JUDGMENT : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. 1. The petitioner by way of this writ petition has assailed the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bhilwara dated 01st November 2002 whereby claim petition of the petitioner assailing action of terminating his services has not been accepted. 2. The facts required for consideration of the case are succinctly stating that a Reference was made by the Central Government on 31st March 1999 in following terms: "Whether the action of the Management of National Insurance Company Ltd in terminating the service of Sh. Gopal Lal Parasar, Ex. IVth Class employees with effect from 1.5.86 is legal and justified ? If not what relief the concerned workman is entitled to ?" 3. While the Industrial Tribunal, after discussing the evidence and facts, reached to conclusion that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the calendar year immediately preceding his termination and that provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after 'the Act of 1947') had not been complied with; still did not grant relief. 4. The Tribunal has examined the aspect of delay in putting up the claim. The issue related to termination of service in the year 1986 while Reference was made on 31st March 1999. The period of 13 years has been treated as fatal for granting any relief and hence, the award was passed denying the relief part. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-workman submits that the petitioner had raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer in the year 1996 and Reference was made in the year 1999, therefore, it is wrong to state that delay is of 13 years. On the other hand, it is stated that in the claim petition it was specifically averred that there were other workmen who had been appointed by the respondent instead of petitioner, who are junior to the petitioner and have been later on made permanent by the respondent. It was, thus, a continuous cause of action as persons were appointed later on. 6. Further, it is submitted that the Act of 1947 does not stipulate any time limitation and a provision can not be added in the Act of 1947 of delay. It was, thus, a continuous cause of action as persons were appointed later on. 6. Further, it is submitted that the Act of 1947 does not stipulate any time limitation and a provision can not be added in the Act of 1947 of delay. The learned counsel for the petitioner further supports her submissions with the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & anr.- (1999) 6 SCC 82 wherein provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were examined and it was held : "10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and hot as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent-management on the full bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State of Haryana, (1999) 1 SCT 141 is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases." However, it went on further to say that "reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and latches if there is no explanation to the delay." We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 37-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had, though if fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted herein above and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/boards and tribunal under the Act." 7. She further relied on State of Punjab v. Anil Kumar - (2007) 9 SCC 663 in identical case where petitioner-workman approached the Labour Court after 13 years and the Supreme Court allowed reinstatement in service without back wages. Further reliance is made on judgment in the case of Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation Ltd v. Nirmal Kumar- (2008) 2 SCC 366 . 8. She also relied upon the position reiterated in S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka- 2003 (4) SCC 27 as follows : "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. 8. She also relied upon the position reiterated in S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka- 2003 (4) SCC 27 as follows : "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra) ( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefore. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even reemployment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen (supra) ( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ), In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839 , a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and dis entitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 AIR SCW 2214), it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief." 9. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. M.S. Singhvi has opposed the submissions and supported the order passed by the Tribunal. He states that the delay is material even though there is not any provision in the statute. Courts have tried to draw a line. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. M.S. Singhvi has opposed the submissions and supported the order passed by the Tribunal. He states that the delay is material even though there is not any provision in the statute. Courts have tried to draw a line. A reasonable time can be said to be acceptable for raising disputes as after several years position changes a lot in the management. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has relied on law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Messrs. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen - AIR 1959 SC 1217 citing following observations : "13. There is no doubt that strictly speaking the order of the company discharging its workmen on April 6, 1948, when a dispute was admittedly pending was a breach of section 33; (see Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bank, 1953 SCR 686 : ( AIR 1953 SC 296 )). The remedy for such a, breach is provided in section 33-A and it can be availed of by an individual workman. If therefore it was felt by the workmen who were discharged on April 6, 1948, that there was breach of section 33 by the company, they should have applied individually or collectively to the tribunal under section 33-A. None of them did this. It is true that some kind of letter was written to the Assistant Labour Commissioner in November 1949, but that was also very late and nothing seems to have happened thereafter for almost another three years, till the first reference was made on October 7, 1952. It is true that there is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale, as in this case." 10. He also relied on observations in the judgment in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavan Kutty & ors.- (2000) 2 SCC 455 : "6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question." (emphasis by Court) 11. Further, the observations made in The Management of Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh- (2001) 1 SCC 424 : "10. In our view on the facts of the case in hand the aforementioned two decisions were of no avail to support the case of the respondent. The learned single Judge also found fault with the Tribunal as to the finding that the claim of the respondent was too stale to grant any relief when parties had not raised such a plea. When the Tribunal on proper and objective appreciation of the material on record found that the claim was made by the respondent after 13 years, it was open to it to refuse relief to the respondent. Moreover, the Tribunal did not refuse relief merely on the ground of delay and laches as is evident from paragraph 25 of the order extracted above inasmuch as the Tribunal has recorded that even without considering the question of delay the respondent had lost his lien on his appointment." 12. He also emphasized on the observations made in Chief Engineer, Ranjeet Sagar Dam & anr. v. Sham Lal- AIR 2006 SC 2682 . 13. Having heard both the learned counsel, the question before the Court is whether after the Labour Court has reached to a finding that there has been a violation of the provisions of the Act of 1947 can relief be denied on the ground of delay ? 14. A look at the terms of the Reference shows that there are two parts of the Reference, one with regard to legality and justification of the termination with effect from 01st May 1986 and second part is with regard to relief, to which the concerned workman would be entitled. The terms of the Reference have not been challenged by the respondent in any court. 15. The terms of the Reference have not been challenged by the respondent in any court. 15. Admittedly, the respondent did not act in accordance with law while dispensing with services of the petitioner and they have violated the provisions of the Act of 1947. The objectives behind the enactment of the Act of 1947 were to ensure social justice to both the employer and the employee and advancement and progress of industry. At the same time, it was to be a legislation for providing and regulating the service conditions of the workers and to improve them and bring industrial peace and calm; as held in Ajaib Singh's case (supra) : "The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker sections of the society which is a pre-requisite for a welfare State. To ensure industrial peace and pre-empt industrial tension, the Act further aims at enhancing the industrial production which is acknowledged to be life-blood of a developing society. The Act provides a machinery for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes ignoring the legal technicalities with a view to avoid delays, by specially authorised courts which are not supposed to deny the relief on account of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation and adjudication as per the need of the society keeping in view the fast changing social norms of the developing country like India." 16. The provisions of the Act deliberately excluded the law of limitation and there is no limitation provided for raising a dispute, apparently for the reason that the workman may not be able to bring himself up to the fact that he may be able to fight with the management immediately and may be having a ray of hope that he would be reinstated as & when work would be available for him. However, it is when he finds that all the doors are closed and other persons are being employed and taken up for work, leaving him aside, that he may knock doors of justice. In such circumstances, to oust him on the ground of delay would be amounting to adding certain provisions in the Act of 1947 and legislating into it which the Legislature never intended to add. 17. In such circumstances, to oust him on the ground of delay would be amounting to adding certain provisions in the Act of 1947 and legislating into it which the Legislature never intended to add. 17. So far as establishment of Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts is concerned, they are creature of the statute, the Act of 1947 and hence, they are governed by provisions of the Act of 1947. They can not deny relief on account of applying a provision which is in violation to the Act of 1947 once the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal reach to conclusion that the retrenchment is illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1947. 18. A discretion can only be exercised within the meaning thereto. However, discretion as available under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution available to this Court or the Apex Court can not be said to be available to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. Such a course, if allowed would result traversing the jurisdiction given to the Tribunal under the Act of 1947. In view of this Court, therefore, the course adopted by the Tribunal was wholly without jurisdiction and was not available to it. 19. The law which the Apex Court has been laying down is based on facts and circumstances which have been brought before it. Most of the cases where there has been a delay in raising the dispute, the relief relating to back-wages has been denied. However, the natural consequence of setting aside of wrongful termination order is reinstatement and the same has been allowed in Ajaib Singh (supra) as also in Anil Kumar (supra). 20. The view has been reiterated in Nirmal Kumar (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has discussed the view taken earlier in Nedungadi Bank (supra) and also noticed position considered in S.M. Nilajkar (supra). 21. The judgments cited by the learned senior counsel for the respondents have been passed by the Supreme Court in their own facts and circumstances. Shalimar Works Ltd v. Their Workmen (supra) was relating to wholesale discharge of workmen, where 250 workmen were involved and the disputed had been raised by their Union. The Court did not examine the issue vis-a-vis individual person raising a dispute. 22. In the case of Nedungadi Bank (supra), the facts were different from the present case. Shalimar Works Ltd v. Their Workmen (supra) was relating to wholesale discharge of workmen, where 250 workmen were involved and the disputed had been raised by their Union. The Court did not examine the issue vis-a-vis individual person raising a dispute. 22. In the case of Nedungadi Bank (supra), the facts were different from the present case. While in the said case the respondent's dismissal was not found to be in any way illegal or there was any irregularity in the disciplinary proceedings, the facts of the present case show that the Tribunal has reached to a positive finding that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of the Act of 1947. Similarly, in Indian Iron & Steel (supra), the Tribunal not only considered the delay but gave a finding that even without considering the question of delay, the respondent has lost his lien in light of the standing orders. 23. Thus, the question of relief is directly proportionate to the findings on the facts before the Tribunal. If the findings and conclusion are found to be against the workmen, the question of delay is taken as additional ground to deny the relief. However, once the Tribunal reaches to a conclusion that there has been a violation of the provisions of the Act, it has no discretion available to it to deny the relief. Of course, relief can be moulded in terms of section 11-A of the Act if the same is applicable. Otherwise, as held by the Apex Court reinstatement is the natural relief to which a workman would be entitled. 24. Taking into consideration all the aspects and also taking into consideration that the management can not take advantage of its own fault and no one can benefit of its own error, this Court finds that the order passed by the learned Tribunal denying relief to the petitioner deserves to be set aside and it is, therefore, directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service. However, on account of delay in putting up the claim, the petitioner shall not be entitled to any back wages but he shall be given benefit of continuity of service. 25. Compliance of the order shall be made within period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.