JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed questioning the judgment and decree passed by learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Berhampur-Ganjam in R.F.A. No. 61 of 2015 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Berhampur in C.S. No. 44 of 2013, decreeing the suit filed by the respondent as the plaintiff and directing the appellant-defendant to give delivery of vacant possession of the suit house and pay the arrear house rent as well as to clear up the charges towards electric and water connection to the said house. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial court. 3. Laxmi Narayan Mahaprabhu (“the DEITY”) Bije, At- Kasturi Das Matha has filed the suit through Mahant Bhagaban Das, Chella of Guru Late Raghunath Das. The plaintiff has a tile roofed house consisting of two rooms in a busy place within the township of Berhampur. The property belonging to the Deity is said to be under management of Mahant Bhagaban Das who is said to be taking all the care and looking after the affairs of the Deity. It is stated that the house had been let out to the defendant on 01.09.1986 for a period of 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. A deed to that effect had been executed. The defendant was last paying a sum of Rs. 700/- per month towards rent. The defendant though had undertaken to leave the house after the expiry of the period of 11 months and sometime thereafter as agreed upon since did not vacate, the suit has been filed, after issuance of notice to vacate. Some allegations have also been made regarding improper of suit rooms under the occupation of defendant as tenant, during period by going for structural alteration and addition therein unperturbed by the protest. 4. The defendant in the written statement has questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has not been properly represented; he has denied the fact that he was a tenant in respect of the suit house since 01.09.1986. It is however next stated that since the year 1946 his ancestors have been in possession of the suit house and when the present Mahant came into picture, he obtained that formal deed. It is however next stated that since the year 1946 his ancestors have been in possession of the suit house and when the present Mahant came into picture, he obtained that formal deed. After expiry of the period mentioned therein, the defendant claims to have been continuing as before by paying monthly rent. The allegation of making structural alteration and addition in the suit rooms have been refuted. It is again stated that this Mahant who has filed the suit representing the Deity has no such status and has no locus to institute the suit. It is stated that the status that he asserts is a self styled and proclaimed one. It is further stated that for serving mischievous purpose, said Mahant is hell bent on evicting the defendant so as to induct his own associates therein as tenants and it is not at all with the intention of benefit the Deity in any way which is of paramount consideration. 5. On such rival pleadings, the trial court altogether framed six issues. The first two concern with the maintainability and cause of action for the suit. The other important issues relate to the representation of the Deity by this Mahant Bhagaban Das if proper for the purpose of suit or not and the entitlement of the plaintiff to the relief of eviction of the defendant from the said house which covers also the point of validity of the notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act served prior to the suit. The trial court then very rightly proceeded to answer the issue relating to the representation of the Deity by said Mahant first. Upon discussion of evidence in the touchstone of the pleadings, answer has been recorded in favour of proper representation of the Deity by said Mahant for the purpose of the suit. The other issues touching the relief of eviction have finally had been answered in favour of the plaintiff. Basing on these findings, the suit has been decreed. 6. The defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree directing him to give delivery of vacant possession of the suit house with payment of arrear house rent with effect from 01.01.2013 by clearing up the charges towards electric and water connection taken to the said suit house, filed the First Appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal having been dismissed, said unsuccessful defendant is now before this Court with the prayer for dismissal of the suit as laid by setting aside the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the courts below. 7. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “A. Whether the findings of the court below that the Deity has been properly represented in the suit as laid for the reliefs claimed being without any basis are as such perverse and thus unsustainable in the eye of law? B. Whether the present suit for eviction is maintainable in view of the bar contained in section 73 of the Odisha High Religious Endowment Act 1951 and the only course open for eviction by taking recourse to a proceeding under the provision under section 25 of the said Act? C. Whether the findings of the courts below with regard to the validity of the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982, in the absence of the signature of the plaintiff thereon suffers from error of law?” (A) 8. Mr. L. Samantaray, learned counsel for the appellant submits that this Mahant Bhagaban Das, the self-styled representative of the Deity ought not to have been taken to be representing of the Deity in filing the suit without establishment by proof of any record relating to his competency as such. Therefore, according to him, the suit should have been dismissed on this lone ground. (B) His next contention is that the service of notice upon the defendant as required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is a pre-condition for the entertainment of the suit and which touches its maintainability having not been established in the case by clear, cogent and acceptable evidence, the courts below have erred in law by recording finding on that score in favour of the plaintiff. He also submits that it’s a ploy to drive out the defendant who is earning his livelihood and maintaining the family and that state has been continuing for past few decades. He also submits that it’s a ploy to drive out the defendant who is earning his livelihood and maintaining the family and that state has been continuing for past few decades. (C) His submission is also to the effect that the courts below should have held the suit as not maintainable taking into account the legal provision contained in section 73 of the Odisha Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1951 and in view of the legal course available under the said Act for the relief of driving out a person from the possession of the property of the Deity, and religious institution. (A-1) 9. Mr. A.K. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent submits that in the present case the challenge to the representation of the Deity by this Mahant Bhagaban Das, Chella of Guru late Raghunath Das is of absolutely no significance, in view of and on the face of the lease-deed (Ext. 2) between said Mahant representing the Deity and the defendant at the time of induction of the defendant as a tenant in respect of the suit house. It is also his submission that the order of learned Commissioner, Endowment passed in C.A. No. 03 of 1984 when is seen together with the lease deed, Ext. 2, the notice of eviction and its reply Ext. 4 given by the defendant, the contention in that regard gets per-se repelled. (B-1) He further contends that this being not a suit falling within the ambit of the suits as stated in the provision of section 73 of the Odisha Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1951, the submission concerning the legal bar under section 73 of the Act for the suit does not hold water. It is also contended that the provision of section 25 of the Act can’t be taken to be standing in the way of the suit holding it to be the only remedy available when neither there remains any express ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court so far as these types of suits are concerned nor the same can be so implied. (C-1) He contends that the courts below having thoroughly analysed the evidence both oral and documentary, when have arrived at a finding with regard to the proper service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, such finding on fact is not liable to be questioned before this Court when no perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence touching the issue is shown and consequently the conclusion arrived at is unsustainable. 10. Going to answer the first substantial question of law by addressing the rival submissions, it is seen that the Mahant Bhagaban Das being examined as P.W. 1 has proved the rent deed dated 01.09.1986 wherein he has represented the Deity and the defendant has not only accepted paid status but also thereafter acted in pursuance thereof. His status as Mahant gets further corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 2. This defendant has also deposed that in the year 1986 he had signed a lease in respect of the very suit house. This document shows the Deity to have been so represented by the said Mahant. Ext. 1, the order of learned Commissioner of Endowment reveals that Mahant Raghunath Das Babaji has executed a Will in favour of this Mahant Bhagaban Das in the year, 1947. The same having been accepted, the order has been passed recognizing this Mahant as the Chella and successor of late Mahanta Raghunath Das Babaji in respect of the Deity and the Religious Institution. Further more, this defendant in view of the lease-deed which he admits to have executed in the year 1986 vide Ext. 2 is estopped from raising that question now at this stage when he has also not disputed this in his reply to the notice given demanding vacant possession from him. In view of such overwhelming evidence on record in support of the status of Mahant Bhagaban Das vis-à-vis the Deity and the Religious Institution, and when estoppel also operates against the defendant to question that the first substantial question of law gets its answer in favour of the proper representation of the plaintiff-Deity by this Mahant Bhagaban Das in this suit. 11. 11. So far as answer to the second substantial question of law relating to the bar contained in section 73 of the Odisha Hindu Religious Endowment Act is concerned, a plain reading of the provision goes to show that the bar operates for the suit as referred to therein are the suits in respect of administration of a religious institution and the suits in respect of other matters or disputes for whose decision and determination specific provisions are there in the Act itself. So for the suits touching upon those aspects, the legal bar comes into play for determination and decision of which specific provisions are made in the said Act which stand as final. The instant suit is by the Deity for eviction of a person who after termination of his tenancy in respect of a house belonging to the landlord, the Deity is continuing with such occupation. This cannot be said to be a suit in respect of administration of the affairs of the Deity and the religious institution. The suit relating to the property of the Deity and Religious Institution with the relief of getting back the physical possession for being further dealt on behalf of the Deity and Religious Institution as such is maintainable. The provision of section 25 of the OHRE Act prescribes that after summary enquiry and finding a person to be in unauthorized occupation of the immovable property given or endowed for the purpose of any Religious Institution, the Commissioner can to pass necessary order of eviction. In this case, the defendant had been inducted as a tenant in respect of the suit house by said Mahant representing the Deity and the Religious Institution to whom the property belong and the continuance in possession of the defendant after the expiry of the period of lease is as that of a tenant holding over. 12. The expression of ‘tenants at sufferance’ is merely a fiction to distinguish their unlawful possession from that of trespassers. The possession of a ‘trespasser’ is unlawful both in its inception and in its continuance, which can mature to title upon satisfaction of other ingredients as the law mandates. But the possession of a tenant at sufferance is rightful in its inception, though wrongful in its continuance after expiry of the period agreed upon. The possession of a ‘trespasser’ is unlawful both in its inception and in its continuance, which can mature to title upon satisfaction of other ingredients as the law mandates. But the possession of a tenant at sufferance is rightful in its inception, though wrongful in its continuance after expiry of the period agreed upon. A distinction is drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease without the consent of the landlord and tenant doing so with the landlord’s consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The act of holding over in any event after expiration of the term does not necessarily create tenancy of any kind; if the lessee remains in possession after determination of the term and for all practical purposes, he becomes a tenant at sufferance. 13. “In Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act (7th Edn.) at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus; A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. The expression “holding over” is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord’s consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position that a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue to possession after the termination of the tenancy. His possession is juridical. The subtle difference resulting a definite distinction between a tenant holding over and a tenant-at-sufferance as above has been noticed in case of Bhupal Prasad reported in AIR 1996 SC 140 ). Holding over stands equivalent to the retention of possession after determination of lease, but with the consent of the landlord whereas, on similar circumstances if the possession is without the consent of the landlord then the same stands out to be as a tenant-at-sufferance Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act does let a statutory recognition to the concept of holding over.”. Therefore, the provision of section 25 of the Act standing in the Odisha Hindu Religious Endowment Act cannot stand on the way of entertainment of a suit of present nature so as to say that provision being therein the said Act, the jurisdiction of civil court is barred by that special statute or stand so excluded. 14. Now coming to aspect of compliance of provision of section 106 of the T.P. Act, it is seen that said notice has been issued by an Advocate under the instruction of the Mahant representing the Deity and the Religious Institution, it has been proved and marked as Ext. 3. The reply given by the defendant which has been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext. 4, not only is silent on that score but also it has not been stated that said Advocate was not having the instruction nor so proved. 3. The reply given by the defendant which has been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext. 4, not only is silent on that score but also it has not been stated that said Advocate was not having the instruction nor so proved. More over the suit having been filed after the said notice, when said Mahant who is representing the Deity does not challenge that aspect, the defendant has nothing to urge on that. 15. Notice to quit means a notice to terminate a tenancy (whether periodical tenancy or a tenancy for a term of years certain or monthly) in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the T.P. Act. The object of the provision as to notice is to enable the tenant to gather up the fruits of his labour. Notice is not a part of cause of action although it is a condition precedent for the commencement of the suit. As a matter of fact, the notice is first step in litigation when the cause of action is complete. It only provides a mode of procedure for getting a relief in respect of cause of action, and does not constitute the relief itself. A statutory notice although essential provisionally for a valid suit, does not make it a part of the cause of action in the suit itself. At this juncture, let us advert to the position of law as it stands after amendment in the year 2002 by Amendment Act 3 of 2003 coming into force on 31.12.2002. The first most important change that has been brought about in para-1 of the existing section is deletion of the words “expiring with the end of a year of tenancy and expiring with the end of a month. In the instant case we are concerned with the new provisions standing after amendment. So now fifteen days notice is necessary and as provided in sub-Section 3 of Section 106 of the T.P.Act, even that notice shall not be deemed to be invalid because of any shortage in the period when the suit is filed after the expiry of the period. So now fifteen days notice is necessary and as provided in sub-Section 3 of Section 106 of the T.P.Act, even that notice shall not be deemed to be invalid because of any shortage in the period when the suit is filed after the expiry of the period. The objects and reasons of Act 3 of 2003 is to prevent the situations of dismissal of the suits on the lone technicality being filed in ignorance of the legal position and to take care of the hardship faced by the suitor in serving fresh notice and filing fresh suit despite the fact that the defendant had more time available to him than the prescribed period of notice by the date when suit is filed to evict him or even by the date of judgment dismissing the suit. Feeling the same to be of severe hardship that the suitor is facing, in the amendment by insertion of sub-section (3) the provision of sub-section (2) as regards the notice under subsection/shall not be deemed to be invalid…..” have been made to apply retrospectively to all notices in pursuance of which any suit or proceeding is pending on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act and to all notices issued prior to the coming into force of that Amendment Act where even no suit or proceeding filed before such commencement. 16. The above provisions of law as discussed make it clear that a notice under Section 106 of the Act is to be given by allowing 15 days time to the lessee. A landlord is entitled to eject a tenant after notice to quit, unless the tenant can prove that he has a right to remain on the land permanently and the onus to prove that lies on the tenant. It has been held in case of Nagendra vs. Jotish: AIR (1952 Cal 221 and Kunj Behari vs. Acharaya Hari; AIR 1975 Raj 138 that a notice should be liberally construed. The essential point is whether the tenant was asked to vacate. In that notice it is not necessary to state any ground and a suit for ejectment need not be on the same ground as stated in the notice (Amarendra vs. Bibhuti; AIR 1952 Cal 773 ). The essential point is whether the tenant was asked to vacate. In that notice it is not necessary to state any ground and a suit for ejectment need not be on the same ground as stated in the notice (Amarendra vs. Bibhuti; AIR 1952 Cal 773 ). It is the settled law that a notice to quit must be construed broadly not with a desire to find fault with it which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valiat quam pereat, that is, in a manner that it may rather become operative than null. 17. In Bhagabandas vs. Bhagabandas; AIR 1977 SC 1120 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has also held that from the language used, it must be endeavoured to ascertain the intention of the parties and the effect thereof. It should be conjointly read not with an intention to split up a straw or in a hypercritical manner or by pedagogic pendantism or over-refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a commonsense way. The principle laid down in case of Burmah-Shell Oil Distributing vs. Khaja Midhat Noor: AIR 1988 SC 1470 is that the notice to quit must be read in the context of the facts of each case having regard to the situation of the parties to whom it is addressed. 18. Examining the oral and documentary evidence, the courts below have recorded finding that the notice is valid. This Court not only finds the finding to be based on proper appreciation of evidence on record but also to be legally in order by testing the evidence on said score through the legal spectrum as discussed in the forgoing paras. 19. The above discussion and reasons provide necessary answers to said substantial questions of law which do not came to the aid of the defendant in thwarting the suit and thus to emerge out successful in getting the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below overturned. 20. 19. The above discussion and reasons provide necessary answers to said substantial questions of law which do not came to the aid of the defendant in thwarting the suit and thus to emerge out successful in getting the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below overturned. 20. Having said this, taking into account the last limb of submission of learned counsel for the appellant and the response thereto, while dismissing this second appeal, the defendant is hereby directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit house to the plaintiff on or before the 31st day of January, 2018 provided he gives an undertaking to above effect and further undertake to clear up the arrear as well as the current house rent and/or damage till vacation as above directed in three equal instalments i.e. 1st one by end of July, 2017; next one by end of October, 2017 and the last one on or before the date fixed for vacation. The defendant is accordingly directed to furnish the undertaking as above before the trial court on or before the 20th day of May, 2017. It is also made clear that on the failure of the defendant either to give the undertaking or thereafter if he fails to abide by the same, the plaintiff would be at liberty to seek the indulgence of the court for appropriate action as per law for breach of said undertaking as also for execution of the decree and in that even the defendant would be liable to pay the cost throughout. The second appeal stands accordingly disposed of.