JUDGMENT : This appeal, moved on behalf of the accused/ appellant Bhawan Singh is received through Superintendent of District Jail, Chamoli, which is directed against the judgment and order dated 06.11.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Chamoli, in Sessions Trial No. 3 of 2015, whereby the trial court has convicted accused/appellant Bhawan Singh under section 304 Part II IPC, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six years, and directed to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-. In default of payment of fine the convict has been directed to undergo further six months rigorous imprisonment. 2. Heard learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant, and learned counsel for the State. 3. Prosecution story in brief is that Darban Singh (complainant) lodged FIR (Ex. A1) before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil Gairsan, District Chamoli stating therein that in the midnight of 15.10.2014 his elder sister-in-law (BHABI) found dead in her house and her step son Bhawan Singh also living with her. On asking, Bhawan Singh admitted that he killed his mother. The complaint was registered as crime no. 3 of 2014 under section 302 IPC. Initially, Tehsildar Gairsan went to the spot and prepared inquest report (Ex. A6) on 16.10.2014. Thereafter, investigation was transferred to the civil police. S.I, Kundan Ram, who investigated the crime, submitted charge sheet (Ex. A14) against the accused/appellant for his trial under section 302 IPC. 4. The Magistrate, on receipt of the charge sheet, after giving necessary copies to the accused as required under section 207 Cr.P.C. appears to have committed the case to the court of sessions for trial. After hearing the parties on 03.02.2015, learned Sessions Judge, Chamoli (Gopeshwar) framed charge of offences punishable under section 302 IPC, against the accused Bhawan Singh, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. On this, prosecution got examined 9 witnesses, namely, P.W.1 Darban Singh (complainant), P.W.2 Raghuvir Singh, P.W. 3 Avtar Singh, P.W. 4 Smt. Laxmi Devi, P.W. 5 Prem Singh, P.W. 6 Kanchan Singh, P.W.7 Dr. V.P. Singh (who conducted post mortem) P.W. 8 Vipin Chandra Pant and P.W. 9 S.I. Kundan Ram (who investigated the case). Oral and documentary evidence was put to the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C., while giving reply to question no. V.P. Singh (who conducted post mortem) P.W. 8 Vipin Chandra Pant and P.W. 9 S.I. Kundan Ram (who investigated the case). Oral and documentary evidence was put to the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C., while giving reply to question no. 30 he has specifically stated that in the morning of 16.10.2004, he went to purchase the gas cylinder at Mehalchori and he was caught by Darban Singh then he came to know that his mother is no more. He further stated that Darban Singh, real uncle of the appellant, wants to grab his property and, therefore, he has falsely been implicated by his uncle. However, no evidence in defence was adduced. The trial court after hearing the parties found that no offence under section 302 IPC is made out against the accused appellant rather from the evidence available on record offence under section 304-II is made out against the accused/appellant as the prosecution has successfully proved the charge of offence punishable under section 304-II IPC. After convicting the appellant and on hearing the parties on sentence, the convict was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of period of six years, and directed to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/-. Aggrieved by said judgment and order dated 06.11.2015, this appeal was preferred by the convict before this Court through jail Superintendent. 5. Before further discussion this Court thinks it just and proper to mention ante-mortem injuries found on the body of Kalavati by P.W.7 Dr. V.P. Singh, on 27.05.2015 at the time of post-mortem examination. Same are being reproduced below from the autopsy report Ex. A4 (i) two lacerated wounds present on forehead size about 2X1cm (ii) Contused swelling present over left parital region, extending from temporal region to occipital region size about 15X7cm under neath bone, parital bone is fractured. The Medical Officer has opined that cause of death is due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of ante mortem head injury. He further stated that injuries might have been caused by the stroke of stick and it is also possible that it can be happen due to fell down from some height or fell down on the box. 6. P.W. 1 Darban Singh (complainant) has stated that deceased Kalawati was his sister in law (Bhabi) and Bhawan Singh is his real nephew. 6. P.W. 1 Darban Singh (complainant) has stated that deceased Kalawati was his sister in law (Bhabi) and Bhawan Singh is his real nephew. On 16.10.2014 at about 7:30 p.m., he was at Mehalchori at the shop of his son and was going for his treatment at Karnprayag, then he received a phone call of Laxmi (daughter in law) that Bhawan Singh has killed his mother and ran away. He informed about the incident to his son and one villager Avtar Singh, when he was going to taxi stand, in the meantime, he saw that Bhawan Singh is coming towards taxi stand and after seeing him, tried to run away from there. Ultimately, he was caught and on asking whether he has killed his mother then he told that he killed his mother by a wooden stick. On asking the next question why he has killed his mother, then he stated that his mother denied to burn the wood and this was the reason of quarrel between them. After taking him into custody, they went to village Gasanv and found Kalawati died in her room. Thereafter, he lodged the FIR. The report was subscribed by Sishupal Singh. He further stated that Naib Tehsildar alongwith his associates went to the spot and asked from the accused about the wood by which he committed murder of his mother then he gave the wood from another room. Same was sealed by the Naib Tehsildar. In his cross examination he has stated that at the time of the incident he was not in his house but his daughter in law informed him that there was no noise in the house of Bhawan Singh. He further state that it is wrong to say that accused Bhawan Singh has not made statement before him and false report has been lodged by him. 7. P.W. 2 Rabhuvir Singh son of complainant and P.W. 3 Avtar Singh also narrated the same story. In his cross examination P.W. 3 has admitted the fact the younger brother of the accused is not living in the village and since more than 4 to 5 years he has not come in the village and has no relation with the accused. He further stated that the land was cultivated by the deceased and not by the accused person. 8. He further stated that the land was cultivated by the deceased and not by the accused person. 8. P.W. 4 Laxmi Devi has stated that in the morning of 16.10.2014, when Kalavati did not come to her house (as she used to come her house for taking tea) then she went to her house, she called her but there was no response. The door of the kitchen was closed, then she unbolt the door and found that Kalavati was lying on the floor and there was bleeding from her head then she shouted and Bhawan Singh came from the upper floor of the kitchen and run away from there and stated that her brother-in-law, father-in-law and Avtar Singh of village brought the accused at about 10:15 a.m. Thereafter, her father-in-law went to lodge the FIR. In her cross-examination she stated that mother of Bhawan Singh has died and Bhawan Singh has run away from the spot. She admitted the fact that she had not stated on phone to her father-in-law, that Bhawan Singh has killed her mother. 9. P.W. 5 Prem Singh stated that Kalavati was his aunti (MAMI) and in his presence wooden stick is recovered from another room. In his cross examination he stated that he received information in the morning at about 9:30 a.m. and he reached at the place of incident at about 11:00 a.m. thereafter Naib Tehsildar came there. 10. P.W.6 Kanchan Singh is the cousin brother of the deceased and stated the same version as narrated by the others. 11. P.W. 7 Dr. V.P. Singh who conducted the post mortem in his cross examination has stated that injuries might have been caused by the stroke of stick and it is also possible that it can be happen due to fell down of some height or fell down on the box. 12. 11. P.W. 7 Dr. V.P. Singh who conducted the post mortem in his cross examination has stated that injuries might have been caused by the stroke of stick and it is also possible that it can be happen due to fell down of some height or fell down on the box. 12. P.W. 8 Vipin Chandra Pant, Naib Tehsilder stated that when he received information of the incident he went to the spot and asked from the accused then he stated that his mother used to scold him and stated that on 15.10.2014 he went Mehalchor to buy wheat, and came back to his house, due to cold weather he was firing the wood, on seeing that his mother said why he is destroying the wood due to this reason he become angry and attacked at the head of his mother and she fell down on the floor. He closed the door of the room and went to his room. In the morning, at about 6:00 a.m. he saw that his mother was lying dead and the wooden stick was handed over. In his cross examination he stated that he was not aware whether there was blood, hair etc, on the wooden stick or not. 13. P.W. 9 S.I. Kundan Ram is the investigating officer, who after completion of the investigation submitted charge sheet. 14. Mr. Siddhartha Jain, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently argued that the trial court has started to write its judgment on the pretext that it is a case of circumstantial evidence and there is no eye witness to the incident. Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that it is not a case of circumstantial evidence rather it is a case of extra judicial confession, allegedly made by the accused before complainant Darban Singh. It is further submitted that prosecution has improved its story during trial. He submitted that initially when the complaint was made, the complaint was silent about that any information was given by Smt. Laxmi Devi P.W. 2 to his father in law. Thus, story set up by the prosecution is highly improbable. From the perusal of the FIR, it would reveal that Darban Singh on whose complaint investigation was commenced has made two lines complaint. Thus, story set up by the prosecution is highly improbable. From the perusal of the FIR, it would reveal that Darban Singh on whose complaint investigation was commenced has made two lines complaint. Version of the compliant is translated hereunder:- “Sir, It is submitted that I Darban Singh, S/o Aalam Singh, R/o Village Syundi, P.O. Mehalchori, Tehsil Gairsan requested that in may family my sister-in-law (Bhabi) w/o late Jawahar Singh, in his house on 15.10.2014 found death in doubtfull circumstances who used to live with his step son. On asking, he admitted that he killed his mother, therefore, it is prayed that matter be investigated”. 15. From the perusal of the complaint made by the complainant it does not reveal that Smt. Laxmi Devi P.W.4 had made any phone call to the complainant. It is also highly improbable that in an independent culture like hill station of Uttarakhand a woman will not make phone call of incident to her husband and made a call to her father in law, thus from the very inception prosecution tried to improve its case which is beyond the initial complaint made by Darban Singh. This case, in fact, based upon the extra judicial confession allegedly made by accused Bhawan Singh before Darban Singh. But neither the alleged extra judicial confession of the accused is proved by the prosecution nor there was an occasion of making such statement before the complainant. Learned trial court has started to decide the case considering this case as of circumstantial evidence. However, the prosecution case rest on the alleged extra judicial confession made by the accused before his uncle/complainant. An extra judicial confession can form the basis of conviction, if it is corroborated by circumstantial evidence and extra judicial confession proved beyond reasonable doubt. But from the version of the complaint/FIR, it would reveal that the alleged extra judicial confession was made by the accused before his uncle, thereto it was allegedly made to the Naib Tehsildar and others. But the very basis of extra judicial confession before the complainant by the accused is doubtful, as the complainant himself states that he had received call from Laxmi Devi and then he came to know that accused after committing murder of his mother fled away from the spot, whereof Laxmi Devi has not supported this version of the complainant. But the very basis of extra judicial confession before the complainant by the accused is doubtful, as the complainant himself states that he had received call from Laxmi Devi and then he came to know that accused after committing murder of his mother fled away from the spot, whereof Laxmi Devi has not supported this version of the complainant. In view of this Court, the entire story of extra judicial confession without corroborated by any circumstantial evidence does not create confidence. Thus, learned trial court failed to consider that it is not a case of circumstantial evidence rather it is a case of extra judicial confession made by the accused before the complainant without there being any corroborative evidence much or less proving the extra judicial confessional statement made by the accused before his uncle and subsequently before others. 16. Section 24 of the Evidence Act deals with the confession statement. For kind perusal, section 24 of the Evidence Act is reproduced below:- “24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.—A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise,1 having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.—A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, 2 having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him." 17. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. M.K. Anthony reported in (1985) 1 SCC 505 . Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. M.K. Anthony reported in (1985) 1 SCC 505 . The relevant paragraph is reproduced below:- “15. There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. { See Jagta v. State of Haryana and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and Ors. In Sahoo v. State of U.P.) , it was held that 'an extra-judicial confession may be an expression of conflict of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime.' Before evidence in this behalf is accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However, in Pyara Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court observed that the law does not require that evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It thus appears that extra-judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. It thus appears that extra-judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trust-worthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon”. 18. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that alleged confessional statement of accused made before Darban Singh cannot be an extra judicial confession. It is further submitted that Darban Singh is willing to grab the property of the accused/appellant, who has created this prosecution story. There is a major contradiction in the statement of the witnesses. P.W. 4 Laxmi Devi states that she found dead body of the deceased in the kitchen after unbolt the door while other witnesses come up with the case that dead body was lying in the room. A kitchen and room cannot be compared same with each other. 19. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State cited the case law reported in 1995 Criminal 3225 Balu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and has placed reliance on para 9. Same is reproduced below:- “9. A kitchen and room cannot be compared same with each other. 19. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State cited the case law reported in 1995 Criminal 3225 Balu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and has placed reliance on para 9. Same is reproduced below:- “9. After hearing both the learned counsel and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced in the proceeding, it appears to us that although from the deposition of Haru it does not transpire that he had spoken about the confession of the accused about murdering the deceased but he has specifically stated that the accused has admitted before him that he had a quarrel and he had confined the deceased in his Jhumpa and he would not allow anybody to open the same before the police would be called. The other witness as we have already indicated, has specifically stated about the said confession and there is some force in the submission of Mr. Gupta that in the FIR lodged by the uncle of the deceased, the injuries caused by lathis on head and other parts of the body have been specifically mentioned. The nature of injuries stated to have been disclosed in confession stand corroborated from the medical evidence. 20. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is similar to the fact of the present case and will help to the appellant that there are chances of false implication of the accused/appellant at the hands of the complainant who wants to grab the property of the appellant. As far as, the facts of the judgment cited by the learned A.G.A. are entirely different and the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment Balu Ram (supra) is not applicable to the present case. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Dagdu & others etc. v. State of Maharashtra & another reported in (1977) SC 1579 have held that in respect of any other admissible evidence, oral or documentary, so in the case of confessional statements which are otherwise admissible, the Court has still to consider whether they can be accepted as true. v. State of Maharashtra & another reported in (1977) SC 1579 have held that in respect of any other admissible evidence, oral or documentary, so in the case of confessional statements which are otherwise admissible, the Court has still to consider whether they can be accepted as true. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is admissible in evidence. Their Lordships have held as under: - “50. Learned Counsel appearing for the State is right that the failure to comply with Section 164(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, or with the High Court Circulars will not render the confessions inadmissible in evidence. Relevancy and admissibility of evidence have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 29 of that Act lays down that if a confession is otherwise relevant it does not become irrelevant merely because, inter alia, the accused was not warned that he was not bound to make it and the evidence of it might be given against him. If, therefore, a confession does not violate any one of the conditions operative under Sections 24 to 28 of the Evidence Act, it will be admissible in evidence. But as in respect of any other admissible evidence, oral or documentary, so in the case of confessional statements which are otherwise admissible, the Court has still to consider whether they can be accepted as true. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is admissible in evidence. That shows how important it is for the Magistrate who records the confession to satisfy himself by appropriate questioning of the confessing accused, that the confession is true and voluntary. A strict and faithful compliance with Section 164 of the Code and with the instructions issued by the High Court affords in a large measure the guarantee that the confession is voluntary. The failure to observe the safeguards prescribed therein are in practice calculated to impair the evidentiary value of the confessional statements.” 22. A strict and faithful compliance with Section 164 of the Code and with the instructions issued by the High Court affords in a large measure the guarantee that the confession is voluntary. The failure to observe the safeguards prescribed therein are in practice calculated to impair the evidentiary value of the confessional statements.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of George v. State of Kerala reported in (1998) 4 SCC 605 have held that statement of a witness recorded under Section 164 CrPC cannot be used as substantive evidence and can be used only for the purpose of contradicting or corroborating him. Their Lordships have held as under: - 36. We may now turn to the evidence of PW 50, detailed earlier. From the judgment of the trial court we notice that the substantial parts of its comments, (quoted earlier) are based on his statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and not his evidence in court. The said statement was treated as substantive evidence; as would be evident from the following, amongst other observations made by the learned trial court: “If Ext. P-42 (the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC) is found to be a genuine statement it can be used as an important piece of evidence to connect the accused with the crime.” In making the above and similar comments the trial court again ignored a fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence that a statement of a witness recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be used as substantive evidence and can be used only for the purpose of contradicting or corroborating him. Instead of appreciating the evidence of PW 50 from that perspective the trial court confined its attention mainly to his statement so recorded and discredited him. This legal infirmity apart, factually also the trial court committed patent errors. As earlier noticed, one of the grounds for disbelieving him was that in the trip-sheet the name of the person who performed the journey, namely, A-1 was not shown. If the trial court had cared to look into the other trip-sheets which form part of Ext. P-54 it would have found that in none of them the name of the person who hired the car is mentioned. The trial court was, therefore, not at all justified in commenting upon such non-mentioning of the name of the hirer and concluding therefrom that the document was suspect. P-54 it would have found that in none of them the name of the person who hired the car is mentioned. The trial court was, therefore, not at all justified in commenting upon such non-mentioning of the name of the hirer and concluding therefrom that the document was suspect. The comments of the trial court that PW 50 made the statement before the Magistrate (Ext. P-42) to oblige the police as his brother was arrested in connection with an excise case is also without any basis whatsoever. In drawing the above inference the trial court was much influenced by the fact that the car in question, namely, KEK 3114 was seized by the police on 31-5-1990 and that it was released on 28-6-1990. According to the trial court it was wrongfully detained by the police for such a long period to compel PW 50 to make a statement according to its dictate. Once a car is seized in connection with a case it can be returned pursuant to the order of a competent court only and there is nothing on record to indicate that in spite of such an order the car was not returned so as to entitle the trial court to comment that the long detention of the car was itself a suspicious circumstance. Having gone through the evidence of PW 50 we find that each of the reasons canvassed by the trial court for disbelieving PW 50 is either legally unsustainable or factually incorrect. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1984 Vol 4 S.C.C. 116 in the case of Sharad Birdichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra have laid down the following conditions, the prosecution must satisfy in a case based on circumstantial evidence. “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2012 (10) SCC 464 , in the case of “Munish Mubar Vs. State of Haryana”, have held that in a case of circumstantial evidence, circumstances must be fully established and all facts so established, must be consistent with hypothesis regarding guilt of accused. It is further held that in the case of circumstantial evidence motive assumes great significance and importance. Their Lordships have held as under:- “28. Undoubtedly, in a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be fully established and all the facts so established, must be consistent with the hypothesis regarding the guilt of the accused. The circumstances so established should exclude every other possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Undoubtedly, in a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be fully established and all the facts so established, must be consistent with the hypothesis regarding the guilt of the accused. The circumstances so established should exclude every other possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. The circumstantial evidence is a close companion of factual matrix, creating a fine network through which there can be no escape for the accused, primarily because the said facts, when taken as a whole, do not permit us to arrive at any other inference but one indicating the guilt of the accused.” 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 122, in the case of “Subodh Nath and another Vs. State of Tripura”, have held that motive becomes relevant as an additional circumstance in a case where prosecution seeks to prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence only. Their Lordships have held as under:- “6. Mr Chauhan next pointed out some discrepancies in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 13. He pointed out that PW 2 had stated in his evidence that PW 13 had told him that Appellant 1 (Subodh) had restrained him and had threatened him if he disclosed it to anyone that he had dealt an axe-blow on the deceased. PW 13, on the other hand, has not said that Appellant 1 (Subodh) had restrained him and threatened him, but has only said that Appellant 2 (Paritosh) ran after him. He also pointed out the discrepancies in the evidence of PW 1 and PW 13. He submitted that while PW 1 has stated that PW 13 had accompanied him to search for the deceased, PW 13 had stated that he never accompanied PW 1 to search for the dead body of the deceased. He also pointed out some discrepancies in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 19, the investigating officer. He finally submitted that in this case the weapons with which the deceased was alleged to have been killed by the appellants have not been recovered nor any motive of the appellants to kill the deceased proved. He argued that this is a clear case in which the appellants should have been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 16. He argued that this is a clear case in which the appellants should have been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 16. Once we find that the eyewitness account of PW 13 is corroborated by material particulars and is reliable, we cannot discard his evidence only on the ground that there are some discrepancies in the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 13 and PW 19. As has been held by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, in the deposition of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies due to normal errors of observation, loss of memory, mental disposition of the witnesses and the like. Unless, therefore, the discrepancies are “material discrepancies” so as to create a reasonable doubt about the credibility of the witnesses, the Court will not discard the evidence of the witnesses. The learned counsel for the appellants is right that the prosecution has not been able to establish the motive of Appellant 1 to kill the deceased but as there is direct evidence of the accused having committed the offence, motive becomes irrelevant. Motive becomes relevant as an additional circumstance in a case where the prosecution seeks to prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence only.” 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 551, in the case of “Rishipal Vs. State of Uttarakhand”, have held that while motive does not have a major role to play in cases based on eyewitness account of incident, it assumes importance in cases that rest entirely on circumstantial evidence. Their Lordships have held as under:- “15. The second aspect to which we must straightaway refer is the absence of any motive for the appellant to commit the alleged murder of Abdul Mabood. It is not the case of the prosecution that there existed any enmity between Abdul Mabood and the appellant nor is there any evidence to prove any such enmity. All that was suggested by the learned counsel appearing for the State was that the appellant got rid of Abdul Mabood by killing him because he intended to take away the car which the complainant Dr Mohd. Alam had given to him. That argument has not impressed us. All that was suggested by the learned counsel appearing for the State was that the appellant got rid of Abdul Mabood by killing him because he intended to take away the car which the complainant Dr Mohd. Alam had given to him. That argument has not impressed us. If the motive behind the alleged murder was to somehow take away the car, it was not necessary for the appellant to kill the deceased for the car could be taken away even without physically harming Abdul Mabood. It was not as though Abdul Mabood was driving the car and was in control thereof so that without removing him from the scene it was difficult for the appellant to succeed in his design. The prosecution case on the contrary is that the appellant had induced the complainant to part with the car and a sum of Rs 15,000. The appellant has been rightly convicted for that fraudulent act which conviction we have affirmed. Such being the position, the car was already in the possession and control of the appellant and all that he was required to do was to drop Abdul Mabood at any place en route to take away the car which he had ample opportunity to do during all the time the two were together while visiting different places. Suffice it to say that the motive for the alleged murder is as weak as it sounds illogical to us. It is fairly well settled that while motive does not have a major role to play in cases based on eyewitness account of the incident, it assumes importance in cases that rest entirely on circumstantial evidence. (See Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab and Pannayar v. State of T.N.) Absence of strong motive in the present case, therefore, is something that cannot be lightly brushed aside.” 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 644, in the case of “Vijay Shankar Vs. State of Haryana”, have summarized the principles of circumstantial evidence as under:- “8. There is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case is based upon circumstantial evidence. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 644, in the case of “Vijay Shankar Vs. State of Haryana”, have summarized the principles of circumstantial evidence as under:- “8. There is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case is based upon circumstantial evidence. The normal principle is that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that these circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation of any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence vide Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra. The same view was reiterated in Bablu v. State of Rajasthan.” 28. The evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to believe the story set up by the prosecution on extra judicial confession of accused/ appellant before his uncle. A false implication of the accused at the hands of his uncle to grab the property of the accused/ appellant cannot be ruled out. The case of the prosecution is merely based upon the extra judicial confession of the accused. The evidence of extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence and while considering the evidence of extra judicial confession, the court should be much careful. But the learned District Judge did not take care of the principle that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence and has not been proved without suspicious circumstances and committed illegality in relying upon the same as evidence without any corroboration. 29. It is settled proposition of law that burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, prosecution miserably failed to prove the case against accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial court without applying its judicial mind has convicted the accused. The learned trial court has convicted the accused/appellant on the pretext that it is a case of circumstantial evidence. In the present case, prosecution miserably failed to prove the case against accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial court without applying its judicial mind has convicted the accused. The learned trial court has convicted the accused/appellant on the pretext that it is a case of circumstantial evidence. From the perusal of the judgment passed by the trial court it does not reveal that trial court recorded any definite finding that it was the accused who alone has committed the murder of Kalavati and no one else, unless the trial court came to the conclusion that murder was committed by the accused/appellant. Thus, the learned trial court has committed illegality in relying upon the inadmissible evidence surrounded by doubt and holding the appellant guilty. 30. In view of the findings recorded above, this Court is of the view that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. The impugned judgment and order dated 06.11.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Chamoli, in Sessions Trial No. 3 of 2015, is hereby set aside. Appeal is allowed. Appellant is languishing in jail since 16.10.2014. Let him release forthwith, if his custody is not required in any other case 31. No order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment alongwith LCR be sent to the court below for compliance.