatory it is merely a discretionary and therefore by referring to the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Judge, Mr. Joshi has submitted that there is no illegality nor any perversity reflecting from the order of the learned Judge which requires any interference, more particularly, dealing with an acquittal appeal in appellate jurisdiction. 15. Mr. Joshi has submitted that it cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge in evaluating the evidence on record. It is settled position of law that when the learned Judge has considered each and every aspects and arrived at the conclusion simply because another view is possible, no order of acquittal be interfered with. More particularly, when the learned trial Judge had an opportunity to see the demeanor of witnesses and therefore, the conclusion even if found to be lack of little irregularity the same cannot be substituted as the conclusion is derived from the evidence on record which has been examined by the trial Court and therefore, the acquittal appeal is required to be dismissed as having no merit. 16. Having heard learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the reasons which are assigned by the learned Judge and after considering the evidence on record, following circumstances are clearly establishing from the evidence, which cannot be ignored. (i) On perusal of the evidence of prosecution witness No. 1, who is examined at Exhibit-10, the brother of the deceased, has deposed before the Court to establish the guilt, but his examination on the contrary raising serious doubt. In fact, this witness has admitted that though the deceased was informing him, he has not informed other family members. (i) On perusal of the evidence of prosecution witness No. 1, who is examined at Exhibit-10, the brother of the deceased, has deposed before the Court to establish the guilt, but his examination on the contrary raising serious doubt. In fact, this witness has admitted that though the deceased was informing him, he has not informed other family members. On the contrary, he has admitted in his cross examination that after cremation ceremony gets over, in consultation with C.P.I., the complaint came to be filed and cross examination of this witness is indicating not only there is delay of two days in filing the complaint, but his cross examination revealed that there was specific deliberation took place with C.P.I., as to whom to be arraigned and against whom the complaint be filed. This version has raised serious doubt about the case of prosecution, which appears to have been rightly analyzed by the learned Judge. This version of the brother has traveled further, and indisputably it has been found that the purchase which has taken place out of the amount of Rs. 4,000/-, the bills, which have been issued, were in the name of the father of the deceased and had there been any such circumstance of dowry of demand of that nature, this circumstance would not have come up in the evidence and therefore, it appears that the learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the dowry aspect has not been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In addition thereto the unnatural conduct of this witness also reflected a doubt that immediate action has not been taken to unearth the guilt out of the incident in question. The complaint came to be filed after a period of two days and apart from that the same has been filed after due deliberation with the police officer and further more this witness has neither informed about the past telephonic conversion with the deceased about the demand of dowry from the respondents accused, nor the telephone call having been received has come up in evidence and therefore, this evidence is not possible to be given any credence further. There is hardly any circumstance which can permit the Court to believe the version given by the Vaishaliben, who has been examined as prosecution witness No. 6. There is hardly any circumstance which can permit the Court to believe the version given by the Vaishaliben, who has been examined as prosecution witness No. 6. On the contrary, there appears to be steep contradiction which clearly indicate that case has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. (ii) The record further indicates that even looking at the evidence of Vaishaliben Pravinbhai said to be a friend of the deceased, her version is also almost on the similar line as that of the brother of the deceased. She also though knowing fully well, has not disclosed any demand of dowry or ill treatment on deceased to any other person and she has stated that this has been conveyed to sister Sonal after two and three days from the incident in question and therefore, version of this witness does not establish guilt of the respondents accused. (iii) In addition thereto from the paper book compilation, if the medical papers are to be seen, the history which has been recorded reflecting on page 345 of paper book compilation at Exhibit-17, in which also the history is not pointing out anybody's guilt including respondents accused. The history stated to have been given by the relatives, which indicates no attribution towards respondents accused. (iv) The evidence of the prosecution further reveals that even from the panchanama, which has been drawn on the scene of offence, reflecting on page 355 of paper book compilation also indicates no further incriminating circumstance which can corroborate the version of prosecution and therefore, in absence of any such material being corroborated to the case of prosecution, it cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge in assigning the reasons for granting benefit of doubt and, therefore, looking to the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Judge more particularly reflecting on page No. 311 paragraph No. 37, no doubt that the case of committal of suicide is established from the material on record. At the same time, this incidence is not possible to connect the respondents accused beyond any reasonable doubt. At the same time, this incidence is not possible to connect the respondents accused beyond any reasonable doubt. (v) The learned Judge while supporting his conclusion of grant of benefit of doubt has specifically examined the evidence on record and has arrived at the conclusion which is reflecting on paragraph No. 38 of the judgment and order and therefore, on careful consideration of this evidence on record coupled with the reasons which are assigned by the learned Judge, we are of the opinion that it is not in the interest of justice to dislodge the finding of the learned Judge who granted benefit of doubt way back in the year 2006. (vi) In addition thereto, the learned Judge has taken the issue pertaining to statutory presumption, which has been available, as the death has occurred within a period of seven years from the marriage, but then that presumption which is available and stipulated in Section 113 of Evidence Act, would indicate that such presumption is discretionary in nature. It appears that for arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge had in his mind the decision in case of Mangat Ram Vs. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1782 , and therefore, on that issue also there appears to be no material irregularity in exercising the jurisdiction. On overall careful analysis of the evidence on record in co-relation with the reasons assigned by the learned Judge, we are of the considered opinion that the order of acquittal, which was passed in January, 2006 does not call for any interference and we accordingly hold that the State Appeal has no merit to substantiate their stand. (vii) While coming to this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that there are self imposed limitation on exercising of appellate jurisdiction particularly when the Court is dealing with an order of acquittal. It is needless to say that it is settled position of law that when two views are possible, the view adopted by the learned trial Judge is under normal circumstance, is not to be disturbed unless some extraordinary stinking distinguishable circumstances prevailing on record must not have been dealt with by the learned Judge while analyzing the evidence on record. It is needless to say that it is settled position of law that when two views are possible, the view adopted by the learned trial Judge is under normal circumstance, is not to be disturbed unless some extraordinary stinking distinguishable circumstances prevailing on record must not have been dealt with by the learned Judge while analyzing the evidence on record. We found no extraordinary distinguishable circumstance which can permit us to take a different view of the case and accordingly in absence of such material being available, we deem it proper not to disturb the findings arrived at by the learned judge. 17. We are also mindful of the fact that the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in series of decisions that in what circumstance the order of acquittal can be disturbed. Same are reproduced hereinafter: 17.1 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 17.2 In case of M.S. Narayana Nenon @ Nani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 17.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 17.4 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 17.5 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court, xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 17.6 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further get assistance from one another decision, State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 11. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 18. In view of the aforesaid situation prevailing on record and after careful consideration of few of the evidence in co-relation with the findings arrived at by the learned Judge, and considering the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the view that the order of acquittal does not call for any interference and hence the appeal filed by the State being meritless, deserves to be dismissed. 19. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 27.01.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 147 of 2001 by the learned Presiding Officer, F.T.C. No. 6, Jam-Khambhalia, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.