JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicants have prayed for the following reliefs: "6(A) That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing to quash and set aside the direction of directing Ghogha Road Police Station to investigate the complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein U/s. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. 1973 which came to be registered as Cr. Reg. No. M-1 of 2016 at Ghogha Road Police Station, pursuant to the order dated 01-08-2016 passed by Ld. 8th Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar in complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein which came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2016 for the offences punishable U/s. 193, 467 r/w 114 & 34 of IPC & also quash and set aside the order of Ld. 6th Additional Session Judge Bhavnagar passed in Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016 confirming the order dated 01-08-2016 passed by the Ld. Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar & further be pleased to direct the withdrawal of the complaint filed by opponent No. 2 herein which came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2016 before Ld. 8th Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar. (B) That during the pendency of the present petition, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the directing of directing Ghogha Road Police Station to investigate the complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein U/s. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. 1973 which came to be registered as Cr. Reg. No. M-1 of 2016 at Ghogha Road Police Station which came to be passed pursuant to the order dated 01-08-2016 passed by Ld. 8th Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar in complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein which came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2016 for the offences punishable U/s. 193, 467 r/w 114 & 34 of IPC. (C) That during the pendency of the present petition, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to restrain the Investigating Officer of Ghogha Police Station from submitting the charge sheet in connection with Cr. Reg. No. M-1 of 2016 at Ghogha Road Police Station which came to be passed pursuant to the order dated 01-08-2016 passed by Ld. 8th Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar in complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein which came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2016. Reg. No. M-1 of 2016 at Ghogha Road Police Station which came to be passed pursuant to the order dated 01-08-2016 passed by Ld. 8th Addl. CJM, Bhavnagar in complaint lodged by opponent No. 2 herein which came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2016. (D) That any just and proper order may be passed." 2. The following dates and events would give a fair idea as regards the factual background of this case: 2.1 On 18th January 1977, the Manilal Ranchoddas Jinabhai Charitable Trust got registered at Bhavnagar bearing the Registration No. E/398 as per the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. 2.2 On 18th January 1977 i.e. at the time of registration, the following were Trustees: "(1) Navinchandra Purshottam Dholakia (2) Devendra Purshottam Dholakia (3) Niranjan Ramniklal Dholakia (4) Chandrakant Jayantilal Parikh." 2.3 On 12th November 1990, vide the change entry No. 677/89, the name of (1) Chandrakant Jayantilal Parikh came to be deleted and the name of (1) Paragbhai Navinchandra Dholakia and (2) Jayesh Niranjanbhai Dholakia came to be added in the Trust as Trustees. 2.4 On 29th November 2000, vide the change entry No. 107/2000, the name of (1) Niranjan Ramnikbhai Dholakia came to be deleted and the name of (1) Deepak Ramniklal Dholakia came to be added. 2.5 On 1st August 2011, an agenda was circulated among the trustees for the deletion of the name of few Trustee and addition of new Trustee. 2.6 On 11th August 2011, the resolution came to be passed by the Trustees of the Trust, whereby the name of (1) Paragbhai Navinchadnrabhai Dholakia, (2) Devendrabhai Purshottambhai Dholakia, (3) Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia came to be deleted, and the name of (1) Falguniben Jayeshbhai Dholakia, (2) Nishant Jayeshbhai Dholakia came to be added in the said Trust. 2.7 On 28th August 2011, Navinchandra Purshottamdas Dholakia passed away. 2.8 On 19th September 2011, the change application in the name of Navinchandra Purshottamdas Dholakia along with the Vakalatnama of Navinchandra Dholakia, agenda, resolution, resignation letter and affidavits of different persons came to be submitted by a lawyer viz. Hiren R. Dhanghdhriya before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar, which came to be registered as the Change Entry No. 289 of 2011. Hiren R. Dhanghdhriya before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar, which came to be registered as the Change Entry No. 289 of 2011. 2.9 On 16th April 2012, the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar passed an order allowing the change entry No. 287 of 2011, whereby the names of (1) Paragbhai Navinchandrabhai Dholakia, (2) Devendrabhai Purshottambhai Dholakia, (3) Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia came to be deleted and the name of (1) Falguniben Jayeshbhai Dholakia, (2) Nishant Jayeshbhai Dholakia came to be added in the said Trust. 2.10 On 21st March 2013, a change application came to be submitted by Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar for taking on record the immovable property of the Trust. 2.11 On 4th April 2013, an application came to be submitted before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner to take the hearing of the Change Entry No. 103 of 2013 at the earliest, whereby a letter was issued to the concerned Trustee intimating further hearing on 17th April 2013. 2.12 On 17th April 2013, Nishant Dholakia, Falguni Dholakia and Jayesh Dholakia submitted their reply about the change entry No. 103 of 2013. 2.13 On 6th May 2013, an application for recalling the order passed in the Change Entry No. 287 of 2011 came to be submitted by (1) Devendrabhai Purshottambhai Dholakia (2) Paragbhai Navinchandra Dholakia and (3) Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia before the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner on the ground that the documents relied upon for the Change Entry No. 287 of 2011 were fraudulent and forged. The said application came to be registered as the Change Entry No. 165 of 2013. 2.14 On 10th May 2013, Deepak Ramniklal Dholakia submitted a list along with documents indicating the details of the immovable property standing in the name of the Trust. 2.15 On 3rd June 2013, a reply came to be submitted opposing the Change Application No. 165 of 2013 by (1) Jayeshbhai Dholakia (2) Falguni Jayeshbhai Dholakia and (3) Nishant Jayeshbhai Dholakia before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. 2.16 On 12th June 2013, a rejoinder affidavit came to be submitted by (1) Paragbhai Navinchandra Dholakia and (2) Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia opposing the reply filed by Jayeshbhai Dholakia and others. 2.17 On 13th July 2013, the written arguments was submitted by Jayeshbhai Dholakia and others. 2.16 On 12th June 2013, a rejoinder affidavit came to be submitted by (1) Paragbhai Navinchandra Dholakia and (2) Deepakbhai Ramnikbhai Dholakia opposing the reply filed by Jayeshbhai Dholakia and others. 2.17 On 13th July 2013, the written arguments was submitted by Jayeshbhai Dholakia and others. 2.18 On 20th July 2013, an order came to be passed by the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner Court allowing the Change Entry No. 103 of 2013. A further order came to be passed directing the Superintendent to lodge a complaint against those persons who created forged documents for the purpose of using it in the Court proceedings. 2.19 On 7th September 2013, Jayeshbhai Dholakia and others preferred the appeal No. 54 of 2013 before the learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Rajkot against the order of the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar passed in the Change Entry No. 165 of 2013. 2.20 On 29th November 2014, the appeal No. 54 of 2013 came to be dismissed by the order of the learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Saurashtra and Kutch Division, Rajkot and thereby, affirmed the order passed by the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar in the Change Entry No. 165 of 2013. 2.21 On 15th January 2015, Jayesh Dholakia and others preferred an appeal No. 1 of 2015 before the learned Principal and District Judge, Bhavnagar under Section 341 of the Cr.P.C. against the order of the learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Rajkot passed in the appeal No. 54 of 2013. 2.22 On 21st January 2016, the learned 3rd Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal No. 1 of 2015 and affirmed the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Rajkot passed in the appeal No. 54 of 2013 as well as the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar passed in the Change Entry No. 165 of 2013. 2.23 On 1st August 2016, Ramanbhai Naranbhai Gamethi, the Superintendent, Public Trust Officer, Bhavnagar filed a criminal complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhavnagar for the offence punishable under Sections 193 and 467 read with 114 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against Jayesh Dholakia and others. 2.24 On 1st August 2016, the learned 8th Additional CJM, Bhavnagar on receipt of the said complaint passed an order for police investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., 1973, and accordingly, directed the Police Inspector of the Ghogha Road Police Station to investigate the complaint and submit an appropriate report. 2.24 On 1st August 2016, the learned 8th Additional CJM, Bhavnagar on receipt of the said complaint passed an order for police investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., 1973, and accordingly, directed the Police Inspector of the Ghogha Road Police Station to investigate the complaint and submit an appropriate report. 2.25 On 5th August 2016, the said written complaint came to be registered at the Ghogha Road Police Station as Cr. Reg. No. M-1 of 2016 for the offence punishable under Sections 193, 467 read with 114 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.26 The applicants Jayesh Dholakia and others having learnt about such F.I.R. being filed immediately, prayed for anticipatory bail before the learned Sessions Judge of Bhavnagar and the same came to be registered as the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 583 of 2016. 2.27 On 19th August 2016, the Investigating Officer of Ghogha Road Police Station submitted an affidavit opposing the anticipatory bail application filed by the petitioners Jayesh Dholakia and others, wherein it was indicated that a report had been submitted by the Investigating Officer before the concerned Magistrate for having subsequently added offences punishable under Sections 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 406, 465, 468 and 471 in respect to the said F.I.R. 2.28 On 22nd August 2016, the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar rejected the application of the applicants Nos. 1 and 2 and allowed the anticipatory bail application of the co-accused Fulguniben Dholakia on certain terms and conditions. 2.29 On 3rd September 2016, the applicants Nos. 1 and 2 herein preferred the anticipatory bail application before this Court. 2.30 After condoning the delay in filing the appeal, the learned Sessions Judge ordered to register the appeal, which came to be registered as the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016. 2.31 On 7th October 2016, the respondent No. 3 herein submitted written objections opposing the said appeal. 2.32 On 10th October 2016, an application by the concerned party namely Deepak Dholakia came to be submitted before the Sessions Court for being joined as a party in the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016. 2.33 On 26th December 2016, this Court granted anticipatory bail to both the applicants herein. 2.34 On 30th January 2016, the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016 preferred by the applicants herein. 3. 2.33 On 26th December 2016, this Court granted anticipatory bail to both the applicants herein. 2.34 On 30th January 2016, the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016 preferred by the applicants herein. 3. Being dissatisfied with the action of the respondent No. 2 in lodging the complaint for the offence punishable under Sections 193 read with 114 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the 8th Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar and the 8th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar passing an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. culminating in the M. Case No. 1 of 2016 at the Ghogha Road Police Station, Bhavnagar, and also the order passed by the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar in the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016, the applicants have come up with this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 4. Mr. Saurin Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicants, in the memo of the petition, has raised the following two questions of law: "(A) Is the procedure as prescribed under Section 340 of Cr.P.C., 1973 before filing complaint by the concerned Court for offences mentioned in Section 193 of Cr.P.C., 1973 duly complied with? (B) Once the complaint is filed by concerned Court before concerned Magistrate as per Section 340 of Cr.P.C., 1973, is it permissible for the concerned Magistrate to pass an order under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., 1973 or not? More particularly, keeping in mind the procedure laid down in Section 343 of Cr.P.C., 1973." 5. Mr. Shah submits that the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar dated 20th July 2013 directing the Superintendent to file a complaint is quite contrary to the settled position of law and deserves to be quashed. He submits that for the purpose of filing a complaint by the Court against any person for forgery, the Court has to form an opinion that the person concerned intentionally fabricated false evidence and must also form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such person should be prosecuted for the offence committed by him. He submits that in the absence of any such satisfaction being recorded in the impugned order, the filing of the complaint by the Superintendent would be bad. 6. Mr. He submits that in the absence of any such satisfaction being recorded in the impugned order, the filing of the complaint by the Superintendent would be bad. 6. Mr. Shah submits that assuming for the moment that such satisfaction is recorded by the Court concerned and pursuant to the direction, a complaint is lodged in the Court of the learned Magistrate, then, in such circumstances, the Magistrate has no power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The only option with the learned Magistrate would be to take cognizance upon the complaint and proceed further in accordance with law by issuing process. He submits that the complaint being lodged by the public servant, even verification of the complainant, would not be necessary. 7. In support of his submissions, Mr. Shah has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: "(1) Amarsang Nathaji as himself and as Karta and Manager v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and others [Civil Appeal No. 11120 of 2016 decided on 23rd November 2016] (2) B.K. Gupta v. Damodar H. Bajaj, (2001) 9 SCC 742 " 8. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Shah prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the reliefs prayed for in this application be granted. 9. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. I.H. Syed, the learned counsel appearing for the original applicant i.e. the person at whose instance the proceedings were initiated before the Charity Commissioner. Mr. Syed submits that the order dated 20th July 2013 passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar, with which fault is being found and severely criticized, was carried in appeal before the District Court at Bhavnagar by filing the Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015. The 3rd Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar, vide order dated 21st January 2016, dismissed the appeal, and thereby affirmed the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner dated 20th July 2013. Since the order passed in appeal had attained finality and the same having not been challenged, it is not open for the applicants herein to criticize or find fault with the first order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner directing the Superintendent to lodge the complaint for the offence of forgery against the applicants herein. 10. Mr. Since the order passed in appeal had attained finality and the same having not been challenged, it is not open for the applicants herein to criticize or find fault with the first order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner directing the Superintendent to lodge the complaint for the offence of forgery against the applicants herein. 10. Mr. Syed further very fairly submitted that once a complaint is lodged by a public servant on behalf of the Court, then it is not open for the Court concerned to order police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate is duty bound to take cognizance and issue process for the alleged offence. 11. Mr. Syed submits that in the order dated 20th July 2013, the Assistant Charity Commissioner, in so many words, has observed that the applicants herein are prima facie guilty of adducing false evidence and should be proceeded for the offence of forgery. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Syed, the necessary satisfaction could be said to have been recorded for the purpose of institution of the prosecution against the applicants. He, therefore, prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicants herein are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this application. 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, I must look into the few provisions of law relevant for the purpose of deciding this matter. 14. 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, I must look into the few provisions of law relevant for the purpose of deciding this matter. 14. The classification of offence under the First Schedule stands as under:- CHAPTER XI FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCE AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE Section Offence Punishment Cognizable or non-cognizable Bailable or non-bailable By what Court triable 193 Giving or fabricating false evidence in judicial proceeding Imprisonment for 6 years and fine Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of First Class Giving or fabricating false evidence in any other case Imprisonment for 3 years and fine Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate CHAPTER XVIII OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO PROPERTY MARKS Section Offence Punishment Cognizable or non-cognizable Bailable or non-bailable By what Court triable 467 Forgery of a valuable security, will or authority valuable security or to receive any money etc Imprisonment for life or for 10 years and fine Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of First Class When the valuable security is a promissory note of the Central Government Imprisonment for 7 years and fine Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of First Class 15. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "195. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servant, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence (1) No Court shall take cognizance-(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), a [except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.] (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that- (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed." 16. Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195 (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; [(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.]. (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195." 17. Section 341 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "341. Appeal (1) Any person on whose application any Court other than a High Court has refused to make a complaint under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 340, or against whom such a complaint has been made by such Court, may appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195, and the superior Court may thereupon, after notice to the parties concerned, direct the withdrawal of the complaint, or, as the case may be, making of the complaint which such former Court might have made under section 340, and if it makes such complaint, the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly. (2) An order under this section, and subject to any such order, an order under section 340, shall be final, and shall not be subject to revision." 18. Section 343 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "343. Procedure of Magistrate taking cognizance (1) A Magistrate to whom a complaint is made under section 340 or section 341 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XV, proceed, as far as may be, to deal with the case as if it were instituted on a police report. Section 343 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "343. Procedure of Magistrate taking cognizance (1) A Magistrate to whom a complaint is made under section 340 or section 341 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XV, proceed, as far as may be, to deal with the case as if it were instituted on a police report. (2) Where it is brought to the notice of such Magistrate, or of any other Magistrate to whom the case may have been transferred, that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen, he may, if he thinks fit, at any stage, adjourn the hearing of the case until such appeal is decided." 19. Section 343 referred to above has its own importance so far as the case at hand is concerned. Clause (1) of Section 343 of the Cr. P.C. consists of two parts. In the first part, the application of Chapter - XV of the Cr.P.C. has been prohibited in a complaint filed by a public servant or by a Court, and in the second part, it has been provided that as far as may be, the case has to be dealt with as if it were instituted on a police report. There is a reason for this because the complaint is not filed by the public servant or by a Court without making previous inquiry and it is largely based on documentary evidence, and therefore, it is not necessary to follow the detailed procedure prescribed for dealing with a case instituted on a complaint filed by a private citizen. In fact, a very detailed procedure has been prescribed to deal with the cases instituted on private complaint so that the unscrupulous persons are not able to harass the good citizens. I consider it appropriate to even refer to the objects and reasons as contained in the 41st Report of the Law Commission as regards Section 343. I may quote the observations of the Law Commission: "35.3. Under S. 476(2), the Court to which a complaint is made under S. 476 shall proceed "as if upon complaint under S. 200". I consider it appropriate to even refer to the objects and reasons as contained in the 41st Report of the Law Commission as regards Section 343. I may quote the observations of the Law Commission: "35.3. Under S. 476(2), the Court to which a complaint is made under S. 476 shall proceed "as if upon complaint under S. 200". It was suggested during our discussions that since a complaint is made under Sec. 476 by a responsible judicial officer (and after inquiry in most cases), the Court to which the complaint is made need not and should not hold another inquiry under Chap. 16 but should issue process under S. 204. It was urged that when a superior Court had made a complaint, it was inappropriate that a Magistrate should again hold an inquiry or dismiss it under S. 203. We, however, felt that there was no justification for totally dispensing with an inquiry under Sec. 202. The Court making the complaint under Section 476 may not have made a thorough inquiry, and the Court taking the cognizance of the offence under S. 195 might like to have more materials before issuing process. The nature of the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Magistrate under Ss. 202 and 203 is not always similar to the nature of proceedings held by the complaining Court under S. 476. For instance, under S. 202, further "investigation" may be ordered, whereas an "inquiry" under S. 476 is of a limited nature. It would not be correct to assume that one will serve the purpose of the other in every case." 20. Similarly, the observations in para 35.13 are of some importance, though made in the context of Section 479A inserted in the Code 1955: "35.13. Moreover, action under the Section cannot be taken after judgment is pronounced. Where a complaint "can be" made under the Section, action cannot be taken under S. 476, so that if the court, by reason of forgetfulness or insufficient material does not make a complaint on the termination of the proceedings, action cannot be subsequently taken under S. 476, and the offender escapes unpunished a result hardly intended by the legislature. This is positive harm done by this Section." 21. It is to be noted that under Section 340, the Court contemplated therein is only to make complaint. This is positive harm done by this Section." 21. It is to be noted that under Section 340, the Court contemplated therein is only to make complaint. It is significant to note that reference to complaint has not undergone any change, notwithstanding the comprehensive amendment of 1976. 'Complaint', by its very definition, has a clear connotation. The definition is as follows:- "2(d) "Complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some, person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report." (Emphasis supplied) The continued retention of the word '"complaint" in Section 340(b) and the amplification thereafter contained in Section 340(3) that the complaint under that Section shall be signed by an officer of the High Court when the complaint is by the High Court and the Presiding Officer in other case, continues the basic characteristic of the proceedings. The complaint does not get transmuted to a police report ipso facto. Section 343 is not cast in inflexible language. It gives the Magistrate to whom a complaint is made, option in given cases to proceed with the case as if it were instituted on a police report. There are exceptions envisaged in the very Section, by the employment of the term "as far as may be". It need not, therefore, invariably, be a case of proceedings as instituted on a police report. Another course is also permissible. In other words, where the background of the complaint is one where materials are uncomplicated and not confusing, and had been gathered sufficiently and satisfactorily both in regard to quality and quantum, the Magistrate could, straightway, proceed as if in a case instituted on a police report. The Court is equipped with the necessary materials which have to be furnished to the accused for preparing his defence. Nothing more is needed for commencement and completion of the trial. 22. It may, however, happen that in a given case, due to the absence of such an enquiry by the complaining Court or by reason of its not being exhaustive or adequately detailed, appropriate procedure as in proceedings instituted on a complaint could be found fair and necessary. The wording of Section 343 permits the Magistrate to adopt the complaint procedure in such a situation. The wording of Section 343 permits the Magistrate to adopt the complaint procedure in such a situation. "Whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (for short, "the Act") is a "Court" for the purposes of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C." 23. Section 195(3) of the Cr.P.C. clarifies that in clause (b) of subsection (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. 24. In Bharat Bank Ltd. New Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and another, AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459 , while dealing with the question, whether industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was a Court for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court. 25. In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 : (1955) 2 SCR 955 : 1956 CrLJ 156 , considering the question whether a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act 1952, reference was made to the decision in Bharat Bank's case (supra) and various other decisions and it was held by the Supreme Court that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment, which has the finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. 26. In Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 : (1955) 2 SCR 1013 : 1956 CrLJ 326 , it was laid down by the Supreme Court that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide the disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. 27. The aforesaid decisions were cited with approval in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another, AIR 1967 SC 1494 : (1967) 3 SCR 163 : 1967 CrLJ 1380 , where the question was whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, an authority under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 could be regarded as a Court for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, it was held that to determine whether a statutory authority was functioning as a court, the provisions of the concerned statute have to be looked into. After examining the provisions of the Act and the powers, duties and functions of the Assistant Registrar thereunder, the Supreme Court held that the Assistant Registrar performed judicial functions. The Assistant Registrar was regarded as a Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. 28. The Bombay Public Trust Act is intended to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of public and charitable trusts in the State. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the registration of public trust after due inquiry. An application for registration of a trust as a public trust is required to be made under Section 18 of the Act, Section 19 stipulates an inquiry for registration. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the registration of public trust after due inquiry. An application for registration of a trust as a public trust is required to be made under Section 18 of the Act, Section 19 stipulates an inquiry for registration. The inquiry shall be held on an application made by any person having interest in the public trust or on his own motion by the Assistant Charity Commissioner to ascertain: "(i) whether a trust exist and whether such trust is a public trust; (ii) whether any property is the property of such trust, (iii) whether the whole or any substantial portion of the subject-matter of the trust is situate within his jurisdiction, (iv) the names and addresses of the trustees and manager of such trust, (v) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee of such trust, (vi) the origin, nature and object of such trust, (vii) the amount of gross average annual income and expenditure of such trust; and (viii) any other particulars as may be prescribed under sub-section (5) of Section 18." 29. Under Section 73, in holding inquiries under the Act, the officer holding the same shall have the same powers as are vested in the Courts in respect of the following matters under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in trying a suit: "(a) proof of facts by affidavits, (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (c) ordering discovery and inspection, and compelling the production of documents, (d) issuing of commissions." 30. Section 74 provides that all inquiries and appeals under the Act shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 76 provides that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. 31. Sections 79 and 80 are of significant importance to determine the point in issue. Section 79 provides that any question, whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act. Section 79 provides that any question, whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act. The decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal, as the case may be, shall, unless set aside by the decision of the court on application or of the High Court in appeal be final and conclusive. Section 80 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It provides that save as expressly provided in the Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act, and in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive. 32. Chapter XI dealing with functions of Charity Commissioner, procedure, jurisdiction and appeals, provides for appeal against the finding or order of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to the Charity Commissioner under Section 70 in following cases: "(a) the finding and order, if any, under Section 20; (b) the findings under Section 22; (b-1) the findings under Section 22-A; (c) the findings under Section 28; (d) the order under sub-section (3) of Section 54;" 33. Under Section 72, any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner under various provisions mentioned therein or on the question whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust or whether any property is the property of such trust may, within sixty days from the date of the decision, apply to the Court to set aside the said decision. It also, inter alia, provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court, against the decision of the Court under sub-section (2) as if such decision was a decree from which an appeal ordinarily lies. The matters relating to the public trust in respect whereof the jurisdiction is conferred on the officers appointed under the Act, but for the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court, would be triable by the Civil Court as provided in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matters relating to the public trust in respect whereof the jurisdiction is conferred on the officers appointed under the Act, but for the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court, would be triable by the Civil Court as provided in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person to be appointed as a Deputy Charity Commissioner and or the Assistant Charity Commissioner, as provided in Section 5(2) of the Act, shall be either a judicial officer or a member of the bar. The officer is, therefore, required to have a legal background. 34. Under the scheme of the Act, the powers conferred on the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act clearly show that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has to be a judicial officer or an officer with a legal background, has to hear parties wherever dispute is raised with regard to existence of a public trust or with regard to a property being trust property or otherwise and then give a definitive judgment after taking evidence having regard to the facts of the case and by application of law. The judgment is final unless interfered with in appeal or thereafter tested in appeal before the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred in the matters inquired into and decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. 35. The aforesaid provisions make it clear that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has not only the trappings of a judicial tribunal but also has the power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The Assistant Charity Commissioner, therefore, possesses all the attributes of a court. The fact that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has also to perform some administrative functions is not of any relevance for coming to the conclusion that he is not a court, having regard to the provisions of the Act which substantially confer on him the power to give a definite judgment subject to finality in appeal, after hearing all concerned. Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary Civil Court has including power of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents, examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence induced and arguments submitted. Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary Civil Court has including power of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents, examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence induced and arguments submitted. [See : K. Shamrao and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2003) 3 SCC 563 ]. 36. In Amarsang Nathaji (supra), the Supreme Court has explained in details the provision of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. I may quote the observations as under: "5. It is the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that while passing the order, as extracted above, the High Court has not followed the procedure contemplated under Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C.. Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.-(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate." 6. There are two pre-conditions for initiating proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. - (i) materials produced before the court must make out a prima facie case for a complaint for the purpose of inquiry into an offence referred to in clause (b)(i) of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. and (ii) it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence. 7. 7. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "the IPC"); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred in Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C., having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. [See K.T.M.S. Mohd. And another v. Union of India, 1992 (3) SCC 178 ]. The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case. 8. In the process of formation of opinion by the court that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into, the requirement should only be to have a prima facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to have been committed. It is open to the court to hold a preliminary inquiry though it is not mandatory. In case, the court is otherwise in a position to form such an opinion, that it appears to the court that an offence as referred to under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. has been committed, the court may dispense with the preliminary inquiry. Even after forming an opinion as to the offence which appears to have been committed also, it is not mandatory that a complaint should be filed as a matter of course. [See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2002(1) SCC 253 ]. 9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005(4) SCC 370 , a Constitution Bench of this Court has gone into the scope of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.. Paragraph-23 deals with the relevant consideration: "23. [See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2002(1) SCC 253 ]. 9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005(4) SCC 370 , a Constitution Bench of this Court has gone into the scope of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.. Paragraph-23 deals with the relevant consideration: "23. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. ..." 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and having gone through the impugned order and also having regard to the subsequent development whereby the parties have decided to amicably settle some of the disputes, we are of the view that the matter needs fresh consideration. ..." 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and having gone through the impugned order and also having regard to the subsequent development whereby the parties have decided to amicably settle some of the disputes, we are of the view that the matter needs fresh consideration. We are also constrained to form such an opinion since it is fairly clear on a reading of the order that the court has not followed all the requirements under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. as settled by this Court in the decisions referred to above regarding the formation of the opinion on the expediency to initiate an inquiry into any offence punishable under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 of the IPC, when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceedings before the court. On forming such an opinion in respect of such an offence which appears to have been committed, the court has to take a further decision as to whether any complaint should be made or not. 11. No doubt, such an opinion can be formed even without conducting a preliminary inquiry, if the formation of opinion is otherwise possible. And even after forming the opinion also, the court has to take a decision as to whether it is required, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to file the complaint. Only if the decision is in the affirmative, the court needs to make a complaint in writing and the complaint thus made in writing is then to be sent to a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. 12. Under Section 343 of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate has to deal with the complaint referred to in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. as if it was instituted on a police report. Therefore, on the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C., all falling within the purview of warrant case, the Magistrate has to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases under Chapter XIX Part A comprising of Section 238 to 243 of the Cr.P.C.. It is only in view of such seriousness of the matter, Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. has provided for a meticulous procedure regarding initiation of the inquiry." 37. In B.K. Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "2. It is only in view of such seriousness of the matter, Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. has provided for a meticulous procedure regarding initiation of the inquiry." 37. In B.K. Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "2. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant urged that there is nothing on record to show that the High Court while making an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC applied its mind whether it was expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint be filed against the appellant. Under Section 340 Cr. PC, if the Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (i) of Section 195 Cr. PC in relation to any proceeding in that Court, the Court after such preliminary inquiry may direct for filing a complaint before the appropriate court against such person. 3. From the above, it follows that there are two conditions, on fulfillment of which a complaint can be filed against a person who has given a false affidavit or evidence in a proceeding before a court. The first condition being that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court and, secondly, in the opinion of the court it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him. It is no doubt true that the High Court has recorded a finding that the appellant has made a false statement on oath and has also used evidence known to be false and fabricated. On perusal of the record we do not find any material on record to show that there was any application of mind by the court that it was expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry and file a complaint against the appellant. We have also perused the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1442/1983 and the judgment does not show that the court applied its mind regarding the second condition as to whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry into the false evidence given by the appellant and a complaint is to be filed. We have also perused the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1442/1983 and the judgment does not show that the court applied its mind regarding the second condition as to whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry into the false evidence given by the appellant and a complaint is to be filed. In the absence of application of mind in regard to expediency for filing compliant against the appellant, the order passed by the High Court directing the Prothonotary and Senior Master of the High Court to file a complaint against the appellant was vitiated." 38. In K.T.M.S. Mohd. and another v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1831 , the Supreme Court observed in para 34 as under; "In this context, reference may be made to Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter XXVI under the heading "Provisions as to certain offences affecting the administration of justice". This section confers an inherent power on a Court to make a complaint in respect of an offence committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, or as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, if that Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 and authorises such Court to hold preliminary enquiry as it thinks necessary and then make a complaint thereof in writing after recording a finding to that effect as contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 340. The words "in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court" show that the Court which can take action under this section is only the Court operating within the definition of Section 195(3) before which or in relation to whose proceeding the offence has been committed. There is a word of caution inbuilt in that provision itself that the action to be taken should be expedient in the interest of justice. Therefore, it is incumbent that the power given by this Section 340 of the Code should be used with utmost care and after due consideration. There is a word of caution inbuilt in that provision itself that the action to be taken should be expedient in the interest of justice. Therefore, it is incumbent that the power given by this Section 340 of the Code should be used with utmost care and after due consideration. The scope of Section 340(1) which corresponds to Section 476(1) of the old Code was examined by this Court in K. Karunakaran v. T.V. Eachara Warrier, (1978) 1 SCC 18 : AIR 1978 SC 290 and in that decision, it has observed (paras 21 and 26 of AIR): "At an enquiry held by the Court under Section 340 (1), Cr.P.C., irrespective of the result of the main case, the only question is whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offence and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action...................... ........................... The two preconditions are that the materials produced before the High Court make out a prima facie case for a complaint and second that it is expedient in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution under Section 193, IPC."" 39. Thus, what is discernible from the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above is that Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. was introduced into the Code with the idea of eradicating to the extent possible the evil of perjury and fabrication of false evidence, a widespread evil corroding our judicial system. The then existing procedure in the matter of prosecuting those who gave false evidence or used fabricated evidence in the judicial proceedings was found to be tardy and ineffective. Therefore, the power was given both to the Trial Court as well as to the Appellate Court to forthwith complain against the witnesses guilty of perjury or fabricating false evidence without having recourse to the procedure laid down in Sections 340 to 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But, at the same time, the legislature felt that before proceeding against those persons, the Court must form an opinion that the witness has either given intentionally false evidence or has intentionally fabricated false evidence and further must form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that the witness or any other person should be prosecuted for the offence committed by him. 40. 40. Thus, what is mandatory is that the Judge of the authority concerned must give a finding that the witnesses or any other person has intentionally given false evidence in the proceeding before him or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purposes of being used in that proceedings and that for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that the witness or the person concerned should be prosecuted for the offence in question. 41. In the case at hand, I take notice of the fact that in the order dated 20th July 2013, there is no satisfaction recorded in so many words that it is expedient in the interests of justice that the applicants herein should be prosecuted for the offence committed by them. It is true that there is a finding recorded as regards the offence of forgery alleged to have been committed by the applicants herein, but, that by itself, is not sufficient. As stated above, the satisfaction, in so many words, should be reflected from the order itself. 42. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Syed that since the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner dated 20th July 2013 was challenged before the District Court and such challenge having failed and the order having attained finality, the applicants cannot find fault with the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. I may only say that if the initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent proceeding would not sanctify the same. 43. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Anata Saha and others, (2011) 5 SCC 142 . I may quote the observations made in paras 32 and 33: "32. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact-situation, the legal maxim "sublato fundamento cadit opus" is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. 33. In Badrinath v. Govt. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact-situation, the legal maxim "sublato fundamento cadit opus" is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. 33. In Badrinath v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3243 : 2000 AIR SCW 3745, this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders. (See also State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam and Anr., (2001) 10 SCC 191 ; and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3745 )." 44. It is very unfortunate to note that the learned Magistrate, before whom the complaint came to be lodged by the Superintendent at the instance of the Charity Commissioner, passed an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. This is something unheard of. I expect the learned Magistrate to at least know that when a complaint is filed by a Court of Law, the same cannot be sent for police investigation, but the learned Magistrate is duty bound to take cognizance of the same and proceed further in accordance with law. This aspect seems to have been overlooked even by the learned Sessions Judge in the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016. A judicial officer of the rank of the Sessions Judge has also exhibited complete ignorance of law in this regard. 45. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Singh v. the State of Pepsu (now Punjab), AIR 1959 SC 843 :- "Lastly it was urged that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was erroneous in that he did not hold an enquiry as required under Ss. 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, the former of which is expressly mentioned in sub-s. (2) of S. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, the former of which is expressly mentioned in sub-s. (2) of S. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. That contention is equally untenable because under S. 200 proviso (aa) it is not necessary for a Magistrate when a complaint is made by a Court to examine the complainant and neither S. 200 nor S. 202 requires a preliminary enquiry before the Magistrate can assume jurisdiction to issue process against the person complained against." 46. A learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Paras Ram v. State of Haryana and others, 1995 CrLJ 1603 had the occasion to consider almost an identical issue like the one at hand. I may quote the observations made by the Court in para 8 as under: "A perusal of the Section shows that when the Court thinks it expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195 and that offence appear to have been committed in relation to proceedings in that Court, the Court may after such preliminary enquiry, if any, make a complaint thereof in writing. On receipt of the application from respondent No. 2, the only course open to the Court was to make an enquiry into the offence alleged to have been committed and after bolding preliminary enquiry if it found that the offence had been committed to make a complaint thereof in writing to a Magistrate of first Class having jurisdiction. The application could not be sent to the police for registration of a case and investigation. The first information report in question has been registered in derogation of the provisions of S. 340, Cr.P.C. and is liable to be quashed on this ground." 47. I may also refer to and rely upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Sagar v. State of Kerala, 2006 CrLJ 1104 . The first information report in question has been registered in derogation of the provisions of S. 340, Cr.P.C. and is liable to be quashed on this ground." 47. I may also refer to and rely upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Sagar v. State of Kerala, 2006 CrLJ 1104 . I may quote the observations made by the learned Single as contained in para 7: "Any Court empowered under the Code of Criminal Procedure has got jurisdiction to make a complaint to the concerned Magistrate on entering a finding with regard to the commission of offences punishable under Section 195, Cr.P.C. it is the duty of the Court to record a prima facie finding that such persons against whom proceedings have been initiated have committed the offences punishable under Section 195, Cr.P.C. Once a finding has been entered by the Court with regard to commission of the offence, no second enquiry or investigation is necessary. In the case in hand, the learned Munsif had already entered a finding and hence the learned Magistrate ought to have proceeded with the complaint as if there is a police report instead of forwarding the same for investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. The procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate is, therefore, irregular and illegal. The registration of the crime itself is against the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 48. In the result, this application is allowed. The First Information Report registered as the M. Case No. 1 of 2016 at the Ghogha Road Police Station pursuant to the order passed by the 8th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar dated 1st August 2016 is hereby quashed. The order passed by the 6th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar in the Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2016 affirming the order dated 1st August 2016 is also hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted. 49. Liberty is reserved for the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar to initiate fresh proceedings against the applicants herein, if he deems fit in accordance with law. In the event, if the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Bhavnagar does not deem fit to initiate fresh proceedings on its own, it shall be open for the client of Mr. I.H. Syed, the learned counsel to take appropriate steps in accordance with law. Application Allowed.