JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. DK Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant as well as Mr. T Debbarma, learned counsel appearing vice Mr. P. Datta, learned counsel for defendant-respondents. 2. By means of this appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant has challenged the judgment dated 04.05.2012 delivered in Title Appeal 02 of 2012 by the District Judge, North Tripura, Kailasahar, as he then was. By the said judgment dated 04.05.2012, the judgment dated 16.12.2011 delivered in Title Suit 62 of 2010 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kailasahar, North Tripura has been affirmed and the said First appeal was dismissed. By the judgment dated 16.12.2011 the suit instituted by the appellant for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit land, as narrated in the plaint was dismissed. 3. At the time of admission of this appeal, by the order dated 17.12.2012 the following substantial questions of law were formulated for hearing: 1. Whether the Courts below were correct in holding that a lessee has got no right to evict trespasser while the lease for 99 years has been in force? 2. Whether the refusal of the Courts below in adding the lessor as a party to the suit was correct? 4. The facts that would be relevant for appreciating the substantial questions of law may briefly be noted at the outset. The plaintiff, who will be referred hereinafter as the appellant, has averred that an area of land measuring 4.50 acres, which is the suit land belonged to Dilkhusa Tea Company Limited. Murticherra Tea Estate was under the possession and management of Dilkhusa Tea Company Limited, hereinafter referred to as the lessor. The plaintiff took the possession of the land measuring 129.87 acres by dint of the lease deed dated 08.04.1997 from Dilkhusa Tea Company Limited. After the lease deed was executed, the plaintiff started managing and controlling the tea plantation over the said area by engaging huge number of labourers including the defendants. Having observed their obedience and satisfactory work in the tea estate, the tea estate allowed the labourers, including the defendants, to reside within the tea estate temporarily on condition that they would vacate when required by Murticherra Tea Estate. The management of Murticherra Tea Estate has made huts for the defendant within the suit land when they were residing therein. Having observed their obedience and satisfactory work in the tea estate, the tea estate allowed the labourers, including the defendants, to reside within the tea estate temporarily on condition that they would vacate when required by Murticherra Tea Estate. The management of Murticherra Tea Estate has made huts for the defendant within the suit land when they were residing therein. During the survey settlement operation the name of the defendant no. 2 was entered in the column 24 of the record of right (ROR) as the permissive possessor. The defendants were occupying the pieces of land for their homestead but gradually they started encroaching a vast area of land. On several occasions, the plaintiff requested them to vacate the land occupied by them but they were not complying such request. The defendants put hindrance in the progress of the tea estate and they started indulging mischievous acts like cutting and taking out of valuable standing trees over the suit land. Situated thus, the Board of Director of the plaintiff decided in a meeting held on 07.10.2009 at Kolkata office for taking action by filing the suit through their authorized representative. Even the plaintiff made several complaints to the Officer-in-Charge of Kailasahar police station. The plaintiff served the notice through their Advocate on the said defendants asking to vacate the said land but nothing yielded in any positive result. Finally the suit has been instituted on expiry of the day, which was provided by way of notice. The principle relief as prayed in the suit is as follows: “For a decree of declaration of jote right, title and interest of the plaintiff as Lessee under the Dilkhusa Tea Company Limited and recovery of khas possession of the suit land.” 5. Having received the written statement, the trial Court framed the following issues for adjudication of the suit: “1. Is the suit of the plaintiff not maintainable in its present form? 2. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 3. Is the suit barred by limitation? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree as prayed for? 5. Any other relief/relieves?” 6. After recording the evidence, the trial Court has observed that the defendants have failed to establish their claim of adverse possession as the suit was not barred by limitation. Having found the suit maintainable, while deciding the issue no. 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree as prayed for? 5. Any other relief/relieves?” 6. After recording the evidence, the trial Court has observed that the defendants have failed to establish their claim of adverse possession as the suit was not barred by limitation. Having found the suit maintainable, while deciding the issue no. (4)- whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for i.e. for recovery of the possession, the trial court has observed as under: “Defendants tendered no documentary evidence in the case. Now coming to the documentary evidence of the plaintiff, we notice that plaintiff mainly relies of the documents of Ext. 4 series (lease deed) and Khatians (Ext.7 series). The plaintiff has placed the Ext. 4 series and 7 series in photocopies. They have not produced the original one before the court. In respect of Ext.7 series the explanation given on behalf of the plaintiff is that the documents are lying with bank in connection with loan. No explanation has been given as to why the documents of Ext. 4 series in original has not been produced or placed before the court. What has been transpired from the above circumstances is that the above documents of Ext. 4 series and Ext.7 series have not been proved as per law of evidence. So those documents cannot be taken into consideration. It is settled law that mere exhibition of a document does not dispense with its proof according to law. Those above documents have been placed on file in Photostat. They are having the original one of the same in their possession. Under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, the documents are to be proved by way of secondary evidence. The documents Ext.4 series and Ext.7 series cannot be described as primary evidence and there is no special circumstances given to allow those documents in evidence as secondary evidence. Even further, the authenticity and correctness of said documents was not established or proved according to law of evidence. If those two documents of Ext.4 series and Ext. 7 series are taken out of file then only the mere statement of PW-1 remains for taking into consideration. Even further, the authenticity and correctness of said documents was not established or proved according to law of evidence. If those two documents of Ext.4 series and Ext. 7 series are taken out of file then only the mere statement of PW-1 remains for taking into consideration. PW-1 in his cross examination stated that they have taken the lease of suit land and other lands in the year 1997 but the defendants have been in possession of the suit land for last 40 years i.e since before the date of lease. Thus, it is noticed that the so called lessor of the suit land did not hand over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff-lessee. The defendant has been in possession of the suit land being permissive from the instance of so called lessor Dilkusha Tea Co. Ltd. Here in the instant case, it is clear that the Dilkusha Tea Co. did not put the present plaintiff into possession, had there been any lease deed executed in between them. It is the settled law that when a lessor fails to put the lessee in possession, the lessee may sue him for obtaining possession of the plaintiff. Here in the instant case, for argument sake the plaintiff has sued the present defendants who have been in possession of the suit land since before the so called execution of the lease deed, which is not tenable at all. (sic.)”. On such premises, the suit has been dismissed 7. Being aggrieved by that judgment dated 16.12.2011 the plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the court of the District Judge, North Tripura, Kailasahar as he then was, being Title Appeal no. 02 of 2012. On hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment dated 04.05.2012 the said appeal has been dismissed on affirming the findings as returned by the trial court. The main stay of the appeal was that since the defendants no. 2 and 3 are the permissive possessor and their claim for adverse possession has been turned down by the trial court they are liable to be evicted from the suit land. The main stay of the appeal was that since the defendants no. 2 and 3 are the permissive possessor and their claim for adverse possession has been turned down by the trial court they are liable to be evicted from the suit land. The first appellate court while affirming that finding of the trial court has returned the following finding, based on which the appeal was dismissed: “From careful scrutiny of the evidence recorded it is found that actually photocopies of four lease khatians were exhibited. It was exhibited on comparison with the original, but mere exhibition of the document is not sufficient to prove the documents itself. Photocopy is not admissible in evidence. It is compared with the original but not with the certificate copy. There is a procedure for proving the certified copy of the documents. Photocopy of the original copy may be proved by examining the attesting witness or examining the scribe or by calling the Volume Book from the custodian. No such procedure was followed to prove the document. Original copy could have been exhibited by the executor or by the scribe. That was not done. Even if the deed is taken into consideration it is found that the appellant-plaintiff was the lessee of the vast area of the land measuring 1290.87 acres. The suit land measuring 4.50 acres was within that land. In para No. 3 of the plaint it is stated that considering their obedience and satisfactory performance the owner/management of the said Tea Estate allowed said labourers to reside temporarily on condition to vacate as and when needed on the land of Murticherra Tea Estate. The management of Murticherra Tea Estate made huts for residential purpose for the labourers and the said defendants are residing in the huts within the below schedule land. In para No. 4 it is also stated that defendants were allowed to occupy a portion of the bastu land wherein temporary huts were constructed by the Tea Estate. In the Khatians also 4.50 acres of land was shown to be occupied by the respondent-defendants as permissive possessors. Nothing is mentioned in the plaint to show that the respondent-defendants encroached beyond the limit of 4.50 acres where they were permitted to possess by the lessor. It is found that the lessor, Murticherra Tea Estate, actually allowed them to reside by constructing huts for them. Nothing is mentioned in the plaint to show that the respondent-defendants encroached beyond the limit of 4.50 acres where they were permitted to possess by the lessor. It is found that the lessor, Murticherra Tea Estate, actually allowed them to reside by constructing huts for them. At the time of lease their presence as permissive possessors was very much there. As per section 108(k) of the T.P. Act the lessee is bound to disclose to the lessor any fact as to the nature or extent of the interest which the lessee is about to take, if which the lessee is, and the lessor is not aware and which materially increases the value of such interest. So, the lessee took over the land with the permissive possessors thereon. There is nothing in the lease deed authorizing the lessee to evict the respondent-defendatns labourers from the suit land. As per section 108(n) of the T.P. Act if the lessee becomes aware of any proceeding to recover the property or any part thereof, or of any encroachment made upon, or any interference with, the lessor’s right concerning such property, he is bound to give, with reasonable diligence, notice thereof to the lessor. Here in this instant case no such notice is given to the lessor and lessor did not authorize to file the suit before institution of this suit in the year 2010. Lessor did not disclose to the lessee the material defect in the property and did not deliver possession of the suit land possessed by the respondent-defendants. Lessee also did not make any such request for delivery of the possession of the suit land. 12. Thus, lessee has acquired no clear interest over the land. When the land of the tenant is in the actual possession of the trespasser and a third party is granted a settlement by the landlord and the third party is granted a settlement by the landlord and the third party dispossesses the trespasser, the ouster amounts to dispossession of the tenant. The tenant lessee may take up the matter with the lessor but he cannot claim declaration of title as lessee for the suit land possessed by the permissive possessors from the original owner and cannot claim the eviction of those permissive possessors from that land. The tenant lessee may take up the matter with the lessor but he cannot claim declaration of title as lessee for the suit land possessed by the permissive possessors from the original owner and cannot claim the eviction of those permissive possessors from that land. The respondent-defendatns have failed to establish their adverse title over the suit land but they are not liable to be evicted as they were permitted to possess by the original owner, the lessor”. 8. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that from reading of the lease deed (Exhibit-4 series) it would be apparent that the right to possess the leasehold property has been conferred on the plaintiff and there is a clear stipulation in the lease deed that the plaintiff would be responsible for keeping the lease hold land un-encumbered. As such the finding that the plaintiff does not have the authority to institute the suit is not sustainable. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has further submitted that for refusal of the trial Court, the lessor could not be added as the party in the suit and as such whether the lessor had given the due authority to protect the possession or not could not be brought on board in absence of any such statement from the lessor. There is no dispute, however, that the lease has been created for 99 years and when the suit was instituted the said lease was in force. 9. For purpose of deciding the appeal, the following two questions are pertinent and called for decision from this court: (i) Whether the license to occupy the land given to the defendants No. 2 and 3 by the lessor can be revoked by the lesee when there is no such authority available in the lease and (ii) whether the clause relating to protecting the possession would authorized the plaintiff to seek eviction by way of instituting the suit or not? 10. Both the trial court as well as the first appellate court has clearly held on appreciating the evidence that the licensor, Dilkhusa Tea Company Limited when granted the license to the defendants No.2 and 3 to possess the land, without them, nobody can revoke that license particularly when in the lease there is no such authority and the lease was not subscribed by the defendants No. 2 and 3. The first appellate court however has questioned the admissibility of Exhibit-4, the lease deed. Even if this issue is avoided for purpose of decision, the principal finding as returned by the courts below cannot be faulted with. The further question that has been framed by this court is that whether in absence of any authority from the owner of the land, the suit as instituted by the plaintiff is maintainable or not. 11. In absence of the express authority by the owner, on the day of institution of the suit, the plaintiff did not have any authority to institute the suit against the defendants No. 2 and 3 in particular. There was no ratification even, in terms of Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1971. But what Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has submitted that if the lessor would have made party and the prayer for the impleadment was not refused by the trial court, the lessor would have taken a stand on the aspect of the authority of the plaintiff to institute the suit. Perhaps Mr. Biswas, learned counsel intended to make reference to the provisions of Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act which confers the legal opportunity to grant authority or confer in the matters post facto by confirmation of the act that has been done. The post facto ratification cannot be made by way of impleadment. It can be made by a separate instrument which can be placed but in the suit in hand no such instrument has been placed by the plaintiff. As such the finding of the courts below in respect of authorization of the plaintiff does not suffer from any infirmity. 12. Having held so, this court finds no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly and thereafter send down the records.