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2017 DIGILAW 570 (UTT)

Kulbeer Singh v. State of Uttarakhand

2017-10-27

U.C.DHYANI

body2017
JUDGMENT : U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. Charge sheet has been filed against the applicant in respect of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. Compounding application, being CRMA no. 1909 of 2017, has been filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their dispute amicably. Joint compromise has been filed along with affidavits of accused-applicant as well as of the complainant- respondent no. 2. 3. Accused-applicant Kulbeer Singh is present in person before the Court, duly identified by his counsel Mr. M.K. Ray, Advocate. Complainant-respondent no. 2 Smt. Charanjeet Kaur @ Charanjeet Dhillon is also present in person before the Court, duly identified by her counsel Mr. Dinesh Gahatori, Advocate. 4. Paragraph 10 of the C-482 petition has been highlighted by learned counsel for the parties saying that the estranged husband and wife have decided to part with their ways of life. 5. Complainant-respondent no. 2 stated that she is no more interested in prosecuting the applicant, in as much as the dispute between the parties has been resolved amicably. She further stated that she may be permitted to compound the offences alleged against the applicant. The statement given by the complainant-respondent no. 2 in the open Court has been affirmed on behalf of the accused-applicant. 6. The only question which is left for consideration of this Court is whether the complainant-respondent no. 2 should be permitted to compound the non-compoundable offences alleged against the accused-applicant or not? 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dimpy Gujral vs Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)] and Narendra Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , has permitted compounding of such type of offences, which are otherwise non-compoundable, within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dimpy Gujral vs Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)] and Narendra Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , has permitted compounding of such type of offences, which are otherwise non-compoundable, within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. 8. It will also be useful to reproduce the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, wherein it was observed, in the context of such cases, as under: “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 9. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, or at the early stage of trial, the High Court may accept the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings. 10. Reliance may also be placed in Dina Nath Prasad & others vs. State & Anr., decided by Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 12th January, 2016 in Criminal Misc. Case no. 111 of 2016, Judgment rendered by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court on 18.11.2015 in C-482 Petition No. 31751 of 2015, Rajendra Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. & another and the Judgment rendered by Punjab and Haryana High Court on 29.05.2012 in Crl. Misc. Case No. 22608 of 2011, Satwinder Singh & another vs. State of Punjab & others. 11. 111 of 2016, Judgment rendered by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court on 18.11.2015 in C-482 Petition No. 31751 of 2015, Rajendra Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. & another and the Judgment rendered by Punjab and Haryana High Court on 29.05.2012 in Crl. Misc. Case No. 22608 of 2011, Satwinder Singh & another vs. State of Punjab & others. 11. A reference may be had to the decision of Narendra Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Criminal Appeal no. 1498 of 2014, Manohar Singh vs. State of M.P. and another, decided by Hon’ble Apex Court on 21.07.2014. Manohar Singh’s case (supra) covers the case under Section 498A IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 12. It will be a futile exercise if proceedings of the criminal case against the applicant are kept pending when the parties have settled their disputes amicably. 13. Compounding application is allowed. As a consequence thereof, application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is also allowed. Charge sheet dated 27.04.2015 and summoning order dated 16.05.2015, as also the entire proceedings of criminal case no. 718 of 2015, State vs. Kulbeer Singh, under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, pending in the court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, Khatima, Udham Singh Nagar are hereby quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.