JUDGMENT N. Seshasayee, J. This is appeal is preferred by an alleged owner of the motor vehicle who was held dis entitled to claim damages that his car had suffered in a road accident. 2. On 27-11-1999, early in the morning, the car belonging to the claimant met with an accident when a lorry bearing Registration No.CAM 6566 belonging to the first respondent insured with second respondent had collided against it. The car was on its return trip to Bangalore and the accident had taken place near Hosur. The inmates of the car suffered injuries and both the injured passenger as well as the petitioner have preferred separate claims, in the former case for personal injuries to person, and in the latter case for damage to the vehicle against the owner and insurer of the offending lorry. By a common order, the Tribunal allowed the claim for injury suffered to the inmate of the car whereas it dismissed the claim for damage to the car. The claimant contended that the car had suffered extensive damages to a tune of Rs.1,53,000/- but the claim was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground (a) that he was not the registered owner of the vehicle to maintain a claim before the MACT; (b) that the quantum of claim is not proved. 3. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the vehicle was sold by its registered owner to the claimant and the property in the goods has already been vested in the claimant. Secondly, the policy is a comprehensive policy and the second respondent is liable to meet the entire liability. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the insurance company argued that it is not the nature of policy that matters here, but it is entirely about the right of the appellant to sustain a claim. It remains on record as a set of indisputable facts that (a) the claimant is not a registered owner of the car and a claim petition cannot be maintained by one who is not the registered owner of the vehicle; (b) at any rate the amount claimed is not proved and a mere production of an estimate issued by the garage owner is not sufficient proof of the actuals, both as to the nature of the damage and as to the quantum of damages. 5.
5. The fundamental point to be immediately investigated is on the question of maintaining a claim. Section 166(1) provides that : (1) An application for compensation of the nature specified in subsection (1) of the Section 165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) Where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be; or (d) by an agent duly authorised. Sec.2(30) of the Act defines the owner. It defines : "Owner means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject matter of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." Should the definition of the word 'owner' as provided in Section 2(30), be imported into Section 166 of the MV Act that falls under Chapter XII ? 6. There are in effect two statutes that govern the sale of a motor vehicle : One, the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and the other the Motor Vehicles Act. The transfer of property or vesting of the good in a property that signifies a sale of a good is the province of Sale of Goods Act, and according to it the property in the good is passed on to its purchaser when once the good is delivered to him, or when he is put in possession of the same, or when the good is left with the carrier to be delivered to him. The MV Act has not been offered a role there. The law on the aspect is too firmly settled that it hardly entertains a doubt or debate now. Motor Vehicles Act in effect takes a role post such vesting of property in a motor vehicle when it insists its registration, and this is essentially intend to regulate the use of the motor vehicles. 7. Section 166 however, is set to an entirely different context.
Motor Vehicles Act in effect takes a role post such vesting of property in a motor vehicle when it insists its registration, and this is essentially intend to regulate the use of the motor vehicles. 7. Section 166 however, is set to an entirely different context. Chapter XII read along with Section 140, 146 and 163-A of the MV Act may be termed as the fountainhead of the beneficial interests conferred on the victims of the road accidents, more particularly third party victims. The MV Act will lose its acclaim as a beneficial legislation if these provisions were left out of the statute, wherein after it will remain only as a regulatory piece of legislation and no more. This, therefore, demands a purposive interpretation of the word 'owner' in Section 166(1)(b) of the Act if the spirit behind the statute were to be preserved and promoted. 8. In the context of the present case, here is a owner of the vehicle, in who the property in the good, a car to be precise, has been vested in terms of the provisions of Sale of Goods Act, prefers a claim against an offending vehicle and its insurer. From the point of view of the respondents herein, the petitioner is a third party. If one turns to the list of things that can be termed as property within the meaning of Section 166(1)(b), they can be anything other than a human being. It will therefore run counter to the spirit of Chapter XII of the MV Act, if the word 'owner' therein is given the same meaning as in Section 2(30) of the Act. The contextual incompatibility between the two provisions is apparent and demonstrable : What about the right of a finder of lost good, if the said good is damaged in a road-accident ? Jurisprudentially he can hold the property as his own against the whole world except its true owner. How can therefore, a motor vehicle, inasmuch as it is also a good, whose holding, transferring and vesting of property on one is controlled by the substantive law of Sale of Goods Act, be any different ? Or, can there be a differential treatment for one who holds the property as the finder of a lost good and who has suffered damage to his property as a third party claimant for compensation ?
Or, can there be a differential treatment for one who holds the property as the finder of a lost good and who has suffered damage to his property as a third party claimant for compensation ? Merely because registration is required for motor vehicle in Chapter III of the MV Act, does not take away his right to be a third party claimant before a Tribunal merely because the vehicle was not registered ? Let another situation be contemplated. A motor vehicle, yet to be registered, is remaining stationary and is not in use on the road, and is not even intended to be put to use until it is registered, is hit by another vehicle. Will such victim of the accident be denied access to the Tribunal as a third party to claim compensation because he has not yet become the registered owner of the vehicle ? Any response in the negative will amount to a declarative statement of the inequal treatment of an owner of a good called 'motor vehicle' on the one hand from the owners of other categories of goods, on the other. Any interpretation leading to an absurdity of planting inequal treatment of those who are similarly placed is not just a denunciation of statutory objective embodied in Chapter XII of the MV Act but also anathema to Constitutional values. As third party victims of road accidents all the owners of all the properties must be understood as a separate class and they share a common denominator called 'third party victims of road accidents'. They do not require any more qualification to approach the Tribunal for compensation than being ordinary owners of goods under the common law or substantive law. This view also gets internal support from the MV Act which does not in explicit terms limit the owners of a motor vehicle for the purposes of Section 166(1)(b) to its registered owner. 9. I therefore, entertain little hesitation to hold that the appellant even as an unregistered owner of a motor vehicle has the locus standi to maintain a claim petition as a third party victim against the owner and the insurer of the offending vehicle. 10. Turning to the quantum of compensation, the accident per se is not disputed. What cannot also be disputed is that the car in question has suffered extensive damage to its front portion.
10. Turning to the quantum of compensation, the accident per se is not disputed. What cannot also be disputed is that the car in question has suffered extensive damage to its front portion. This gets established both by Ext. A-9, the MVI report as well as Ext.P-10 photograph. What however, is in dispute is the value of this damage and the fact if the appellant suffered any loss owing to it. To support his entitlement the appellant has produced only Ext.A-15 estimate issued by the garage owner. This is dated 29-11-1999 which was two days after the accident. The total value of damage as per this is Rs.1.53,700/- to which another Rs.6,300/- was required to be added towards labour charges. If this document is contrasted with Ext.A-17 receipt dated 19- 06-1999, which evidences the sale of car to the claimant wherein it is stated that the consideration passed for the purchase of the car was Rs.1.50 lakhs, the value stated in the estimate for repairing the vehicle shows a value appreciation when it ought to otherwise. In other words the damages sought is in excess of the monetary value of the car in the hands of the appellant. It does not therefore, stands to reason that Ext.A-15 might represent a true value of the damage the appellant had suffered. Further, it is also not made clear in the evidence of appellant, who examined himself as P.W.2, if the car was still waiting to be repaired and made road worthy. Here the appellant fails and consequently the approach of the Tribunal cannot be faulted. After all it is required to decide a point in dispute based on the evidentiary material made available. It is pertinent to note here that this is one of the grounds on which the Tribunal had rejected the appellant's claim, but despite that the appellant has not chosen to produce any document necessary to sustain his quantified damages even in the appellate stage. 11. However, without going into the merits as to the exact quantum for which the appellant might be entitled to claim compensation, since the damage to the car stands established this Court does not consider it appropriate to deny him any damages. Therefore, this Court chooses to award a consolidated Rs.20,000/- to the appellant towards damage to his car.
11. However, without going into the merits as to the exact quantum for which the appellant might be entitled to claim compensation, since the damage to the car stands established this Court does not consider it appropriate to deny him any damages. Therefore, this Court chooses to award a consolidated Rs.20,000/- to the appellant towards damage to his car. Of this, the second respondent would be liable to pay Rs.6,000/- in terms of Ext.A-4 policy and the rest shall be borne by the first respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle. 12. In the result this appeal is partially allowed and the appellant is awarded a consolidated sum of Rs.20,000/- as compensation of which the first respondent shall pay Rs. 14,000/- and the second respondent shall pay Rs.6,000/- within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.