JUDGMENT : MIR DARA SHEKO, J. 1. The application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been directed against Order No. 13 dated March 8, 2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge, 12th Court at Alipore in Title Appeal No. 30 of 2015 rejecting the amendment application filed by the petitioner-appellant-defendant (hereinafter called on only the petitioner) under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 2. Heard Mr. Banerjee assisted by Mr. Mohiuddin representing the petitioner and Mr. Mondal appearing for the second opposite party, Mir Akhtar Ali. Perused the materials on record as well as the LCR as made available before this court. 3. Mr. Banerjee assailed the order impugned virtually on two grounds: firstly, due to change of lawyer before learned trial court proper steps could not be taken as against the order of rejection of the earlier amendment application filed by the petitioner; and secondly, since the suit premises appear to be governed under the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 and since thereby there is bar under section 21 of the Act putting embargo upon the civil court to adjudicate the suit of present nature and since at that relevant point of time no document was with the petitioner, he could not produce the same, and therefore the proposed amendment was filed before learned first appellate court to bring our the real controversy in issue, Mr. Banerjee criticized the order impugned that for the interest of justice and to bring out the real controversy in issue, learned appellate court ought to have allowed the amendment application, instead of rejecting it. Submitted that the order impugned is not also supported with proper reasons. 4. Mr. Banerjee in support of his contention relied on two Supreme Court decisions - viz. the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanswamy and Sons & Ors. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 (paras. 39, 43, 47 and 55); and the case of Gayathri Women's Welfare Association v. Gowramma & Anr. reported in (2011) 2 SCC 330 (paras. 34, 37 and 38). 5. Mr. Banerjee contended that even for bringing out the real controversy in issue any new plea is raised the same should not be turned down and the court should offer liberal approach in attending the amendment application in the interest of justice. 6. Mr. Mondal, per contra, relied upon two decisions - viz. 34, 37 and 38). 5. Mr. Banerjee contended that even for bringing out the real controversy in issue any new plea is raised the same should not be turned down and the court should offer liberal approach in attending the amendment application in the interest of justice. 6. Mr. Mondal, per contra, relied upon two decisions - viz. the case of Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey & Anr. v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. & Ors. reported in (2006) 12 SCC 1 ; and the case of The Metro Railway v. Phonographic Performance Limited reported in (2017) 2 WBLR (Cal) 617. Submitted that while on earlier occasion the amendment application on the self-same fact was rejected, at this stage the admission which was made by the petitioner in the pleadings that cannot be allowed to withdraw by any amendment application. Further submitted that learned trial court also dealt with the plea of thika tenancy in issue No. 1, and, against the decree the petitioner has preferred an appeal which is pending for decision before learned first appellate court. Therefore, according to him, in no circumstances the order impugned should be interfered with. 7. The LCR shows that though the petitioner participated to cross-examine the witnesses examined on the side of the opposite party (plaintiff), but on their own no witness was examined, meaning thereby, whatever would be available on record the lis would have to be decided on the basis of the same. 8. Now, the ratio of the decisions cited at the Bar undoubtedly have empowered the court to exercise the judicial discretion either to allow or reject the amendment application whatever and whenever it would be appropriate. In dealing with the respective cases the ratio of the decisions also have established the rule of precedent for the interest of justice, if there is requirement to allow the amendment application to bring out the real controversy in issue. 9. But in either of the cases as cited at the Bar there was no occasion where any earlier amendment petition bearing the self-same fact was rejected and there was no step taken by the aggrieved party against such order of rejection, and at subsequent stage a similar fact has been ventilated in the garb of amendment application that was rejected, and by intervention of the High Court or the Supreme Court such second application was allowed. Therefore, all the facts as available from the decisions cited are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. The order dated June 6, 2014 passed by learned trial court in dealing with the petitioner's earlier amendment application, inter alia, was as follows:- "It transpires from the record dept. that the defendant after appearing in this suit had filed one application u/s. 17(2) W.B.P.T Act, admitting himself as tenant of the suit premises under the plaintiff and the said petitioner was disposed on contest long back on 09.8.06 by order No. 79. The said order had not been challenged by the defendant and sat back with the order admitting himself to be a tenant." 11. Therefore, the law is set at rest that had there been any admission made in the proceedings by a party, the same would be binding on him to operate as an estoppel preventing him from its withdrawal on any subsequent stage. He may explain on such admissions, but is debarred from its withdrawal. The term "interest of justice" obviously is an abstract one, which cannot be one-sided. 12. Hence by getting the earlier amendment application rejected and there being no further step taken by the petitioner to assail the said order of rejection, a valuable right has been accrued in favour of the opposite party which cannot be brushed aside in allowing the second prayer of amendment on the self-same fact in some other language. 13. As pointed out by Mr. Mondal, learned trial court had also dealt with the plea of thika tenancy during dealing with the issue of maintainability of the suit, and it was negated, presumably, for want of any legal evidence favouring the plea. The judgment of the suit is now pending in first appellate court and learned appellate court is in seisin to deal with the appeal for its disposal in accordance with law dealing with both fact and law. 14. The judgment of the suit is now pending in first appellate court and learned appellate court is in seisin to deal with the appeal for its disposal in accordance with law dealing with both fact and law. 14. Thus, while the earlier amendment petition bearing the plea of being thika tenant was turned down by learned trial court on June 6, 2014 and while said order has been allowed by the petitioner to set at rest, and while said order also contains the finding about the admission of the petitioner who had contested the suit by giving his status as a tenant under the opposite party, the second application bearing the self-same fact in some other language, of course, shall operate as res judicata in the same proceeding. Though usually the question of res judicata is dealt with for consideration on final adjudication of a proceeding, but at every stage of the proceeding if any particular matter is ventilated and an order is passed deciding the same, and the aggrieved party does allow the same to remain at rest without assailing the same before the proper forum, then at any subsequent stage if the self-same matter is ventilated for incorporation in the pleadings or record for otherwise purpose the principle of res judicata also shall apply in the case of the same proceeding. Therefore, such second attempt for amendment is barred by the principle of res judicata, so far as that particular fact is concerned. 15. Therefore, learned first appellate court did not commit any illegality or perversity in rejecting the second amendment application pertaining to the selfsame fact and thika tenancy and there is no lapses in said decision-making process. Hence Order No. 13 dated March 8, 2016 passed by learned first appellate court in Title Appeal No. 30 of 2015 is upheld and the revisional application (CO No. 2381 of 2016) stands dismissed. 16. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 17. Stay order, if any, stands vacated. 18. Learned first appellate court is directed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law without being swayed by or influenced with any observations made by this court and all points are kept open for adjudication. 19. The department is directed to send down the LCR immediately to learned first appellate court, Alipore along with a copy of this order. 20. 19. The department is directed to send down the LCR immediately to learned first appellate court, Alipore along with a copy of this order. 20. Certified photostat copy of this order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties.