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2017 DIGILAW 541 (GAU)

Rabindra Nath Barman v. Gauhati High Court

2017-05-04

ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA, MANOJIT BHUYAN

body2017
JUDGMENT & ORDER : A.M. Bujor Barua, J. Heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned senior counsel for the appellant and also heard Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. During the relevant period, to which the allegations made against the appellant pertains to, the appellant was serving as a Deputy Registrar in the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court. While the appellant was serving as the Deputy Registrar, an advertisement dated 19.03.2004 under the signature of the Registrar General of the Gauhati High Court was issued for recruitment to 59 numbers of posts of Lower Division Assistant. Around 2300 applications were received pursuant to such advertisement and the written test was held on 04.07.2004. On the basis of the result of the written test, 597 numbers of candidates qualified for the viva-voce and accordingly call letters for the viva-voce were issued by registered post, which was held on 11th, 12th, 18th, 19th and 25th September, 2004. The 597 candidates, who had qualified for the viva-voce, were divided into five batches of approximately 120 candidates each and the five batches were accordingly subjected to viva-voce on the aforesaid five dates. The list of the 597 candidates was arranged in the alphabetical order for the purpose of viva-voce. The result of the viva-voce was announced on 02.12.2004. As per the declared results, 40(forty) candidates were selected for appointment, although the notified vacancies as per the advertisement were 59 (fifty nine). 3. By the order of the Registry dated 09.09.2004, the appellant was required to attend duties on the scheduled dates for the viva-voce and one of the entrusted duty was to make the sitting arrangement of the candidates in the High Court building on the aforesaid dates. 4. Before the final results of the selection procedure was declared, the Registry of the High Court had received certain reports that some of the candidates, who had appeared in the viva-voce were approached by certain persons with an offer of being selected against payment of monetary consideration. Accordingly, on the direction of the Registrar (I&E), a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the then Deputy Registrar (I&E) and a Report was submitted on 04.01.2005. 5. As per the Report of 04.01.2005, the statements of some of the candidates, who were apparently approached by certain persons, were recorded and the statements of the said candidates were also included in the report. 5. As per the Report of 04.01.2005, the statements of some of the candidates, who were apparently approached by certain persons, were recorded and the statements of the said candidates were also included in the report. As per the Report, one of the candidate namely, Suprativ Lal Baruah had mentioned the name of one Rituraj Barman, while another candidate Rituparna Das mentioned the name of one Dhiraj Barman and Bhusan Kalita to be the persons who had approached them with the offer of appointment against payment of money. Rituparna Das also stated that Dhiraj Barman and Bhushan Kalita were working in the establishment of the High Court and the District Judge, Kamrup and he can identify the two persons. Rituparna Das had also given the mobile phone number 9435044030, which was said to have been given to him by Dhiraj Barman in order to enable the candidate to contact him. The Report also states that when the enquiring Deputy Registrar (I&E) had personally called the aforesaid mobile phone number, it could be ascertained that it was the phone number of Dhiraj Barman, who was working in the establishment of the District Judge, Kamrup. Further, a photograph of Dhiraj Barman, when shown to Rituparna Das, the candidate readily identified the photograph to be of Dhiraj Barman. 6. The aforesaid Report of the Deputy Registrar (I&E) was placed before the two Hon'ble Judges who were involved in the selection procedure, and thereafter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Upon being so placed, the Report of the Deputy Registrar (I&E) was converted to a writ petition being WP(C) No.87/2005. By the order dated 10.01.2005, this Court on the judicial side had directed the CBI to register a case, investigate the matter and submit a report within a period of four months. Accordingly, the report dated 29.11.2005 was submitted by the Investigating officer of the CBI. 7. In the report of the CBI, it had been stated that on the examination of Rituparna Das, who was also examined by the Deputy Registrar (I&E), it was revealed that Bhushan Kalita, being an employee of the District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati had given the candidate the mobile phone number of Dhiraj Barman so that Dhiraj Barman can manage the post of LDA for the concerned candidate. As per the statement of Rituparna Das, as reflected in the Report of the CBI, one Upen Sarma, being a resident of Mirza, had visited the house of Rituparna Das and told his parents that he knew one person who can help in the selection for the post of LDA on payment of Rs.1,50,000/- by saying that the brother of the said person is a senior officer in the High Court at Guwahati. Accordingly, one of the uncle of the candidate met Bhushan Kalita on the next date and he was told that the colleague of Bhushan Kalita was working in the Accounts Section of the District and Sessions Judge Court and his brother is working in the High Court as a Senior Officer and the brother can help in arranging the job of LDA for an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-. The CBI report also reflects the statement of another candidate Suprativ Lal Barua, who stated that on meeting one Hitesh, the candidate was told to contact Rituraj Barman who works in the Sessions Court at Guwahati and gave his mobile number as 9435044030. Upon meeting Rituraj Barman, the candidate was told that he had some hold in the High Court and can arrange for the selection on payment of Rs.1,20,000/-. Later on, the said candidate Suprativ Lal Barua came to know that, in fact, the concerned person Rituraj Barman was none other than Dhiraj Barman and he could identify from the photograph of Dhiraj Barman that it was Dhiraj Barman who had demanded the money from him. 8. The CBI report further reflected the statement of another candidate Rajib Deka, who stated that two persons from the High Court had gone to the house of his neighbor Pradip Das, who works as a Grade-IV peon in the office of Rabindra Barman i.e. the appellant and had offered to help in the selection of the LDA. The examination of Pradip Das had revealed that the two persons, who had visited the village of Rajib Deka were Dhiraj Barman and one Dipak Haloi, who is also working in the High Court as a Grade-IV Mali. It was stated that the said Dipak Haloi stays in the house of the appellant Rabindra Barman since 1998 without payment of any rent. It was stated that the said Dipak Haloi stays in the house of the appellant Rabindra Barman since 1998 without payment of any rent. The CBI report also reflects the statement of another candidate, namely, Monoj Kumar Goswami, who stated that one person came to his house and introduced himself as D. Barman and gave his mobile number by stating that his brother holds a high post in the High Court and he can arrange the job of LDA through him. 9. As per the CBI Report it had been established that Dhiraj Barman in connivance with Bhushan Kalita and Upen Sarma had demanded illegal gratification from one of the candidate Rituparna Das for helping in his selection as LDA and further, Dhiraj Barman had contacted and demanded illegal gratification from some other candidates, namely, Monoj Kumar Goswami, Rajib Deka, Suprativ Lal Baruah. The report also states that it had further been established that Dhiraj Barman had used his elder brother Rabindra Barman's stature in the High Court for coercing the candidates. 10. Based on the aforesaid statement of the candidates, the CBI in its report proceeded on the premises as to how a person, who is working in the District and Sessions Court, Kamrup, Guwahati can have access to the list of candidates who had applied for the post of LDA in the High Court and also as to which of the candidates had passed the written examination/interview. The CBI considered that said Dhiraj Barman, who is not working in the High Court, cannot have access to such confidential matter on his own. The CBI also took into consideration that the appellant, who is the brother of Dhiraj Barman, was working as a Deputy Registrar (Administration) in the High Court during the relevant period and that Dhiraj Barman was flaunting the influence of his brother, being the appellant, while seeking illegal gratification from the candidates. The report also considered that the appellant was associated with the holding of the interview for the post of LDA on different dates in September, 2004 and that the appellant along with some other staff of the High Court was assigned the duty for holding the viva-voce test. The report also considered that the appellant was associated with the holding of the interview for the post of LDA on different dates in September, 2004 and that the appellant along with some other staff of the High Court was assigned the duty for holding the viva-voce test. It was also considered that the appellant was given a specific duty to supervise the process of conducting the viva-voce test and, as such, he was in possession of the list of candidates who had qualified for the viva-voce and, therefore, there is a strong probability of his involvement in providing the list to his brother Dhiraj Barman. The CBI also took note of the fact that the accused had volunteered himself to give statement before the CBI and in the said statement he had admitted that his younger brother Dhiraj Barman had demanded money from some of the candidates, but the list and address of the candidates, who had passed the written test and interview were obtained from one Mukul Bhattacharjee, who was working as a Programmer in the Computer Section of the High Court. The CBI also took note of the aspect that in a normal circumstance, no brother would like to give evidence against his younger brother. Accordingly, the CBI concluded that there are strong substantial evidence to prove that Dhiraj Barman had obtained the list of the selected candidates prior to the declaration of the result and after the interview from his elder brother Rabindra Barman, who was the then Deputy Registrar (Administration) in the High Court or from Mukul Bhattacharjee, who was the Programmer in the Computer Section. The CBI further concluded that out of the two persons, the appellant being a Supervisory Officer, had access to the names and addresses of the persons who had appeared for the viva-voce and, therefore, there is a strong presumption that the appellant could be the person who had furnished the said list of the selected candidates. The CBI also took note that the accused persons while demanding illegal gratification had used the name of the appellant by stating that he had influence in the High Court. The CBI also took note that the accused persons while demanding illegal gratification had used the name of the appellant by stating that he had influence in the High Court. The CBI also took note that the Peon of the appellant, namely, Dipak Kumar Haloi, who is also from the same village, had accompanied Dhiraj Barman while contacting one of the candidate and that the said Peon stays in the house of the appellant. 11. Although the report of the CBI had been submitted on 29.11.2005 but the recommendation contained therein for initiating disciplinary proceeding against the appellant was not acted upon. It was only in the year 2013, when the appellant had submitted a representation against an order of transfer, transferring him from the Principal Seat in Guwahati to the Itanagar Permanent Bench, the Hon'ble Chief Justice had the occasion to go through the contents of the said report of the CBI. 12. Upon going through the report, the Hon'ble Chief Justice was pleased to refer the matter to the Administrative Committee and the Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 23.06.2015 had decided to place the matter before the Full Court. Accordingly, the Full Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2015 had adopted a resolution to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. Consequent upon such decision of the Full Court, the charge memo dated 13.07.2015 was served upon the appellant. In the charge memo, five specific charges were framed against the appellant, which are as follows:- "(1) That while you were posted as Deputy Registrar (Administration) in September, 2004 in the Gauhati High Court (Principal Seat), you were associated with the recruitment process of Lower Division Assistant (now renamed as Judicial Assistant), the viva-voce for which was held on 11th, 12th, 18th, 19th and 25th September, 2004. Vide Order No. HC.V-45/2004/3622/Estt. Dated 9.9.2004, you were assigned duties for holding the viva voce. You were also directed to supervise the said interview. You by virtue of such engagement had access to the select list and particulars of the selected candidates like their names, mobile numbers, addresses and other particulars. It was revealed that approaches were made to many of the selected candidates with a proposal for managing appointment to them in lieu of illegal gratification. You by virtue of such engagement had access to the select list and particulars of the selected candidates like their names, mobile numbers, addresses and other particulars. It was revealed that approaches were made to many of the selected candidates with a proposal for managing appointment to them in lieu of illegal gratification. The approaches as made to many of the selected candidates and/or their relatives was revealed to be either by Dhiraj Barman, who at that relevant point of time was working as a Lower Division Assistant, in the establishment of the District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup, or on his behalf. Dhiraj Barman is your own brother. The approach as made to the selected candidates and your brother being the prime mover in such approaches reflects that the select list along with the particulars of the selected candidates was leaked by you to him. You were duty bound to maintain the secrecy of the said list until and unless the same was published in due process. As such, you failed to maintain absolute integrity, secrecy and devotion of duty, while discharging your duties. Your aforesaid act amounts to gross indiscipline, negligence, misconduct and dishonesty, tarnishing the reputation of the Institution, which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline and gross negligence. (2) That you having gained access to the select list and particulars of the candidates selected in the recruitment held for the post of Judicial Assistant allowed/assisted/helped and/or furnished your brother, namely, Sri Dhiraj Barman, who was an employee of the establishment of District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup and was working as a Lower Division Assistant in the said establishment at that relevant time, to have access to the said select list and thereby facilitating him with the names and all other particulars of the selected candidates, who were selected in the said list. You accordingly entered into a conspiracy with your above named brother to get pecuniary benefits either to him or to you or to both of you and others related and/or connected and/or associated with the said conspiracy and in pursuance of the said conspiracy and illegal design, your brother above named, approached many selected candidates and/or their relatives and demanded illegal gratifications with a false promise that they would be helped for being finally selected for the post of Judicial Assistant. Your aforesaid act amounts to gross indiscipline, misconduct and dishonesty, lowering the reputation and decorum of the Institution thereby diminishing public confidence on it, which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline, gross negligence and misuse of your official position. (3) That on revelations of approaches being made to selected candidates, selected in the process of recruitment for the post Judicial Assistant by your brother Dhiraj Barman and others with false promise to secure for them appointment as Judicial Assistant on payment of consideration, coming to light the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the judicial side had directed for an investigation into the matter by the CBI. The investigations as carried out in the matter by the CBI had revealed that your brother Dhiraj Barman was the prime accused in the matter and he had approached many of the selected candidates with a proposal to secure a job for them in return of consideration. Your brother being in no way connected with the recruitment process could not have had access to the select list and/or particulars of the selected candidates. He could have gained such access only through you and accordingly you by misusing the trust and faith reposed in you had parted with the information pertaining to the selected candidates to your brother facilitating him to approach many of the selected candidates, thereby ensuring wrongful gain for yourself or for your brother and/or for both and other players of the act. Your aforesaid act amounts to misuse by you of your official position, gross indiscipline, misconduct, dishonesty and had the effect of lowering the reputation and decorum of the Institution, thereby diminishing public confidence on it, which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline and gross negligence. (4) That you had full knowledge of the approaches being made by your said brother Dhiraj Barman to selected candidates with a false promise to secure appointments against the post of Judicial Assistant with demand for illegal gratification, but you refrained from bringing the same to the notice of the authorities of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court. (4) That you had full knowledge of the approaches being made by your said brother Dhiraj Barman to selected candidates with a false promise to secure appointments against the post of Judicial Assistant with demand for illegal gratification, but you refrained from bringing the same to the notice of the authorities of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court. Such act on your part clearly reflects that you were an active and willing participant in the acts perpetuated by your said brother and the same were also done with your knowledge and consent and you were a part and parcel of the conspiracy involved. As such, you had misused the trust and faith reposed on you and by misusing your official position you had actively participated in an act that had the effect of lowering the reputation and majesty of the Institution, which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline and gross negligence. (5) That your above named brother (Dhiraj Barman) was convicted under Section 120(B) IPC and Section 7 and 15 of the PC Act by the learned Court of Special Judge, CBI, Assam in Special Case No.14 of 2005 by judgment dated 29.09.2009, which was further affirmed by the Hon'ble High Court vide judgment and order dated 03.01.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.181 of 2009. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in its said Judgment and order dated 03.01.2014 has recorded a categorical finding to the effect that the records of the selection for the post of Lower Division Assistant (now renamed as Judicial Assistant) were in your possession. As such you had by misusing your position mischievously and deceitfully in collusion with your said brother and others demanded and attempted to realize money from the selected candidates on false assurance of securing them appointment as Judicial Assistant in the High Court Registry. Your aforesaid act amounts to gross indiscipline, misconduct and dishonesty tarnishing the reputation and prestige of the Institution which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline, negligence accordingly." 13. The appellant submitted his written statement dated 28.09.2015 to the aforesaid charge memo. Your aforesaid act amounts to gross indiscipline, misconduct and dishonesty tarnishing the reputation and prestige of the Institution which is unbecoming of a public servant. You are, therefore, charged with misconduct, gross indiscipline, negligence accordingly." 13. The appellant submitted his written statement dated 28.09.2015 to the aforesaid charge memo. The main thrust of the reply of the appellant to the charges was that he did not have access to the select list of the candidates and it was only Mukul Bhattacharjee who had access to such a list, being the Programmer of the Computer System of the High Court. The appellant also stated that the CBI had recorded that there were six different conversations between Dhiraj Barman and Mukul Bhattacharjee and the same is an indication that the select list was leaked out to Dhiraj Barman by Mukul Bhattacharjee. The appellant also states that the nature of the work assigned to him during the interview process was such that he could not have gained any access to the merit list of the candidates who had qualified for the interview. It was stated that his involvement with the recruitment process was only confined to the supervisory work on the scheduled dates and he had no access to the final select list. 14. The aforesaid charge memo dated 13.07.2015 was assailed by the appellant in the writ petition being WP(C) No.6717/2015. In the writ petition the petitioner had, inter-alia, raised a contention that in the Full Court meeting held on 24.06.2015, no final decision was taken regarding the issuance of the charge memo, but subsequently a resolution was shown to have been adopted by the Full Court for issuing a show cause notice to the appellant. Accordingly, it was contended that the charge memo dated 13.07.2015 was unauthorized and it was issued in violation of the resolution of the Full Court meeting. Apart from the contention that the Full Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2015 did not recommend disciplinary proceeding, the appellant also raised the contention that the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also that the charge memo had been issued on non-existent ground. Per contra, contentions made on behalf of the respondent High Court was that the charges against the appellant were of serious nature, which by itself do not justify quashing of the charge memo. 15. Per contra, contentions made on behalf of the respondent High Court was that the charges against the appellant were of serious nature, which by itself do not justify quashing of the charge memo. 15. As regards the contention of the appellant in the writ proceeding that the Full Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2015 did not recommend for a disciplinary proceeding, the learned Single Judge had allowed the learned senior counsel for the appellant to inspect the record. Upon inspection, the learned senior counsel for the appellant was satisfied that the said contention is incorrect and that, there was a decision of the Full Court for initiating the disciplinary proceeding. As regards the contention of delay and insufficiency of material, the learned Single Judge by discussing the various propositions of law relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, had rejected the same. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant have preferred this appeal. 16. In the appeal, the learned senior counsel, Mr. PK Tiwari, had urged the following: (i) The unexplained delay in initiating the proceeding, where the appellant had not contributed in any manner to the delay, had caused prejudice to the appellant. (ii) In a case where the allegations are against two persons and the nature of the allegations are such that only one of the two persons can be held to be guilty, by initiating the proceeding and enquiry against one and making the other person a witness, a prejudice is caused to the person against whom the proceeding and enquiry had been initiated. (iii) When the materials on record indicates that the appellant had taken a stand that the select list could have possibly been leaked out by one Mukul Bhattacharjee to Dhiraj Barman but the charges having been framed only against the appellant, it indicates that there is a conclusive opinion of the disciplinary authority that it is the appellant alone who had done the act of leaking out the select list and that the involvement of Mukul Bhattacharjee had been ruled out. (iv) The aim of the enquiry should be to search for the truth, but the nature of the enquiry initiated against the appellant and also from the charges framed, militates against the aforesaid fundamental principle of holding of an enquiry and it is the grievance of the appellant that there is no joint enquiry being held against both the appellant and Mukul Bhattacharjee. (v) The select list of 597 candidates was never in the custody or possession of the appellant and the same had not been made available to the appellant till date. (vi) The disciplinary proceeding may adversely affect the promotional prospect of the appellant and that the charges Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 are speculative in nature. 17. The learned senior counsel refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another reported in 1990 (Supp.) SCC 738, wherein, in paragraph 4, the Court was of the view that where there is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo, it will be unfair to permit a departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at that stage. 18. The learned Senior counsel also relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the State of Punjab and Others v. Chamanlal Goyal, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570 , wherein in paragraph 9 it has been held that if the disciplinary proceeding is initiated after a lapse of considerable period of time, it would not be fair to the delinquent officer and that such delay would not only make the task of proving the charges difficult but would also not be in the interest of administration. Further, that delay in initiation of the proceeding is bound to give room for the allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power and if the delay is too long and unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. 19. Further, that delay in initiation of the proceeding is bound to give room for the allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power and if the delay is too long and unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. 19. The learned Senior counsel further refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PV Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636 , wherein in paragraph 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had quoted the paragraph 19 of its judgment and order in State of A.P. v. N Radhakrishnan, reported in 1998(4) SCC 154 , wherein it had been held that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. 20. To substantiate the contention that the charges are vague, the learned senior counsel, also relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dy. Inspector General of Police v. KS Swaminathan, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 498 , wherein in paragraph 4, it has been held that if the charge memo is totally vague and does not disclose misconduct for which the charges have been framed, the Court would not be justified at that stage to go into the question whether the charges are true. 21. Reliance is also placed in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409 , wherein in paragraphs 41 and 42, the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite and suspicion has no role to play in such matter and there must exist a reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. 22. With regard to the contention that when the nature of allegations are such that out of the two persons only one of them could be held to be guilty and the singling out one person for an enquiry and making the other person a witness against him, indicates a pre-determined mind of the disciplinary authority, the learned senior counsel relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Others, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 at paragraphs 23, 24 and 35 thereof. Reliance is also placed in State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and Others, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330 , wherein it has been held that it is well settled in service jurisprudence that the authority concerned has to apply its mind upon receipt of the reply of charge sheet or show cause, as the case may be, as to whether a further enquiry is called for. The learned senior counsel relies upon paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the said judgment. 23. Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Standing counsel appearing for the Gauhati High Court, on the other hand, had urged upon the following: (i) In the writ proceeding, only the show cause notice has been put to challenge and in the written statement submitted by the appellant, there had been no comments on the charges framed. (ii) In the reply dated 28.09.2015, the appellant had taken all the available grounds in defence against the charges framed against him. (iii) The plea that there has been a delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding had not been taken in the written statement except in the prayer portion. (iv) Neither in the written statement nor in the pleadings in the writ petition the appellant had stated as to what is the prejudice that he had suffered due to the delay in initiation of the departmental proceeding. As transpires from the pleading, one of the ground that the appellant had taken against the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding was that there is a jurisdictional error in the initiation, inasmuch as, the same has not been reflected in the decision of the Full Court meeting held on 24.06.2015. As the grounds of jurisdictional error with reference to the Full Court meeting held on 24.06.2015 had been rejected by the learned Single Judge after allowing the learned counsel for the appellant to verify the original records and the same having not been taken as a ground in the present appeal, there remains nothing further to preclude an enquiry or a disciplinary proceeding to be initiated against the appellant for arriving at the truth. Further, the appellant had also not raised any ground that the provisions of Rule 23 of the Gauhati High Court Service Rules, 1967 has been violated. Further, the appellant had also not raised any ground that the provisions of Rule 23 of the Gauhati High Court Service Rules, 1967 has been violated. (v) The appellant being an employee, is always subject to initiation of a disciplinary proceeding if the authorities initiating such proceeding are of the view that there are certain misconduct on the part of the appellant. It is the outcome of such initiation and not the initiation itself that can be challenged by the appellant on any available ground. (vi) Without expressing any comments on the merit of the charges, the charges by itself are of serious nature which affects the image of the Institution and, as such, it is relevant that the truth as regards the charges has to be arrived at in a conclusive manner. 24. Mr. Medhi further argues that the burden to prove the charges is entirely on the disciplinary authority and the appellant would get all opportunity in the proceeding to disprove the charges. The disciplinary authority having decided to proceed against the appellant and deciding not to initiate any such proceeding against Mukul Bhattacharjee does not, ipso facto, violate the right of equality as there cannot be any negative violation of Article 14. It is contended that by initiating the disciplinary proceeding, no legal right of the appellant had been violated as the disciplinary authority had not come to any finding so as to give rise to a cause of action for challenging the same. Also, the appellant having approached the Court after filing of the written statement and there being no violation of the Rules or of any institutional bias and considering the serious nature of the charges, the balance of equity is against the appellant, irrespective of the allegation of delay. 25. Mr. Medhi also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Ashok Kacker, reported in 1995 Supp.(1) SCC 180, wherein in paragraph 4, it has been held that the delinquent having full opportunity to reply to the charge sheet and to raise all points available to him, including those urged in the writ petition, the quashing of the charge sheet was not justified. 26. 26. The learned Standing counsel also relies upon the case in Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565 , wherein in paragraph 10, it has been held that ordinarily a writ petition does not lie against a charge sheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action and a writ is maintainable only when some right of the party is infringed. The charge sheet does not infringe the right of the party and it is only when a final order of punishment is passed or an order adversely affecting the party is passed, it may constitute a grievance and a cause of action may arise. Thus, a charge sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. 27. Mr. Tiwari, in order to urge upon the ground that the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding had caused prejudice to the appellant, contends that the report of the CBI dated 29.11.2005 had recommended the initiation of a departmental proceeding against the appellant and thereafter the report of the CBI was placed before the Division Bench of this Court on 12.05.2006 in WP(C) No.87/2005 and having taken note of the fact that criminal proceeding had already been initiated in terms of the report of the CBI against Dhiraj Barman and Bhushan Kalita, the Division Bench had closed the said writ petition without any specific order or observation as regards initiation of the departmental proceeding against the appellant. It is further contended that the Registry of this Court had initiated another disciplinary proceeding against the appellant on 23.06.2006 on an entirely different set of facts alleging that the appellant had pursued the LLB Course without due permission from the competent authority, for which the appellant was imposed a major penalty of reversion from the grade of Deputy Registrar to the junior most Assistant Registrar, which action was interfered by this Court in a writ proceeding in WP(C) 4364/2008 and the major penalty of reversion was set aside. Thereafter, the appellant had submitted representations for expunction of the remarks in his Service Book and also for constitution of a Review DPC for considering his case for promotion from Deputy Registrar to Joint Registrar, as during the period when the order of reversion was in force, several persons junior to the appellant had been promoted to the post of Joint Registrar. Although the Committee constituted for the purpose, in its meeting held on 07.05.2013, had directed the Registry to expunge the remarks made in the Service Book of the appellant that the LL.B degree obtained by him was in contravention of the Rules, but by Notification dated 22.08.2013 the appellant was transferred from the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court to the Itanagar Permanent Bench. It is the contention of Mr. Tiwari that while the representation of the appellant against the transfer was under consideration before the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the entire record of the case of the appellant was placed before the Administrative Committee and the Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 23.06.2015 had decided to place the matter before the Full Court. Thereafter, the Full Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2015 adopted a resolution to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. According to the learned senior counsel, the charge memo dated 13.07.2015, comprising of five charges, was served upon the appellant, to which the appellant submitted his written statement of defence dated 28.09.2015. 28. In the aforesaid factual background, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that although a departmental proceeding was recommended by the CBI in its report dated 29.11.2005 but in the interregnum, i.e. from 29.11.2005 to 24.06.2015, the recommendation of the CBI to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant was not pursued. Hence, there is an inexplicable delay of nearly ten years and such delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding has caused prejudice to the appellant. It is the further contention that the record does not reveal any reason which would provide sufficient explanation as to the cause of such delay. 29. In order to substantiate the submission that the delay of almost ten years has caused prejudice to the appellant, the learned senior counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh'(supra). 29. In order to substantiate the submission that the delay of almost ten years has caused prejudice to the appellant, the learned senior counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh'(supra). In paragraph-4 of the said decision vis-à-vis the facts involved, it is held that there being no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo, the Court was of the view that it would be unfair to permit the departmental proceeding to be continued. The learned senior counsel for the appellant also refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chamanlal Goyal (supra) by relying upon paragraph-9, wherein it is provided that a disciplinary proceeding cannot be initiated after a lapse of considerable time and if the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. The learned senior counsel also relies upon N. Radhakrishnan (supra), wherein in paragraph-19 it had been provided that a disciplinary proceeding should be allowed to be terminated due to delay, when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay and further if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. The learned senior counsel further relies upon the decision in P.V. Mahadevan (supra), wherein in paragraph-11 the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that allowing the departmental proceeding to continue at such distance of time will be prejudicial to the delinquent and keeping a government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. 30. In respect of the judgments so relied upon, it is noticed that the factual background on which the aforesaid pronouncements were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court were that: (i) In Bani Singh (supra), the delinquent was charge-sheeted in 1987 in respect of certain incidents that had happened in the year 1975-76. 30. In respect of the judgments so relied upon, it is noticed that the factual background on which the aforesaid pronouncements were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court were that: (i) In Bani Singh (supra), the delinquent was charge-sheeted in 1987 in respect of certain incidents that had happened in the year 1975-76. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken note of the fact that although the subject matter of the enquiry had taken place in the year 1975-76, it is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the irregularities, if any, and came to know of it only in the year 1987 and secondly, according to the department, in the year 1977, there was a doubt about the involvement of the concerned officer in the irregularities. (ii) In Chamanlal Goyal (supra), the delinquent was the Superintendent of a high security jail in the year 1986 and after he had handed over charge of his office on 26.12.1986, on being transferred, certain terrorists had escaped from the jail on the night of 1-1-1987 and subsequently, there was a report that the escape was due to the cumulative result of lax administration, indiscipline and control over the prisoners. Although the incident had occurred on the night of 01.01.1987, there was no action against the delinquent and the charge sheet was issued on 09.07.1992. (iii) In N. Radhakrishnan (supra), while the delinquent was posted as the City Planner under the Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam in the year 1981, it was the allegation that the delinquent in collusion with certain builders had permitted a deviation from the building plans by obtaining pecuniary advantage and accordingly two memos dated 12.12.1987 were issued against the delinquent officer and some others, but till 31.07.1995, the articles of charges had not been served on the delinquent and, in the meantime, there was an amendment in the disciplinary rules in 1991. Also, various enquiry officers were appointed from time to time and thereafter, the articles of charges were issued on 31.07.1995. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that although the charges were vague, the respondent authorities had chosen not to appoint any further enquiry officer, after the appointment of the last enquiry officer Sri M. Veerahhadraiah was cancelled by order dated 16.06.1995, i.e. before the articles of charges dated 31.07.1995 was issued. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that although the charges were vague, the respondent authorities had chosen not to appoint any further enquiry officer, after the appointment of the last enquiry officer Sri M. Veerahhadraiah was cancelled by order dated 16.06.1995, i.e. before the articles of charges dated 31.07.1995 was issued. It is in the above context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had concluded that there was no explanation for the delay in concluding the enquiry proceeding all these years and accordingly the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31.07.1995. (iv) In P.V. Mahadevan (supra), the delinquent was issued a charge memo in the year 2000 for an irregularity in issuing a Sale Deed in 1990 and was to superannuate shortly. In the said case, the departmental authorities had not taken any action against the delinquent since 1990 for almost ten years and no explanation was offered for the delay. 31. In all the aforesaid four cases referred to and relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, it is noticed that either the nature of the charges against the delinquents were trivial in nature or that the departmental authorities had issued the memo at a very belated stage or that although several enquiry officers were appointed in the meantime, the matter could not be proceeded any further as the articles of charges were not issued to the delinquent for eight years after issuance of the charge memo. 32. In the instant case, the factual background in issuing the show cause and the charge memo against the appellant is that the nature of the charges are very serious and are to the effect that it not only casts an aspersion on the character of the appellant but his conduct also tends to bring the entire institution to disrepute. Secondly, the conduct of the appellant was also enquired into by the CBI which had submitted a report recommending a disciplinary proceeding, which unlike in the four cases referred by the appellant, the departmental authorities had done absolutely nothing for a considerable long period of time. Secondly, the conduct of the appellant was also enquired into by the CBI which had submitted a report recommending a disciplinary proceeding, which unlike in the four cases referred by the appellant, the departmental authorities had done absolutely nothing for a considerable long period of time. The fact that the recommendation of the CBI was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Chief Justice from 2005 to 2015 may be a cause of another enquiry, but the same on its own cannot give rise to an indefeasible right to the appellant to claim that prejudice has been caused due to such delay in issuing the charge memo. Records reveal that the moment it was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Chief Justice as regards the recommendation of the CBI, appropriate steps for issuing the charge memo had been initiated. The fact that the recommendation of the CBI was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Chief Justice till 2015, also cannot give rise to any legal right to the appellant for a negative violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 33. Further, on a reading of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh (supra), Chamanlal Goyal (supra), N. Radhakrishnan (supra) and P.V. Mahadevan (supra), it can be seen that in Bani Singh's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was confronted with a situation where the Tribunal had quashed the charge memo and the departmental enquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over twelve years in the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding and in that context it was held that in the absence of satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded at that stage. Further, in Bani Singh's case, the Tribunal had quashed the charge memo and the departmental proceeding in a subsequent Original Application No. 102/1987 by a common judgment and order, where an earlier Original Application No. 201/1986 was pending for quashing of the adverse entries in the ACR in respect of the year 1976/77 and also for retrospective promotion and promotion to super-time scale and the impugned charge memo and departmental enquiry therein had been initiated during the pendency of the earlier Original Application. The absence of satisfactory explanation and the unfairness to permit the departmental enquiry to go any further, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh's case, has to be looked into from the aforesaid factual situation. 34. In Chamanlal Goyal’s case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while observing that a departmental proceeding cannot be initiated after a lapse of a considerable time and that it would not be fair to the delinquent official, the same has to be understood in the context of the further observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same paragraph wherein the reasons for the aforesaid observation has also been stated. It had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that delay makes the task of proving the charge difficult and the same would not be in the interest of the administration. Secondly, how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case and if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, is also a relevant factor. It had further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of the circumstances. In view of such conclusions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, delay in initiation by itself may not be fatal to interdict a disciplinary proceeding unless there are attending facts and circumstances that it would be difficult for the administration to prove the charges and that for such delay the delinquent officer would be prejudiced in defending himself. 35. In the instant case, neither the appellant had pleaded nor he had contended as to what prejudice would be caused to him in defending his case in the disciplinary proceeding due to the delay in issuing the charge memo in the year 2015, although there was a recommendation by the CBI for such proceeding in the year 2005 itself. All that the appellant had contended in the appeal is that the delay by itself has caused prejudice to the appellant. Nor there is any contention on behalf of the appellant that the administration will have any difficulty in proving the charges against the appellant nor any material placed to demonstrate that the administration will have the difficulty. 36. All that the appellant had contended in the appeal is that the delay by itself has caused prejudice to the appellant. Nor there is any contention on behalf of the appellant that the administration will have any difficulty in proving the charges against the appellant nor any material placed to demonstrate that the administration will have the difficulty. 36. In N. Radhakrishnan's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 19 had clearly laid down that it is not possible to lay down any predetermined principle applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the departmental proceeding and each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of that case alone. Although the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the delinquent employee has a right that the disciplinary proceedings are to be concluded expeditiously and the proceeding should be allowed to be terminated when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay and that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee would be writ large on the face of it, it is noticed that all such observations were made in the factual premises where there was not only a delay in initiation of the proceedings but that subsequent to the initiation also there were inordinate and unexplained delay in proceeding with the disciplinary proceeding. In the cited case the articles of charges were issued on 31.07.1995, whereas the memos were initially issued on 12.12.1987 and in between several enquiry officers were appointed but could not continue with the enquiry. Be that as it may, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also expressed the view that in considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceeding, the Court has to consider the nature of the charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. 37. From the above, it can be seen that the nature and seriousness of the charge is also a vital aspect that has to be considered by the Court in arriving at a conclusion, whether the delay by itself in initiating the proceeding had vitiated the entire proceeding itself. Further, the complexity of the involvement of the delinquent is also another vital aspect that has to be given its due consideration. Further, the complexity of the involvement of the delinquent is also another vital aspect that has to be given its due consideration. In the instant case, the charge against the appellant is that the appellant was responsible for leaking of certain information of the selected candidates which enabled his brother Dhiraj Barman to approach the candidates offering job against payment of monetary consideration and also that the appellant had refrained from bringing it to the notice of the authorities of the High Court about the said activities of his brother, which reflects that the appellant was an active and willing participant and was also part and parcel of the conspiracy involved. Such charges against the appellant are very serious in nature and also reflects the complexity of the involvement of the appellant. As such, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case to interdict the disciplinary proceeding on a ground that there has been a delay of almost ten years in issuing the charge memo to the appellant after recommendation of the CBI. 38. Similarly, in P.V. Mahadevan's case, the allegation against the delinquent was that there were certain irregularities in issuing a Sale Deed in the year 1990 by an employee of a Housing Board and the charge memo was issued in the year 2000, at a stage when the delinquent was to superannuate shortly. The nature of charges being an irregularity in issuing a Sale Deed and also the fact that the delinquent was to superannuate shortly, on its own fact, was the background where the Hon'ble Supreme Court had refused to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in quashing the charge memo. 39. In view of the above, none of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant leads this Court to arrive at a conclusion that the delay of ten years in issuing the charge memo in the year 2015 after the recommendation of the CBI in the year 2005 can be held to be fatal requiring this Court to interdict the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant. 40. 40. Further, as already noticed, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of Chamanlal Goyal's case was also of the view that the delay alone is not sufficient to interdict a disciplinary proceeding unless the delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself. In paragraph-11 of Chamanlal Goyal''s case the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the plea of the delay, observed that "at the same time, it has been observed that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case." 41. Further, as already noticed in N. Radhakrishnan's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had referred to the nature of the case and the complexity of the involvement to be factors to be taken into consideration while interdicting a disciplinary proceeding on the ground of delay in initiation. 42. In V. Padmanabham v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 537 , in paragraph 18, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "we, therefore, are of the view that delay alone in a case of this nature should not be held to be fatal in the matter of continuing the departmental proceeding as the charges against the appellant are serious in nature and a large sum of money has to be recovered from the appellant. It is, thus, not expedient in the interest of justice that on the ground of delays alone, the matter should be given a quietus." 43. In view of the above propositions of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the prejudice that may be caused to the delinquent due to the delay in initiation and the nature of the charge and the complexity of the involvement are relevant factors which has to be taken into consideration while arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not to interdict a disciplinary proceeding on the ground of delay in initiation. 44. 44. As per the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "prejudice" means a preconceived opinion or a harm or injury that results or may result from some action or judgment. Black's Law dictionary gives the meaning of the word "prejudice" to be a for-judgment, bias, partiality, preconceived opinion, and in respect of speedy trial, prejudice means actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to present effective defence. Prejudice, in the context of a delay in initiation of a disciplinary proceeding, has to be understood to mean that the delay in the initiation has resulted in a situation where, due to the change in the circumstance as because of the delay, the delinquent is in a less advantageous position to defend his case in the proceeding in comparison to what would have been, had the proceeding been initiated at an earlier point of time. Therefore, in order to establish the prejudice that may have been caused due to the delay, it is incumbent upon the delinquent to show as to what change in the circumstances had taken place and what advantage the delinquent had to forego because of such change. 45. In the instant case, neither in the pleadings nor through any contention the appellant is able to show that due to the delay in issuing the charge memo in the year 2015, although the recommendation of the CBI for such proceeding was given in the year 2005, has led to any preconceived opinion or harm or injury to the appellant due to the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding in the year 2015. Nor the appellant is able to show any actual prejudice caused to his ability to present any effective defence. Further, the appellant is unable to show as to what had been the change in the circumstances because the charge memo was issued in the year 2015 and as to what was the earlier advantage that the appellant had which had to forego as because of the delay. 46. In view of the above and also taking into consideration the seriousness of the charges, the appellant is unable to make out any case to carve out an exception from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of interdiction of a disciplinary proceeding on the ground of delay in initiation. No case is made out on the actual prejudice caused. No case is made out on the actual prejudice caused. No case is established to downplay the seriousness of the charge and the complexity of the involvement, so much so, that this Court would be justified to interdict the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding. 47. As regards the other contention of the appellant that although the allegations were against two persons and the nature of the allegations are such that only one of the two persons can be held to be guilty and initiating the proceeding against the appellant and making the other person a witness would cause prejudice, the learned senior counsel, apart from making the bald statement, is unable to provide any further material to substantiate the same. 48. It has also been contended by the appellant that the basis for initiating the departmental proceeding is the report of the CBI and in the said report the recommendation made for initiating a disciplinary proceeding were on the basis of speculation, surmises and conjectures and were not based on any sound, cogent or relevant material. The charges framed against the appellant are on the basis of non-existent material and on pure speculation and surmises and, as such, the same are not tenable in law. We are afraid that the contention put forth is not correct. First, nothing has been stated substantiating such a contention, save and except, a bald statement. Second, the recommendations of the CBI, as can be inferred from its Report dated 29.11.2005, were on the basis of the statements of identified candidates who were approached by Dhiraj Barman for securing appointment against monetary consideration. The candidates had made definite reference to the elder brother of Dhiraj Barman who would be instrumental in procuring the appointment and the said elder brother being none other than the appellant, it cannot be said in totality that there was absolutely no material or that the recommendation for initiating disciplinary proceeding were made on surmises and conjectures. In addition, while considering the aspect as to whether recommendation made for a disciplinary proceeding were on the basis of non-existent material or on the basis of surmises and conjectures, the relevant consideration would be whether it is a case of absolutely no materials or it is a case requiring evaluation as to whether the materials on the basis of which the recommendation was made were adequate enough or not. If there is some materials to arrive at such a recommendation, it would not be appropriate for the Court in judicial review to make a subjective evaluation on the adequacy of the material or as to whether such material can ultimately be the basis to arrive at a conclusion against the delinquent. It is best left to the disciplinary authority. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr v. Ashok Kacker (supra) can be referred wherein in paragraph-4 it had been held that the delinquent has the full opportunity to reply to the charge-sheet and to raise all the points available to him, including those which are being urged upon in a proceeding for quashing the charge memo and accordingly, it would not be appropriate to entertain an application for quashing of the charge memo and the appropriate course for the delinquent to adopt would be to file his reply to the charge memo and invite a decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. 49. In the context of the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would not be appropriate for this Court to adjudicate upon the adequacy or the inadequacy of the materials upon which the CBI had made the recommendation for initiating a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. Further, apart from the recommendation of the CBI, it also cannot be said with certainty that there is no further other material with the disciplinary authority to substantiate the charges against the appellant and that the entire charge memo is based bereft of any material to substantiate the charges. Other than the bald statements made on behalf of the appellant, no further material or indication has been placed before the Court to lead to any conclusion that there is absolutely no material available with the disciplinary authority to substantiate the charges against the appellant. 50. Other than the bald statements made on behalf of the appellant, no further material or indication has been placed before the Court to lead to any conclusion that there is absolutely no material available with the disciplinary authority to substantiate the charges against the appellant. 50. The other contention raised by the appellant that the select list could have possibly been leaked out to Dhiraj Barman by one Mukul Bhattacharjee and, therefore, the charges having been framed only against the appellant indicates that the disciplinary authority is of the conclusive opinion that it is the appellant alone who had done the act of leaking out of the select list and that the involvement of Mukul Bhattacharjee had been ruled out, also cannot be a basis for interdicting the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant. The possibility of the select list being leaked out by Mukul Bhattacharjee cannot be a basis for not initiating a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant, inasmuch as, if the same remains only in the realm of a mere "possibility", the truth has to be unearthed in a regular disciplinary proceeding on the basis of cogent material and evidence. In any view of the matter, the appellant would have adequate opportunity to raise the issue in course of the enquiry proceeding and also, if necessary, to examine or cross-examine said Mukul Bhattacharjee. 51. With regard to the further contentions that the aim of the enquiry should be to search for the truth but the nature of the enquiry initiated against the appellant and also from the charges framed negates the fundamental principles of holding of an enquiry, also cannot be a reason not to proceed further with the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant. It is a fundamental principle of law that a disciplinary proceeding is always held in a free, fair and transparent manner, unless the adverse is indicated with relevant materials. No materials has been placed before this Court to reach a conclusion that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant is made with the purpose of not arriving at the truth. 52. The other further contention that the select list of 597 candidates was never in the custody of possession of the appellant and that the disciplinary proceeding may adversely affect the promotional aspect of the appellant, also cannot be a reason for interdicting a disciplinary proceeding. 52. The other further contention that the select list of 597 candidates was never in the custody of possession of the appellant and that the disciplinary proceeding may adversely affect the promotional aspect of the appellant, also cannot be a reason for interdicting a disciplinary proceeding. The fact as to whether the select list was in the custody or possession of the appellant or not would be a question of factual determination in the disciplinary proceeding. Further, the possibility of there being an adverse aspect on the promotional prospect, also cannot be a reason for interdicting a disciplinary proceeding and the law provides for an appropriate mechanism to mitigate such grievance. 53. In paragraphs 10 and 12 of Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceeding. Neither the disciplinary proceeding nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 54. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 54. Upon consideration of the aforesaid provisions of the law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as having regard to the foregoing discussions, we hold that no procedural requirement have been violated and it is within the extant provisions of law to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. Needless to say, the outcome of such proceeding can always be challenged. The question of delay in initiating the proceeding has to be looked into from the point of view of the seriousness of the charges. The disciplinary proceeding so initiated cannot be said to have been made without any basis. In the light of the above, this Court finds that the appeal is devoid of any merit. The same stands accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to cost.