JUDGMENT : Tapabrata Chakraborty, J. 1. The subject matter of challenge in the present appeal is an order dated 6th January, 2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP 5763 (W) of 2015 by which the writ petition preferred by the petitioner/appellant herein praying for directions upon the respondents to release all service benefits and to pay compensation in lieu of reinstatement, was dismissed. 2. The appellant preferred the writ petition stating, inter alia, that the petitioner/appellant joined the post of Junior Scientific Assistant on 30th June, 1971 in National Chemical Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as NCL) which is one of the laboratories under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (hereinafter referred to as CSIR). The appellant was issued an order of suspension on 27th January, 1982 and after an enquiry, punishment of removal from service was imposed on 16th/17th August, 1982. The statutory appeal preferred against the same was dismissed by an order dated 12th March, 1983. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed OA 520 of 1987 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai which was allowed on 3rd January, 1990 setting aside the order of the appellate authority with a direction to consider the appeal afresh upon the appellate authority to rehear. In spite of repeated representations thereafter the respondents did not respond and as such an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed but no proper reply was furnished. 3. In the backdrop of the said facts averred in the writ petition, the appellant, appearing in-person, argued before the learned Single Judge that he is entitled to be compensated since the respondents have not bothered to comply with the order passed by the learned Tribunal passed in OA 520 of 1987 on 3rd January, 1990. He further argued that when the order of the appellate authority dated 12th March, 1983 was set aside by the learned Tribunal the respondents ought to have reinstated him in service and for such denial the appellant had suffered irreparable loss and injury. 4. Mr. Pulakesh Bajpayee, learned advocate appearing for the respondents submits that the appellant filed the writ petition suppressing material facts and has approached this Court unnecessarily since the appellant’s claim had already been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The appellant has, however, been paid all his dues, including provident fund, to which he was entitled after suffering the penalty of removal from service. 5. The appellant has, however, been paid all his dues, including provident fund, to which he was entitled after suffering the penalty of removal from service. 5. Upon perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we find that the argument towards denial of reinstatement and consequential compensation was duly considered and it was observed that the learned Tribunal by order dated 3rd January, 1990 did set aside the order of the appellate authority but did not direct the appellant to be reinstated. The matter was sent back to the appellate authority for a fresh adjudication. According to the learned Single Judge it was open to the appellant to challenge the said order for not directing reinstatement and having not done so he cannot argue that he ought to have been reinstated by the authorities. Merely because the order of appellate authority was set aside, the dismissal order passed by the disciplinary would not get effaced as argued by the appellant. The learned Tribunal had not set aside that order and therefore he did not have a right to be reinstated upon the appellate authority’s order being set aside. The learned Single Judge, upon dealing with all the factual issues arrived at specific findings and we do not find any error, least to say any patent error of law in the order impugned. At this juncture we could have set the matter at rest but the way the appellant has sought to mislead us, taking advantage of our sympathetic approach, needs further deliberation. 6. We have heard the appellant on several occasions and gave him enough time to argue the matter as we felt that he did not have the alacrity and acumen attributable to a professional and as he was appearing in-person without any professional help. Subsequently, however, alarming facts came to our notice when, as directed by us, an affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the respondents. In the said affidavit it was stated that after the order dated 3rd January, 1990 was passed in OA 520 of 1987, the appellate authority granted him due opportunity of hearing and passed a speaking order on 20th August 1990 confirming the penalty of removal from service. Challenging the said order the appellant again preferred OA 160 of 1991 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench and the same was dismissed on 9th October, 1994. Challenging the said order the appellant again preferred OA 160 of 1991 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench and the same was dismissed on 9th October, 1994. Challenging the said order the appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Special Leave Petition was also dismissed on 23rd September, 1996 on merits. Thereafter, the appellant filed another original application being OA 42 of 1997 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench but the same was also dismissed on 15th December, 2003 and the review application filed thereafter being RA 1 of 2004 was also dismissed on 22nd March, 2004. The appellant filed another original application being OA 173 of 2012 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench but the same was also dismissed on 23rd February, 2012. Challenging the said order the petitioner filed a writ petition being WPCT 99 of 2012 before this Court. All the said facts were intentionally suppressed by the appellant and the writ petition being WP 5763 (W) of 2015 was filed before this Court. 7. As the respondents could not apprise us about the fate of the writ petition being WPCT 99 of 2012, we called for the records of the said writ petition from the department. Upon production of the same we found that the said writ petition had also been dismissed by an order dated 25th April, 2012 observing, inter alia, as follows: “We have heard the petitioner in person. It is his contention that because the New Bombay Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No. 520 of 1987 had set aside the decision of the Appellate Authority and directed it to decide the Appeal afresh, he is entitled to reinstatement in service and for all consequential benefits. The petitioner has relied on several decisions including that of the Supreme Court, Krishna Kumar –vs- The Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway and others, AIR 1979 SC 1912 and decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunal. We are afraid that the petitioner has been ill advised and has approached the Courts for relief, which cannot be granted. The petitioner has relied on several decisions including that of the Supreme Court, Krishna Kumar –vs- The Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway and others, AIR 1979 SC 1912 and decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunal. We are afraid that the petitioner has been ill advised and has approached the Courts for relief, which cannot be granted. The case of the petitioner that he was entitled to reinstatement and consequential reliefs because Appellate Authority had not passed any order pursuant to the directions of the New Bombay Bench of the Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.520 of 1987 is belied by the fact that the petitioner was called for a personal hearing by the Appellate Authority on 20th August, 1990. He refused to appear before the Authority. Left with no alternative, the Authority has passed the order confirming the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The orders of both the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority have been confirmed right upto the Supreme Court. Therefore, no relief cannot be given to the petitioner in this case. The petitioner has been unable to bring to our notice any Rule indicating that even after removal or dismissal from service he would be entitled to pension. The petitioner points out that all the orders passed against him are void ab initio because they violate Articles 14, 16, 41, 42, 51A, 309, 311(1) and 311(2) of the Constitution. We are not impressed with this argument. As we have noted earlier, the orders have been challenged in the Supreme Court and it has found no merit in the petitioner’s case. Therefore, the petitioner cannot now contend before us that the orders passed against him are ultra vires. In these circumstances, the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, was right in dismissing his Application. The petition is dismissed.” 8. After such dismissal of the writ petition the appellant again preferred an application being CAN No. 3811 of 2012 praying for release of pension, arrears of salary and all other service benefits. The same upon hearing was disposed of by an order dated 8th June, 2012 observing, inter alia, as follows: “In the event the applicant is entitled to pension in accordance with law, that should be paid to him expeditiously. It is made clear that the pension will be paid to the applicant only if he is entitled to it, despite his dismissal/removal from service. It is made clear that the pension will be paid to the applicant only if he is entitled to it, despite his dismissal/removal from service. We make it clear that in case the applicant files any further frivolous litigation knowing full well that the dismissal order passed against him has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, he will be liable to pay heavy costs. The application being CAN No.3811 of 2012 stands dismissed.” 9. Such repeated orders of dismissal and observations made by this Court did not deter the appellant from again approaching this Court through the writ petition being WP 5763 (W) of 2015. The appellant has taken the advantage of the sympathetic approach of the Court and has mislead the Court and wasted its valuable time. The appellant deserves to be castigated as he is an irresponsible litigant who had repeatedly approached this Court with frivolous litigations and such recalcitrant attitude of the appellant warrants imposition of appropriate punishment. 10. However, considering the fact that the appellant has been removed from service way back in the year 1982 and that he is presently more than 70 years of age, we restrain ourselves from imposing heavy costs. 11. The appeal and the application are, accordingly, dismissed. 12. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.