Judgment and Order : 1. Heard Mr. D. R. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Ms. R. Purkayastha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC from the judgment dated 11.06.2013, delivered in Title Appeal No. 04 of 2012 by the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur (as he then was). At the instance of the defendant-appellant, the following substantial question of law was framed by this Court for hearing the appeal: “Whether the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court suffers from perversity?” 3. The appellant was given liberty to raise further substantial question of law in the hearing but Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has fairly submitted that he would confine on the framed substantial question of law and he will not suggest any fresh substantial question of law. 4. At the beginning, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has submitted that the first appellate court while passing the impugned judgment has misread the Tehsildar’s report (Exhibit-A) and landed up in the finding holding that the defendant was not in the possession and by reversing the judgment of the trial court [judgment dated 05.01.2012 delivered in T. S. No. 03 of 2011 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, South Tripura, Udaipur, [as he then was]. The suit was filed for perpetual injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, in respect of the land pertaining to R.S Khatian No. 15/2, Plot No. 2398 (Nal), corresponding to C.S Plot No. 964 (part) and in the plaint, the suit land has been delineated in the Para-1. 5. According to the plaintiff-respondent, his predecessor or he has possessed the suit land since 1965 and the suit land was originally belonged to one Adam Khan who had left this country. Still, the said land is recorded in the name of Adam Khan. 6. The plaintiff has been claiming right to possession throught the predecessor. Having the cause of action from the act of the respondent by which he wanted to dispossess the plaintiff from the said land on 26.12.2010, the said suit was instituted. 7. The defendant-appellant by filing a written statement has disputed the claim of the plaintiff and asserted that he has come into the possession as his predecessor, Pran Gopal Sen exchanged the property with the cousin of Adam Khan. 7. The defendant-appellant by filing a written statement has disputed the claim of the plaintiff and asserted that he has come into the possession as his predecessor, Pran Gopal Sen exchanged the property with the cousin of Adam Khan. However, the suit is not for adjudicating the title of the land, or any right based on the title. It is wholly confined on the possession over that land. 8. Therefore, one of the issues those were framed by the trial court inter alia is: “Whether the plaintiff side is entitled for a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and his men from entering into the suit land and disturbing peaceful possession of the plaintiff over it?” 9. The trial court on recording the evidence by the judgment dated 05.01.2012 has returned the finding averse to the plaintiff. All the documents as produced by the plaintiff have been discussed properly but on the basis of a demarcation report prepared by one Thesildar (Exhibit-A), the trial court has observed as under: “As per Exhibit-A, it reveals that suit land is handed over to the defendant by the Tehesildar in presence of village Chairman and the 2nd party and other various persons. It is clear from this Exhibit-A that at present the suit land is in the possession of the defendant of this case.” 10. By observing this, the entry made in R. S. Khatian showing the plaintiff-respondents in possession of the suit land has been completely ignored and no presumption under Section 43(3) of the TLR & LR Act has been drawn. 11. This judgment of the trial court has been challenged in the title appeal being T.A. No. 04 of 2012, filed by the plaintiff-respondent in the Court of the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, as he then was. By the impugned judgment dated 11.06.2013, the said appeal has been allowed and consequent thereupon, the suit has been decreed by granting perpetual injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff-respondent over the suit land. 12. While discussing that aspect of Exhibit-A, the first appellate court has observed as under: “It is true that the plaintiff-appellant applied for demarcation before filing this case but he has not signed in the document. Demarcation generally is done on consensus. 12. While discussing that aspect of Exhibit-A, the first appellate court has observed as under: “It is true that the plaintiff-appellant applied for demarcation before filing this case but he has not signed in the document. Demarcation generally is done on consensus. If one party disagrees, then demarcation cannot be done but the court below relied on the demarcation report prepared by the Tehsildar (Exbt.A). In that demarcation report Tehsildar handed over the suit land to the defendant respondent. Tehsildar is not empowered at all to handover the land to one person or another as it is not consensus. Signature of the plaintiff-appellant was not even taken in the demarcation report. Entries in the record of right as finally published, shall be taken into consideration until contrary is proved and this presumption it to be correct.” 13. Thus, the first appellate court relying on the Exhibit-1 series (R. S. Khatian No. 15/2) has returned the finding that the plaintiff-respondent was in possession when his possession was threatened by the defendant-appellant. 14. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that since the plaintiff has admitted that he had instituted the demarcation proceeding and in the demarcation report (Exhibit-A), Tehsildar has clearly recorded that the possession of the suit land was handed over to the defendant-appellant, that fact cannot be just brushed aside in the fashion as has been done by the first appellate court. It is a complete misreading of the said document. 15. According to Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel, the finding as returned by the trial court is correct and for reversing the said finding the analogy that has been brought forth by the first appellate court cannot be sustained in law. He has further submitted that the conduct of the Tehsildar as questioned by the first appellate court is not relevant in the realm of the controversy. The fact which is not relevant, if is considered, it makes the finding perverse. 16. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has succinctly submitted that the content of Exhibit-A, has proved the fact of possession which cannot be derided in the manner as has been done by the first appellate court. Hence the said judgment warrants interference from this Court. 17. The question that has been raised in this appeal is very short in nature. Hence the said judgment warrants interference from this Court. 17. The question that has been raised in this appeal is very short in nature. This Court has scrutinized and appreciated the nature of the document called the report of the Tehsildar in connection with a demarcation proceeding. There is no dispute that the demarcation proceeding was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant. The demarcation report has observed as under: “with reference to the above I beg to inform you that today on 04.11.2010 demarcate the disputed land against Bimal Sen son of Pran Gopal Sen of Uttar Chalagang, Amarpur, South Tripura District of C/S Plot No. 964/2398, Khatian No. 15/2 class of land Nal, area 0.13 acre of Mouja Uttar Challagang to handed over to the 1st party on proper demarcation in presence of village Chairman and 2nd party and also various persons.” 18. Without even looking into the aspects about the status of this document inasmuch as the document has been admitted by the defendant-appellant without adducing the author of that report which obviously does not come within the nature of the document as provided under Sections 74/77 of the Evidence Act and leaving aside technicality for the moment, this Court is of the view that since the plaintiff-respondent instituted the demarcation proceeding, he is the person who has been referred as the first party and the possession was handed over to the first party. The observation of the trial court as well as the first appellate court in this regard is a gross misreading. But if this fact is considered, this will only support the entry, made in the R.S. Khatian No. 15/2 of Mouja Uttar Chalagang and the fact of possession manifests on the face of the report that it was with the plaintiff-respondent and hence the crux of the finding as returned by the first appellate court even though the reasons are not acceptable, according to this Court, does not warrant any interference. Thus, this appeal is bereft of merit and accordingly the same is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly and send down the LCRs thereafter.