JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, H.P., camp at Karsog, in Civil Appeal No. 57 of 2005, dated 04.12.2007, vide which learned Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellant upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) Karsog, in Civil Suit No. 17 of 2004, dated 20.11.2004, whereby learned trial Court had dismissed the suit filed by the present appellant/plaintiff for declaration and injunction. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this case are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) filed a suit for declaration and injunction to the effect that the suit land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 143/276, 277, 278, Kita 10, measuring 3-09-16 Bighas, situated in Muhal Sanarali/415, Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi, (HP) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’) was recorded in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and proforma defendants and that one Dassi, widow of Twaru was having half share in the suit land whereas out of the remaining land, 1/4th share belonged to the plaintiff and 1/4th share belonged to the defendant. It was the case of the plaintiff that by playing fraud upon Smt. Dassi, defendant with the connivance of witnesses got a Will executed in her favour i.e. Will No. 179, dated 11.10.1994, whereas Smt. Dassi never intended to execute the alleged Will for bequeathing her entire share in favour of defendant No. 1. It was further the case of the plaintiff that she i.e. plaintiff was also in good terms with Smt. Dassi who was her mother and in fact Will which was got executed by defendant No. 1 in her favour from Smt. Dassi was a result of misrepresentation and the said Will was thus liable to be declared null and void. It was further mentioned in the plaint that in order to disinherit the plaintiff, the defendant pressurized Smt. Dassi to file a suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff was not the daughter of Twaru, however, in her statement Smt. Dassi had clearly admitted that plaintiff was daughter of Twaru. In the said suit which was decided on 29.08.1997, it stood decided that plaintiff was in fact the daughter of Twaru. In the said suit which was decided on 29.08.1997, it stood decided that plaintiff was in fact the daughter of Twaru. It was further mentioned in the plaint that the cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff on 12.10.2004 when defendant filed a suit against Khem Singh and the plaintiff qua the suit land and on inquiry, plaintiff came to know that a Will had been executed by Smt. Dassi in favour of defendant No. 1 and on the basis of said Will, the property in dispute stood mutated in the name of defendant No. 1 on 22.05.1998. According to the plaintiff, she was not aware that any Will was executed by Smt. Dassi in favour of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff prayed for passing a decree to declare the Will No. 179, dated 11.10.1994, allegedly executed by Smt. Dassi in favour of defendant as null and void as the same was executed by playing fraud and misrepresentation and it was further prayed that defendants be restrained through a permanent prohibitory injunction decree from alienating the suit land in any manner. 3. The suit so filed by the plaintiff was contested by defendant No. 1 who was the contesting defendant and who by way of her written statement took the stand that the Will in issue was a genuine Will and even the plaintiff had accepted the Will at the time of mutation of the same before the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Karsog, when the mutation was attested. According to the defendant, plaintiff had sold her share of the land and she never used to visit the house of her mother Dassi and she had not come to see their mother (Dassi) even at the time of her death. As per defendant, Smt. Dassi was looked after by her and her land was cultivated by her husband till her death. It was further the case of the defendant that after the death of Smt. Dassi, her Kriya-karam and funeral were performed by defendant and her husband. On these bases, the claim put in the plaint by the plaintiff was contested by the defendant. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiff while denying the averments made in the written statement reiterated the stand as was taken by her in the plaint. 5. On these bases, the claim put in the plaint by the plaintiff was contested by the defendant. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiff while denying the averments made in the written statement reiterated the stand as was taken by her in the plaint. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- “1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of declaration that registered Will No. 179 dated 11.10.1994 is result of fraud, mis-representation and is liable to be set aside? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants? OPP. 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD. 5. Whether this suit is barred by principle of res-judicata? OPD 6. Whether the Will No. 179 dated 11.10.1994 executed by deceased Dassi in favour of Katki defendant No. 1 is genuine one? OPD. 7. Relief.” 6. On the basis of evidence adduced by the respective parties both oral as well as documentary, learned trial Court decided the issues so framed as under:- “Issue No.1 : No. Issue No. 2 : No. Issue No. 3 : No. Issue No.4 : No. Issue No.5 : No. Issue No.6 : No. Relief : The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed as per the operative portion of judgment.” 7. Learned trial Court held that in view of oral deposition of witnesses and the fact that Will is executed to disinherit other persons from the property and as plaintiff had been given her share after the death of her father in the property and deceased Dassi had executed the Will in favour defendant in lieu of services rendered by her for 35 years and in view of the fact that defendant had performed last rites and last ceremonies of her mother, Issues No. 1 and 6 stood decided in favour of defendant. This is the entire reasoning given by learned trial Court while deciding Issues No. 1 and 6. For the purpose of ready reference, the reasoning so returned on Issues No. 1 and 6 by the learned trial Court is reproduced here-in-below. This is the entire reasoning given by learned trial Court while deciding Issues No. 1 and 6. For the purpose of ready reference, the reasoning so returned on Issues No. 1 and 6 by the learned trial Court is reproduced here-in-below. “Keeping in view the oral deposition of witnesses, and Will is executed just to disinherit other persons in the property and more so, plaintiff has been given her share earlier after the death of his father in the property and deceased Dassi Devi executed a Will in favour of defendant in lieu of services rendered by her for 35 years and defendant has performed last rites and ceremony of her mother Dassi Devi. Thus, issues No. 1 is decided against the plaintiff and issue No. 6 is decided in favour of the defendant.” 8. Learned trial Court further held that as Issue No. 1 stood decided against the plaintiff and issue No. 6 stood decided in favour of defendant No. 1, the plaintiff was not entitled for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant. On these bases, the suit so filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned trial Court. 9. In appeal, learned Appellate Court while upholding the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court held that a perusal of Will Ext. D-1 demonstrated that same was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar and it was specifically recited in the Will that Smt. Dassi had inherited the suit land from her husband Twaru, whereas plaintiff was born of her after her second marriage with Nanti and thus Ramki was daughter of Nanti and in fact it was Katki who rendered services in favour of Dassi for about 30 years and that was why she bequeathed her property in favour of Katki. Learned Appellate Court further held that execution of Will Ext. D-1 stood proved from the testimony of DW2 and DW4 and as evidence led by the defendant demonstrated that Will was executed in lieu of services rendered to Dassi by defendant No. 1, therefore, the Will was not shrouded by any suspicious circumstance. Learned Appellate Court also held that as there was litigation between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, the same demonstrated that both of them were not having good terms. Learned Appellate Court also held that as there was litigation between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, the same demonstrated that both of them were not having good terms. It also held that records demonstrate that Dassi had given 2 ½ bighas of land in favour of plaintiff and plaintiff had sold the same to Nihal Chand etc. On these bases, learned Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal so filed by the appellant. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal. 11. The present appeal was admitted by this Court on 31.05.2010 on the following substantial questions of law. “1. Whether in the absence of non-examination of attesting witness, the findings on issue No. 6 are sustainable in the eyes of law. 2. Whether the findings on issue No. 1 are sustainable in the eyes of law specially when the allegations with respect of commission of fraud goes un-rebutted in pleadings as well as in evidence.” 12. On 20.07.2012, the following substantial question of law was also framed by this Court. “3. That the judgment passed by the learned Addl. District Judge Mandi in Civil Appeal No. 57 of 2005 is against the dead person reason being that the respondent Smt. Katki had expired during the pendency of appeal i.e. on 30/04/2006 and the judgment and decree passed by t he learned Addl. District Judge, Mandi in the appeal No. 57 of 2005 dated 4/12/2007 could not have been passed and is a nullity in the eyes of law.” 13. The substantial question of law No. 3 was not pressed at the time of arguments, accordingly, this Court is adjudicating upon substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2, on which, the appeal was admitted initially. For the sake of brevity and to avoid repletion, the substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are being answered together. 14. Mr. B.S. Chauhan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has argued that judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below are not sustainable in the eyes of law and both the learned Courts have erred in not appreciating that the Will propounded by defendant No. 1 was in fact shrouded with suspicious circumstances and these suspicious circumstances were neither successfully dispelled by defendant No. 1, nor the Will in issue was proved on record in accordance with law. On these bases, it was argued by Mr. Chauhan that the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below were perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law and were liable to be set aside. Mr. Chauhan further argued that the factum of the Will having been propounded as a result of fraud and misrepresentation remained un-rebutted in pleadings as well as in evidence and this aspect of the matter has also been ignored by both the learned Courts below. In support of his arguments, Mr. Chauhan has relied upon the following judgments. (i) (2009) 4 SCC 780 , YUMNAM ONGBI TAMPHA IBEMA DEVI Versus YUMNAM JOYKUMAR SINGH AND OTHERS. (ii) (2010) 5 SCC 274 , S.R. SRINIVASA AND OTHERS Versus S. PADMAVATHAMMA. 15. On the other hand, Ms. Sunita Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant No. 1 has strenuously argued that there was no merit in the present appeal as there were concurrent findings returned against the present appellant by both the learned Courts below that the Will in issue was a valid Will, duly executed by the testator and the same was not shrouded with any suspicious circumstance as alleged. Ms. Sunita Sharma, further argued that the execution of the Will stood duly proved in accordance with law and as far as the factum of Will having been got executed as a result of fraud and misrepresentation was concerned, plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the same. On these bases, it was submitted by Ms. Sunita Sharma, that as the appeal was without any merit, the same be dismissed with cost. In support of her arguments, she relied upon the following judgments. (i) AIR 1958 CALCUTTA 440 (V 45 C111)Earnes Bento Souza versus John Francis Souza and others, (ii) AIR 1961 PUNJAB 411 (C 48 C 120), Makhan Mal L. Ram Ditta Mal and others, v. Mst. Pritam Devi and others, (iii) AIR 1965 Kerala 32(V 52 C 13), Punnakkal Konnu’s daughter Ammu v. Thekkekara Kunhunn’s son Krishanan and other, (iv) AIR 1974 ORISSA 170 (V 61 C 53), Harish Chander Sahu and Another v. Basant Kumar Sahu and others, (v) AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana, 384, Lal Singh and another v. Bant Singh and others, (vi) AIR 1984 Punjab And Haryana 270, Labh Singh and another v. Piara Singh (deceased by L.Rs.) and another. 16. 16. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. 17. Section 68 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that if a documents is required by law to be attested, then it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be a attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. Proviso to the said Section further provides that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied. 18. The Will in issue in the present case is Ext. D-1. A perusal of the same demonstrates that this Will has been scribed by one Shri Ram Lal Sharma, Advocate and marginal witness to the same are Kishan Chand s/o Molak r/o Village Panchakur, upper Karsog and Nanak Chand s/o Brestu r/o village Madarnu, upper Karsog. It is not in dispute that the Will in issue is a registered Will. 19. It is settled law that when suspicion is cast on the genuineness of the Will, then the initial onus is on the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 20. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 , that in the cases in which execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that in such circumstances, the initial onus is on the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes initial onus heavier. Such suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind at the time when the will was made. 21. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes initial onus heavier. Such suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind at the time when the will was made. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Adivekka and others Vs. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead) by LRS. and another, (2007) 7 SCC 91 , that where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to remove suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. Section 63 of the Succession Act lays down the mode and manner in which an unprivileged Will is to be executed. Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner in which proof of execution of document is required by law to be attested. It in unequivocal terms states that execution of Will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. The proof of Will is not required as a ground of reading the document but to afford the judge reasonable assurance of it as being what it purports to be. 22. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention that PW1 Smt. Ramki has entered the witness box to support her case and in her testimony, she stated that both she and defendant No. 1 were the daughters of Smt. Dassi and that their father was Twaru. This witness has further categorically deposed in the Court that the Will in issue was got procured by the defendants by playing fraud upon their mother and that in fact she in her capacity of daughter of Dassi was entitled to half of the said property. Incidentally, in her cross examination, there is no suggestion given to the plaintiff on behalf of defendant No. 1 that the Will in dispute was not got executed by defendant No. 1 from the testatrix by playing fraud upon her. 23. In the present cases defendant No. 1 examined five witnesses. She herself entered the witness box as DW1 and besides her, Shri Ram Lal Sharma, was examined as DW2, who is the scribe of the Will. One Shri Bhagat Ram entered the witness box as DW-3 but said Bhagat Ram is not a marginal witness to the said Will. 23. In the present cases defendant No. 1 examined five witnesses. She herself entered the witness box as DW1 and besides her, Shri Ram Lal Sharma, was examined as DW2, who is the scribe of the Will. One Shri Bhagat Ram entered the witness box as DW-3 but said Bhagat Ram is not a marginal witness to the said Will. DW4 is Bharat Bhushan, who as per his deposition was serving as M.C. in the Tehsil office in the year 1993. DW5 is Shri Gulab Singh, but he is also not a marginal witness to the Will in issue. 24. DW1 in her deposition has stated that the Will in issue was scribed by Shri Ram Lal, Advocate and the same was scribed as per desire of her mother and that her mother had appended her signatures on the said Will in the presence of witnesses Krishan Lal and Nanak Chand and thereafter they had gone before the Tehsildar where the said Will was registered. 25. DW2 Shri Ram Lal deposed that Will Ext. D-1 was scribed by him and after scribing the same, he had read the contents of the same to the testatrix who thereafter had appended her thumb impression upon the same in the presence of witnesses Krishan Chand and Nanak Chand, who had also appended their signatures on the same as marginal witnesses. However, it is a matter of record that DW3 Bhagat Ram had deposed that the Will in issue was scribed by Shri Ram Lal Sahrma, Advocate and after the said will was scribed, it was read over and explained to the testatrix who thereafter appended her thumb impression upon the same and the said Will was registered before the Sub Registrar. However, it is a matter of record that Shri Bhagat Ram is not a marginal witness to the Will in issue. 26. DW4 Shri Bharat Bhushan, who was an official serving in the office of Tehsildar, Karsog, had brought the relevant record pertaining to registration of Will Ext. D-1. 27. DW5 Shri Gulab Singh deposed to the effect that he knew Dassi and that Dassi had two daughters i.e. Ramki and Katki. Ramki was the younger one. This witness further stated that Dassi was looked after by both her daughters and that Dassi died at Lichhdi. He deposed that her last rites were performed by both her daughters. 28. 27. DW5 Shri Gulab Singh deposed to the effect that he knew Dassi and that Dassi had two daughters i.e. Ramki and Katki. Ramki was the younger one. This witness further stated that Dassi was looked after by both her daughters and that Dassi died at Lichhdi. He deposed that her last rites were performed by both her daughters. 28. In the present case, execution of the Will in issue was not proved on record by the defendant by examining any of the marginal witnesses. Here is a case where one of the daughters of the testatrix had laid challenge to the veracity of the Will on the ground that the same is a result of fraud and misrepresentation. In other words, here is a Will where the younger daughter was left out of the inheritance of the property in dispute by the testatrix by way of Will in dispute. Thus as a close relative was left out from the Will, the allegation of the said close relative is that testatrix had never intended to execute any such Will as was being propounded by the beneficiary and Will in fact was a result of fraud and misrepresentation. In these circumstances, the initial onus to discharge the suspicious circumstances was heavily upon the defendant. In my considered view, as per evidence on record, defendant No. 1 has miserably failed to discharge said onus on record. Neither there is cogent explanation on record as to why the plaintiff was left out by the testatrix from the Will in issue and further, the will has not been proved in accordance with law as per the mandate of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, as neither of the marginal witnesses was examined in the Court to prove the Will in issue by defendant No. 1. It is not the case of defendant No. 1 nor is there any material on record from which it can be inferred that at the time when statements of defendant’s witness were recorded, both the marginal witnesses were not alive. Therefore, as neither of the marginal witnesses was examined by the defendant to prove the Will in issue, in my considered view, the said Will was never proved on record in accordance with law. This aspect of the matter has been ignored by both the learned Courts below. Therefore, as neither of the marginal witnesses was examined by the defendant to prove the Will in issue, in my considered view, the said Will was never proved on record in accordance with law. This aspect of the matter has been ignored by both the learned Courts below. Learned Courts below have erred in not appreciating that the veracity of the Will or due execution of the Will could not be proved by the testimony of DW2 and DW4. The conclusion arrived to this effect by both the learned Courts below is perverse and not sustainable in law. 29. Now I will deal with the judgments which have been cited by learned counsel for the parties to substantiate their respective stands. 30. A three judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in YUMNAM ONGBI TAMPHA IBEMA DEVI Versus YUMNAM JOYKUMAR SINGH AND OTHERS, (2009) 4 SCC 780 has held. “11. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a Will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the Will; (2) the signature or the mark of the testator should be so placed that it should appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will; (3) the Will should be attested by two or more witnesses, and (4) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will and each of them should sign the Will in presence of the testator. 12. The attestation of the Will in the manner stated above is not an empty formality. It means signing a document for the purpose of testifying of the signatures of the executant. The attested (sic attesting) witness should put his signature on the Will animo attestandi. It is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation is necessary. Since a Will is required by law to be attested, execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. 13. Since a Will is required by law to be attested, execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. 13. Therefore, having regards to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator. 14. In Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh this court observed as follows: [AIR p.351, para 15] "15. When this position was realised the learned counsel for Gangotri fell back on an alternative argument and it was that the deceased admitted execution and completion of the will Ex. A-36 and acknowledged his signature thereto before the Sub-Registrar at Tarabganj and this acknowledgment of his signature was in the presence of the two persons who identified him before the Sub- Registrar viz. Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur who had in their turn appended their signatures at the foot of the endorsement by the Sub-Registrar. These signatures it was contended were enough to prove the due attestation of the will Ex. A-36. This argument would have availed Gangotri if Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur had appended their signatures at the foot of the endorsement of registration animo attestandi. But even apart from this circumstance it is significant that neither Mahadeo Pershad nor Nageshur was called as a witness to depose to the fact of such attestation if any. One could not presume from the mere signatures of Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur appearing at the foot of the endorsement of registration that they had appended their signatures to the document as attesting witnesses or can be construed to have done so in their capacity as attesting witnesses. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires an attesting witness to be called as a witness to prove the due execution and attestation of the will. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires an attesting witness to be called as a witness to prove the due execution and attestation of the will. This provision should have been complied with in order that Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur be treated as attesting witnesses. This line of argument therefore cannot help Gangotri." 15. In B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh it was observed as follows: (SCC pp.456-60, paras 15-24) "15. It is, however, well settled that compliance with statutory requirements itself is not sufficient as would appear from the discussions hereinafter made. 16. The approach of the Division Bench of the High Court did not address itself the right question. It took an erroneous approach to the issue as would appear from the decision of this Court in Surendra Pal v. Dr. Saraswati Arora [ 1974 (2) SCC 600 ] whereupon again Mr V. Balachandran himself placed reliance, wherein the law was stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 605, para 7) ‘7. The propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the will are not the result of the testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain." 17. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N.Thimmajamma it was opined: (AIR pp. 451-52, paras 19-20) ‘19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter." 18. In Guro v. Atma Singh this Court has opined: (SCC p. 511, para 3) ‘3. With regard to proof of a will the law is well settled that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. With regard to proof of a will the law is well settled that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will could be accepted as genuine. Such suspicious circumstances may be a shaky signature, a feeble mind and unfair and unjust disposal of property or the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator.’ 19. Yet again Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner of proof of execution of document which is required by law to be attested stating that the execution must be proved by at least one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 20. This Court in Daulat Ram v. Sodha stated the law thus: (SCC p. 43, para 10) ‘10. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. Since it is required to be attested, as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it cannot be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. In addition, it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. In addition, it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. In order to assess as to whether the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so." (emphasis in original)” 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. SRINIVASA AND OTHERS Versus S. PADMAVATHAMMA, (2010) 5 SCC 274 has held that in the absence of execution of Will having been proved, as none of the attesting witnesses were examined, the statement of the scribe itself was not sufficient to prove the Will as animus to attest was not evident from the document. In the present case also the scribe who was examined as DW2 has not stated that he had signed the Will with the intent to attest the same and in his statement he has merely deposed that he was the scribe of the Will. 32. I am not independently dwelling upon each of the judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondent. Suffice it to say that law laid down in all the said judgments is that Registration Officer/Sub Registrar can be regarded as an attesting witness if execution of Will is admitted before him. With respectful agreement as far as laws declared by various Hon’ble High Courts are concerned, in my considered view, the judgments so cited by learned counsel for the respondents have no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. With respectful agreement as far as laws declared by various Hon’ble High Courts are concerned, in my considered view, the judgments so cited by learned counsel for the respondents have no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, neither the Registration Officer nor the Sub Registrar, before whom the Will was purportedly admitted by the testatrix, were examined in the Court by the defendants. Thus, the judgments which have been relied by learned counsel for the respondents have no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 33. Both the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 34. In view of the discussion above, this appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, camp at Karsog, in Civil Appeal No. 57 of 2005, dated 04.12.2007 and learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) Karsog, in Civil Suit No. 17 of 2004, dated 20.11.2004, are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed to the effect that registered Will No. 179, dated 11.10.1994 is declared as null and void and defendant No. 1 is also restrained by way of a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from alienating the suit land in any manner. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.