JUDGMENT : 1. The defendants in Regular Civil Suit No. 148 of 2012 have filed the present Civil Revision Application as they are aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court rejecting the application moved by them under provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the Code”) for rejection of the plaint. 2. The facts relevant for adjudicating the challenges as raised, are that it is the case of the nonapplicant nos. 1 to 3/plaintiffs that they are predecessors of one Shri M. N. Deshpande and have received the property which is land admeasuring 7.44 HR in a family partition dated 8.6.1969. Said Shri Deshpande expired on 7.4.1980 leaving behind the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 5. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant no. 5 without having any right or absolute interest in the suit property, executed a sale deed of the same in favour of the defendant no. 2 on 14.5.1987. The plaintiffs got knowledge about the said transaction in December 2009 and February 2011 during the course of mutation proceedings. According to the plaintiffs, the said sale deed was void ab initio and it did not confer any valid title on the defendant no. 2. The transaction was also without obtaining the permission of the Competent Authority under the provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. On that basis, the plaintiffs on 3.10.2012 filed suit for declaration that they are the owners of the suit property and also for a decree for possession. An injunction was also sought seeking to restrain the defendants from changing the nature of the suit property. 3. The defendant nos. 1 to 4 filed their Written Statement and opposed the prayers, as made. Besides denying the claim of the plaintiffs, it was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendants thereafter filed an application below Exhibit 25 under provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. Rejection of the plaint was sought on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action and that from the statements made in the plaint, the suit was barred by the law of limitation. This application was opposed by the plaintiffs by filing reply. The trial Court by its order dated 15.2.2014 rejected the said application by holding that the suit was filed within limitation. This application was opposed by the plaintiffs by filing reply. The trial Court by its order dated 15.2.2014 rejected the said application by holding that the suit was filed within limitation. Being aggrieved, the defendants have challenged the said order. 4. Shri M. G. Bhangde, learned Senior Advocate for the applicants submitted that it was the case of the plaintiffs that the sale deed dated 14.5.1987 executed by defendant no. 5 in favour of defendant no. 2 was void ab initio. There was no prayer made by the plaintiffs for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed. The limitation for filing such suit for possession was governed by provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, the “said Act”) and the suit was required to be filed within a period of twelve years from the date when the possession of the defendants became adverse to that of the plaintiffs. According to him, the date of knowledge of the aforesaid sale transaction was not at all relevant for the purposes of applicability of Article 65 of the said Act. As it was the case of the plaintiffs themselves that the sale deed was void ab initio, there was no need to have the same set aside. The suit in question having been filed after a period of twelve years from said sale deed, it was clearly barred by limitation and the defendants had perfected their title. In that regard, the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance upon the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar reported in (2000) 3 SCC 460 ; Jivaji Keshav Bapat v. Venkatesh Krishna Byadgi reported in AIR 1940 Bombay 136; Dagadu Patil v. Trakadu Patil reported in AIR 1957 Bombay 79; Gangadhar Pandurang Puranik v. Dnyanoba Nivrutti Mundhe reported in 2010 (7) Mh. L. J. 477 and Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 . It was then submitted that according to the plaintiffs, defendant no. 2 was not an agriculturist and, therefore, the sale deed was hit by the provisions of Section 89 (1) (a) of the Maharashtra Tenancy Act, 1958. Such invalid sale would result in the property vesting in the State government. Even on this count, the plaintiffs lost their title and there was no cause of action to file the suit. 2 was not an agriculturist and, therefore, the sale deed was hit by the provisions of Section 89 (1) (a) of the Maharashtra Tenancy Act, 1958. Such invalid sale would result in the property vesting in the State government. Even on this count, the plaintiffs lost their title and there was no cause of action to file the suit. It was further submitted that under provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, only the plaint averments were required to be taken into consideration by accepting the case of the plaintiffs as correct. It was urged that as per the pleadings in the plaint, the sale deed dated 14.5.1987 was a void document and therefore there was no need whatsoever to have such void document set aside. In that regard, reliance was placed on the decision in Kanayalal Thakkar v. Shree Padmanabh Builders reported in 2011 (1) Mh.L.J 939 ; T. Arivanandanam v. T.V. Satyapal reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 ; N.V. Srinivasa Murthy v. Mariyamma reported in (2005) 5 SCC 548 and Manoharlal Chatrath v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 2000 Del 40 . It was, therefore, submitted that the plaint was liable to be rejected in the aforesaid facts. 5. Shri A.A. Naik, learned counsel for the original plaintiffs on the other hand supported the impugned order. According to him, as per the plaint averments, the plaintiffs got knowledge about the aforesaid sale deed on 30-12-2009 and the suit as filed for possession within a period of twelve years from said date was within limitation. It was submitted that as per the deed of management dated 26.3.1980, defendant no. 5 was to manage the suit property on behalf of the family members and hence his possession was permissive in nature. Unless such permissive possession was delivered back, the same would not be adverse. He referred to the provisions of Article 65 of the said Act and submitted that the expression “become adverse” would come into play on the plaintiffs' getting knowledge about the same. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Smt Neelawwa v. Smt Shivawwa reported in AIR 1989 Kar 45 and Raghubar Dayal Prasad v. Ramekbal Sah reported in AIR 1986 Pat 78 . In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Smt Neelawwa v. Smt Shivawwa reported in AIR 1989 Kar 45 and Raghubar Dayal Prasad v. Ramekbal Sah reported in AIR 1986 Pat 78 . It was then submitted that the plea with regard as to the maintainability of the suit with regard to the bar under Section 89 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was not raised before the trial Court and the same was being raised for the first time in these proceedings by amending the Civil Revision Application. According to him, as a larger relief of seeking possession after declaration of title had been prayed for there was no reason to seek a lesser relief with regard to setting aside the sale deed dated 14.5.1987. For said purpose, learned counsel referred to the provisions of Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code and sought to rely upon the decision in Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad & anr reported in (2002) 1 SCC 90 . It was thus submitted that the power under the provisions of Order VII, rule 11 of the Code being drastic in nature, the same could not be exercised in the present facts. Reference was made to the decision in P. V. Guru Raj Reddy and anr v. P. Neeradha Reddy & ors reported in 2015 (2) SCALE 337 in that regard. Ms Junghare, learned counsel appeared for nonapplicant nos. 4 (I) to 4 (iii). 6. Since the defendants seek rejection of the plaint under provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, the legal position in that regard as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede And Company reported in 2007 (5) Mh.L.J. 577 would be required to be taken into consideration. In the said decision, it has been held as under:- “It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not, must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint, if taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint, if taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense.” 7. In the plaint filed by the plaintiffs, it has been stated that the suit property was received by the predecessor of the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 5 by virtue of a family partition. The said property was entrusted to defendant no. 5 by virtue of a management deed. However, defendant no. 5 without having any right, sold the suit property to defendant no. 2 on 14.5.1987. In paragraph 3 of the plaint, it has been stated that in absence of any written consent from the plaintiffs and other legal heirs, the sale deed executed by the defendant no. 5 dated 14.5.1987 was void ab initio. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, it is averred that no title could be conferred on the basis of mutation entries in the Record of Rights and that the sale deed executed by defendant no. 5 representing himself to be the owner of the suit property be declared null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. It is on that basis that the plaintiffs have sought a declaration that they were the owners of the suit property and have prayed for a decree of possession of the suit property. 8. As per the law referred to hereinabove, the averments in the plaint as a whole would have to be taken into consideration and they have to be taken to be correct. The pleadings have to be construed as they stand without change of its grammatical sense and without being subjected to any addition or subtraction. 8. As per the law referred to hereinabove, the averments in the plaint as a whole would have to be taken into consideration and they have to be taken to be correct. The pleadings have to be construed as they stand without change of its grammatical sense and without being subjected to any addition or subtraction. Thus, the Court would have to proceed on the basis that the sale deed dated 14.5.1987 executed by defendant no. 5 in favour of defendant no. 2 was void ab initio and not binding on the plaintiffs, as averred. As per the application filed vide Exhibit 25, it is the case of defendant nos. 1 to 4 that the suit appeared from the statements in the plaint to be barred by the law of limitation. That clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code includes the ground of limitation has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. (supra). 9. As per Article 65 of the said Act, the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession based on title is twelve years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. On the aspect of possession of the defendant becoming adverse, the Privy Council in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli reported in AIR 1914 PC 27 has held that if possession is acquired by a person under an invalid title and he continues to remain in possession for more than the statutory period, his title becomes unassailable though the document of his title may be invalid. Relying upon this decision, learned Single Judge in Gangadhar Pandurang Puranik (supra) upheld the plea as to bar of limitation under Article 65 of the said Act. In Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay & ors reported in AIR 1951 SC 469 , it was held that the possession of a person not having a legal title but under an invalid grant would be adverse to the legal title of the owner. In Jivaji Keshav Bapat (supra), the Division Bench of this Court after referring to an earlier Full Bench decision in Bhaurao v. Rakhmin reported in (1899) 23 Bom 137 observed that when the vendee enters into possession, his possession becomes adverse to the coparcenery title or interest. In Jivaji Keshav Bapat (supra), the Division Bench of this Court after referring to an earlier Full Bench decision in Bhaurao v. Rakhmin reported in (1899) 23 Bom 137 observed that when the vendee enters into possession, his possession becomes adverse to the coparcenery title or interest. In Dagadu Dhondu Patil (supra), the Division Bench held that where an owner purports by an oral sale to transfer property and delivers possession, the possession of the transferee must be deemed to be adverse to the owner and suit for recovery of possession must be filed within twelve years from the date when possession was delivered. 10. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the possession of the defendants would become adverse on the execution of the sale deed on 14.5.1987 and the aspect of knowledge being obtained by the plaintiffs of such transaction would not come into play. The contention raised on behalf of the plaintiffs that the period of twelve years under Article 65 of the said Act would commence from 30.12.2009 on which date they got knowledge of the sale deed cannot be accepted. The period of limitation would commence from 14.5.1987 when the sale deed was executed in favour of defendant no. 2. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiffs also seek possession of the suit property fortifies the aforesaid position. 11. According to defendant nos. 1 to 4, the suit having been filed for possession on the basis of title, it was required to be filed within the limitation prescribed by Article 65 of the said Act. In Prem Singh and others (supra) it has been held that when a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as such document would be non est in the eye of law. Article 59 of the said Act would be applicable only with regard to a voidable transaction. In Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when possession has been taken by the defendant pursuant to a void document, Article 65 of the said Act would apply and the limitation to file the suit would be twelve years. Article 59 of the said Act would be applicable only with regard to a voidable transaction. In Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when possession has been taken by the defendant pursuant to a void document, Article 65 of the said Act would apply and the limitation to file the suit would be twelve years. It is further observed that when the document of title is null and void, a suit for possession simplicitor could be filed ignoring such document and in the course of such suit, it could be contended that such document was a nullity. In said case, the sale deed on the basis of an invalid order came to be executed on 23.8.1976 and the suit for possession on the basis of limitation prescribed by Article 65 of the said Act was held to be within limitation. Once it is found that the period of limitation under Article 65 of the said Act would commence from 14.5.1987 when the sale deed in question was executed by defendant no. 5, the suit as filed on 2.10.2012 is beyond the period of twelve years, as prescribed. Under provisions of order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code, the plaint can be rejected if it is found from a statement in the plaint to be barred by law. By considering the pleadings of the plaintiffs that the sale deed dated 14.5.1987 was a void document and as the plaintiffs seek possession on the basis of their title, it is clear that the claim as made is barred by limitation. 12. Once it is found that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 65 of the said Act, it is not necessary to go into the aspect of the said sale being hit by provisions of Section 89(1) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Hence, I do not find it necessary to record any finding on the submissions in that regard. Insofar as the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs by relying upon the provisions of Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to seek lesser relief of cancellation of aforesaid sale deed, the said submission cannot be accepted. Insofar as the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs by relying upon the provisions of Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to seek lesser relief of cancellation of aforesaid sale deed, the said submission cannot be accepted. It is wellsettled that a document which is treated to be void ab initio, can be ignored as a nullity and it is not necessary to have the same set aside. Even if it is assumed that the sale deed dated 14.5.1987 was not required to be got cancelled by the plaintiffs, the same cannot improve the case of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the relief of possession which is the larger relief is itself found to be barred by limitation. Moreover, provisions of Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code could be applied after adjudication of the suit on merits when it is found that the plaintiff has not made out any case for granting the relief as prayed but the facts as established justify granting of a smaller relief. In these facts, therefore, said submission cannot be accepted. The ratio of the decision in Rajendra Tiwari (supra) cannot be made applicable in the present facts. Similarly, the other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs also cannot assist the case of the plaintiffs. 13. Thus, considering the aforesaid position, I find that defendant nos. 1 to 4 have made out a case for rejection of the plaint under provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation. It is true that the power of rejection of the plaint is drastic in nature as observed in P. V. Guru Raj Reddy (supra). However, in the present case I am satisfied that all necessary ingredients in that regard are satisfied. On that count, the order passed by the trial Court below Exhibit 25 dated 15.2.2014 is quashed and set aside. The application below Exhibit 25 is allowed and it is held that the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No. 148 of 2012 stands rejected under provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code. Civil Revision Application is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.