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2017 DIGILAW 544 (ALL)

JAHUL HASAN @ JAHOOL v. REGIONAL MANAGER HIMANCHAL STATE ROAD TRANSPORT, RAMPUR

2017-02-15

PANKAJ MITHAL, SHASHI KANT

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri S.D. Ojha, learned counsel for the claimant-appellant and Sri Ram Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1-Himachal State Road Transport Corporation through its Regional Manager, Rampur Depot, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. 2. No one has appeared for the driver of the bus. 3. An accident took place on 9.3.2011. The bus HP-06-A-7509 of the Himachal State Road Transport Corporation fell in the khad, on account of which, the claimant received serious injuries. He applied for a claim. 4. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgment, order and award dated 28.11.2012, rejected the claim petition but awarded compensation under no fault liability. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, order and award passed by the Tribunal, the claimant-appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. The argument of Sri Ojha, learned counsel for the claimant-appellant, is that even if no negligence on the part of the driver is proved, the very fact that the push and pull rod of steering of the bus had broken, on account of which, the driver lost his control and the bus fell in the khad, is sufficient to hold negligence on the part of the owner entitling the claimant-appellant for compensation. 7. Sri Ram Singh, in response to the above argument, submits that there is no negligence in driving the bus. In the circumstances of the case as the claimant sustained injuries while travelling in the bus, he is only entitled the compensation, if any, under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 8. In Gian Chand and others v. Gurlabh Singh and others, 2016 (2) TAC 279, a similar question arose before the Supreme Court, wherein, belt of springs of the brakes were broken, resulting in an accident. 9. The Supreme Court held that it was a case of mechanical failure but such a failure is not enough to exonerate the Transport Undertaking from its liability to pay compensation when the accident has occurred. 10. The aforesaid decision on principal, except the liability of the transport undertaking to shoulder the burden to pay the compensation, once an accident had occurred with its bus, may be on account of mechanical failure and not due to any negligence of its driver. 11. 10. The aforesaid decision on principal, except the liability of the transport undertaking to shoulder the burden to pay the compensation, once an accident had occurred with its bus, may be on account of mechanical failure and not due to any negligence of its driver. 11. A similar question had arisen before another Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum and others v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2001 ACJ 428. In the said case, the accident took place due to bursting of the tyres of the jeep. 12. The Tribunal dismissed the claim petition and only awarded compensation under no fault liability as negligence on the part of the driver could not be established. The High Court upheld the decision but the Supreme Court took a different view and held that even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or the owner, a person who has suffered on account of accident, is entitled for compensation by applying the rule of strict liability as laid down in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861-73 All ER 1. 13. The principle, which emerges from the above two decisions that even if there may not negligence on the part of the driver of the bus but if any causality or injury is suffered by any person due to accident, the Corporation is responsible to compensate the victim. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has gone completely wrong in dismissing the claim petition by awarding the compensation under no fault liability and as such, the matter requires to be re-considered on merits for the purposes of determining the compensation, if any, payable in accordance with law. 15. Accordingly, impugned judgment and order dated 28.11.2012 is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded. 16. All appeals are allowed.