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2017 DIGILAW 546 (HP)

Madho Ram v. Durga Ram

2017-05-18

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2017
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. The plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendants for declaration and for permanent prohibitory injunction. The suit of the plaintiff stood decreed by the learned trial Court. In an appeal carried therefrom by the aggrieved defendants before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court allowed the appeal of the defendants whereupon it dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff/appellant standing aggrieved by the impugned rendition recorded by the learned First Appellate Court, hence, concerts to assail it, by preferring an appeal therefrom before this Court. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that one Sarwan alias Sarwan Dutt was joint owner in possession of land comprising in khata/khatoni No. 8/8, 10/10, 11/11, 12/12 to 15, situated in village Khaswin. Said Sarwan had executed a Will dated 16.01.1981, whereby, he had bequeathed ½ share of his property in favour of Madho Ram and Durga Dutt and remaining ½ share in favour of his widow Smt. Ajudhya Devi till her life time. On her death, her ½ share was to be reverted back to Madho Ram and Durga Dutt in equal share. It is further alleged that Smt. Ajudhya Devi was not absolute owner of the suit land and as such she was not competent to alienate the same by executing a Will. Said Smt. Ajudhya Devi had not executed any Will in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, out of defendants No. 1 to 3, in connivance with Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Ghumarwin, got a Will of Smt. Ajudhya Devi registered and thereafter mutation No. 208 of 17.03.1994 was illegally attested qua the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. In the month of May, 1994, the defendant had threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land. Thus, the plaintiff had sought a decree for possession that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 be declared owners in possession of the suit land and that the Will of Smt. Ajudhya Devi and mutation No. 208 of 17.03.1994, in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 be declared wrong and illegal with a consequential relief of permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering exceeding share of defendant No. 1 in the suit land and claiming share of Smt. Ajudhya Devi and in the alternative a decree for possession. 3. 2 and 3 be declared wrong and illegal with a consequential relief of permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering exceeding share of defendant No. 1 in the suit land and claiming share of Smt. Ajudhya Devi and in the alternative a decree for possession. 3. The defendants contested the suit and filed written statement, wherein, they have taken preliminary objections qua maintainability of the suit, cause of action, locus standi, estoppel, valuation of the suit and limitation. On merits, they had averred that Smt. Ajudhya Devi being widow of Sarwan was already having a pre-existing right to maintenance in the suit land and she was given the suit land by Sarwan in lieu of her maintenance and thus Smt. Ajudhya Devi was absolute owner of the suit land. It was further pleaded that Smt. Ajudhya Devi was competent to alienate the suit land in faovur of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Said Smt. Ajudhya Devi had executed a valid Will of 27.05.1992 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. On the basis of said Will of 27.05.1992, the defendants No. 2 and 3 had inherited the suit land and consequently mutation dated 17.03.1994 was legally attested in the names of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. In nutshell the defendants refuted the case of the plaintiff and they prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 4. The plaintiff/appellant herein filed replication to the written statement of the defendants/ respondents wherein, he denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and re-asserted the averments, made in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties in contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed? OPP 2. Whether in the alternative the plaintiff is entitled for possession? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit by his act and conduct? OPD 5. Whether Smt. Ajudhya was having pre-existing right of maintenance over the property of her father-in-law? OPD 6. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff/appellant herein. OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit by his act and conduct? OPD 5. Whether Smt. Ajudhya was having pre-existing right of maintenance over the property of her father-in-law? OPD 6. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff/appellant herein. In an appeal, preferred therefrom by the defendants/respondents before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court allowed the appeal and reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. Now the plaintiff/appellant herein, has instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court wherein he assails the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission on 17.03.2006, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted by the plaintiff/appellant against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the appellate Court erred in not appreciating the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? 2. Whether the first appellate Court erred in holding that Ajudhia Devi had pre-existing rights of maintenance? Substantial questions of Law No. 1 and 2. 8. Under a testamentary disposition executed by Sarwan, testamentary disposition whereof is comprised in Ex. P-1, he bequeathed a life time interest in his estate upon one Ajudhiya Devi. Consequently, Sarwan, the deceased testator hence made a restricted besides a limited grant upon his wife Smt. Ajudhiya Devi. Sarwan predeceased Ajudhiya. The aforesaid Ajudhiya under her testamentary disposition comprised in Ex.DW2/A, bequeathed her estate, which she derived from her predeceased husband, upon the defendants. The validity of the testamentary disposition made by Ajudhiya under Ext. DW2/A, whereunder she bequeathed her estate upon the defendants, is challenged by the plaintiff. The challenge made with respect to the aforesaid testamentary disposition executed by Ajudhiya, is anchored upon the factum, of, with hers under Ex.P-1 acquiring a limited/restricted grant with respect to the estate of her predeceased testator husband, she was hence, disempowered to during her life time, hence, execute Ex.DW2/A, whereunder she bequeathed her estate upon the defendants. Even though, formidable evidence has erupted in display of the propounders of Ex.DW2/A, hence, begetting satiation of the statutory parameters enshrined in Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. Even though, formidable evidence has erupted in display of the propounders of Ex.DW2/A, hence, begetting satiation of the statutory parameters enshrined in Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. Even though, thereupon, this Court would be constrained to conclude that the propounders of Ex.DW2/A proving the factum of it standing validly and duly executed, nonetheless, any conclusion qua cogent proof standing adduced with respect to Ex.DW2/A, hence standing proven to be duly and validly executed, would not hold any prevalence, in the light of this Court, hereinafter concluding that with Ajudhiya Devi, the executor of Ex.DW2/A, in making its execution “hers” given the conferment of a restricted or a limited grant upon her by her pre-deceased testator husband under the latter's testamentary disposition comprised in Ex.P-1, hence, being concomitantly, disabled to execute Ex.DW2/A. 9. Ex. P-1 stood executed on 16.1.1981, hence, the execution of Ex.P-1 occurred subsequent to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act (hereafter referred to as the Act). However, in making a determination, whether the apposite recitals occurring in Ex.P-1, with candid voicing's therein, of its testator constituting Ajudhiya Devi as his legatee, yet with a rider that she would hold only a life time interest or a restricted grant in the properties mentioned therein, hence, warrant attraction thereon, of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), entails this Court to make their interpretation, for hence applying them thereon. The relevant provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act read as under: “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property:- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” 10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff, has contended with vigour that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act along with its explanation holding no play also their relevant clout, upon the apposite recitals borne in Ex. P-1 standing wholly effaced, “by” a specific statutory provision borne in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, whereunder, there occurs a specific mandate, that any property obtained under a Will, with a categorical prescription therein, that its bestowment upon the apposite legatee, being restricted or limited during his/her life time, conspicuously also with its mandate hence prevailing upon the preceding sub-section thereto, given the opening words thereof “nothing contained therein in sub-section (1)” hence, also denuding the vigour of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. In aftermath, he contends that with the play of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section (14) along with its explanation, when stand statutorily excluded with respect to property received by a legatee under the relevant testamentary disposition, with a prescription therein that he or she holds thereon only a life time interest, hence for reiteration, he contends that the apposite recitals borne in Ex.P-1, whereunder the apposite grant as bestowed upon the legatee, is restricted to her life time, warranting vindication. He also contends that with the aforesaid restrictive grant, made upon the legatee, under Ex. P-1, acquiring statutory validation from the mandate occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, hence, Ajudhiya Devi, the legatee under Ex. P-1, was statutorily barred from making a testamentary disposition comprised in Ex. DW2/A. He hence contends that Ex.DW2/A is amenable to a construction, that it holds no legal binding force upon the rights of the plaintiffs in the suit property. In making the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in a case titled as Shivdev Kaur (dead) by LRs. In making the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in a case titled as Shivdev Kaur (dead) by LRs. and Others vs. R.S. Grewal, (2013) 4 SCC 636 , the relevant paragraphs whereof occurring at serial Nos. 10 to 16 stand extracted hereinafter:- “10. Section 14 of the Act 1956 reads as under: “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” (Emphasis added) The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for conversion of life interest into absolute title on commencement of the Act 1956, however, sub-section (2) carves out an exception to the same as it provides that such right would not be conferred where a property is acquired by a Hindu female by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument prescribing a restricted estate in that property. 11. In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru and Others, AIR 1971 SC 745 , a similar issue was considered by this Court and after examining the contents of the Will came to the conclusion that where a woman succeeded some property on the strength of a Will, she cannot claim any right in those properties over and above what was given to her under that Will. The life estate given to her under the Will would not become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act 1956 and, thus, such a Hindu female cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the Will executed in her favour. (See also: Navneet Lal vs. Gokul and Others, AIR 1976 SC 794 and Jagan Singh (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Dhanwanti and Another, (2012) 2 SCC 628 ). 12. (See also: Navneet Lal vs. Gokul and Others, AIR 1976 SC 794 and Jagan Singh (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Dhanwanti and Another, (2012) 2 SCC 628 ). 12. In Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and Others, AIR 2006 SC 3282 , this Court again considered the issue, held as under: “When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression “property possessed by a female Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance. (Emphasis added) 13. Shri Verma, learned counsel for the appellant placed a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Balwant Kaur and Another vs. Chanan Singh and Others, AIR 2000 SC 1908 , contending that a destitute Hindu daughter if acquires such a right, it would stand crystallised in absolute title. There is a complete fallacy in his argument. In the said case, this Court held that all the clauses of the Will must be read together to find out the intention of the testator. There is a complete fallacy in his argument. In the said case, this Court held that all the clauses of the Will must be read together to find out the intention of the testator. The court held: “........This is obviously on the principle that the last clause represents the latest intention of the testator. It is true that in the earlier part of the Will, the testator has stated that his daughter Balwant Kaur shall be the heir, owner and title-holder of his entire remaining moveable and immovable property but in the later part of the same Will he has clearly stated that on the death of Balwant Kaur, the brothers of the testator shall be the heirs of the property. This clearly shows that the recitals in the later part of the Will would operate and make Appellant 1 only a limited estate-holder in the property bequeathed to her......” (Emphasis added) 14. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a “life interest” through Will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the Act 1956 would become otios. Section 14(2) carves out an exception to rule provided in sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property has been acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift, giving her only a “life interest” it would remain the same even after commencement of the Act 1956 and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title. 15. Whether person is destitute or not, is a question of fact. The expression destitute has not been defined under the Act 1956 or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The dictionary meaning is “without resources, in want of necessaries.” A person can be held destitute when no one is to support him and is found wandering without any settled place of abode and without visible means of subsistence. The dictionary meaning is “without resources, in want of necessaries.” A person can be held destitute when no one is to support him and is found wandering without any settled place of abode and without visible means of subsistence. In the instant case, no factual foundation has ever been laid by the appellant before the courts below in this regard. In such a fact-situation, the issue does not require consideration. 16. All the courts have taken a consistent view rejecting the claim of the appellant of having acquired an absolute title. We do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. Appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.” 11. A reading of the aforesaid relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid citation, make a candid communication “of” sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, standing engrafted, as an exception to the principle embodied in sub-section (1) thereto, hence, its mandate “cannot” stand either undermined nor hence, the conferment of a restricted estate upon the apposite legatee being construable to hold no statutory vigour nor the restrictive grant made upon the relevant legatee, hence, facilitating any inference of it being overlookable nor as a corollary, the relevant restricted grant conferred upon the legatee, bolstering any inference that it is construable, under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, to be conferring an absolute dominion upon the legatee, with respect to the properties acquired by her under the relevant testamentary disposition. The aforesaid view propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivdev Kaur's case (supra) also finds reiteration in its another decision in a case titled as Ramji Gupta and Another vs. Gopi Krishan Agarwal (dead) and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 438 , the relevant paragraphs No. 13 and 14 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “13. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record. 14. In Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal, (2013) 4 SCC 636 this Court dealt with the issue of Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act and held: (SCC p. 641, para 14) “14. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record. 14. In Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal, (2013) 4 SCC 636 this Court dealt with the issue of Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act and held: (SCC p. 641, para 14) “14. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a life interest, through will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the 1956 Act, the said rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act, the provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the 1956 Act would become otiose. Section 14(2) carve out an exception to the rule provided in sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property has been acquired by a Hindu female by a will or gift, giving her only a life interest, it would remain the same even after commencement of the 1956 Act, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title.” (p. 443) 12. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment reported in a case titled as Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 75 has enunciated an akin view, the relevant paragraphs No. 5, 11 and 12 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “5. In case on hand, since the properties admittedly were the separate properties of Ralla Singh, all that Isher Kaur could claim dehors the will, is a right to maintenance and could possibly proceed against the property even in the hands of a transferee from her husband who had notice of her right to maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. No doubt, but for the devise, she would have obtained the property absolutely as an heir, being a Class I heir. But, since the devise has intervened, the question that arises has to be considered in the light of this position. (p. 83) 11. No doubt, but for the devise, she would have obtained the property absolutely as an heir, being a Class I heir. But, since the devise has intervened, the question that arises has to be considered in the light of this position. (p. 83) 11. On the wording of the section and in the context of these decisions, it is clear that the ratio in V. Tulasamma vs. V. Shesha Reddi (supra) has application only when a female Hindu is possessed of the property on the date of the Act under semblance of a right, whether it be a limited or a pre-existing right to maintenance in lieu of which she was put in possession of the property. The Tulasamma ratio cannot be applied ignoring the requirement of the female Hindu having to be in possession of the property either directly or constructively as on the date of the Act, though she may acquire a right to it even after the Act. The same is the position in Raghubar Singh vs. Gulab Singh (supra) wherein the testamentary succession was before the Act. The widow had obtained possession under a Will. A suit was filed challenging the Will. The suit was compromised. The compromise sought to restrict the right of the widow. This Court held that since the widow was in possession of the property on the date of the Act under the will as of right and since the compromise decree created no new or independent right in her, Section 14(2) of the Act had no application and Section 14(1) governed the case, her right to maintenance being a pre-existing right. In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru and Others, AIR 1971 SC 745 , the owner of the property executed a will in respect of a self-acquired property. The testamentary succession opened in favour of the wife in the year 1938. But it restricted her right. Thus, though she was in possession of the property on the date of the Act, this Court held that the life estate given to her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. This can only be on the premise that the widow had no preexisting right in the self-acquired property of her husband. Thus, though she was in possession of the property on the date of the Act, this Court held that the life estate given to her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. This can only be on the premise that the widow had no preexisting right in the self-acquired property of her husband. In a case where a Hindu female was in possession of the property as on the date of the coming into force of the Act, the same being bequeathed to her by her father under a will, this Court in Bhura and Others vs. Kashi Ram, (1994) 2 SCC 111 , after finding on a construction of the will that it only conferred a restricted right in the property in her, held that Section 14(2) of the Act was attracted and it was not a case in which by virtue of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, her right would get enlarged into an absolute estate. This again could only be on the basis that she had no pre-existing right in the property. In Sharad Subramanyan vs. Soumi Mazumdar and Others, JT 2006 (11) SC 535, this Court held that since the legatee under the will in that case, did not have a preexisting right in the property, she would not be entitled to rely on Section 14(1) of the Act to claim an absolute estate in the property bequeathed to her and her rights were controlled by the terms of the will and Section 14(2) of the Act. This Court in the said decision has made a survey of the earlier decisions including the one in Tulasamma. Thus, it is seen that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would come into play. What emerges according to us is that any acquisition of possession of property (not right) by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the Act, cannot normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act. It would depend on the nature of the right acquired by her. If she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely. It would depend on the nature of the right acquired by her. If she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely. If while getting possession of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction is placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view of Section 14(2) of the Act. 12. When a male Hindu dies possessed of property after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, his heirs as per the schedule, take it in terms of Section 8 of the Act. The heir or heirs take it absolutely. There is no question of any limited estate descending to the heir or heirs. Therefore, when a male Hindu dies after 17.6.1956 leaving his widow as his sole heir, she gets the property as class I heir and there is no limit to her estate or limitation on her title. In such circumstances, Section 14(1) of the Act would not apply on succession after the Act, or it has no scope for operation. Or, in other words, even without calling in aid Section 14(1) of the Act, she gets an absolute estate. (p. 85 & 86) 13. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents has contended that with the explanation accompanying sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, holding a contemplation that when a female Hindu possesses property, property whereof is acquired by her from husband either on or before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, hers in the manner aforesaid, holding the relevant properties does attract vis-a-vis the relevant properties, the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, wherein a contemplation occurs, that the aforesaid mode of holding of possession of property by a female Hindu being construable to be, hers holding it as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner, contemplation whereof also warranting attraction, with respect to the apposite recitals occurring in Ex. P-1. He proceeds to contend that the conferment of a limited grant, under Ex.P-1, by the deceased testator husband upon the legatee/his surviving spouse being per se construable to be in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, hence, the mandate sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act warranting attraction thereon. P-1. He proceeds to contend that the conferment of a limited grant, under Ex.P-1, by the deceased testator husband upon the legatee/his surviving spouse being per se construable to be in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, hence, the mandate sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act warranting attraction thereon. In making the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case titled as Vaddeoboyina Tulasamma and Others vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. AIR 1977 SC 1944 . However, the graphic gross distinctivity inter se the factual scenario prevalent in the afore referred citation vis-a-vis the factual matrix prevailing hereat does visibly surge forth, distinctivity whereof, is encapsulated in the eminent fact of the Hon'ble Apex Court in its verdict pronounced in the aforesaid case, standing seized with a compromise arrived at inter se the parties at lis therein, whereunder certain properties stood allotted to the aggrieved spouse, in lieu of maintenance also in respect thereto a limited interest stood created upon the aggrieved. Moreover, in the relevant compromise therein, it was envisaged that on demise of the aggrieved, the properties allotted to her being reverted to the legal heirs of her predeceased husband. Consequently, also in the aforesaid case, the relevant compromise occurred prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act also it is apparent on a close circumspect reading of the aforesaid decision, that Tulsma, who received the relevant properties under the relevant compromise, compromise whereof evidently occurred prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, had continued to retain the properties even after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Consequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court had concluded that the mandate of the explanation accompanying sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act standing attracted, significantly, when, it is contemplated therein that when any property, upto and after the commencement of the Act, is possessed by a female Hindu, property whereof is acquired by her before or after commencement of the Act, significantly, also when acquisition thereof, is evidently, in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, bringing forth hence a statutory conclusion of hers being construable to be its full owner and not its limited owner, dehors any restriction or fetters being imposed upon the relevant grant in sequel whereto she holds possession of the properties. However, contradistinctively in the instant case, the legatee under Ex.P-1, exhibit whereof comprises the testamentary disposition executed by the deceased testator “after” the coming into force of the “Act” whereunder he bestowed a restrictive besides a limited grant upon the apposite legatee, with respect to the property embodied therein. Hence, though a restrictive grant is made upon the legatee of Ex.P-1, or even if, the grant is limited to her life time hence it may be amenable to an inference that it is in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance. However, the aforesaid coinage occurring in the explanation accompanying sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, has its limited play only with respect to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Obviously, when the opening phrase of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, is couched in the coinage “nothing contained in sub-section (1)” thereupon with sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act “sapping” the vigour of the provisions of both sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act also of the explanation accompanying it, wherein a phrase “in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance” occurs, rather with the mandate of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act hence with explicitly, ousting the play of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, with respect to a restrictive grant made under a Will upon a Hindu widow also its mandating that the restrictive grant made upon an apposite legatee, enjoining imputation of reverence thereto. Imperatively hence even if a restrictive grant is conferred upon the legatee of Ex.P-1 also even if it may rear an inference, of it being construable to be in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, yet when as aforestated, with the aforesaid coinage occurring only in the explanation accompanying sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, play whereof is statutorily eroded by sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, thereupon the apposite recitals borne in Ex.P-1, whereunder a restrictive or life time estate is conferred upon the legatee constituted thereunder, warrants imputation of reverence thereto. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents also relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in a case titled as Smt. Palchuri Henumkayamma vs. Tadikamalla Kotlingam (D) by LRs and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3062 , hence, “seeks attraction” upon the apposite recitals borne on Ex.P-1, the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. However, with the pronouncement recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid decision standing recorded with respect to a “Will” executed “prior” to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, whereas the contentious Will borne in Ex.P-1 stands executed subsequent to the coming into force of the Act aforesaid, hence, the aforesaid visible fact, hence, brings to the fore, an apparent distinctivity inter se the facts of the case in hand vis-a-vis the factual matrix prevailing in the case relied by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants. Contrarily also when the contentious Will borne on Ex. P-1, is apparently executed after coming into force of the Act hence when as aforestated sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, stands concluded by this Court to be attracted vis-a-vis Ex.P-1, hence, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants, when, hence is distinguishable, it is of no avail to him for his carrying forward his submission that the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act along with its explanation, is hereat attracted. 15. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court is not based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court has excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. 15. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court is not based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court has excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. Consequenlty, both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the plaintiff/appellant and against the defendants/respondents. 16. In view of above discussion, the present Regular Second Appeal is allowed. In sequel, the judgment and decree rendered by the learned first Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 265/13 of 2004/2000 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree rendered by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. in case No. 40-1 of 1998/94 is maintained and affirmed. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs. Records be sent back.