JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Naqvi, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Srivastava, holding brief of Sri Prakash Chandra Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri K.R. Singh, the learned ACSC. 2. This contempt has been preferred for punishing the opposite party for committing wilful/deliberate disobedience of the order dated 1.2.2005 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 56181 of 2004. 3. The applicant filed the above writ petition challenging his rejection for appointment on compassionate basis, in lieu of his father’s death in harness, which was allowed on 1.2.2005 directing the opposite parties to consider the case of the applicant for compassionate appointment afresh, within two months from the date of the communication of the order. The applicant represented before the opposite party alongwith a certified copy of the order on 26.2.2005 duly received on the same date, but no orders appear to have been passed. A Special Appeal (Defective) No. 326 of 2007 alongwith delay, was preferred by the State against the order dated 1.2.2005, but in view of rejection of delay, the Special Appeal also came to be dismissed on 13.12.2011. The applicant again represented his claim before the opposite party on 16.8.2014, 19.2.2015 (registered), 8.3.2016(registered), but to no avail, the present contempt. 4. Sri K.R. Singh, the learned Addl. C.S.C raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the contempt, in view of the embargo of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He submits that the order of the Writ-Court dated 1.2.2005, was allegedly served on 26.2.2005, mandated the opposite party to consider the application for compassionate appointment within two months, which expired on or about 27.4.2005, the instant contempt filed in 2016 is barred. He submits, that cognizance of such a contempt could have been taken only upto 27.4.2006, i.e., the date on which period of one year from the date of alleged contempt, i.e. 28.4.2005, expired vide Section 20 of the Act. He finally submits that neither mere pendency of a Special Appeal filed by the State, in which at no point of time, was there any stay order preventing the applicant to prosecute his contempt, nor filing of repeated representations would not enure to the benefit of the applicant. He finally submits that neither mere pendency of a Special Appeal filed by the State, in which at no point of time, was there any stay order preventing the applicant to prosecute his contempt, nor filing of repeated representations would not enure to the benefit of the applicant. Refuting the aforesaid submission, Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant assiduously urged that as the matter relates to grant of appointment, refusal to consider the case of the applicant, is a continuing wrong, which cannot be restricted/defeated by laches, which is countered by Sri Singh that the alleged cause of action is non recurring and in the event the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is upheld, restriction under Section 20 of the Act would be otiose. Sri Srivastava placed reliance on authorities, reference of which would be made at an appropriate stage. 5. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is quoted hereunder : 20. Limitation for actions for contempt.— No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” The Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) considered the scope of Section 20 wherein it inter alia held that the wording of Section 20 is negative but it is clear that terminus ad quem is the initiation of the contempt proceedings within a year. The question arises as to how and when the proceedings are initiated.In this connection paragraphs 38,41and 42 of Pallav Sheth (supra) are extracted hereunder: “38. The Rules so framed by all the Courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated inter alia with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. If, however, proceedings are not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed then the Court shall not have jurisdiction to punish for contempt. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt like the present before the Court within the period of limitation then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the Court exercising its jurisdiction. 41. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt like the present before the Court within the period of limitation then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the Court exercising its jurisdiction. 41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (supra), to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate Court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate Court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate Court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate Court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.” 6. The fall out of the above discussion is that contempt must be initiated either by filing an application or by the Court issuing notice suo moto within one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged. Whether contempt proceedings are initiated within the prescribed period or not is an issue to be decided in each and every case. 7. The Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh, 2008(8) SCC 648 , had an occasion to consider the concept of continuing wrong and recurring/successive wrong, vis-a-vis, the service law disputes. The Apex Court held in paragraphs 4 and 7 thereof as under : 4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. The Apex Court held in paragraphs 4 and 7 thereof as under : 4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798 , explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of Section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to Section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) : “31. .....It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. A cause of action for filing contempt accrues only upon wilful disobedience of the order. The orders could be of multifarious types. If the order prescribes a particular period, within which it is to be complied, but is not complied with, the cause of action to file contempt begins and the Court must initiate the contempt proceedings within a year of the alleged contempt. However, if this initiation is after a year contempt may be barred under Section 20. 9. The order relating to payment of salary and other dues, can be subject-matter of contempt only when salary/dues are not paid when ought to have been paid. Cause of action in relation to such dues would accrue on every wilful default but subject to the provisions of Section 20, else the said provision would become redundant. Whether the proceedings were initiated within the prescribed period or not is an issue to be decided on the basis of the materials on record for which there could be no straightjacket formula. Mere filing of representations, would not be a ground to extend the period of limitation for taking cognizance of contempt. 10. The decisions cited by learned counsel for the applicant in K.J. Derasari and another v. Union of India and others, (2001) 10 SCC 496 ; State of Bihar and others v. Rajendra Singh and another, AIR 2004 SC 4419 , have no application to the instant case. 10. The decisions cited by learned counsel for the applicant in K.J. Derasari and another v. Union of India and others, (2001) 10 SCC 496 ; State of Bihar and others v. Rajendra Singh and another, AIR 2004 SC 4419 , have no application to the instant case. The Apex Court in Director of Education, Uttaranchal and others v. Ved Prakash Joshi and others, (2005) 6 SCC 98 , held that a Contempt Court can neither pass a substantive order nor can examine the correctness of an order, which is not the issue involved in the instant case. The judgment in Ram Bux Singh and others v. U.O.I. and others, 2012 (30) LCD 1589, related to a scenario, where an O.A, came to be allowed by the Tribunal on 14.9.1998 directing that all the applicants of the said O.A, would be engaged in future vacancies in the order of seniority and would continue to work till the work is available and junior to any of them is working. The Union of India assailed the order before this Court, which, on 7.4.2005, while keeping the writ petition pending, directed the the Union of India to provide jobs to the private opposite parties of the writ petition within six weeks. It appears that the writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution on 29.3.2012 and accordingly the interim order also stood vacated. The petitioners therein preferred a contempt in an Original Application before the Tribunal, which rejected the same on the ground that it does not have the competency to entertain a contempt of this Court and that too when the writ petition itself has been dismissed for non-prosecution. The said rejection was challenged by way of a writ petition before this Court, wherein this Court after placing reliance on the Pallav Sheth (supra) took the view that only after order dated 29.3.2012, wherein the writ petition came to be dismissed for non-prosecution, cause of action arose for the petitioners’ to approach the Tribunal and initiate contempt proceedings under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 and in case, the petitioners preferred contempt proceedings for enforcement of the order dated 14.9.1998 within a year from 29.3.2012, it shall be well within time. The facts of the said case have no application in the instant case. 11. The facts of the said case have no application in the instant case. 11. Learned counsel for the applicant assiduously placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285 , to contend that in respect of a continuing wrong, the provisions of Section 20 of the Act would not be applicable. To examine the contention, one would have to examine the facts of Ganpat Ram (supra) in extenso. In that case, a decree of eviction came to be confirmed as against the Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar before the Apex Court but with the stipulation that it would not be executed for 6 months, provided the firm filed the usual undertaking. The order was not complied as neither any undertaking was furnished nor possession delivered by the firm. On the contrary, the sons of the partner of the firm instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the landlord and obtained an injunction. It was in this context that the Apex Court held that though the Firm could not be said to be guilty of violating any undertaking as there was no undertaking but failure to deliver possession from the date of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 3.11.1988, constituted a continuing offence to which Section 20 of the Act would have no application. Thus, the observations of the Apex Court in Firm Ganpat Ram (supra) were confined to its own facts and cannot be said to have laid down a binding rule of law. 12. The order of the Writ Court dated 1.2.2005 directed the competent authority to consider his request for compassionate appointment, within 2 months. It is not disputed that the applicant sent a certified copy of the order to the opposite party on 26.2.2005. The time limit for consideration fixed by the Writ Court expired on or before 27.4.2005. Subsequent filing of the special appeal by the State in which at no point of time, was there any interim order prohibiting the applicant from pursuing his claim ever came into existence would be of no consequence to the applicant. The special appeal came to be dismissed on 13.11.2012. It is well-settled that mere filing of repeated representations cannot extend the period of limitation. The special appeal came to be dismissed on 13.11.2012. It is well-settled that mere filing of repeated representations cannot extend the period of limitation. Thus, neither the pendency of the special appeal nor filing of the representations dated 16.8.2014/19.2.2015/8.3.2016 could ever extend the period of limitation for initiating contempt under Section 20. In view of above analysis, this Court is of the considered view that the contempt as framed and filed is liable to be dismissed as being barred by Section 20. The contempt is dismissed.