JUDGMENT : Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J. Doubting the correctness of the judgment and order of conviction dated 30.08.2007 and 31.08.2007 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura in Sessions Trial Case No. 4(8)06, the appellant has preferred this appeal. By filing this appeal the convict appellant ventilates his grievances that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in its proper perspective. According to the appellant there being no direct evidence, the Court was supposed to consider the circumstantial evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of events. He has further submitted that one of the witnesses had shifted the place of occurrence. This apart, it is emphasised that the accused himself was admitted in hospital on the relevant day and at the relevant point of time and the concerned doctor, P.W. 11, deposed as such. Finally, it is asserted that there was no motive behind the alleged murder and the conclusion of the learned Trial Court is baseless. 2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is unimpeachable and it does not warrant any interference. 3. The factual scenario which emerges from a cumulative reading and scrutiny of the materials available is as follows: The marriage between the victim and appellant took place on 26.03.2004 as per Hindu religious rites and ceremonies. At the wedding, some ornaments and cash were gifted to the husband of the victim. Unfortunately, the victim, who expected a rosy life, had to face a jinxed matrimony. Physical and mental torture were put upon her by the appellant and, on some occasions, she was not provided food and clothing. On the occasion of Astamongala and Rathajatra the victim came to her paternal house and disclosed her pain and agonies to her parents. After giving her some consolation, she was again sent to her matrimonial home. On 06.08.2004, the defacto complainant received the information of death of her beloved daughter. She rushed to the house of the appellant and found the victim lying on a cot with bleeding injuries all over the body. On the same day, an F.I.R. was lodged by the defacto complainant pointing a finger at the appellant as the author of the crime. She rushed to the house of the appellant and found the victim lying on a cot with bleeding injuries all over the body. On the same day, an F.I.R. was lodged by the defacto complainant pointing a finger at the appellant as the author of the crime. In this way, law was set into motion. 4. The defence case as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and examination of the accused/appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is innocence and that he has been falsely implicated. After the registration of the F.I.R., the investigating agency came into operation. In course of cross-examination, Investigating Officer (P.W. 14) deposed that he had received the written complaint and put his signature on the written complaint which was marked Ext.7. Thereafter, he had drawn up the formal F.I.R. which was marked Ext.8. He took up the investigation and during investigation he prepared a sketch map with index, visited the place of occurrence, examined witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., arrested the accused/appellant and, on being transferred to another place, he handed over the case diary to his successor. P.W. 15 then submitted the charge-sheet on the basis of the investigation conducted by the former Investigating Officer. 5. Pursuant to the charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer, the learned Trial Court framed the charges under Sections 498A/302/34 of I.P.C. The charges were read over and explained to the convict accused/appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution produced as many as 15 witnesses from their gallery. Let us have a look at the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses. P.W. 1 in her evidence corroborated the F.I.R. in toto. She found the victim in her bedroom lying on a cot. She also found marks of injuries on her throat and other parts of the body. She put her L.T.I. on the inquest report. In course of cross-examination, she stated that she went to the Onda Police Station at or about 3:00 P.M. She was very categorical in saying that none from Bishnupur or Jamdahara accompanied her to the Onda Police Station. She ruled out the suggestion that the F.I.R. was scribed as per the dictation of the police. On perusal of the F.I.R. we find that F.I.R. was received at 3:35 P.M. In course of cross-examination, it transpires that she went at 3:00 P.M. Therefore, her evidence is credible. She ruled out the suggestion that the F.I.R. was scribed as per the dictation of the police. On perusal of the F.I.R. we find that F.I.R. was received at 3:35 P.M. In course of cross-examination, it transpires that she went at 3:00 P.M. Therefore, her evidence is credible. It was suggested to her if she had informed the negotiator of the marriage of her daughter and she admitted that she did not do so. P.W. 2, a local villager, also lent support to the prosecution case saying that he had been to the house of the accused after hearing the news of death of the victim and found the victim lying in the bedroom of the appellant on a cot. His such evidence remained unshaken. In course of cross-examination, P.W. 3 also corroborated the F.I.R. as well as P.W. 1 and 2 substantially i.e. he stated about the alleged torture and that the dead body of the victim bore marks of injury. In course of cross-examination, she was mainly given suggestions, which she denied. 7. Now we are to consider the evidence of P.W. 4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has launched a dual challenge to such testimony. Learned Counsel has argued that in course of cross-examination this P.W. 4 stated that some villagers brought the dead body from the field and kept the dead body on the cot which was in the house of the accused. Referring his such part of the evidence, he has submitted that the alleged murder took place not in the house of the accused but in the field. He seeks to submit that there is a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not commit the murder. It is trite law that the evidence has to be scrutinised as a whole and not in an isolated manner. Therefore, it is peremptorily incumbent on us to look at the entire testimony of P.W. 4. In course of his examination-in-chief, this P.W. 4 was very categorical in saying that after coming to know about the death of the victim, he went to the house of the accused and found the victim’s dead body lying on the cot in her bedroom. He was also very specific that he did not inquire about her death. In course of his examination-in-chief, this P.W. 4 was very categorical in saying that after coming to know about the death of the victim, he went to the house of the accused and found the victim’s dead body lying on the cot in her bedroom. He was also very specific that he did not inquire about her death. In course of cross-examination by the defence he admitted that his house is intervened by 3 to 4 houses from the house of the accused. He also stated that the villagers brought the dead body from the field. He clarified his stand by saying, “I have falsely stated in my examination-in-chief and now I am telling the truth in my cross-examination.” He was declared hostile. Learned Defence Counsel submits that this prosecution, witness does not support the prosecution rather supports the defence. If we dissect his evidence, we would find that he is a turn-coat. In course of his examination-in-chief he stated something and within a short while i.e. in course of cross-examination he did a somersault. First, nobody stated that the dead body was brought from the field. Secondly, he did not disclose the names of the villagers who had allegedly brought the dead body. No reliance can be placed upon his evidence. In course of cross-examination by the prosecution (after being declared hostile) he admitted that he did not see when the dead body was brought from the field. To our estimation, this P.W.4 is completely unreliable. 8. P.W. 5 also substantially corroborated the prosecution story. He was present at the time of the inquest and the seizure-list was prepared in his presence. He proved his signature on the inquest report as well as on the seizure-list. He also stated that he came to know from the victim during her visit to her parents’ house that she was subjected to torture at her matrimonial home. In course of cross-examination, he further stated that he told the Investigating Officer that the victim personally told him that she was subjected to torture by the accused. He also stated that after hearing the news of death of victim, he went to that house and found the dead body lying on a cot. Such part of his evidence remains unshaken. 9. P.W. 6, accompanied by others, went to the house of the accused and found the dead body of the victim. He also stated that after hearing the news of death of victim, he went to that house and found the dead body lying on a cot. Such part of his evidence remains unshaken. 9. P.W. 6, accompanied by others, went to the house of the accused and found the dead body of the victim. He also put his signature on inquest report which goes to suggest that he had been to the house of the accused because the inquest was done there. He also stated that while the victim was alive, she disclosed that she was tortured. In course of his cross-examination, he made it clear that he was not related to the victim. In course of his cross-examination, he deposed that he told the Investigating Officer that he found the dead body of the victim and there were marks of injuries on her body. Other parts of his cross-examination are in the form of denials. 10. The evidence of P.W. 7 is not much relevant as far as the commission of offence is concerned. He was a witness to the seizure which is marked Ext. 4/2, which contains the wearing apparel of the victim. 11. P.W. 9 is the Deputy Magistrate. He prepared the inquest report in terms of 174 Cr.P.C. He found marks of injury on the dead body. 12. P.W. 10 identified the appellant on the dock and she found injury in or around the neck of the victim. In course of cross-examination, she stated that her husband was a patient of insanity and she did not know his whereabouts. 13. P.W. 11 is the doctor. According to him, on 16.08.2004 he was posted at Bishnupur Sadar Hospital and on that day at or about 5:10 A.M. a patient namely Mahadev Dutta (present appellant) was admitted under his care and he was discharged on 07.08.2004 at or about 9:45 A.M. According to the appellant, he consumed rat-killer poison and he was treated by this witness after having his stomach washed. The suggestion was given to the doctor that no such person was admitted and he denied the suggestion. Referring to the deposition of this witness, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that if the appellant was admitted in hospital upon taking rat-killer poison, he could not have committed the murder of his wife. This argument is devoid of any merit on divers grounds. Referring to the deposition of this witness, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that if the appellant was admitted in hospital upon taking rat-killer poison, he could not have committed the murder of his wife. This argument is devoid of any merit on divers grounds. Normal conduct of the husband and wife is such that they reside together in the same room during the night. If he was admitted in hospital in that night, he might have been accompanied by some other person to the hospital and particularly during the late night. The distance from the house of accused to Bishnupur is about 20 kilometres. It would not be possible for a person to go there for treatment without the assistance of any other person if he at all took poison. In course of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he never disclosed such alibi. Learned Trial Court, in course of the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., asked the appellant if he had anything to say in connection with the prosecution case and, in reply, the appellant only stated that he was innocent. We are not oblivious to the fact that the accused certainly has a right of silence during the trial. But if there was any specific defence, he ought to have disclosed the same in course of the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. As such, the alibi does not impress us. That apart, if a person goes out of his room during the middle of the night for the purpose of being admitted to a hospital or for any treatment, he ought to have drawn the attention of his wife and she would be expected to be with him. Even if he had gone out for treatment without waking up his wife, he ought to have called for some person to accompany him. But the accused did not disclose if he had gone to the hospital with anybody or name any person may have accompanied him. Besides that, keeping his wife in the room alone a person would, ordinarily, not go anywhere. At least, he would ask the wife to bolt the room from inside. But the accused did not disclose if he had gone to the hospital with anybody or name any person may have accompanied him. Besides that, keeping his wife in the room alone a person would, ordinarily, not go anywhere. At least, he would ask the wife to bolt the room from inside. There is no such defence nor was it pleaded by him in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is not the case of the appellant that some other persons entered his bedroom by breaking the door had killed the victim. The police officer or any other witnesses of that locality did not notice that the door was broken. Therefore, such argument of the defence cannot be accepted. One thing more is required to be noticed to discard the evidence of the doctor. He stated everything from his memory. If a patient had been admitted in the hospital, there must have been an entry in the admission register or something else; but there was no reference to the same. Considering all these aspects we are not at all inclined to place any reliance on this witness. Surprisingly, he was cited by the prosecution! 14. P.W. 12 is the Investigating Officer of this case. In course of his examination-in-chief he disclosed how he had conducted the investigation. This Investigating Officer had examined Tarunava Bhadra, Samir Ojha, Debnath Biswas, Dhananjoy Chakraborty, Bimalendu Das. Former Investigating Officer N.A. Khan had examined the other witnesses. 15. P.W. 13 is the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim. In course of his cross-examination, he said that he found certain injuries on the body of the victim and clearly opined that the death was due to the effect of manual strangulation. In his view, the death occurred between 24 hours and 72 hours before the post-mortem. By simple calculation, we find that if the alleged offence took place in the early morning and if post-mortem was done on the next day at 12:30 P.M., in that case the death occurred about 31 hours prior to the post-mortem examination. Therefore, the evidence of this doctor does not help the defence in any way. 16. By simple calculation, we find that if the alleged offence took place in the early morning and if post-mortem was done on the next day at 12:30 P.M., in that case the death occurred about 31 hours prior to the post-mortem examination. Therefore, the evidence of this doctor does not help the defence in any way. 16. Learned Defence Counsel has referred to a decision reported in (2004) 11 SCC 282 in connection with Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy -Vs.- Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. On perusal of the said judgment, we are of the clear opinion that the said decision cannot be mechanically applied in this case. There was doubt regarding the place of occurrence. But in this instant case we have already observed in the earlier paragraphs that the place of occurrence is the bedroom of the appellant. Learned Defence Counsel has also referred to a decision reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 732 in connection with Vikramjit Singh Alias Vicky -Vs.- State of Punjab. We are in respectful disagreement with learned Defence Counsel on the ground that the said decision was based on the principle that if two views of a story appeared to be probable, the one that supports the defence should be accepted. But in this instant case that decision cannot be applied. From the sequence of events established by the prosecution, there is no possibility of a second view. Learned Defence Counsel has wanted to rely mainly on the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 11. According to him, they are prosecution witnesses and one of them turned hostile. He has also contended that it is a settled position of law that the evidence of a hostile witnesses has also to be considered. It is true that the evidence of a hostile witness can be taken into consideration in favour of the defence, if it passes the touchstone of credibility. On perusal of the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 11, their testimonies are wholly unacceptable. This P.W. 5 resides within close proximity of the house of the accused. In course of his cross-examination he has taken a somersault. A court of law has to make a reasonable assessment of a witness and his testimony. More often than not, some coward/timid person may not like to incur the wrath of an accused neighbour either out of fear or for some extraneous consideration. In course of his cross-examination he has taken a somersault. A court of law has to make a reasonable assessment of a witness and his testimony. More often than not, some coward/timid person may not like to incur the wrath of an accused neighbour either out of fear or for some extraneous consideration. The Court may disregard such testimonies. 17. Learned Defence Counsel has also submitted that most of the witnesses are interested witnesses and so it would be unsafe to rely on them. In this regard we may say that it is settled law that merely because the witnesses may be related to the victim or the complainant, their testimonies may not be rejected. There is no legal canon that only unrelated witnesses shall be considered credible. On the contrary, we are of the view that it is not natural for the related witness to implicate a person falsely leaving aside the actual culprit. It is pertinent to note that only interested witnesses want to see the real culprit is brought to book. Therefore, we are unable to accept the argument. 18. Learned Defence Counsel has also submitted that there are certain discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and such discrepancies should be considered in favour of the accused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a decision reported in 2002 Criminal Law Journal Page 2645 held “in a case of discrepancies pointed out are in the realm of pebbles, the Court should tread upon it, but if the same are boulders the Court should not attempt to jump over the same.” In this instant case, there is a very minor discrepancy so we can tread upon it. We are not at all interested to allow the truth to be sacrificed at the altar of hyper technicality by making the society a casualty. Normal phenomenon, robust common sense are the guiding factors to arrive at a conclusion. 19. A passionate submission has been made by learned Defence Counsel regarding benefit of doubt. If any cloud remains, the criminals are clothed with this protective umbrella to receive the benefit of doubt. The Court should not lose sight of the reality of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by giving elasticity to the phrase ‘benefit of doubt.’ No sort of leniency can be shown in such a case. 20. If any cloud remains, the criminals are clothed with this protective umbrella to receive the benefit of doubt. The Court should not lose sight of the reality of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by giving elasticity to the phrase ‘benefit of doubt.’ No sort of leniency can be shown in such a case. 20. Considering all these aspects, we are of the view that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Bankura, is well-reasoned and does not call for any interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is hereby affirmed. 21. If the appellant is on bail, he shall surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks from this date, in default the learned Trial Court shall execute the sentence in accordance with law. 22. Let a copy of this judgment and the L.C.R. be sent to the learned Court below for information and taking necessary action in accordance with law. 23. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Siddhartha Chattopadhyay & Sanjib Banerjee, JJ. I Agree.