JUDGMENT : AJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI, J. 1. Appellant was the private respondent no.6 in a writ application filed on behalf of respondents no.6 to 12 in the present appeal. Since the writ application has been allowed by the learned Single Judge which has a fall out on the interest of the present appellant, therefore, he has chosen to assail the order dated 25.03.2014 passed in CWJC No.15686 of 2005. 2. Since the learned Single Judge has traced the history of the entire litigation in a very orderly fashion beginning 20.03.1947, we are tempted to reproduce the narration of facts, which sums up the entire history of the dispute. The relevant portions of the said narration is reproduced herein below : “It appears on 20.03.1947, Marai Singh executed a mortgage deed in favour of Mathura Singh in respect of 2 bighas, 2 kathas and 10 dhurs of land appertaining to Khata No 29 and several plots thereunder as mentioned in the writ petition. On the same day, he also executed another mortgage deed again for 2 bighas, 2, kathas and 10 dhurs of land also appertaining to Khata No 29 of the same very plots as for the first mortgage deed and for the same very areas respectively. Then there was a third mortgage which was executed on 18.06.1951, this time appertaining to Khata No 418, Plot No 1982 admeasuring 2 kathas, 5 dhurs and 15 dhurkis. Mathura Singh was handed over possession of the lands. It appears in 1949, one Bigu Singh filed a suit being Money Suit No 89 of 1949 against Marai Singh. The suit was decreed and Execution Case No 192 of 1953 was instituted for executing the decree. In the said execution case, Bigu Singh got attached the lands as covered by the two mortgage deeds of 1947. Bigu Singh then purchased the said lands appertaining to the two aforesaid mortgage deeds in auction on 02.02.1957. Having purchased these lands, which were mortgaged to Mathura Singh, he paid the entire mortgage money of Rs 5,000/- to Mathura Singh. Thus, by this purchase and consequent payment to Mathura Singh, the mortgage stood extinguished. There was then partition in the family of Marai Singh. Certain lands were allotted to one Gaya Singh. Thereafter, Bigu Singh sold 1 bigha, 12 kathas, 19.75 dhurs of land to Mathura Singh. Thus, by this purchase and consequent payment to Mathura Singh, the mortgage stood extinguished. There was then partition in the family of Marai Singh. Certain lands were allotted to one Gaya Singh. Thereafter, Bigu Singh sold 1 bigha, 12 kathas, 19.75 dhurs of land to Mathura Singh. It is not in dispute that out of these 1 bigha, 12 kathas, 19.75 dhurs, only 19 kathas of land, which was conveyed by Bigu Singh in favour of Mathura Singh, were lands which were covered by mortgage deed dated 20.03.1947. The rest were lands of Bigu Singh which were not subject matter of mortgage. At this stage itself, I would like to observe that out of the total land purchased by Mathura Singh of 1 bigha, 12 kathas, 19.75 dhurs, the dispute, in the present case, would only be in relation to 19 kathas and not the rest. As noted above, there was partition in the family of Marai Singh. One of his agnates Gaya Singh, son of Sheodhari Singh, on 05.01.1971, sold 1 bigha, 10 kathas and 0.25 dhurs of land to Mathura Singh by registered sale deed out of which 18 kathas and 1.75 dhurs of land were lands, which were subject matter of mortgage deed executed by Marai Singh in favour of Mathura Singh. Thus, here again, Mathura Singh, who was the mortgagee himself, purchased the mortgaged lands from Gaya Singh. Thus, even to the extent of 18 kathas, 1.75 dhurs of land which were subject matter of mortgage, the mortgage stood extinguished and it is only this part of land which is subject matter of dispute. Thus, the total land that is subject matter of dispute is 19 kathas as purchased by Mathura Singh in 1957 from Bigu Singh and 18 kathas, 1.75 dhurs of land as purchased by Mathura Singh from Gaya Singh and others. Thus, the total land, which was purchased by Mathura Singh by two sale deeds from Bigu Singh and Gaya Singh and others, were put together and covered under the mortgage deeds was 1 bigha, 17 kathas, 1.75 dhurs. As noted above, the facts itself establish that to this extent, the mortgage had already stood redeemed and, thus, the mortgage stood extinguished by 05.01.1971 that is the date of second sale deed. As noted above, the facts itself establish that to this extent, the mortgage had already stood redeemed and, thus, the mortgage stood extinguished by 05.01.1971 that is the date of second sale deed. The dispute arises with the advent of Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 which, inter alia, provided that wherever lands were transferred with existing and subsisting mortgage, those properties would revert to the mortgagor who would get a fresh right to redeem the mortgage. It preserved the right of equity of redemption. It seems that respondent No 6, the son of late Marai Singh moved the authorities under the Act and authorities have ultimately held misapprehending and misconstruing the facts that all the three mortgages subsisted. They were not redeemed and, as such, Marai Singh had a right to pay the mortgage dues and get back the possession of the land. Accordingly, petitioners were dispossessed from the land purchased by them from Bigu Singh and Gaya Singh. While doing so, the petitioners were dispossessed of the entire lands purchased under the two sale deeds though, as noticed above, the mortgage land was only a part thereof. This is what has brought the petitioners to this Court.” 3. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties decided that so far the lands purchased by Bigu Singh in the auction sale is concerned, the mortgage stood extinguished because the entire mortgage dues was paid to Mathura Singh, the mortgagee. This mortgage stood extinguished in the year 1957 itself in respect of purchase made by Bigu Singh. Then comes the sale by Gaya Singh to Mathura Singh in the year 1971, this mortgage deed subsisted up till 1971 but since the mortgagee himself purchased the property mortgaged to him, this mortgage also stood extinguished. The finding is that once the mortgage stood extinguished many many years ago, first in the year 1957 and the second in the year 1971, there was no occasion for the descendents of Marai Singh to claim redemption under the Money Lenders Act, 1974. 4. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that since it was a usufructuary mortgage, it could be redeemed at any time at the instance of the mortgagor and the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Singh Ram (D) Thr. L.Rs. v. Sheo Ram and others, reported in AIR 2014 SC 3447 is case in point. 5. L.Rs. v. Sheo Ram and others, reported in AIR 2014 SC 3447 is case in point. 5. The said decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court as a principle is not a matter of dispute. However, the Court cannot be blind to the developments which had taken place with regard to the said mortgage and what had transpired over a long long period of time from one generation to the next and, therefore, the said decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the given facts cannot be used by the appellant to redeem a property now where his right for redemption stood extinguished way back in the year 1957 and 1971. It was in this background that the learned Single Judge in the interest of justice allowed the writ application and also gave liberty to the petitioners, who are the respondents herein, in following terms : “Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as petitioners had been wrongly thrown out of possession of the entire lands as far back as in 1977 which action is challenged, it would be difficult for them on their own to get the land demarcated and/or restored to them. In my view, the answer lies in the Bihar Land Dispute Resolution Act, 2009. Parties would move the learned DCLR, Siwan with copy of order of this Court and seek demarcation and delivery of possession of land as aforesaid. Both parties that is petitioners and respondent No 6 would fully cooperate in the matter. No other family member of Marai Singh would adversely impact the proceedings. The DCLR would ensure that the proceedings are concluded within the statutory period provided under the Act subject to cooperation by all parties. Thus, while setting aside the orders impugned being order of the Additional Collector, as contained in Annexure 2, and of the Collector affirming the same, as contained in Annexure 1, I direct the parties to move accordingly, as observed above.” 6. In the opinion of this Court, no infirmity emerges from the decision of the learned Single Judge, which is required to be rectified. In fact, it is a dishonest kind of effort made by the appellant knowing fully well and taking a plea now before this Court that the appellant had no knowledge of all these facts is not going to alter either the fact or the law. Appeal has no merit. It is dismissed.