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2017 DIGILAW 564 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Abdulgani Ismailbhai Pathan

2017-03-10

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant - State has filed the present appeal against the judgment and order, 28.3.2006, passed by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 12, Vadodara in Sessions Case No. 128 of 2005. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the FIR came to be registered on 9.9.2003 by one Dhulabhai Girdharbhai, Unarmed Head Constable, City Police Station, Vadodara stating, inter-alia, that they were in the bandobast at Champaner-Bhoiwada for immersion of idol of Lord Ganesh along with other police personnel and throughout the area, the police personnel were deployed for keeping vigil over the miscreants. At the time of immersion ceremony, when the immersion proceedings was passing through Champaner-Bhoiwada, nani Chhipwada at about 20.15 hours, at that time mob of 3000 persons approximately comprising of Hindu-Muslim gathered and started pelting stones on each other and though warning given by police personnel not to throw the stones, the mob did not respond positively and since pelting of the stones, bottles and bombs were intensified and one explosion was also took place near the police vehicle, the tear gas cell were fired at the mob, but the pelting of the stones could not be reduced. Hence, the complainant fired five rounds from his 303 revolvers in the air and as a result of which, mob started running helter-skelter and during that time, one Abdulgani Ismailbhai Pathan was caught from mob. Accordingly, complaint was lodged against 3000 strong mob under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 336 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substance Act and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act bearing C.R. No. 218 of 2003. 2.1 It is further reflecting from the record that the Investigating Officer, upon registering the offence, had commenced the investigation, recorded the statements of relevant witnesses, drawn necessary panchnamas and also conducted every steps which were required in furtherance of investigation and ultimately, having found material against the respondents accused, a detailed charge-sheet came to be filed on 24.11.2003. 2.2 Since the case was triable by the court of sessions, the learned Magistrate, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to commit the case to the sessions court and the same was registered as Sessions Case No. 128 of 2005. 2.2 Since the case was triable by the court of sessions, the learned Magistrate, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to commit the case to the sessions court and the same was registered as Sessions Case No. 128 of 2005. The learned Sessions Judge pursuant to the committal order, was pleased to frame the charge at Exh. 5 against the respondents accused and to proceed with the trial, a plea was recorded of the respondents accused in which the respondents accused denied the offence being committed and therefore, the case was put up for further adjudication. With a view to prove the case against the respondents accused, the prosecution has led the oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner. Sr. No. PW No. Name Exh. With a view to prove the case against the respondents accused, the prosecution has led the oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner. Sr. No. PW No. Name Exh. No. 1 1 Dhulabhai Girdharbhai 11 2 2 Lalabhai Bajrangbhai Kahar 13 3 3 Arvindbhai Harinath 14 4 4 Pravinbhai Chhitabhai Parmar 15 5 5 Vijay Lallubhai Parmar 16 6 6 Dineshbhai Bachubhai Parmar 17 7 7 Vinod Kishanbhai Kahar 18 8 8 Ashwinbhai Kalyansinh Mahida 29 9 9 Dipakbhai Kanubhai Vaghela 31 10 10 Rajeshbhai Harjivan Thakkar 33 11 11 Baldevji Takhuji Chavada 34 12 12 Hirabhia Jalambhai 35 13 13 Harising Gulabsing Gadhavi 36 14 14 Kanubhai Pragjibhai 37 15 15 Vijaysinh Shankarsinh 38 16 16 Fatesinh Punjabhai 39 17 17 Pruthvisinh Abhesinh 40 18 18 Thakorbhai Shanabhai 41 19 19 Rajeshbhai Dinkarrao Bhalekar 43 20 20 Harendrasinh Udesingh 45 21 21 Mahendrasinh Chhatrasinh 46 22 22 Gohil Jagdipsinh Velubha 48 23 23 Narendrabhai Govindbhai 49 24 24 Bharatbhai Ramubhai 50 25 25 Hitendrasinh Bahadursinh 51 26 26 Ashokbhai Shivajiram 52 27 27 Udesing Shanabhai Parmar 53 28 28 Husainkhan Pathan 55 29 29 Jugbhai Vansantsing Surela 56 Evidence led by prosecution 1 Original Complaint 12 2 Panchnama of place of incident 19 3 Panchnama of recovery of explosive substance 20 4 Yadi as to defusing the bomb 21 5 Report of FSL 22 6 Injury certificate of witness 23 7 Injury certificate of witness 24 8 Yadi as to sending of FSL 25 9 Receipt as to receiving muddamal in FSL 26 10 FSL report 27 11 Notification 28 12 Panchnama as to production of accused 30 13 Panchnama as to recovery of bomb 32 14 Muddamal panchnama 44 15 Copy of station diary 54 2.3 The prosecution has examined as many as 29 witnesses and has adduced 15 documentary evidence in number and after leading the evidence, a closure pursis was given at Exh. 57. Thereafter, the trial court has given an opportunity to the respondents accused on recording their statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which also since the offence was denied to have been committed and the respondents accused claimed to be tried, the case was put up for further adjudication. 57. Thereafter, the trial court has given an opportunity to the respondents accused on recording their statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which also since the offence was denied to have been committed and the respondents accused claimed to be tried, the case was put up for further adjudication. The trial court pursuant to that has framed the issues and after considering the detailed evidence and material led before the Court, has passed the judgment and order, dated 28.3.2006, whereby, all the respondents accused have been acquitted from the offence for which they have been tried and it is this judgment and order which is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellate - State. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP representing the State has vehemently contended that there is a clear error on the part of trial court in passing an order of acquittal. Learned APP has contended that though by leading detailed evidence on record the prosecution has established the case beyond the reasonable doubt, there is hardly any circumstance left upon which an order of acquittal can be passed and therefore, in the absence of any such cogent circumstance, the reasons assigned by the trial court are not palatable or germane to law and therefore, a serious error committed by the trial court in exercising jurisdiction is required to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal. Learned APP further contended that there is adequate material adduced before the Court to justify the guilt of the respondents accused and further, a serious offence was alleged against the respondents which could not have been brushed aside simply because some of the witnesses are not supporting the case of prosecution. 3.1 Learned APP, while taking such plea before this Court and while suggesting that error is committed, has taken us to various documents appearing on record of the case including depositions which have been adduced. Learned APP has also taken us to the testimony of complainant - Dhula Girdhar (PW-1), who is examined at Exh. 3.1 Learned APP, while taking such plea before this Court and while suggesting that error is committed, has taken us to various documents appearing on record of the case including depositions which have been adduced. Learned APP has also taken us to the testimony of complainant - Dhula Girdhar (PW-1), who is examined at Exh. 11, has also taken us to various witnesses, who are the police officers deployed on the spot for bandobast including the injured eye witness, who supports the case of prosecution and by referring to these evidences, learned APP has contended that a clear error is committed by the trial court in passing an order of acquittal and therefore, this is a fit case in which the order of acquittal can be reversed. 3.2 Learned APP has then taken us to the documentary evidence which have been led before the trial court and in furtherance to that, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court have also been drawn the attention thereof and ultimately, contended that the reasons are not cogent enough to substantiate the conclusion arrived at by the trial court. Learned APP has also contended that there is a specific material available on record to establish the guilt of the respondents accused. Over and above that, there is enough medical evidence and the serological material which is connecting the circumstance having nexus with the respondents accused and therefore, when such piece of evidence is substantiating and strengthening the case of prosecution, it was not open for the trial court to exercise the jurisdiction in mechanical manner to dispose of the case on the basis of presumption and inferences. The inferences which have been drawn by the trial court are not substantiating or getting support from the evidence and therefore, such irregular exercise of jurisdiction is required to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal. 3.3 Learned APP has contended further that there are two injured witnesses, who have substantially supported the case of prosecution, who sustained injuries on account of incident in question. Still, however, on the basis of some flimsy grounds, their versions have not been accepted. 3.3 Learned APP has contended further that there are two injured witnesses, who have substantially supported the case of prosecution, who sustained injuries on account of incident in question. Still, however, on the basis of some flimsy grounds, their versions have not been accepted. Learned APP further contended that accused No. 1 - Abdulgani Ismailbhai is identified by the witnesses, who are injured eye witnesses to the incident in question, their testimony at least could have been believed from the stand point of view of accused No. 1, who played vital role in commission of crime and therefore, when the prosecution has made out a case at least against accused No. 1, there is hardly any reason to disbelieve the version and acquit him from the charges leveled against him. Learned APP has further contended that the Investigating Officer has also supported the case of prosecution and his version is getting support from other injured eye witnesses and therefore, simply because the testimony is that of police officers, it cannot be discarded. Learned APP has further contended that when the panchas have turned hostile, simply on that circumstance it is not open for the trial court to disbelieve the entire case especially when the cogent evidence is substantiating the version of the prosecution and therefore, in its entirety learned APP has contended that the case is made out against the respondents beyond the reasonable doubt and in this set of circumstance, this is a fit case to interfere with an order of acquittal by exercising jurisdiction under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. Learned APP has ultimately requested the Court to reverse the finding and order passed by the trial court and allow the appeal filed by the appellant - State. 4. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. J.S. Kadiya, learned advocate for Mr. Shakeel A. Qureshi for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the case beyond the reasonable doubt. Mr. Kadiya has specifically contended that there are adequate and cogent reasons assigned by the trial court to justify the order of acquittal. J.S. Kadiya, learned advocate for Mr. Shakeel A. Qureshi for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the case beyond the reasonable doubt. Mr. Kadiya has specifically contended that there are adequate and cogent reasons assigned by the trial court to justify the order of acquittal. Learned advocate has further contended that looking to the entire judgment as a whole, there appears to be no perversity in the reasons assigned by the trial court nor any irregularity or illegality in passing the order of acquittal and therefore, in the absence of such contingencies, the appellate jurisdiction may not be exercised to interfere with an order of acquittal. Mr. Kadiya has further contended that even if on the basis of material on record, any plausible view is possible, the said plausible view cannot be substituted in exercise of appellate jurisdiction more particularly when the trial court has considered the evidence and arrived at a subjective satisfaction and looking to the material on record, there appears to be no plausible view by virtue of which an order of acquittal is to be intercepted. Mr. Kadiya has further contended that all the witnesses, who have been examined, are not independent witnesses and the witnesses, who have been examined, are police witnesses and therefore, in the absence of any cogent corroboration, such evidence is not safe to rely to convict the respondents accused. Mr. Kadiya has further contended that even the witnesses inter-se have not cogently established the guilt. On the contrary, there appears to be a stiff contradiction in the version of the witnesses. He also pointed out that substantial evidence which is coming out is on the basis of the fact that the names have been given by the "D" staff employees and therefore, the credential to the version of witnesses is of no avail and therefore, Mr. Kadiya has requested the Court not to reverse the order of acquittal. 4.1 Mr. Kadiya, learned advocate has further contended that medical evidence is also not supporting the case of prosecution and the independent corroboration which is required is also not substantiating the case of prosecution and therefore, Mr. Kadiya has requested the Court that no order of conviction may be passed on the basis of such kind of weak piece of evidence. Kadiya, learned advocate has further contended that medical evidence is also not supporting the case of prosecution and the independent corroboration which is required is also not substantiating the case of prosecution and therefore, Mr. Kadiya has requested the Court that no order of conviction may be passed on the basis of such kind of weak piece of evidence. Learned advocate has also contended that overall evidence and the reading thereof is indicating that there is no irregularity or illegality committed in passing an order of acquittal which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of such eventuality, no order of acquittal is to be interfered with and accordingly, Mr. Kadiya has requested that looking to the settled position of law propounded by catena of decisions on the issue of exercise of appellate jurisdiction in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, no interference is required in the present case and therefore, ultimately requested the Court to discard the contentions raised by the learned APP and prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the order passed by the trial court and having assessed the evidence on record independently also, the following circumstances are not possible to be ignored to test whether the prosecution has proved the case beyond the reasonable doubt. 6. The examination of record reveals that the PW-1 - Dhula Girdhar (complainant), who is examined at Exh. 11, has deposed that on account of incident in question on 9.9.2003, the mob of approximately 3000 people was on the road and despite bandobast, the violence shown by the mob. This witness has also stated in chief examination that in the bandobast, there were two police personnel named as Fatesinh Punjabhai, who sustained injures in leg and another Narendra Govindbhai, on whose face there was an injury by stone and therefore, it is only after hard efforts and firing in air, the mob got disbursed and therefore, these witnesses have made an attempt to establish the case of prosecution. But then if their cross-examination is to be evaluated it is revealed that at the time when the occurrence took place, there was darkness. It was also admitted that mob of Hindu and Muslims was consisting of approximately 3000 persons. But then if their cross-examination is to be evaluated it is revealed that at the time when the occurrence took place, there was darkness. It was also admitted that mob of Hindu and Muslims was consisting of approximately 3000 persons. He also admitted that he is not in "D" staff and has categorically stated that respondents accused have not been arrested or nabbed by him and it is only on account of the say of "D" staff, name of Abdulgani Ismailbhai is mentioned and therefore, this witness has not personally either nabbed accused No. 1 - Abdulgani Ismailbhai nor has seen in commission of crime. On the contrary, it appears that accused No. 1 - Abdulgani Ismailbhai has been arraigned on the basis of say of "D" staff. 7. The PW-5 - Vijaybhai Lallubhai Parmar, who is examined at Exh. 16, has also stated about occurrence. But since he has not supported the case of prosecution, this witness has been declared as hostile. Similar is the case with respect to another PW-6 - Dineshbhai Bachubhai Parmar, who is examined at Exh. 17. Said witness has also not supported the case of prosecution. Yet another PW-7 - Vinod Kishanbhai Kahar, who is examined at Exh. 18, has also not supported the case of prosecution and therefore, all these witnesses have chosen not to support the case of prosecution which is not taking the case of prosecution beyond a reasonable point. 8. The record of the case has further been examined to unearth the truth and for that purpose, the Court has undertaken the exercise of examination and assessing the testimony of other witnesses. The PW-11 - Baldevji Takhuji Chavada, who is examined at Exh. 34, who was serving as Police Inspector at the relevant time i.e. on 9.9.2003 and was in bandobast, a close scrutiny of his evidence is clearly reflecting that neither he has seen Abdulgani Ismailbhai with a sword nor having any personal knowledge about his playing role. Again, this witness has categorically stated that Abdulgani Ismailbhai's name has been mentioned on the basis of the say of "D" staff. Similar is the case with another PW-13 - Harising Gulabsing Gadhavi, who is examined at Exh. 36. Again, this witness has categorically stated that Abdulgani Ismailbhai's name has been mentioned on the basis of the say of "D" staff. Similar is the case with another PW-13 - Harising Gulabsing Gadhavi, who is examined at Exh. 36. This witness, who was the police officer incharge of Baldevji Takhuji Chavada at the relevant point of time, has stated that Dhulabhai, Head Constable had fired 5 rounds from his revolver and other colleagues had also made an attempt to disburse the crowd. But then surprisingly this witness has stated that he had seen Abdulgani Ismailbhai, who was nabbed with sword. This injured witness has further stated in his chief examination that this very Abdulgani Ismailbhai, who was spotted from the scene of occurrence and nabbed by the police. At the time when this witness had received the message to reach to the place of occurrence, he went to the spot and then after discharging, went away. This police witness has been examined after almost a period of more than 3 years and there this witness deposing that he had identified the accused - Abdulgani Ismailbhai with sword. 9. The evidence of PW-14 - Kanubhai Pragjibhai, who is examined at Exh. 37, is also pressed into service by the prosecution to establish the guilt. The said witness has stated that on the scene of occurrence, stone pelting was continuing including bombs were thrown and the mob was in uncontrolled situation where despite warning having been given, same had not been disbursed and in that atmosphere, this witness has stated that he had seen one Yashir, who was throwing bomb, to whom he was knowing well and one person had been named, who was Abdulgani Ismailbhai Pathan with a sword. Now the version of this witness if to be viewed from the testimony of other witnesses as is reflecting, at that time there was a darkness and mob of 3000 persons approximately and this witness was very much in the "D" staff, who specifically admitted that name of Abdulgani Ismailbhai had been mentioned on the basis of the say of "D" staff. Therefore, this witness is raising serious doubt about the testimony of other witness, who made an attempt to support the case of prosecution. 10. Yet another PW-15 - Vijay Shankarsinh, who is examined at Exh. Therefore, this witness is raising serious doubt about the testimony of other witness, who made an attempt to support the case of prosecution. 10. Yet another PW-15 - Vijay Shankarsinh, who is examined at Exh. 38, who is a police constable of city police station, who in his testimony appears to have identified Abdulgani Ismailbhai with sword. But again if his cross-examination is to be evaluated, he has not supported the case of prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. On the contrary, his version is appearing in conflict with the other testimony of witnesses and therefore, no credence be given. Similar is the case with PW-16 - Fatesinh Punjabhai, who is examined at Exh. 39 and other witnesses as well. Therefore, these witnesses having been examined before the trial court have deposed before the trial court and the trial court has considered their testimony and then, arrived at a conclusion which appears to be in consonance with the evidence and cannot be said to be perverse. 11. The evidence of PW-22 - Gohil Jagdipsinh Velubha, who is examined at Exh. 48, is very crucial as he was serving as PI at Patan at the relevant point of time and on 9.9.2003 was in city police station. This witness, in his testimony, has categorically admitted that whenever a person is to be nabbed with muddamal, a panchnama is required to be prepared, panchas are to be called for endorsing their signatures are to be taken on each page and entire process has been mentioned in his cross-examination. But in further cross-examination, said witness has conveyed that Abdulgani Ismailbhai was also having some another case and therefore, there are all possibilities that on the basis of past history, said Abdulgani Ismailbhai might have been nabbed though some of the witnesses have not seen him nor arrested. Same is the case with another PW-23 - Narendrabhai Govindbhai, who is examined at Exh. 49, who in cross-examination has admitted specifically that he has not named Abdulgani Ismailbhai nor has seen nor has supported the version of other witnesses that on the scene of occurrence, there was a darkness and therefore, all these witnesses, who are the police witnesses, who were handling large gathering of 3000 persons' mob in the darkness, have made an attempt to establish the case beyond the reasonable doubt. But not a single independent witness is examined by the prosecution and therefore, unless and until the police witnesses are corroborated by the version of other cogent material, it is difficult for the Court to arrive at a conclusion of guilt as there are possibilities of raising suspicion. Here, in this case, reading of the evidence as a whole, none of the police witnesses are referring to the name of other accused persons, who are party to the sessions case and only the name of Abdulgani Ismailbhai is getting reflecting and therefore, when the testimony of PI Gohil is suggesting that there was some other case of Abdulgani Ismailbhai also, a reasonable apprehension was rightly voiced out by learned advocate that on account of past history, the name of the accused must have been mentioned and he was arraigned in the prosecution. 12. In addition thereto, reading of the entire evidence is reflecting that nothing much is stated by any of the witnesses so far as other accused persons are concerned and most surprising fact which is emerging is that Yashir Pathan, who is said to have thrown the bomb at the time of occurrence, he is not named nor knowing nor made a party to the present proceedings as an accused and therefore, the case of the prosecution is becoming suspicious and generating any confidence to arrive at a decision the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. In addition to this ocular evidence, even the statement recorded under Section 313 if to be seen of accused - Abdulgani Ismailbhai in which, accused - Abdulgani Ismailbhai has specifically denied the offence being committed and has stated categorically that he has wrongly been nabbed in the prosecution and therefore, when such stand is taken by the respondent accused, it was obligatory on the part of prosecution to establish the same by leading evidence beyond the reasonable doubt against him. No such attempt appears to have been made by the prosecution. 14. In addition thereto, the evidence in the form of serological report is also not indicating any incriminating material by virtue of which it can be established that Abdulgani Ismailbhai has utilized the weapon with which he has been arraigned. No such attempt appears to have been made by the prosecution. 14. In addition thereto, the evidence in the form of serological report is also not indicating any incriminating material by virtue of which it can be established that Abdulgani Ismailbhai has utilized the weapon with which he has been arraigned. The serological examination reflecting on Page-192 and 193 of the paper-book compilation, on the contrary, reveals that something else than the weapon which is shown with the accused - Abdulgani Ismailbhai and therefore, here in the case none of the witnesses attributing specific role so far as other accused persons are concerned and the witnesses who naming Abdulgani Ismailbhai are not cogently establishing his role being played in commission of crime. No injury with sword is attributed to have been given by accused No. 1 - Abdulgani Ismailbhai nor any serological report is connecting the accused person with commission of crime and therefore, in the absence of any cogent circumstantial link with the respondents accused, the case cannot be said to have been proved beyond the reasonable doubt and therefore, the prevalent position reflecting on material on record which necessitated the Court to look into the reasons which are assigned by the trial court. Our independent analysis of evidence coupled with the reasons which are assigned by the trial court based upon the very material on record are the views which are possible to be reflected. From page-277 onwards, the analysis of evidence is reflecting that there is a stiff contradiction between the witnesses who have been pressed into service with respect to role of Abdulgani Ismailbhai being played. It is further reflecting from the order that who is the person from "D" staff, who has specifically given the name of Abdulgani Ismailbhai and therefore, all witnesses are stating that some "D" staff person has named Abdulgani Ismailbhai and therefore, witnesses are naming the very person but, who named is not put for examination nor his name is emerging from the record. Therefore, from the very incident, attribution and assignment of Abdulgani Ismailbhai is raising serious doubt in the case of prosecution which was rightly appreciated by the trial court as is appearing. 15. Therefore, from the very incident, attribution and assignment of Abdulgani Ismailbhai is raising serious doubt in the case of prosecution which was rightly appreciated by the trial court as is appearing. 15. In furtherance of the reasons which are assigned, the panchas are not supporting the case of prosecution and therefore, most material aspect is that the persons who have used throwing bomb on the scene of occurrence, though police officers who are examined naming specifically that Yashir Pathan was the person who had thrown the bomb, is not nabbed nor interacted nor arraigned in the prosecution and nor is a party to the present proceedings. This is seriously questioning the veracity of the case of the prosecution. In addition thereto, it has also come on record that at the scene of occurrence, there was a darkness. Now, how in such darkness and in a scuffle with the mob of 3000 persons, these police witnesses naming specifically at the tip of tongue the name of the respondents accused. This is possibly because of the fact that Abdulgani Ismailbhai may have some past history and therefore, this possibility of arraigning the accused wrongfully is not possible to be overruled which the trial court appears to have rightly appreciated and therefore, this possible view which has been taken by the trial court is a probable view as the entire evidence which has emerged is considered in detail by the trial court and therefore, when the trial court on the basis of such material has found that no case is made out in the absence of any distinguishable circumstance, sitting in an appellate jurisdiction, it is not possible for this Court to dislodge the finding arrived at by the trial court and therefore, on the basis of such kind of analysis of evidence as a whole, we found that the trial court has not committed any error in arriving at a decision. We also found on the basis of our independent analysis also that the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not perverse nor irregular nor any illegality appears to have been committed in passing an order of acquittal. We also found on the basis of our independent analysis also that the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not perverse nor irregular nor any illegality appears to have been committed in passing an order of acquittal. Therefore, on totality of the circumstances prevailing on record coupled with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, we are not in a position to find out any extraordinary circumstances contrary to disturb the finding arrived at by the trial court and therefore, the reasons which are assigned are in consonance with the evidence on record which cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the evidence on record and therefore, we are not inclined to disturb the finding arrived at by the trial court. 16. We are mindful of the fact that exercise of appellate jurisdiction, more particularly while dealing with the appeal against acquittal, there are certain parameters prescribed by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. Some of them are deserve to be narrated hereinafter: 16.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 16.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 16.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside"." 16.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 16.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 17. From the aforesaid position prevailing on record and upon due consideration to the evidence as a whole and looking to the proposition of law on the issue, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal filed by the appellate - State has no merit which can permit us to interfere with the finding of the trial court and accordingly, the appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 18. In view of the above, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 28.3.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 128 of 2005, by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 12, Vadodara, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.