JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J.( Oral) - By way of instant original miscellaneous petition (OMP), respondents - Judgment debtor has filed objections under section 47 CPC to the execution petition filed by the Decree Holder, seeking therein dismissal of execution proceedings instituted by the Decree Holder. 2. Before adverting to the merits of the application, it may be noticed by way of instant execution petition filed under Order 21, Rule 11 CPC read with Section 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Decree Holder has sought execution of award dated 30.5.2009 passed by Shri D.N. Bansal, Sole Arbitrator. 3. It emerges from the record that Shri D.N. Bansal, Chief Engineer (Retd.) and ex-member of the HPSEB was appointed as Sole Arbitrator by the HP Electricity Regulatory Commission vide order dated 25.2.2008 in Petition No. 139 of 2007, titled M/s Sai Engineering Foundation v. HPSEB , for adjudication of dispute between the parties concerning evacuation of power from Titang Mini Hydel Project, Kinnaur. Arbitrator, in the present case, was appointed in terms of conditions contained in Power Purchase Agreement dated 3.10.2000, signed between the parties for the said project. Aforesaid Sole Arbitrator passed award on 30.5.2009. 4. By way of above referred execution petition, Decree Holder has prayed that total amount of Rs. 1,21,41,958/- along with interest @ 18% p.a. upto actual date of payment, be realized by way of sale of attached property of judgment debtor, as well as from its bank accounts. In the aforesaid background, judgment debtor has filed instant objections by way of instant application under section 47 CPC. 5. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Satish Sharma, Advocate, while inviting attention of this Court to objections filed by them, contended that award dated 30.5.2009, is not executable as signed copy of award was not supplied to judgment debtor, as such, provisions of Section 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act would not apply in the instant case. Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, further contended that objections with regard to signed copy of award not having been supplied to the judgment debtor was also taken by them before HP Electricity Regulatory Commission in petition No. 136/2011, wherein, award in question came to be passed in favour of Decree Holder as also subsequent arbitration proceedings between same parties before arbitral tribunal. Mr. Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, further contended that award sought to be executed in the present proceedings is not executable since time for filing application for setting aside award under Section 34 of the Act has still no elapsed. Apart from above, Mr. Bhogal, contended that HP Electricity Regulatory Commission had appointed Shri D.N. Bansal, retired Chief Engineer, as Sole Arbitrator vide order dated 25.2.2008, for adjudication of dispute between the parties, whereby, he was directed to make award within a period of three months. In the instant case, above named Sole Arbitrator failed to make award within time so stipulated and at no point of time, he sought extension of time, as such, award dated 30.5.2009, is no award in the eyes of law and same is not capable of being executed. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate further contended that bare perusal of award passed by learned Sole Arbitrator itself suggests that no amount has been awarded in favour of the Decree Holder, rather, arbitrator has only made recommendations that too without any justification, as such, present execution petition deserves to be dismissed. Mr. Bhogal, further contended that learned arbitrator himself arrived at positive finding against issue No. 2 to the effect that the judgment debtor has not in any manner violated provisions of Article 9 of the PPA. These findings have not been challenged at any time, by the Decree Holder in any forum, as such, same has attained finality against Decree Holder. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate prayed that present execution petition filed by Decree Holder deserves to be dismissed. 6. Mr. Vikas Chauhan, learned counsel representing the Decree Holder, opposed aforesaid prayer having been made by the learned counsel representing the judgment debtor. Mr. Chauhan, while refuting the aforesaid contentions/submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the judgment debtor, invited attention of this Court to the communication dated 12.11.2009 (Annexure A-2), annexed to the reply to the objections, to demonstrate that signed copy of award was sent to the judgment debtor, as per Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, for necessary action on the part of judgment debtor. Mr. Mr. Chauhan, also invited attention of this Court to the information furnished by the PIO-cum-Superintending Engineer (Electricity) o/o Chief Engineer, (P&M), HPSEB, Shimla (Annexure A-1) of reply, to substantiate his aforesaid argument that signed copy of award was duly received by the Board on 12.11.2009. While placing reliance upon annexure A-1 i.e. information dated 24.9.2011, procured under Right to Information Act. Mr. Chauhan, contended that signed copy of award was received in Board''s diary on 12.11.2009, which was further marked to Chief Engineer (Projects), HPSEB, Shimla. Mr. Chauhan, with aforesaid submissions seriously disputed contentions having been made by Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate that execution petition is premature as time to file objections under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, has not still expired. Mr. Chauhan, contended that it stands duly proved on record that signed copy of award was received by the judgment debtor on 12.11.2009, but despite that it failed to file objections under Section 34 of the Act being aggrieved by the award passed by Sole Arbitrator within stipulated period of three months. Mr. Chauhan, with a view to refute another contention of Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate that no amount has been awarded by the Sole Arbitrator, invited attention of this Court to the award passed by the arbitrator, whereby learned arbitrator has specifically recommended compensation, while deciding issue No. 3. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Chauhan, contended that other objections as raised in the present application, are not maintainable in view of the fact that legality, if any, of the award can not be challenged in the execution proceedings, rather, same was required to be laid challenge by way of objections, if any, filed under Section 34 of the Act. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 8. After having carefully perused pleadings adduced on record by respective parties, this Court sees no force in the contentions of Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate that execution petition is premature and no signed copy of award was made available to the judgment debtor. Perusal of communication dated 12.11.2009, annexure A-2, clearly shows that Sole Arbitrator, in compliance to Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, had sent a signed copy of arbitral award to the Secretary of the Board, for necessary action. Perusal of communication dated 12.11.2009, annexure A-2, clearly shows that Sole Arbitrator, in compliance to Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, had sent a signed copy of arbitral award to the Secretary of the Board, for necessary action. Contents of annexure A-2 dated 12.11.2009, are reproduced herein below: "To M/S. Sai Engineering Foundation, Sai Bhawan, Shimla-9 (H.P.) Subject:- Arbitration case (Pet.No. 139/07) in the matter of M/ Sai Engineering Foundation, Sai Bhawan, New Shimla- 9(claimant) V/s Himachal Pradesh State Elect. Board (Respondent) Sir, A signed copy of arbitral award on the subject cited arbitration case is enclosed as per Sub-section (5) of section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for your kind information and necessary action. Please acknowledge the receipt. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (D.N. Bansal) Arbitrator Enclosure-Copy of arbitral award.(Please read compensation recommended as compensation awarded at page-9 under Table-II). Signed copy of arbitral award to: 1. Secretary HPSEB, Vidyut Bhawan Shimla-4 as per Sub-section (5) of section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for kind information and necessary action. He is requested to acknowledge the receipt. Enclosure-Copy of arbitral award. (Please read compensation recommended as compensated awarded at page-9 under Table II) 2. Secretary HPERC, Keonthal Commercial complex, Khalini, Shimla-171002 (HP) with reference to her office letter No. HPERC-ARB/Reader: 3093 dated 4.11.09. Enclosure-Original copy of arbitral award. (Please read compensation recommended as compensation awarded at page-9 under Table-II)." 9. Though, aforesaid communication has been addressed to M/s Sai Engineering Foundation i.e. Decree Holder but note appended in the aforesaid letter clearly suggests that a signed copy of award was sent to the judgment debtor also. Factum with regard to sending signed copy of award to the judgment debtor further stands corroborated by information supplied to the Decree Holder by the PIO-cum-Superintending Engineer (Elect.), wherein, it has been specifically informed that a copy of award was received in Board''s diary on 12.11.2009, which was further marked to the Chief Engineer (Projects), HPSEB Shimla. At this stage, Mr. Bhogal, contended that there is no mention, if any, of signed copy of award, but aforesaid plea of Mr. Bhogal is not sustainable in view of the fact that there is acknowledgment in the information supplied under Right to Information Act that Board had received copy of award vide communication dated 12.11.2009, wherein, admittedly, signed copy of arbitral award was sent to Secretary, HPSEB. Bhogal is not sustainable in view of the fact that there is acknowledgment in the information supplied under Right to Information Act that Board had received copy of award vide communication dated 12.11.2009, wherein, admittedly, signed copy of arbitral award was sent to Secretary, HPSEB. This Court deems it fit to reproduce the relevant portion of information supplied to Decree Holder under Right to Information Act, as under: "Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited No. HPSEBL(Sectt)410-RTI/11-73337 Dated: 24-9-11 To The Chief Information Commissioner, Room No. 222, Armsdale Building, HP Secretariat, Shimla-171002 (HP). Sub:- Notice under section 19(3) of the Right To Information Act, 2005. Ref:- Appeal/case No. SIC-1(A)0045/2011-12-2495 dated 25.8.201 Sir, With reference to above it is to inform that the subject cited information under RTI Act, 2005 in response to application dated 26.03.2011 and 28.05.2011 has been supplied to the General Manager (H), Sai Engineering Foundation, Sai Bhawan, Sector IV, New Shimla consisting of sheets P-1 to P-25 having 29 pages. However, the point wise reply as desired by the appellant is appended as below:- (i) The date on which the copy of the award given by Er. D.N. Bansal, Arbitrator vide his No. DNB/Sai Arbitration/10-12 dated 12.11.2009 in the Arbitration case (Pet. No. 139/07) in the matte of Sai Engineering Foundation, Sai Bhawa, New Shimla-9 (Claimant) v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (Respondent) was received by the Secretary, HPSEB Ltd. The copy of award was received in Board''s dairy on 12.11.2009 which was further marked to the Chief Engineer (Projects), HPSEB Ltd. Shimla-4. 10. This Court, after having carefully perused reply filed by the Decree Holder, especially communications dated 12.11.2009 and 24.9.2011, (Annexure A-1 and Annexure A-2, respectively, sees no force, much less substantial, in the arguments of Shri Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, that since no signed copy of award was received by the judgment debtor, it was precluded from filing objections to the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator. It stands duly proved on record that signed copy of award was received by the judgment debtor on 12.11.2009, as such, limitation as prescribed under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act had commenced from 12.11.2009, when admittedly, signed copy of award was received by the judgment debtor. Since objections were not filed within time as prescribed under section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act, arguments having been made by Mr. Since objections were not filed within time as prescribed under section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act, arguments having been made by Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, can not be accepted that present execution petition is premature, rather, this Court, after having carefully perused the pleadings as well as impugned award has no hesitation to conclude that execution petition having been filed by the Decree Holder, is maintainable and not premature, as claimed by the judgment debtor. 11. As far as another contention made by Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate that present award is not executable since no compensation has been awarded in favour of Decree Holder, is concerned, this Court sees no merit in the same. Careful perusal of award in question clearly suggests that the Sole Arbitrator, while deciding issue No. 3 i.e. "exact amount of loss, if any, suffered by the claimant", has held Decree Holder entitled to compensation, which has been recommended in Table-II of award, which is also reproduced herein below: Table-II Compensation recommended S.No. Year Generation at 35% PLF (800x24x365x0.35)(kWh) Generation as per actual(kWh) Generation to be compensat ed(kWh) Compensation ** at the rate of Rs. 2.50 per kWh (Rs.) 1 4/02 to 3/03 24,52,800 22,27,148 2,25,652 5,64,130/- 2 4/03 to 3/04 24,52,800 28,20,300 - - 3 4/04 to 3/05 24,52,800 1818.7 6,39,100 15,97,750/- 4 4/05 to 3/06 24,52,800 22,36,867 2,15,933 5,39,832/- 5 4/06 to 3/07 24,52,800 20,59,050 3,93,750 9,84,375/- 6 4/07 to 3/08 24,52,800 17,96,542 6,56,258 16,40,645/- 7 4/07 to 3/08 24,52,800 24,69,549 - - 12. Apart from above, learned Sole Arbitrator, while returning his findings with respect to terms of reference as contained in HPERC reference No. HPERC: CMN: 139: 07: 1481 dated 14.3.2008 also reiterated that quantum of compensation has been worked in Table-II, (as finds mention at page-27 of paper-book in the initial lines). Learned Sole Arbitrator, while awarding compensation as detailed in table-II, also made certain recommendations, while answering reference No. 3 i.e., "to make recommendations for efficient resolution of such disputes in future as also for developing processes which impede such events.", as such dispute in future is also for developing processes, which impede such events. 13. Hence, this Court, after having carefully perused award, is in agreement with the contentions of Mr. 13. Hence, this Court, after having carefully perused award, is in agreement with the contentions of Mr. Vikas Chauhan, learned counsel representing the Decree Holder that specific amount has been awarded as compensation to the Decree Holder by the Sole Arbitrator, in the award sought to be executed. 14. Another contention of Mr. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate with regard to passing of award by Sole Arbitrator beyond period of three months can not be looked into in the present proceedings because, in execution proceedings, executing Court is only required t ensure execution of decree/award passed by the Court. Aforesaid plea as has been raised herein above, could only be raised by the judgment debtor in the objections, if any, filed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. As far as effect of finding returned by the Sole Arbitrator that the Board has not, in any manner, violated the provisions of Article 9 of PPA vis-a-vis amount awarded as compensation to the Decree Holder, is concerned, that can also not be looked into in the present proceedings, because, admittedly, certain amount has been ordered to be paid as compensation to the Decree Holder and Decree Holder is well within its right to get that amount of compensation by way of execution of award passed by Sole Arbitrator. Otherwise also, perusal of award clearly suggests that aforesaid finding with regard to provisions of Article 9 of the PPA was returned by Sole Arbitrator while answering issue No. 1, "Whether the provisions of article 9 of the PPA has be violated by the respondent" and, Sole Arbitrator while holding that respondent Board has not, in any manner, violated provisions of Article 9 of the PPA, has not awarded any amount under aforesaid issue. Amount as detailed in Table-II has been awarded qua issue No. 3, "Exact amount of loss, if any, suffered by the claimant." 15. Apex Court in Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1245 , has held as under: "10. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court. In our view, the High Court has rightly held that the application made by the appellant was an application for directing the arbitrator to file the award in Court so that such award is made a rule of Court. In our view, the High Court has rightly held that the application made by the appellant was an application for directing the arbitrator to file the award in Court so that such award is made a rule of Court. In this case, there was no express authority given by the arbitrator to the applicant to file the award to make it a rule of Court although a signed copy of the award was sent to the applicant. The forwarding letter clearly indicates that the award was sent for information. Accordingly, the decision of this Court made in Kumbha Mauji''s case (supra) is applicable. The High Court has given very cogent reasons which, we have indicated in some details, for not accepting the case of the appellant that he had received a signed copy of the award and the forwarding letter some time in May, 1965 and we do not find any reason to take a contrary view. The applicant has not produced the registered cover received by him which would have established the actual date of the receipt of the postal cover by the applicant convincingly. We are also not inclined to hold that the delay in presenting the application deserves to be condoned in the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellant has taken a very bold stand that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 and only within three weeks of such receipt, he had filed the application. On the face of such statement, the plea of ignorance of the change in the Limitation Act need not be considered and accepted. As the case sought to be made out by the appellant that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 has not been accepted, and we may add, very rightly by the Court, the question of condonation of delay could not and did not arise. In our view, it is not at all a fit case where in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken by the Court in considering the sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Coming to the contention of Mr. In our view, it is not at all a fit case where in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken by the Court in considering the sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Coming to the contention of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that to defeat a just claim of the appellant, the ignoble plea of bar of limitation sought to be raised by the respondent should not be taken into consideration, we may indicate that it may not be desirable for the government or the public authority to take shelter under the plea of limitation to defeat a just claim of a citizen. But if a claim is barred by limitation and such plea is raised specifically the court can not straightway dismiss the plea simply on the score that such plea is ignoble. A bar of limitation may be considered even if such plea has not been specifically raised. Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy. That apart, the appellant, in this case, having taken a false stand on the question of receipt of the signed copy of the award to get rid of the bar of limitation, should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on his part by rejecting the plea of limitation raised by the Respondent. We may also indicate here that the High Court is justified in its finding that the objection petition has been filed within time by the respondent and the service of the copy of the application made by the appellant on the counsel of the respondent who had appeared in an earlier proceeding did not constitute a notice as contemplated under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeal must fail and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs." 16. Apex Court in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. M/s. Universal H.M.L. Enterprises, AIR 1999 SC 246 , has held as under: "8. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeal must fail and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs." 16. Apex Court in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. M/s. Universal H.M.L. Enterprises, AIR 1999 SC 246 , has held as under: "8. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions, the following points arise for bur Consideration: - (i) Whether the award decree dated 2.6.1989 was a nullity being barred by limitation. (ii) Whether the executing Court can go behind such a decree, (iii) Whether any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is called for. 9. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions, we find that none of the aforesaid points for determination can be sustained in favour of the respondent-judgment debtor. The reasons are obvious. Point Nos. (i) and (ii): 10. The award dated 17/4/1985 was filed in the court on 23/3/1989 by the arbitrator and the court proceeded to deal with the question whether the award should be made the rule of the court or not. Notice was issued by the court to the respondent to show cause as to why this award should not be made the rule of the court. There is no dispute that this notice was served on the respondent. Despite such service of notice, for reasons best known to the respondent, it did not think it fit to contest the proceedings nor did it file any objection under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In the result, the court passed an award decree on 2/6/1989 on account of the absence of any contest by the judgment-debtor. It is true that this award decree was sought to be executed years thereafter. But the said delay on the part of the decree-holder in executing the decree within the permissible period for limitation in execution of such decree cannot give any sustainable right to the judgment-Debtor to challenge the execution proceedings on that ground. The contention of Shri Javali, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the award was a mock one and was not intended to be enforced cannot be sustained as that stage has gone for the respondent. In execution proceedings, such a contention requiring the executing court to go behind the decree cannot be sustained. The question whether the award decree was filed by the arbitrator on his own or not was a mixed question of law and fact. In execution proceedings, such a contention requiring the executing court to go behind the decree cannot be sustained. The question whether the award decree was filed by the arbitrator on his own or not was a mixed question of law and fact. The division bench in the impugned judgment itself has noted that if a the award was filed by the arbitrator suo motu, then the award decree cannot be said to be barred by limitation but If, on the other hand, the award was filed by the arbitrator at the instance of the appellant-decree-holder, then the question of limitation would arise. The aforesaid observation of the division bench itself indicates that this is a mixed question of law and fact. That was an issue to be raised before the award was made a rule of the court. But such a plea can never make the decree a nullity especially when the respondent for reasons best known to it did not think it fit to file objections under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is well settled that the executing court, cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, which would make it a nullity. In the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey a bench of four learned Judges of this court speaking through Mudholkar, J. observed that when the question of limitation was not raised before the trial court or before the High court, it could not be raised for the first time before this court even in the hierarchy of proceedings arising from the suit when such question of limitation raised before the court was not a pure question of law but was a mixed question of law and fact. In the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman , J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge bench of this court made the following pertinent observation in connection with the jurisdiction of the executing court, when called upon to execute the decree and on the question as to under what circumstances the executing court can go behind the decree sought to be executed. The observation at SCR p. 68 of the Report deserves to be extracted in extenso "6. The observation at SCR p. 68 of the Report deserves to be extracted in extenso "6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties, When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti , the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was b made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, there is. to provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction." (11) The aforesaid decision of this court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a case in which the award decree on the face of c it was shown to be without jurisdiction. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction." (11) The aforesaid decision of this court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a case in which the award decree on the face of c it was shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the decree was passed beyond the-period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such decree. It is not the case of the respondent that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. This becomes all the more so when the d respondent did not think it fit to file objection against the award which was sought to be made the rule of the court." 17. Apex Court in Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 2040 has held as under: "7. Section 14 of the provides that when the arbitrator or umpire has made his award, he shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. In the language of the Section, an award will be complete as soon as it is made and signed. Thus mere writing of an award would not amount to making of an award. There can be no finality in the award except when it is signed because signing of the award gives legal effect to it and to give validity to an award. It is not necessary that it should also be delivered or pronounced or filed in the court. Making and delivery of the award are different stages of an arbitration proceeding. An award is made when it is authenticated by the person who makes it. The word made suggests that the mind of the Arbitrator as being declared and it is validly deemed to be pronounced as soon as the Arbitrator has signed it and once an award has been given by the Arbitrator he becomes functus officio. An award is made when it is authenticated by the person who makes it. The word made suggests that the mind of the Arbitrator as being declared and it is validly deemed to be pronounced as soon as the Arbitrator has signed it and once an award has been given by the Arbitrator he becomes functus officio. If this is the position in law, it becomes difficult to support the view taken by the High Court in stating that the interim award was not pronounced though it was made and signed by the Arbitrator. If he had made the award the question of superseding the same could not arise. Therefore, the view of the High Court appears to us to be fallacious. 8. On this aspect of the matter we may refer to some of the decisions on the aspect as to when an award becomes final. In Janardhan Prasad v. Chandrashekhar, AIR 1951 Nagpur 198 , after examining the scope of Section 14 of the Act, it was held as follows: The award becomes valid and final so far as the arbitrators or umpire are concerned the moment it is made and signed by them. The provision for giving notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and the award is for the purpose of limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, entitling either party to apply to the Court for the filing in Court of the award. No time is fixed for the giving of such notice by the Arbitrator and it has been held in several cases that it may be done within reasonable time either by the Arbitrator or by his agent. A notice may be given to one party and may not be given to another party for a much longer period. It cannot be said that an award becomes final so far as the first party is concerned and no as against the other entitling the Arbitrators to scrap the award and make a fresh one. There is thus a fundamental difference between the making, signing and delivery of a judgment and making and signing and giving notice of an award. In the former case all three must be simultaneous acts and parts of the same transaction. There is thus a fundamental difference between the making, signing and delivery of a judgment and making and signing and giving notice of an award. In the former case all three must be simultaneous acts and parts of the same transaction. In the latter case the first two may be simultaneous and the notice of the award can be postponed. That award does not become invalid because notice of the making of it has not been given. An Arbitrator is entitled to file an award in Court under Section 14, sub-section (2). If he does so, the Court is bound to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. 9. The circumstances in which these observations are made by the court are as follows: The Arbitrators had made and signed an award on January 11, 1944 which was registered on January 13, 1944. Thereafter the Arbitrators made a second award on January 26, 1944. It was contended that as they did not pronounce the award by issuing a notice of having signed it, they had not become functus officio and could, therefore, make and deliver the second award dated January 26, 1944. The learned Judges of the High Court refused to hold that the first award was not final and could be superseded by the second award because no notice was given before January 26, 1944. This view was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Badarla Ramakrishnamma & Ors. v. Vattikonda Lakshmibayamma & Ors., AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 497 , at para 2. Again in Ram Bharosey v. Peary Lal, AIR 1957 All.265 , it was observed as under: It is true that in the present case the Arbitrators did not give notice to the parties of the making and the signing of the award. But the arbitrators after making and the signing the award filed it in the court. The validity of the award does not depend upon the notice of the same being given to the parties. When an award is duly make, signed and filed in Court it is a valid document. 10. This position was reiterated in Asad-ul-lah v. Muhammad Nur, ILR 27 All. 459(A) and it was held that : For the making of an award it is enough that the Arbitrators act together and finally make up their minds and express their decision in writing. 10. This position was reiterated in Asad-ul-lah v. Muhammad Nur, ILR 27 All. 459(A) and it was held that : For the making of an award it is enough that the Arbitrators act together and finally make up their minds and express their decision in writing. This writing must be authenticated by their signatures. The award is thus made and signed and is complete and final so far as the Arbitrators are concerned. 11. This Court in Rikhabdas v. Ballabhdas & Ors., 1962 (1) SCR Supp. 475 , held that once an award is made and signed by the Arbitrator the Arbitrator becomes functus officio. In Juggilal Kamlapat v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., 1962 (2) SCR Supp. 101 , this Court held that an Arbitrator having signed his award becomes functus officio but that did not mean that in no circumstances could there by further arbitration proceedings where an award was set aside or that the same Arbitrator could never have anything to do with the award with respect to the same dispute. Thus in the present case, it was not open to the Arbitrator to re-determine the claim and make an award. Therefore, the view taken by the trial court that the earlier award made and written though signed was not pronounced but nevertheless had become complete and final, therefore, should be made the rule of the court appears to us to be correct with regard to Item No. 1 inasmuch as the claim in relation to Item No. 1 could not have been adjudicated by the Arbitrator again and it has been rightly excluded from the second award made by the Arbitrator on January 28, 1994. Thus the view taken by the trial court on this aspect also appears to us to be correct. Therefore, the trial court has rightly ordered the award dated January 28, 1994 to be the rule of the court except for Item No. 1 and in respect of which the award dated November 26, 1992 was ordered to be the rule of the court." 18. Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Inderjit Goel v. Punjab Reliable Investment (P) Ltd. and Anr. decided on 1.2.2005 , has held as under: "3. Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Inderjit Goel v. Punjab Reliable Investment (P) Ltd. and Anr. decided on 1.2.2005 , has held as under: "3. The facts, which are relevant for the decision of the present case are that in a dispute between the parties an ex parte award dated 18-7-2000 was passed by the Arbitrator (respondent No. 2). Thereupon, respondent No. 1 filed execution petition under Section 36 of the Act. The execution petition was transferred from the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jalandhar to the Court of Addl. Distt. Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. In the petition under Section 9 of the Act filed by the present appellant it was alleged that the said execution proceedings were fixed in the Courts at Delhi for 5-9-2003 for filing of the original copy of the award. It was alleged in the said petition that the present appellant was not served a valid notice about the arbitration proceedings and even the impugned award dated 18-7-2000 had not been served upon him and as such he was prevented to exercise a legal right to file petition under Section 33 and 34 of the Act for setting aside the award. It was alleged that these points were brought to the notice of the Court at Delhi by filing objection petition on 26-7-2002 but these objections were withdrawn in view of the order dated 18-7-2003 passed by the Delhi High Court. It was alleged that under Section 31(5) of the Act, it is mandatory to send a copy of the award to the parties which had not been done and as such limitation to file petition under Section 34 of the Act had not started and the execution proceedings pending in the Court at Delhi were premature. It was accordingly prayed that the execution proceedings may be dismissed as premature and in the alternate the enforcement of the award dated 18-7-2000 be stayed till a signed copy of the award it supplied to him. 4. In the reply filed by respondent No. 1, it was alleged that registered A.D. notice was sent to the parties by the Arbitrator but the appellant did not join the proceedings and was proceeded against ex parte and thereupon ex parte award for Rs. 4. In the reply filed by respondent No. 1, it was alleged that registered A.D. notice was sent to the parties by the Arbitrator but the appellant did not join the proceedings and was proceeded against ex parte and thereupon ex parte award for Rs. 3,64,780/- with interest and costs had been passed on 18-7-2000 and the copy of the award was sent to the parties by UPC. It was alleged that the appellant had appeared in the Executing Court at Delhi on 26-7-2002 and copy of the award was attached with the execution proceedings. 5. After hearing both sides and perusing the record, the learned Distt. Judge dismissed the petition under Section 9 of the Act, holding that the Court was not competent to hold the proceedings pending in the Executing Court to be premature nor such a relief was covered under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Aggrieved against the order dated 17-11-2003, passed by the Distt. Judge, present appeal has been filed. 6. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the record, in my opinion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. Section 9 of the Act reads as under:- "9. Interim measures, etc. Aggrieved against the order dated 17-11-2003, passed by the Distt. Judge, present appeal has been filed. 6. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the record, in my opinion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. Section 9 of the Act reads as under:- "9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.- A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court:- (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely :- (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence: (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it." 7. From a perusal of the above, it would be clear that under Section 9 of the Act, the Court is competent to pass such interim order which may appear to the Court to be just and convenient even after the making of the arbitral award and before it is enforced. In the present case the prayer of the appellant is that the proceedings pending in the Executing Court may be dismissed as premature or enforcement of the said award dated 18-7-2000 passed by the Arbitrator may be stayed till a signed copy of the award is supplied to him. In the present case the prayer of the appellant is that the proceedings pending in the Executing Court may be dismissed as premature or enforcement of the said award dated 18-7-2000 passed by the Arbitrator may be stayed till a signed copy of the award is supplied to him. In my opinion, such a prayer would not be covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the Act and in any case on the facts and circumstances of the present case, no case was made out for the Distt. Judge, Jalandhar, either to have dismissed the executing proceedings pending in the Court of Addl. Distt. Judge, Delhi as premature or to have stayed those proceedings till a signed copy of the award is supplied to the appellant. It is not disputed before me that the copy of the award was attached with the execution proceedings. It is also not disputed before me that the appellant has appeared in the execution proceedings pending in the Court at Delhi. It is also not disputed before me that so far the appellant has not filed any objection against the award given by the Arbitrator under Section 34 of the Act or otherwise, seeking the setting aside of the award on any ground. As referred to above, the case of respondent No. 1 is that copy of the award was sent to the appellant under UPC. The question as to whether the appellant received copy of the award or not is a question of fact which cannot be gone into in the present proceedings. If the appellant was aggrieved against the award passed by the Arbitrator on any of the grounds whether on merits or otherwise, including non-supply of a copy of the award to him by the Arbitrator, the appellant could have raised all these points by filing objection petition under Section 34 of the Act before the competent Court and if any such objection had been filed the Court would have considered the same in accordance with law. However, in the present case nothing of the kind was done. On the other hand the appellant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act, which is intended for interim measures etc. by the Court. However, in the present case nothing of the kind was done. On the other hand the appellant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act, which is intended for interim measures etc. by the Court. In the present case, as referred to above, the Arbitrator has already given the award and the execution proceedings are pending in the Courts at Delhi and admittedly no objection petition under Section 34 of the Act has been filed by the appellant. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, learned Distt. Judge was perfectly justified in holding that no case for holding the execution proceedings to be premature was made out. Similarly, in my opinion, no case was made out for staying the proceedings which were pending before the Executing Court merely on the ground that the appellant had not received a copy of the award from the Arbitrator. 8. In view of the above, in my opinion, no case for interfering with the present appeal is made out. Hence the present appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed." 19. High Court of Calcutta in Food Corporation of India v. Dilip Kumar Dutta, AIR 1999 Calcutta 75 , has held as under: "30. No doubt the Court has power to extend) the time which is available under Section 28 as well as Schedule 1 paragraph 3 of the Act. It is also clear that Court can enlarge the time but Court must decide such question judicially. Therefore, factual position has to be ascertained before passing any order. In the instant case, no doubt, parties have participated in the arbitration proceedings before the expiry of the time and after the expiry of the time on the basis of the time extended at the instance of Food Corporation of India, petitioner herein. The petitioner, in one hand, volunteered before the Arbitrator for extending the time and has taken the plea reverse to such stand now before the Court to frustrate the award. Therefore conduct of the petitioner cannot be said to be good. Moreover such act is hit by principle of approbate and reprobate. In the premises the conduct of the Arbitrator may be construed as irregular but not as illegal. Irregularity may be condoned but illegality is not. 31. Under such circumstances, I think it should not be fair on my part of say that award is illegal and to hold in favour of the petitioner. In the premises the conduct of the Arbitrator may be construed as irregular but not as illegal. Irregularity may be condoned but illegality is not. 31. Under such circumstances, I think it should not be fair on my part of say that award is illegal and to hold in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, defect, if any, is condoned and time to make and publish the award is formally extended under this order with the retrospective effect." 20. A Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Subhas Projects & Marketing Ltd. v. Assam U.W.S. and S. Board, AIR 2003 Gauhati 158 , has held as under: "7. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have been duly considered by us. Section 31 of the Act does not prescribe any particular form or manner of passing an award. An award is an expression of an adjudication of a dispute between the parties and as long as the manifestation of the decision on the dispute raised is clear and unambiguous, it will not be correct to hold an award to be invalid merely because it does not subscribe to any particular format. An unstamped or insufficiently stamped award is at best a curable irregularity. Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, the objections of the respondent Board regarding the validity of the award on the aforesaid two grounds would hardly call for any serious consideration of this Court. 8. The law relating to the power of an executing Court under the provisions of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well settled. The difficulty is not with regard to the principles of law, but with regard to the application of such principles. In view of the clear language of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has always been understood that while the executing Court cannot go behind the decree to determine its legality, objections regarding the validity of the decree has to be decided in an execution proceeding. However, such objections must appear on the face of the record and cannot be left to be determined by a long drawn process either of evidence or reasoning. The same principles of law would undoubtedly apply to the execution of an award under Section 36 of the Act. However, such objections must appear on the face of the record and cannot be left to be determined by a long drawn process either of evidence or reasoning. The same principles of law would undoubtedly apply to the execution of an award under Section 36 of the Act. It is also our considered view that the inhibitions that would operate upon the Court while executing an award would be somewhat more in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. As Section 34 of the Act has enumerated specific grounds on which an application for setting aside of an award may be filed, any such objection to the award on the grounds enumerated in Section 34 cannot be allowed to be agitated or re-agitated while resisting the execution of the award. To that extent, the argument advanced by Mr. Markunda appearing on behalf of the revision petitioner is well founded. In the instant case no objection under Section 34 of the Act was filed on behalf of the respondent board. In such a situation to permit the respondent Board to raise the question of jurisdiction of the arbitral Tribunal to pass the interim award in question in its objections resisting the execution of the award cannot be understood to be permissible in law. Such a course of action would render the provisions of Section 34 virtually redundant. As evident from the subsequent facts of the case on which there is no dispute at the Bar, it appears that the arbitral proceeding has now to recommence. The question of jurisdiction of the arbitral Tribunal which has not yet been decided, therefore, must be decided by the Tribunal itself and we are confident that this question if agitated by any party, would be brought to its logical conclusion by the Tribunal. However, entertainment of said question by the learned District Judge in an execution proceeding and in treating the conclusion reached by it as the foundation for its decision cannot be said to be corrective law." 21. After having bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the facts of the case, law cited herein above as well as submissions of learned counsel representing the parties, I see no merit in the present objections having been filed by the judgment debtor and same are dismissed.