ORDER : M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, J. 1. This company petition had been filed on 24.9.2014 by M/s. Paharpur Cooling Towers Limited (for short 'the petitioner') under Section 433(e) & (f) of the Companies Act, 1956 to wind up M/s. Basal Steels and Power Pvt. Ltd., ('the respondent'). On 26.8.2014, this company petition had been adjourned sine die, taking note of the fact that at that time, Appeal No. 117 of 2014 filed by the respondent against an order dated 23.12.2013 in BIFR Case No. 64 of 2012 was pending before AAIFR constituted under Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short 'SICA'). 2. However, on 6.7.2017 this Court passed an order in this company petition recalling the order dated 26.8.2014 and directing that there is no impediment to proceeding with it in as much as the SICA was repealed and the Forums created there under were dissolved by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 (Act 1 of 2004) which was brought into force by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short 'the IBC). This Court also held that once the very Forums created under the SICA did not exist, the stay of operation as was available under Section 22 of the SICA would not be available to the respondent-company beyond a period of more than six (6) months in terms of the 8th Schedule notified under Section 252 of IBC. It also granted six weeks time to the respondent company to file counter holding that there is no impediment for company petition to be considered on merits. 3. Subsequent thereto, the National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad (for short 'the NCLT') passed an order dated 19.7.2017 at the instance of a third party M/s. Bharat Steel Industries against the respondent company in CP. No. (D3) 77/6/HDB/2016 under Section 9 of IBC invoking Sections 10 to 22 and 25 of the IBC as under: "(a) We hereby declare the following Moratorium by prohibiting the following actions: (i) The institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceeding against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any Court of law tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority. (ii)............." 4. (ii)............." 4. Counsel for respondent-company, placing reliance on the above clause, contends that the Moratorium imposed by the NCLT under the IBC applies to continuation of winding up proceedings before any Court of law, this it applies to this Court as well; that this power of the NCLT is traceable to Section 14(1)(a) of the Act; and in view of the said Moratorium, this company petition cannot be continued/proceeded with and adjudicated by this Court. He also placed reliance on Section 238 of the IBC and contended that the said Act will override any provisions in any other law including the Companies Act, 1956, inconsistent with the IBC. He placed reliance on Yellagola Ramanarasaiah v. G. Sadanand and others, 1989 (3) ALT 610 . 5. On the other hand, Counsel for petitioner in the company petition however refuted the said contentions and pointed out that Section 238 of IBC needs to be read with Section 255 of IBC which made amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 as specified in 11th Schedule; that a proviso has been added to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 stating that only such proceedings relating to winding up of companies pending on the file of the High Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal as may be prescribed by the Central Government, that the Central Government issued Notifications dated 7.12.2016 under Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 and 29.6.2017 under Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 239(1) of IBC directing transfer of only those winding up petitions pending before the High Court as on 15.12.2016 wherein petitions have not been served to the respondents as per Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959; since in the present case, notices in the company petition had already been served on the respondent-company prior to 15.12.2016, this Court continues to have jurisdiction to deal with the company petition; and the moratorium does not apply to this Court and it can proceed to hear and adjudicate this company petition. He contended that the overriding Section 238 of IBC does not apply to proceedings permissible under notifications issued under Section 239(1) of the IBC. 6. He contended that the overriding Section 238 of IBC does not apply to proceedings permissible under notifications issued under Section 239(1) of the IBC. 6. He further contended that the term "Court of Law" mentioned in Section 14(1)(a) cannot be made applicable to this Court, and can only apply to a Forum which is subordinate to the NCLT; this Court is not subordinate to the NCLT in any manner; and the Moratorium order passed by the NCLT under Section 14(1)(a) therefore cannot be relied upon by the respondent-company to stop this Court from continuing these proceedings against the respondent-company, which one, is in fact permitted by Section 239(1) and Section 255 of the IBC. 7. He also pointed out that the High Court is a Superior Court of Record and that under Article 215 of the Constitution of India it has all the power of such a Court of Record including the power to punish contempt of itself and it is entitled to consider the questions of its jurisdiction raised before it. He contended that the NCLT is not a Forum superior to a High Court and it's order dated 19.7.2017 cannot be construed as injuncting this High Court from proceeding with the hearing of this winding up petition. 8. I have noted the contentions of both sides. 9. It is settled law that Parliament is competent to enact a law transferring the jurisdiction exercised by High Courts in regard to any specified subject (other than those which are vested by express provisions of the Constitution) to any Court/Tribunal. IBC is one such law and the NCLT is such a forum as held in Union of India v. Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1 . In that case it was held that NCLT took over the functions of the High Court. A. IBC itself confers jurisdiction on the High Court in regard to pending winding up proceedings like the instant case. 10. Section 255 of IBC made amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 as specified in 11th Schedule. A proviso has been added to Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 stating that only such proceedings relating to winding up of companies pending on the file of the High Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal as may be prescribed by the Central Government. A proviso has been added to Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 stating that only such proceedings relating to winding up of companies pending on the file of the High Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal as may be prescribed by the Central Government. The Central Government issued Notifications dated 7.12.2016 and 29.6.2017 directing transfer of only those winding up petitions pending before the High Court as on 15.12.2016 wherein petitions have not been served to the respondents as per Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. Since in the present case, notices in the company petition had already been served on the respondent-company prior to that date, this Court continues to have jurisdiction to deal with the company petition. 11. So when the IBC itself confers jurisdiction on the High Court by virtue of notifications issued under Section 239 and Section 255 in regard to pending winding up proceedings where notices were already served on the respondent-company prior to 15.12.2016, it cannot be said that by virtue of Section 238, the High Court's jurisdiction gets taken away. What is made possible by IBC and permitted by Sections 239 and 255 cannot be said to be inconsistent under Section 238. B. Moratorium order of NCLT cannot operate against this Court 12. Coming to the Moratorium order announced by the NCLT invoking Section 14(1)(a), I am of the opinion that the words "any Court of law" used therein cannot be interpreted as including this High Court and such a moratorium order cannot injuct this Court from continuing a winding up proceeding pending on it's file where notices were already served on the respondent-Company prior to 15.12.2016 and which is saved by the notifications issued by the Central Government under Section 239 and Section 255 of the IBC. 13. 13. Section 14(1) of IBC insofar as is relevant for our purpose states: "14(1) Subject to provisions of subsections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:- (a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any Court of law, Tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;..." (i) The power of the High Court to decide this winding up petition is also protected by Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which bars a Court from injuncting proceedings in a forum not subordinate to it." 14. Under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. 15. The High Courts are constituted under Article 214 of the Constitution of India. The NCLT, however, is only a statutory Tribunal constituted under the Companies Act, 2013. It cannot therefore be said that the High Court and the NCLT have equal status, though it may not be subordinate to the High Court. 16. Though the High Court is the forum constituted under the Companies Act, 1956 to hear winding up petitions, it is also a Superior Court of Record. As held in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1967 SC 1 ; it is entitled to consider the question of its own jurisdiction. 17. A 'moratorium' under Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC is in effect nothing but an injunction restraining a person from initiating or prosecuting a proceeding in a Court of law. 18. Question is whether the Constitution of present proceedings before this Court, in the winding up petition filed by petitioner herein can be so injuncted by the NCLT, which is a tribunal not superior to this Court? 19. Since NCLT is not a forum superior to the High Court, it's orders cannot be construed as injuncting this Court from proceeding with a winding up proceeding in which it has clear jurisdiction to hear and decide. That is the effect of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly when the IBC itself permits such continuation under the notifications issued under Sections 239 and 255 of the IBC. That is the effect of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly when the IBC itself permits such continuation under the notifications issued under Sections 239 and 255 of the IBC. 20. If the argument of Counsel for respondent is accepted it would in effect mean that though this Court has jurisdiction to continue the winding up proceedings as per the notifications issued under Sections 239 and 255 of the IBC, a statutory body like NCLT, which is not of equal status, can stop it from continuing the winding up proceedings. In fact it may even be contended that the Supreme Court of India can be barred by the NCLT to hear and decide a case. This cannot be allowed because it is settled principle of law that only a Superior Court can regulate proceedings in a Court subordinate to it and not vice versa. 21. This principle was laid down by the Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank, AIR 1983 SC 1272 Para 7. In that case also, a question arose whether the appellant Corporation before the Supreme Court can be restrained by an injunction in a civil suit filed on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court from presenting a winding up petition against the Bank in the said Court. The Supreme Court held that such injunction cannot be granted and placed reliance on Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Interpreting Section 41(b), the Supreme Court held: "7. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 states: 41. An injunction cannot to granted: (a) xxxx (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; xxx" The predecessor of Section 41(b), Section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act of 1887 repealed by 1963 Act read as under: "56. Injunction cannot be granted: (a) x x x x (b) to stay proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought." A glance at the two provisions, the existing and the repealed would reveal the legislative response to judicial interpretation. Under Section 56(b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought. Under Section 56(b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought. In other words, the Court could stay by its injunction a proceeding in a Court subordinate to the Court granting injunction. The injunction granting stay of proceeding was directed to the Court and the Court has to be the Court subordinate to the one granting the injunction. This is postulated on the well recognised principle that the superior Court can regulate proceedings in a Court subordinate to it. It is implicit in this assumption and the language used in Section 56(b) that the Court could 'not grant injunction under Section 56(b) of the repealed Act to stay proceeding in a Court superior in hierarchy to the Court from which injunction is sought. But by judicial interpretation, a consensus was reached that as injunction acts in personam while the Court by its injunction cannot stay proceedings in a Court of superior jurisdiction, it could certainly by an injunction restrain a party before it from further prosecuting the proceeding in other Courts may be superior or inferior in the hierarchy of Court. To some extent this approach not only effectively circumvented the provision contained in Section 56 of the repealed Act but denuded it of its content. The Legislature took notice of this judicial interpretation and materially altered the language of the succeeding provision enacted in Section 41(b) replacing Section 56(b) of the repealed Act while enacting Specific Relief Act of 1963. The Legislature manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Section 41(b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personam, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Section 41(b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the Court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the Court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. As a necessary corollary, it would follow that the Court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court of coordinate or superior jurisdiction. This change in language deliberately adopted by the Legislature after taking note of judicial vacillation has to be given full effect." (ii) Principle of comity of Courts as laid down in Yellagola Ramanarsiah's case (supra), does not operate 22. Principle of comity of Courts was recently explained in World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 639 ; by the Supreme Court in the following terms: "22.......what is meant by the principle of "comity" is that Court of one State or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another State or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." So the said principle is one of self restraint essentially. 23. In Yellagola Ramanarsiah's case (supra), relied upon by the respondent a decree of eviction passed in a Rent Control case was sought to be executed in violation of an interim injunction granted by a Civil Court against such eviction. In that context this Court applied the said principle and held that the Rent Controller should have waited till the injunction order is vacated or modified and he cannot allow the order of the Civil Court to be circumvented. That judgment is not applicable if the Court which grants the injunction is wholly without jurisdiction. 24. The principle of Comity of Courts cannot be invoked to restrain the High Court from proceeding with a winding up petition which Parliament intended the High Court alone to decide as per the notifications issued under Sections 239 and 255 of the IBC. Since this winding up petition did not get transferred to the NCLT by virtue of the notifications dated 7.12.2016 and 29.6.2017 issued under the very IBC, the NCLT cannot have any jurisdiction in regard to the petitioner or to the winding up petition and it's order cannot be interpreted to restrain this Court. 25. Since this winding up petition did not get transferred to the NCLT by virtue of the notifications dated 7.12.2016 and 29.6.2017 issued under the very IBC, the NCLT cannot have any jurisdiction in regard to the petitioner or to the winding up petition and it's order cannot be interpreted to restrain this Court. 25. Therefore I hold that the objection raised by the respondent company that the order dated 19.7.2017 in CP. No. (IB) 77/6/HDB/2016 of the NCLT bars this Court from continuing with this winding up petition against the respondent company cannot be accepted and it is accordingly rejected. List the matter for further hearing on 14.9.2017.