JUDGMENT : Tapabrata Chakraborty, J. 1. Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics (hereinafter referred to as the said Institute) has come up in appeal challenging an order dated 27th April, 2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. 12988 (W) of 2007 which was preferred by the writ petitioner being the respondent no.1 herein, inter alia, praying for “judicial review of the acts and conducts of the respondents relating to delayed promotion, denial of research facilities, disciplinary proceedings against him”. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details the facts are that a charge sheet was issued against the writ petitioner on 30th August, 2015 alleging violation of clauses 4.5, 4.5.2 and 4.6.7 of the bye-laws of the said Institute. Before conclusion of the same the writ petition was preferred and during pendency of the same the writ petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 30th June, 2010. Subsequent thereto, the final order was passed in the disciplinary proceeding on 16th June, 2011 imposing a penalty of deduction of an amount of 10% for a period of five years from the pension of the writ petitioner on and from the month of July, 2011. In the midst thereof, the writ petitioner filed W.P. 7504 (W) of 2010 seeking a direction upon the Institute towards extension of service within the meaning of clause 4.3.1 of the said bye-laws which was ultimately withdrawn by the writ petitioner on 13th February, 2015. In W.P. 12988 (W) of 2007 the writ petitioner filed several applications from time to time. One amongst the said applications, being CAN 9509 of 2013, was filed on 10th September, 2013, inter alia, praying for inclusion of a ground to the effect that “the bye-laws of the said Institute, relating to the recruitment, promotion, disciplinary and management rules were unenforceable and all actions taken against the charged officer are to be declared to be void and are not entitled to be further effect to any decision arrived if any against the petitioner”. The said application for amendment was allowed by an order dated 25th January, 2016 and the writ petition was disposed thereafter on 27th April, 2016 quashing the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the writ petitioner as having been initiated under the byelaws which were not duly approved by the Central Government. 3. Mr. The said application for amendment was allowed by an order dated 25th January, 2016 and the writ petition was disposed thereafter on 27th April, 2016 quashing the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the writ petitioner as having been initiated under the byelaws which were not duly approved by the Central Government. 3. Mr. Mantha, learned advocate appearing for the said Institute submits that the Chairman of the Governing Council of the said Institute is the ex-officio Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India and the Governing Council of the said Institute under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India has duly approved the said bye-laws and as such it needs to be construed that the said bye-laws had the deemed approval of the Central Government. Had there been no such approval the Central Government would not have disbursed grants in favour of the said Institute. Lack of formal approval can at best be an irregularity but not an illegality. 4. He further submits that the writ petitioner got promotional benefits under the said bye-laws and placing reliance upon the same he claimed extension of service and preferred a writ petition whereas the petitioner again preferred an amendment application in the present writ petition alleging that the said bye-laws are not enforceable and such acts of approbation and reprobation were not taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge. 5. According to Mr. Mantha, the observation of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the said bye-laws of 1995 are not enforceable for lack of approval of the Central Government would be having an alarming effect and would render all actions of the said Institute pertaining to administration during the period from the year 1992 till the year 2016 to be vulnerable and open to challenge and accordingly such observation of the learned Single Judge needs to be set aside. 6. The writ petitioner being the respondent no.1 herein, appearing in-person submits that in the disciplinary proceeding charges were framed alleging violation of different clauses of the said bye-laws which were not even approved by the competent authority and as such the proceedings suffered from a jurisdictional error and accordingly the same has been quashed and there is no infirmity in the order impugned in the present appeal warranting interference of this Court. 7. 7. He further submits that the authorities have conspired against him and have illegally entangled him in a proceeding levelling vague charges though he had always endeavoured to uphold the interest of the said Institute. He had been unnecessarily heckled and harassed and had been persuaded to approach this Court and to suffer the trauma of pendency of proceedings before this Court for a period of more than 10 years and for such illegality the said Institute needs to be directed to appropriately compensate him. 8. In reply, Mr. Mantha submits that the learned Judge erred in law in allowing the writ petitioner to raise a plea that the said bye-laws were not enforceable primarily since the petitioner was arguing the matter in person and assuming that he did not have the alacrity and acumen as attributable to a professional but the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration the fact that after filing the writ petition in the year 2007 the petitioner filed several applications from time to time. The amendment was sought for by the petitioner about 6 years after the writ petition was filed and he was conscious that in the event such amendment is allowed he might have to face an objection that having stated that the bye-laws are not enforceable he could not have filed the writ petition being W.P. 7504 (W) of 2010 claiming extension of service on the basis of the said bye-laws and as such he took steps to withdraw the said writ petition and such prayer was allowed in 13th February, 2015 though thereafter again he preferred an application for recalling the said order. The said amendment application of 2013 was allowed only three months prior to disposal of the writ petition on 25th January, 2016. 9. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and considered the materials on record. 10. We find substance in the argument of Mr. The said amendment application of 2013 was allowed only three months prior to disposal of the writ petition on 25th January, 2016. 9. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and considered the materials on record. 10. We find substance in the argument of Mr. Mantha that in the event the observation of the learned Single Judge that the said bye-laws of 1995 are not enforceable, is not expunged, the same would be having an alarming effect and would render all actions of the said Institute pertaining to administration during the period from the year 1992 till the year 2016 to be vulnerable and open to challenge and would open a flood gate of litigation and that too at the instance of a person who at one juncture obtained benefits in terms of the same bye-laws. 11. Taking into consideration such submissions and the fact that the said bye-laws have been approved by the Central Government ex-post facto on 18th May, 2016 with retrospective effect from 16th November, 1995, we are of the opinion that it would be a futile endeavour on our part to decide an issue as to whether the legal fiction of deemed approval was attributable to the said bye-laws since the said issue has become academic after ex-post facto approval of the same. 12. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitioner to argue a maintainability issue pertaining to jurisdiction placing reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Rattan Lal Sharma -vs- Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 10 . In the said case it was, inter alia, observed that in the anxiety to do justice which is the paramount consideration of the Court, it is desirable that a litigant should not be shut out from raising a plea which goes to the root of the lis involved before the High Court in a writ proceeding for the first time though the said plea has not been specifically raised before the subordinate tribunals when the plea goes to the root of the question and is based on admitted and uncontroverted facts and does not require any further investigation into a question of fact. The desirability to raise such a plea in the instant case ought to have been considered by the learned Single Judge taking into consideration the plea of deemed approval of the said bye-laws as argued on behalf of the said Institute. On the basis of the agreement dated 27th August 1992 and the bye-laws framed thereunder, the Governing Council of the said Institute was constituted in which the Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy functioned as the Chairman and the Central government, in terms of the said agreement and byelaws, sanctioned funds in favour of the said Institute. The lack of formal approval at best could have been construed to be an irregularity but not an illegality. In the backdrop of the facts involved in the instant lis, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Learned Single Judge to the effect that it was desirable to allow the writ petitioner to raise the plea that the said bye-laws were not formally approved, since the plea was belated. Such exercise of discretion was not at all judicious. 13. It is well settled that the Appellate Court instead of remanding a matter can decide the matter on merits in the event all evidence is on record. Thus, in the instant case without remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge to decide the sustainability of the disciplinary proceeding on other counts, we can certainly decide the said issue as all the records to decide the same are available on record. As such, we intended to consider the sustainability of the disciplinary proceeding on the other grounds of challenge as agitated in the writ petition. The records reveal that the order of punishment was issued subsequent to cessation of employer-employee relationship and the other infirmities in conducting the said proceeding, as argued by the writ petitioner, appears to have substance. But before proceeding further we requested Mr. Mantha to avail instruction as to whether the said Institute was desirous of dropping the proceedings. Upon availing necessary instruction, Mr. Mantha submits that the authorities would not give effect to the order of punishment and that the promotion as sought for by the petitioner had also been placed before the Governing Council which would pass appropriate order. 14. Mantha to avail instruction as to whether the said Institute was desirous of dropping the proceedings. Upon availing necessary instruction, Mr. Mantha submits that the authorities would not give effect to the order of punishment and that the promotion as sought for by the petitioner had also been placed before the Governing Council which would pass appropriate order. 14. In case of dismissal of the appeal, the observation of the learned Single Judge that the bye-laws are not formally approved and are not enforceable would attain finality which would have an alarming effect on all administrative issues finalised by the said Institute on the basis of the agreement of 1992 and the byelaws framed thereunder. On the other hand, the expunction of such observation would not affect the writ petitioner in any manner in view of the instruction furnished by the said Institute. Weighing the balance of convenience and inconvenience among the parties, we are of the opinion that observation of the learned Single Judge that the bye-laws are not approved and are not enforceable needs to be expunged. 15. For the reasons discussed above, we modify the impugned order expunging the observations of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the said bye-laws are not approved and are not enforceable and dispose of the appeal directing the said Institute to drop the disciplinary proceeding, which had been initiated against the petitioner through the charge sheet dated 30th August, 2005 and to grant the admissible service benefits which have been denied to the petitioner pursuant to the said order of punishment dated 16th June, 2011 within a period of four weeks. In the event the Governing Council grants promotion to the writ petitioner, all arrears of salary arising therefrom shall be paid within 4 weeks from the decision of the Governing Council. 16. With the above observations and directions the appeal and the connected applications are disposed of. 17. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.