JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal is instituted against the judgment and order dated 03.04.2012 and 04.04.2012, rendered by learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Ist FTC, Rudrapur, District U.S. Nagar in Sessions Trial No.351 of 1999, whereby the appellants-accused, were charged with and tried for the offences under Section 302, 201 and 394 IPC. The appellants were convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- (each) and in default of payment of fine to under additional imprisonment for a period of one year each. They were also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years under Section 201 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (each) and in default of payment of fine to undergo additional imprisonment for a period of three months each. They were further convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years under Section 394 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-(each) and in default of payment of fine to undergo additional imprisonment for a period of three months each. All the sentences imposed under the aforesaid sections were directed to run concurrently. One of the accused namely Murari has died during the pendency of trial. The trial qua him stood abated. 2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that PW1 Smt. Dhandai lodged a report on 17.08.1999 to the effect that on 08.08.1999 in her neighbourhood, her husband has some altercation with Om Prakash, S/o Sri Nait Ram and Pappu, S/o Sri Ratan Lal. In the meantime, the accused Raja Ram, Mahendra and Murari came on the spot. They started abusing her husband. They started giving beatings to her husband. Her husband was saved by Om Prakash and Pappu. The accused escaped from the spot. They threatened to kill her husband within 7-8 days. On 09.08.1999, her husband has gone on his rickshaw. He did not come back till late night. The family members started looking for him. The missing report was lodged on 12.08.1999. The dead body was recovered on 15.08.1999. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. The investigation was carried out and the challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities. The prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses in its support.
The family members started looking for him. The missing report was lodged on 12.08.1999. The dead body was recovered on 15.08.1999. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. The investigation was carried out and the challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities. The prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses in its support. The statements of the accused were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They have denied the case of the prosecution. The appellants were convicted and sentenced, as noticed hereinabove. Hence, this appeal. 3. Learned Legal Aid Counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Learned counsel on behalf of the State has supported the judgment and order dated 03.04.2012 and 04.04.2012. 4. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the judgment and record very carefully. 5. PW1 Smt. Dhandai testified that she knew the appellants Raja Ram, Mahendra and Murari. Seven years back, Om Prakash and Pappu had some altercation with her husband. The accused came on the spot. They started giving beatings to her husband. She saved her husband from the clutches of the accused. The accused proclaimed that her husband would be killed within eight days. Her husband has gone to the market on his rickshaw. He did not come back. The relatives of deceased searched for him. The missing report was lodged at P.S. Rudrapur. The dead body was recovered from the sugarcane field. She recognized the dead body of her husband. The rickshaw was also missing. 6. PW2 Jograj has deposed that on 23.08.1999 at about 8:30 PM, he along with PW3 Tika Ram was sitting in his house. The appellants came on the spot and told him that since he was familiar with the family members of Ramdas, he should make efforts to compromise the matter, as they have killed Ramdas. He told them that he would talk to the father of Ramdas and his wife and thereafter, he will tell them about the outcome. However, the family members of the deceased refused to accept the money. He has told this fact to SHO. 7. PW3 Tika Ram testified that he was sitting in the house of PW2 Jograj. The accused came on the spot and confessed that they have killed Ramdas. They requested for compromise. 8.
However, the family members of the deceased refused to accept the money. He has told this fact to SHO. 7. PW3 Tika Ram testified that he was sitting in the house of PW2 Jograj. The accused came on the spot and confessed that they have killed Ramdas. They requested for compromise. 8. PW4 Banwari Lal has deposed that he was made panch by the police on 15.08.1999 in the panchayatnama when the dead body was recovered. 9. PW5 Smt. Premwati has deposed that Ramdas was a rickshaw puller. He has gone missing on 09.08.1999. His wife lodged the report on 12.08.1999. The dead body was found on 15.08.1999 in the sugarcane field. She has gone with PW1 Dhandai to identify the body. 10. PW6 Khacharu Singh testified that he was posted as Constable Clerk at P.S. Rudrapur on 15.08.1999. He has deposed that one Smt. Premwati has lodged a report that a dead body of person was found in the sugarcane field. He made the necessary entries. 11. PW7 S.I. Brijesh Kumar Tyagi has prepared the spot map. He recorded the statements of Mahendra and Murari in sub-jail Haldwani on 02.10.1999. 12. PW8 Mahendra Singh has deposed that he has taken the dead body for postmortem examination. 13. PW9 Girish Kumar Kotiya has deposed that he was in-charge of the police check-post Pantnagar. The information was received that a dead body was found on 15.08.1999. He filled up panchayatnama. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. 14. PW10 Dr. Chandra Shekhar has conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased on 15.08.1999. According to his opinion, the period between the postmortem and death was 5-7 days. The cause of death of the deceased was coma as a result of ante mortem injury. 15. PW11 Om Prakash has deposed that he has filed the report on 19.08.1999 at the instance of people of the area. He was declared hostile. He was permitted to be cross-examined by learned ADGC. According to him, his statement was never recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He has also denied that on 19.08.1999 at 07:00 AM, he was threatened by one of the accused. 16. Learned Trial Court has relied upon the extrajudicial confession made by the appellants before PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram. According to PW2 Jograj, the appellants have approached him on 23.08.1999.
16. Learned Trial Court has relied upon the extrajudicial confession made by the appellants before PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram. According to PW2 Jograj, the appellants have approached him on 23.08.1999. They confessed their crime before him and asked him to compromise the matter in the presence of PW3 Tika Ram. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that he has not informed the police about the extra-judicial confession made by the appellants before him on 23.08.1999. PW3 Tika Ram has also deposed that when the appellants came and confessed their crime and requested him to compromise the matter, he was sitting in the house of PW2 Jograj. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that he was closely related to deceased. He has also admitted that they have not disclosed the police about the extra-judicial confession made by the appellants before them. They have apprised the wife of the deceased of the extra-judicial confession but they have not told this fact to the SHO. 17. PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram have deposed that the appellants have made extra-judicial confession before them. In case, the accused have made extra-judicial confession before them they should have told this fact to the police and they should have also nabbed the appellants. There was no occasion for the appellants to make the extra-judicial confession before PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram. PW3 Tika Ram was the relative of the deceased. 18. PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram have categorically deposed that they have not informed the police of the extra-judicial confession made on 23.08.1999. PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram have categorically deposed that they have asked the family members of the deceased about the compromise. However, PW1 Dhandai, in her statement, has not stated anything about the alleged offer of compromise made by PW2 Jograj and PW3 Tika Ram. 19. According to the case of the prosecution, the quarrel has taken place between Om Prakash, Pappu and the deceased. The prosecution has examined PW11 Om Prakash but he has not supported the case of the prosecution at all. He was declared hostile. Pappu, one the material witnesses, has also not been examined by the prosecution. The deceased had gone missing on 09.08.1999. His dead body was recovered on 15.08.1999 but the FIR was filed on 17.08.1999.
The prosecution has examined PW11 Om Prakash but he has not supported the case of the prosecution at all. He was declared hostile. Pappu, one the material witnesses, has also not been examined by the prosecution. The deceased had gone missing on 09.08.1999. His dead body was recovered on 15.08.1999 but the FIR was filed on 17.08.1999. No explanation has been given by the prosecution why there was delay of more than 48 hours in lodging the FIR. Since, the quarrel has taken place between Om Prakash, Pappu and the deceased, there was no occasion for the appellants to beat the husband of PW1 Dhandai. 20. The present case is based on circumstantial evidence. In order to prove the case based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary for the prosecution to complete the entire chain. All the circumstances must exclusively point towards the guilt of the accused. The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence. 21. In 2006 (13) SCC 516, in the case of “Gagan Kanojia & another vs. State of Punjab”, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have laid down the following principles in regard to appreciation of the circumstantial evidence as under:- “10. We would proceed on the well-known principles in regard to appreciation of the circumstantial evidence which were noticed by the High Court in the following terms: “(1) There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (2) Circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused person’s conviction if it is of such character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. (3) There should be no missing links but it is not that every one of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. (4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. (5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be.
(4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. (5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1984 SC 1622 , in the case of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra”, have held following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused based on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established. Their Lordships have held as under: - “152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153.
153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1990 SC 2140 , in the case of “Kishore Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh”, have held that the Court has to look into the surrounding circumstances and to find whether the extra-judicial confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of the law suggesting that it may not be true one. For this purpose the Court must scrutinize all the relevant facts such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words used by the accused. Their Lordships have further held that the extrajudicial confession was made which the accused was in the police custody and could not be proved against the accused. Their Lordships have held as under: - “7. The question that emerges, therefore, is whether the prosecution has established the three circumstantial evidences heavily banked upon by the prosecution in proof of the guilt of the appellant. The first circumstance is that the deceased and the appellant were last seen together by PW 7 and PW 8. From the evidence it is clear that there is no prior intimacy of the appellant and the deceased. They happened to meet perchance. Equally from the evidence it is clear that PW 7, the liquor shop owner and PW 8 who had liquor with the appellant and the deceased are also absolute strangers to the deceased and the appellant. Admittedly there is no identification parade conducted by the prosecution to identify the appellant by PW 7 or PW 8. The appellant was stated to have pointed out to PW 7 as the one that sold the liquor and PW 8 consumed it with him and the deceased. Therefore it is not reasonably possible to accept the testimony of PW 7 and PW 8 when they professed that they have seen the appellant and the deceased together consuming the liquor. It is highly artificial and appears on its face a make believe story. The next piece of evidence is the alleged extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to PW 10.
It is highly artificial and appears on its face a make believe story. The next piece of evidence is the alleged extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to PW 10. An unambiguous extra-judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of its falsity. But in the process of the proof of the alleged confession the court has to be satisfied that it is a voluntary one and does not appear to be the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the court has to look into the surrounding circumstances and to find whether the extra-judicial confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of the law suggesting that it may not be true one. For this purpose the court must scrutinise all the relevant facts such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words used by the accused. Extra-judicial confession if found to be voluntary, can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence on record. Therefore, even the extrajudicial confession will also have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made and the circumstances in which it came to be made and the actual words used by the accused. Sometimes it may not be possible to the witness to reproduce the actual words in which the confession was made. For that reason the law insists on recording the statement by a Judicial Magistrate after administering all necessary warnings to the accused that it would be used as evidence against him. 8. Admittedly PW 10 and the appellant do not belong to the same village. From the narrative of the prosecution story it is clear that PW 27, and PW 10 came together and apprehended the appellant from his village and was taken to Jassur for identification.
8. Admittedly PW 10 and the appellant do not belong to the same village. From the narrative of the prosecution story it is clear that PW 27, and PW 10 came together and apprehended the appellant from his village and was taken to Jassur for identification. After he was identified by PW 7 and PW 8 it was stated that he was brought back to Gaggal village of PW 10 and was kept in his company and PW 27 left for further investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 provides that no confession made by any person while he is under custody of the police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Therefore, the confession made by an accused person to a police officer is irrelevant by operation of Section 25 and it shall (sic not) be proved against the appellant. Likewise the confession made by the appellant while he is in the custody of the police shall not be proved against the appellant unless it is made in the immediate presence of the magistrate, by operation of Section 26 thereof. Admittedly the appellant did not make any confession in the presence of the magistrate. The question, therefore, is whether the appellant made the extra-judicial confession while he was in the police custody. It is incredible to believe that the police officer, PW 27, after having got identified the appellant by PW 7 and PW 8 as the one last seen in the company of the deceased would have left the appellant without taking him into custody. It is obvious, that with a view to avoid the rigour of Sections 25 and 26, PW 27 created an artificial scenario of his leaving for further investigation and kept the appellant in the custody of PW 10, the Pradhan to make an extra-judicial confession. Nothing prevented PW 27 to take the appellant to a Judicial Magistrate and have his confession recorded as provided under Section 164 of the CrPC which possesses great probative value and affords an unerring assurance to the court.
Nothing prevented PW 27 to take the appellant to a Judicial Magistrate and have his confession recorded as provided under Section 164 of the CrPC which possesses great probative value and affords an unerring assurance to the court. It is too incredulous to believe that for mere asking to tell the truth the appellant made voluntarily confession to PW 10 and that too sitting in a hotel. The other person in whose presence it was stated to have been made was not examined to provide any corroboration to the testimony of PW 10. Therefore, it would be legitimate to conclude that the appellant was taken into the police custody and while the accused was in the custody, the extra-judicial confession was obtained through PW 10 who accommodated the prosecution (sic appellant). Thereby we can safely reach an irresistible conclusion that the alleged extra-judicial confession statement was made while the appellant was in the police custody. It is well settled law that Sections 25 and 26 shall be construed strictly. Therefore, by operation of Section 26 of the Evidence Act, the confession made by the appellant to PW 10 while he was in the custody of the police officer (PW 27) shall not be proved against the appellant. In this view it is unnecessary to go into the voluntary nature of the confession etc.” 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1972 (3) SCC 759 , in the case of “Kahim Beg & another vs. State of U.P.”, have held that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Their Lordships have held as under:- “18. We may now deal with the evidence regarding the extra-judicial confession of the two accused to Mohammad Nasim Khan (PW 4) and the recovery of ornaments belonging to the deceased from the two accused. It is primarily upon these two pieces of prosecution evidence that the conviction of the accused has been based. So far as the confession to Mohd. Nasim Khan is concerned, we find that, according to the said witness, the two accused came to him at his house in Sakunpur on August 4, 1969 and told him about their having raped and killed the daughter of Ramjas by strangulating her as well as regarding the removal of her ornaments. Mohammad Nasim Khan belongs to another village.
Nasim Khan is concerned, we find that, according to the said witness, the two accused came to him at his house in Sakunpur on August 4, 1969 and told him about their having raped and killed the daughter of Ramjas by strangulating her as well as regarding the removal of her ornaments. Mohammad Nasim Khan belongs to another village. There was no history of previous association between the witness and the two accused as may justify the inference that the accused could repose confidence in him. In the circumstances, it seems highly improbable that the two accused would go to Mohammad Nasim Khan and blurt out a confession. It is also not clear as to why the two accused should try to run away on seeing the police party coming with Mohammad Nasim Khan if Mohammad Nasim Khan had gone to the police at the request of the accused. According to Mohammad Nasim Khan, Gur Sewak PW was with the police Sub-Inspector when the Sub-Inspector came with Mohammad Nasim Khan to his house and apprehended the accused. The evidence of Ramjas PW, however, shows that Gur Sewak PW went with Ramjas to the mortuary on the night between 3 and 4 August, 1969 and that on August 4, 1969 Sur Sewak remained with Ramjas throughout the day at Rae Bareli. It was on August 5, 1969 that, according to Ramjas, he and Gur Sewak returned to their village after throwing the dead body of Kesh Kali in Sain river. It would thus appear that Ramjas PW who, being the father of the deceased, had no particular reason to damage the prosecution case and to support the accused has contradicted Mohammad Nasim Khan on the point that Gur Sewak PW was with the police Sub-Inspector on August 4, 1969. The fact that Mohammad Nasim Khan has deposed regarding the presence of Gur Sewak with the police Sub-Inspector with a view to support. the prosecution case even though, according to Ramjas PW, Gur Sewak was not with the police Sub-Inspector shows that Mohammad Nasim Khan has scant regard for truth. The evidence of extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. The evidence in this respect adduced by the prosecution in the present case is not only of a frail nature, it is lacking in probability and does not inspire confidence.” 25.
The evidence of extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. The evidence in this respect adduced by the prosecution in the present case is not only of a frail nature, it is lacking in probability and does not inspire confidence.” 25. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1997 (8) SCC 158 , in the case of “Pakkirisamy vs. State of T.N.”, have held that it is a rule of caution that the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon an extrajudicial confession. Their Lordships have held as under:- “8. Mr Murlidhar, learned counsel then contended that it is well settled that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence and ordinarily the court would be slow to accept such type of evidence. He therefore, urged that Ex. P-8 be left out of consideration. We are unable to accept this broad proposition put forth on behalf of the appellant. It is well settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession. It is no doubt true that extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and it is for this reason that a duty is cast upon the court to look for corroboration from other reliable evidence on record. Such evidence requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. If such an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, needless to state that its credibility becomes doubtful and consequently it loses its importance. The same principle has been enunciated by this Court in Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the courts below committed no error in relying upon Ex. P-8 as the same is corroborated from several other proved circumstances.” 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2009 (8) SCC 383 , in the case of “State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Swarnalatha & others”, have held that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, although in given situations reliance can be placed thereupon. Their Lordships have held as under: - “16. PW 6 admitted that prior to the making of confession to him, Accused 1 never talked to him.
Their Lordships have held as under: - “16. PW 6 admitted that prior to the making of confession to him, Accused 1 never talked to him. Why she, instead of her husband, would confide in PW 6, is beyond all comprehension. In the aforementioned situation, the extra-judicial confession purported to have been made by Accused 1 to PW 6 becomes doubtful. Extra-judicial confession as is well known is a weak piece of evidence, although in given situations reliance thereupon can be placed. (See State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, SCC p. 517, para 15 and State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, SCC p. 262, para 14.)” 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2012 (6) SCC 403 , in the case of “Sahadevan & another vs. State of Tamil Nadu”, have held that in case of circumstantial evidence, onus lies upon prosecution to prove complete chain of events which must undoubtedly point towards guilt of accused. When prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. Their Lordships have held as under: - “13. There is no doubt that in the present case there is no eye-witness. It is a case based upon circumstantial evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. Furthermore, in case of circumstantial evidence, where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. 28. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2012 (6) SCC 403 , in the case of “Sahadevan & another vs. State of Tamil Nadu”, have held if extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent, it may be difficult for court to base a conviction on such a confession. Their Lordships have held as under: - “14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
Their Lordships have held as under: - “14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. 15. Now, we may examine some judgments of this Court dealing with this aspect. 15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab2 this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10) “10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance.” 15.2. In Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N. the Court held that: (SCC p. 162, para 8) “8. … It is well settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession.” 15.3. Again in Kavita v. State of T.N. the Court stated the dictum that: (SCC p. 109, para 4) “4. There is no doubt that convictions can be based on extra-judicial confession but it is well settled that in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. It is to be proved just like any other fact and the value thereof depends upon the veracity of the [witnesses] to whom it is made.” 15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram stated the principle that: (SCC p. 192, para 19) “19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact.
An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made.” The Court further expressed the view that: (SCC p. 192, para 19) “19. … Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused.…” 15.5. In Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B. the Court, while holding the placing of reliance on extra-judicial confession by the lower courts in absence of other corroborating material as unjustified, observed: (SCC pp. 265-66, paras 87 & 89) “87. Confession ordinarily is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted upon. Confession may under certain circumstances and subject to law laid down by the superior judiciary from time to time form the basis for conviction. It is, however, trite that for the said purpose the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the confession; and (iii) corroboration. *** 89. A detailed confession which would otherwise be within the special knowledge of the accused may itself be not sufficient to raise a presumption that confession is a truthful one. Main features of a confession are required to be verified. If it is not done, no conviction can be based only on the sole basis thereof.” 15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, the Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan held that: (SCC p. 611, paras 29-30) “29. There is no absolute rule that an extrajudicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 and 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd.
[Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 and 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.] 30. In the present case, the extra-judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 15.7. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra-judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat held as under: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 53) “53. It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. When an extrajudicial confession is retracted by an accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must invariably accept the retraction. But at the same time it is unsafe for the court to rely on the retracted confession, unless the court on a consideration of the entire evidence comes to a definite conclusion that the retracted confession is true.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extrajudicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. (Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. and Pancho v. State of Haryana.) The principles 16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused: (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself.
These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused: (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law. 29. According to PW10 Dr. Chandra Shekhar, the fracture of skull was caused by blow of laathi. The police has not recovered any laathi from the appellants. 30. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 03.04.2012 and 04.04.2012 is set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges framed against them. The appellants are on bail. They need not to surrender. Their bail bonds and sureties are discharged. 31. Let a copy of this judgment along with LCR be sent to the trial court.