JUDGMENT : Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. Mohan Dei and Son Dei (P.W.2), two daughters of Hukma @ Hukam Singh (P.W.1) on 23.4.2008 were married with two brothers namely, Kaptan Singh and Santosh, residents of Luthwara, Police Station Udhyog Nagar, Bharatpur. 2. Mohan Dei died an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage and on the basis of written report (Exhibit-P/1), which was submitted by her father Hukma @ Hukam Singh (P.W.1), before SHO, Police Station Udhyog Nagar, Bharatpur after investigation, Kaptan Singh husband of Mohan Dei, along with his parents namely Smt. Ramdei and Ghanshyam was sent for trial. The court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Bharatpur, charged all the three accused for the offences under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, in alternate for the offence under Section 304-B IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. The prosecution to secure conviction of the accused, examined eighteen witnesses and proved on record documents Exhibit-P/1 to Exhibit-P/24. Thereafter, the statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused denied all the incriminating circumstances put to them and claimed innocence. In defence, accused examined three witnesses and also proved on record the statements made by various witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during the course of investigation as Exhibit-D/1 to Exhibit-D/10. 4. The court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Bharatpur, vide impugned judgment dated 13.9.2012, recorded acquittal of Ramdei mother-in-law and Ghanshyam father-in-law of deceased Mohan Dei. However, the trial court held the appellant Kaptan Singh guilty of offences under Section 498A and 304 B IPC. Having convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offences, the trial court vide a separate order of even date, sentenced the appellant as under :- U/s. 498-A IPC - to undergo three years S.I. and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional three months S.I. U/s. 304-B IPC - to undergo life imprisonment. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 5. Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence, the appellant Kaptan Singh has preferred the instant appeal. 6. Hukma @ Hukam Singh (P.W.1) in his written report (Exhibit-P/1) stated that his two daughters namely Mohan Dei and Son Dei (P.W.2) on 23.4.2008 were married with Kaptan Singh and Santosh, two sons of Ghanshyam, resident of village Luthwara, Police Station Udhyog Nagar, Bharatpur. Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence, the appellant Kaptan Singh has preferred the instant appeal. 6. Hukma @ Hukam Singh (P.W.1) in his written report (Exhibit-P/1) stated that his two daughters namely Mohan Dei and Son Dei (P.W.2) on 23.4.2008 were married with Kaptan Singh and Santosh, two sons of Ghanshyam, resident of village Luthwara, Police Station Udhyog Nagar, Bharatpur. The complainant stated that at the time of marriage, he had given lot of dowry but the accused from the very first day of marriage were demanding Rs.50,000/- and a motorcycle. He had gone with number of villagers many times to the village Luthwara of the accused to make them see reason but they had not accepted his enteritis. Hukma @ Hukam Singh on 8.11.2009, received telephonic information from Son Dei, who disclosed that her father-in-law Ghanshyam, mother-in-law Ramdei and Kaptan Singh husband of Mohan Dei have taken Mohan Dei out of the house. In the evening, Ghanshyam, Ramdei and Kaptan Singh returned and informed that Mohan Dei had gone to house of her parents. Kaptan Singh was having stains of blood on his shirt. On receipt of telephonic information, Hukma @ Hukam Singh along with villagers came to the village of the accused and asked the whereabouts of Mohan Dei. The accused replied that she ran away from the house. The complainant kept on searching for his daughter and contacted with S.P. In the written report raised a suspicion that his daughter Mohan Dei has been murdered by her husband Kaptan Singh, father-in-law Ghanshyam and mother-in-law Ramdei and dead body has been concealed in their house. Later the dead body was recovered by the police. The report was submitted for taking legal action. Data Ram (P.W.17) in the court deposed that on 11.11.2009, he was posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bharatpur. On receipt of information that one woman had died due to unnatural circumstances, he reached at village Luthwara. He carried inquest proceedings, same were attested by the residents of village. Witnesses to Panchnama (Exhibit-P/3) gave an opinion that the deceased Mohan Dei died as a result of hanging. According to Data Ram (P.W.17), after conclusion of the inquest proceedings, dead body was sent to RBM Hospital, Bharatpur for post mortem. Dr. Sanjay Choudhary (P.W.16) in the court deposed that under the orders of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bharatpur, a medical board was constituted consisting of Dr. According to Data Ram (P.W.17), after conclusion of the inquest proceedings, dead body was sent to RBM Hospital, Bharatpur for post mortem. Dr. Sanjay Choudhary (P.W.16) in the court deposed that under the orders of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bharatpur, a medical board was constituted consisting of Dr. Sanjay Choudhary (P.W.16), Dr. Akhilesh Srivastav and Dr. Sunil Pathak. This witness in the court proved the post mortem report (Exhibit-P/22). In the post mortem report (Exhibit-P/22), medical board noted that the dead body was in the state of advance decomposition, it was emitting foul smell. Face, abdomen were distended and swollen. Bluish discolouration of skin had taken place and maggots were crawling. Tongue swollen was protruding out from the mouth. Eye balls were also protruding, hairs and nails were loose and could easily be pulled out. There was presence of ligature mark and as per opinion of the medical board, cause of death was asphyxia as a result of constriction of air passage and death was result of hanging which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was further opined that ligature mark present around neck was ante mortem in nature. Hukma @ Hukam Singh (P.W.1) in the court deposed that his two daughters namely Mohan Dei and Son Dei were married with two brothers namely Kaptan Singh and Santosh sons of Ghanshyam. The marriage was performed about two years ago. At the time of marriage, he had given Rs.30,000/- cash and house-hold articles. The accused were demanding Rs.50,000/- in cash and a motorcycle was demanded by Kaptan Singh. This witness stated that he is poor person and could not fulfil the demands made by the accused. The accused persons were not giving food to his daughters and used to keep them confined in a room. Son Dei (P.W.2) sister of the deceased, was also married in the same house. She also reiterated that she along with her sister was harassed by the accused. This witness further stated that her sister Mohan Dei had liking for her husband but her husband had not accepted the marriage. This witness stated that the accused after causing murder hanged her and Kaptan Singh was having blood stains on his shirt and when she asked accused about whereabouts of her sister Mohan Dei, the accused informed that she ran away and had gone to the parental house. 7. This witness stated that the accused after causing murder hanged her and Kaptan Singh was having blood stains on his shirt and when she asked accused about whereabouts of her sister Mohan Dei, the accused informed that she ran away and had gone to the parental house. 7. The prosecution has examined relations and residents of village of the deceased. They have deposed that accused were demanding dowry and used to harass the deceased. In the present case, the prosecution has not examined any eyewitness. 8. The learned trial court, considering that no eyewitness has been examined, has recorded the conviction of the appellant Kaptan Singh husband of deceased Mohan Dei for the offences under Sections 498A and 304-B IPC. 9. The appellant Kaptan Singh in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that he was unemployed. His wife Mohan Dei due to his unemployment and poverty used to remain depressed. On 8.11.2009 he had gone to search for job at Bharatpur. His father had gone to attend a religious congregation and his mother and sister had taken Mohan Dei to the village Vaid. Thereafter, Mohan Dei was not found in the house. They had informed the police. Later they learnt that Mohan Dei at the ground floor of the old house had committed suicide by hanging herself. The defence witnesses also deposed that foul smell started coming from the house, then they learnt that in the deserted house, Mohan Dei had hanged herself. Accused further deposed that they had informed at Kuchawati, parents of Mohan Dei, deceased. 10. From the medical evidence, inquest proceedings carried by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, and defence evidence, it is apparent that deceased Mohan Dei had died due to hanging. It is a case of suicide. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 12. The learned Public Prosecutor has also urged that fed up with the conduct of the accused appellant and her parents due to demand of dowry, deceased Mohan Dei had committed suicide. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the allegation of demand of dowry are exaggerated and have been levelled after deceased had committed suicide. 12. The learned Public Prosecutor has also urged that fed up with the conduct of the accused appellant and her parents due to demand of dowry, deceased Mohan Dei had committed suicide. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the allegation of demand of dowry are exaggerated and have been levelled after deceased had committed suicide. It is urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that during the duration of the marriage, no panchayat was ever conducted, no complaint has been submitted against the conduct of the accused and for the first time in the written report (Exhibit-P/1), and in the court witnesses have deposed regarding demand of dowry and harassment and maltreatment caused to the deceased. Thus, it is canvassed before us that we should disbelieve the allegation regarding demand of dowry. 14. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions advanced before us. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments could not assail the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. It goes unchallenged that the deceased had died an unnatural death within the seven years of marriage in her matrimonial home. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the allegations of demand of dowry have been levelled for the first time in written report. 16. We cannot discard the testimony of numerous witnesses examined by the prosecution that soon before death, deceased was subjected to demand of dowry and accused appellant was demanding Rs.50,000/- cash and a motorcycle. Thus to us, the prosecution has succeeded to prove the offence under Section 304-B IPC against the appellant. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments, has submitted that the learned trial court committed a grave error to award maximum sentence prescribed for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that since the deceased had committed suicide, no circumstances are available on the record to award maximum sentence of life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC. 18. Once we come to the conclusion that the deceased had died an unnatural death, within seven years of her marriage, and she was harassed, maltreated on account of demand of dowry, presumption under Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act is to be drawn against the accused. 18. Once we come to the conclusion that the deceased had died an unnatural death, within seven years of her marriage, and she was harassed, maltreated on account of demand of dowry, presumption under Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act is to be drawn against the accused. Therefore, the appellant Kaptan Singh has been rightly convicted for the offence under Section 304B IPC. 19. Having upheld the conviction of the accused appellant Kaptan Singh for the offence under Section 304B IPC, we have to examine whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded on this count is justifiable or not. 20. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Puran Vs. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Cr. Appeal No.1445 of 2007, decided on 29.1.2015, to which one of us (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.) was party, had considered the quantum of punishment qua the offence under Section 304B IPC. It will be apposite here to reproduce following portion from the judgment rendered in the case of Puran (supra), wherein we have noted the contentions of the counsel for the accused and had examined the question of quantum of sentence in somewhat similar circumstances, as under :- "Considering the forceful and truthful testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses, Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, has frankly conceded that he is not in a position to argue this case on merits. Therefore, he has confined his arguments only to the quantum of punishment which should be meted out to the appellant. Relying on the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli Vs. State of Rajasthan [D.B. Criminal Appeal No.13 of 2005, decided on 25.11.2014], a case decided by us, the learned counsel has pleaded that sentencing cannot be left to the whims and capries of the trial court. Although in catena of cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the principles governing sentencing, although these principles generally relate to the cases of death penalty, but in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [ (2014) 4 SCC 375 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its opinion that the principles governing sentencing in death penalty cases would equally apply to the offences of lesser punishment. Therefore, the maximum sentence prescribed by law for a given offence can be inflicted only in rarest of rare case. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [ (2014) 4 SCC 375 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its opinion that the principles governing sentencing in death penalty cases would equally apply to the offences of lesser punishment. Therefore, the maximum sentence prescribed by law for a given offence can be inflicted only in rarest of rare case. Thus while imposing punishment for an offence under Section 304B IPC, the court would have to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances before inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Moreover, the court would have to give reasons for inflicting the maximum sentence of life imprisonment upon an accused while convicting him for offence under Section 304B IPC. In the present case, the learned Judge has not given any cogent reason for sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment. Moreover, there are hardly any aggravating circumstances for imposing life imprisonment upon the appellant. Instead, Kaila Devi had died of strangulation. She had committed suicide as she was unhappy with her married life. Further, the appellant has suffered the pains and agony of a trial and incarceration for about ten years. Thus, the sentence should be reduced from life imprisonment to ten years." Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, has emphasized only upon the fact that the case falls under Section 304B IPC, but has not been able to raise any arguments against reduction of sentence. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and examined the impugned judgment. In the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli (supra), while relying on the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), we have held as under :- "Having affirmed the conviction of the appellants, we have been called upon to answer whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances, is adequate and justified ? Counsel for the appellant had relied upon case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) wherein Their Lordships referring to case law, had culled out the principles which till now had been applied for awarding death as sentence and thereafter had observed that application of same principles while determining sentence in the case of dowry death also make better sense. In a very erudite judgment by culling out the principles laid in Jagmohan Singh Vs. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 , and Bachan Singh Vs. In a very erudite judgment by culling out the principles laid in Jagmohan Singh Vs. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 , and Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 , it was held that since sentencing is an onerous exercise to be undertaken by the court, court should take note of aggravating and in mitigating circumstances. Their lordships in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) had also taken note of principles laid in a recent pronouncement by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sangeet and Another Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . It was held that evolution of principles of sentencing policy are to be distinguished from judge centric to fair amount of certainty. It will be appropriate for us to extensively quote from the judgment rendered by Apex Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra) :- "10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order. 11. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh (supra) has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Sankar Kisanrao Khade (supra). The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimizing individualized and judge centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Prem Sagar and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 550 . The difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. Prem Sagar and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 550 . The difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorization of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach. 12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years through largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Beside paragraph 163 (underlined portion) of Bachan Singh (supra), reproduced earlier, bears testimony to the above fact. 13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of "dowry death" under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance. As against this the extenuating/ mitigating circumstances which would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code is concerned." We may also notice that in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), while reducing the sentence, it was noted that wife of Sunil Dutt Sharma died due to asphyxia, resulting from strangulation. Furthermore, in the case of Hari Om Vs. State of Haryana and Another [Cr. Appeal No.1167 of 2011 decided on 31.10.2014], the Hon'ble Apex Court considering question of sentence for offence under Section 304-B IPC, took note of case law on this question, and after considering various judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court, held as under :- "22. In the case of Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under : "7........ the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI. ..." 23. xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI. ..." 23. xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the appellant from life imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons." Having noted the principles of law governing sentencing, Their Lordships held that since in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) death was due to strangulation, it was appropriate to award sentence of ten years to the appellant in that case under Section 304-B IPC as same shall serve ends of justice." 21. We may also notice here that in the present case, the occurrence had taken place on 8.11.2009 and the appellant Kaptan Singh has already suffered pain and agony of protracted trial and incarceration. 22. Borrowing the dictum of law laid in Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra) and Hari Om's case (supra), relied by a Division Bench of this Court in Puran's case (supra), while upholding conviction of the appellant, Kaptan Singh, under Section 304B IPC, we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment awarded upon him and reduce the same to ten years' RI. However, we maintain the conviction and sentence for offence under Section 498A IPC along with fine and the default clause. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. In view of modification in the sentence, the present appeal stands disposed of.