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2017 DIGILAW 576 (KER)

Abdul Azeez v. Nedungadi Bank Ltd.

2017-03-23

K.ABRAHAM MATHEW, SATHISH NINAN, V.CHITAMBARESH

body2017
ORDER : 1. The conflict between Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 (DB) and Ramakrishnan K. vs. Venugopalan, 2013 (2) KLT 98 (DB) has led to this reference of the case to the Full Bench. 2. The suit for realisation of money filed by the Bank was decreed against which the principal debtor has filed the Regular First Appeal challenging the extent of the liability as well as the rate of interest. One-third fee was remitted at the time of preferment of the appeal and the balance fee was also paid in time under the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (‘the Act’ for short). The dispute was later settled between the parties out of court and no compromise in terms of O.XXIII R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short) was however recorded. Nevertheless the appeal was dismissed as ‘not pressed’ in view of the submission on behalf of the appellant that the liability to the Bank has been fully discharged. It is thereafter that the appellant filed I.A. No. 918/2016 seeking refund of the total fee paid on the memorandum of Regular First Appeal relying on Section 69 of the Act. The Division Bench noticed that the dictum in Ramakrishnan’s case (supra) militated against the dictum in Philomina Joseph’s case (supra) as regards the entitlement for refund of fee. Two learned single Judges have also taken a contrary view in Peirce Leslie India Ltd. vs. Kunheerium, 1978 KLT 811 and Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin, 2003 (1) KLT 644 . 3. We heard Mr. C.P. Muhammed Nias, Advocate on behalf of the appellant, Mr. C. Ajlth Kumar, Advocate on behalf of the respondents as well as Mr. B. Jayasurya, Senior Government Pleader on the issue. 4. Section 69 of the Act is as follows:- “69. 3. We heard Mr. C.P. Muhammed Nias, Advocate on behalf of the appellant, Mr. C. Ajlth Kumar, Advocate on behalf of the respondents as well as Mr. B. Jayasurya, Senior Government Pleader on the issue. 4. Section 69 of the Act is as follows:- “69. Refund in cases of compromise or when suit is decided on the admission of parties:- When a suit or appeal is compromised or when a suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation, one-half of the Court fee paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been paid respectively: Provided that no refund shall be ordered where only one-tenth of the amount of fee on plaint as required by Section 4A or one-third of the amount of fee on memorandum of appeal as required by Section 52 has been paid by the parties.” Section 69 of the Act would apply only under the following two contingencies:- (i) A suit or appeal should have been compromised without any investigation; (ii) A suit should have been decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation. The term ‘compromise’ has not been defined in the Act and necessarily we have to take recourse to O.XXIII R.3 of the C.P.C, to understand the import of its meaning in the context in which it is used. The compromise is an adjustment wholly or in part by a lawful agreement in writing whereby the defendant/appellant satisfies the plaintiff/ respondent in respect of the whole or part of the subject matter. The compromise should be proved to the satisfaction of the court whereupon the same would be recorded and a decree passed in accordance therewith. The amplitude of the power given to the court is so wide that the parties can even rope in matters which are not the subject matter of the suit in the compromise to be so recorded and decree passed. The proviso to O. XXIII R.3 of the C.P.C. empowers the court to decide the question as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at by compromise if the same is in dispute. 5. The proviso to O. XXIII R.3 of the C.P.C. empowers the court to decide the question as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at by compromise if the same is in dispute. 5. The court cannot take judicial notice of a compromise unless the terms of the agreement are put in writing and the same proved to its satisfaction before the same is recorded and a decree passed. Of course statement by the parties or the counsel duly signed by them can amount to a compromise under O.XXIII R.3 of the C.P.C. (See Pushpa Devi Bhagat vs. Rajinder Singh, AIR 2006 SC 2628 . But a unilateral statement by one of them or a settlement arrived at out of court without being satisfied of the adjustment or satisfaction cannot be a ‘compromise’. It is only when a compromise is judicially recorded can the suit or appeal be said to have been compromised without investigation for Section 69 of the Act to apply. We are of the firm opinion that no compromise of that sort has taken place in the Regular First Appeal enabling the appellant to get refund of one-half of the fee as was demanded in the instant case. 6. A suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation only if the plaint claim or the counter claim is conceded in whole or in part by the defendant or the plaintiff as the case may be. An ‘admission’ in the context can only mean acknowledgment as true (about which there is no dispute) which has to emanate from the person who was originally resisting the claim. A unilateral assertion by the plaintiff in the plaint claim or by the defendant in the counter claim withdrawing therefrom tantamounts to an abandonment or relinquishment and is not an ‘admission’. A mere submission or statement of one of the parties that there has been a settlement with the other cannot be treated as an admission made in the proceedings before court. 7. Let us also refer to the term ‘admission’ as occurring in the C.P.C. as well as the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in order to have a correct picture of the statutory wordings in the Act on hand. Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. 6. 7. Let us also refer to the term ‘admission’ as occurring in the C.P.C. as well as the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in order to have a correct picture of the statutory wordings in the Act on hand. Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. 6. Judgment on admission.-(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. Section 19 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: 19. Admissions by persons whose position must be proved as against party to suit:- Statements made by persons whose position or liability, it is necessary to prove as against any party to the suit, are admissions, if such statements would be relevant as against such persons in relation to such position or liability in a suit brought by or against them, and if they are made whilst the person making them occupies such position or is subject to such liability.” The above statutory provisions imply that the court is absolved of the duty to determine the disputed fact when the same asserted in the pleading or otherwise is conceded to by the opponent in view of the admission. The admission should not only be against the interest of the maker but should also concede in whole or in part the claim made by the opponent for the same to be legally reckoned. 8. The result of a ‘compromise’ or an ‘admission’ as explained above would enable the court to dispose of the suit without any investigation clothing the claimant with the right to seek refund of one-half of the fee paid thereon. It is not the mere absence of investigation that determines the entitlement of the plaintiff/claimant in the counter claim/appellant/cross objector to claim refund of fee. It is not the mere absence of investigation that determines the entitlement of the plaintiff/claimant in the counter claim/appellant/cross objector to claim refund of fee. The absence of investigation is a corollary of the compromise or admission on the basis of which the suit is disposed of and the same is not an indicia for Section 69 of the Act to apply. The observation in Ramachandran Pillai vs. Kerala Water Authority, 2006 (1) KLT 784 lends support to the above conclusion though the same was strictly obiter dicta. There is no necessity to call in aid the principles of interpretation or imbibe the spirit of alternative dispute resolution in the backdrop of the statutory provisions which carry a plain and unambiguous meaning. 9. We overrule the decisions in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case (supra) and Philomina Joseph’s case (supra) and affirm the decisions in Peirce Leslie India Ltd.'s case (supra) and Ramakrishnan’s case (supra). We hold that the appellant is not entitled to refund of one-half of the fee paid on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of an alleged settlement out of court. The Regular First Appeal had earlier been dismissed and I.A. No. 918/2016 filed later for refund of one-half of the fee paid on the memorandum of appeal is hereby dismissed. Reference answered accordingly. K. Abraham Mathew, J. (Concurring) - The question which apparently is a very simple one, but the answer of which has application in civil courts very frequently, has been referred to Full Bench because of the conflicting views taken by two Division Benches of this court. 10. In the appeal in which this reference order was made the entire court fees payable on the appeal memorandum was paid. Thereafter, the appeal was dismissed as not pressed. Is the appellant entitled to refund of half the court fees paid on the appeal memorandum? The Division Bench took notice of the divergent views taken by two Division Benches in Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 and Ramakrishnan K. vs. Venugopalan, 2013 (2) KLT 98 : 2013 (2) KHC 71 and referred the question to Full Bench. 11. The Division Bench took notice of the divergent views taken by two Division Benches in Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 and Ramakrishnan K. vs. Venugopalan, 2013 (2) KLT 98 : 2013 (2) KHC 71 and referred the question to Full Bench. 11. The provision of law which requires interpretation by the Full Bench is Section 69 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1959 (for short the Court Fees Act), which reads thus: When a suit or appeal is compromised or when a suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation, one-half of the Court fee paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been paid respectively: Provided that no refund shall be ordered where only one-tenth of the amount of fee on plaint as required by Section 4A or one-third of the amount of fee on memorandum of appeal as required by Section 52 has been paid by the parties: 12. In Peirce Leslie India Ltd. vs. Kunheerium, 1978 KLT 811 , the advocate for the plaintiff filed a statement which was as follows: “1. This suit has been settled out of court. 2. It is therefore submitted that the suit may be dismissed as settled on plaintiffs admission without taking any evidence and that half court fee may be refunded, under Section 69 of the Kerala Court Fees Act.” The suit was dismissed. The prayer of the plaintiff for refund of half the court fees paid on the plaint was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that the suit was not disposed of on admission of the defendant. A learned Judge of this court, Justice P. Janaki Amma, upheld the view taken by the Trial Court. In Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin, 2003 (1) KLT 644 two Revision Petitions were heard together and disposed of by a single order by another learned Judge of this court. The revision petitioner was the plaintiff in two suits. In one of the suits he submitted that the dispute was settled and the suit need not be proceeded with. This resulted in its dismissal. In the second suit the counsel appearing for the plaintiff as well as the defendant submitted that the matter was settled. The revision petitioner was the plaintiff in two suits. In one of the suits he submitted that the dispute was settled and the suit need not be proceeded with. This resulted in its dismissal. In the second suit the counsel appearing for the plaintiff as well as the defendant submitted that the matter was settled. An endorsement to that effect was made by both counsel. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. In both suits the trial court refused to grant the request of the revision petitioner to refund half of the court fees paid on the plaint. In the revision petitions the learned Judge ordered refund of half the court fees taking the view that both suits were disposed of on admission without any investigation. It may be mentioned that the decision in Peirce Leslie India Ltd. vs. Kunheerium, 1978 KLT 811 has not been referred to in Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin, 2003 (1) KLT 644 . 13. Though the question of refund of court fees as provided in Section 69 of the Court Fees Act did not arise in Ramachandran Pillai vs. Kerala Water Authority, 2006 (1) KLT 784 the learned Judge dissented from the view taken in Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin, 2003 (1) KLT 644 expressing the opinion that disposal of a suit “on a statement of the plaintiff that he does not want any relief or that he has settled the matter out of court cannot be considered as a decision made solely on the admission of the parties.” The correctness of the decisions in Peirce Leslie India and Aravindaksha Prabhu came up for consideration in Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 . The Division Bench approved the decision in Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin and overruled the decision in Peirce Leslie India Ltd. vs. Kunheerium. 14. In all the above decisions referred to above it was the correctness of the decisions of the trial court and not appellate court which came up for consideration. A similar question arose in appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in Ramakrishnan K. vs. Venugopalan, 2013 (2) KLT 98 : 2013 (2) KHC 71. In it the appellant filed a memo stating that he and the respondent had settled the matter out of court and he withdrew the appeal. In the memo there was a request for refund of the entire court fees. In it the appellant filed a memo stating that he and the respondent had settled the matter out of court and he withdrew the appeal. In the memo there was a request for refund of the entire court fees. The Division Bench was called upon to answer the question whether the appellant was entitled to refund of any part of the court fees paid on the appeal memorandum. It took the view that it was not a case of compromise and Section 69 does not mention disposal of appeals on admission and hence the appellant was not entitled to refund of court fees. It made a reference to the decisions in Aravindaksha Prabhu vs. Shamsuddin and Peirce Leslie India Ltd. vs. Kunheerium. It held that as those decisions were made in suits they were not applicable in appeals. The decision of the earlier Division Bench in Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 was not brought to the notice in Ramakrishnan’s case. 15. The principal clause in Section 69 directs refund of one half of the court fees paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal while the subordinate clause mentions two categories of disposal in which refund of half the court fees paid by the party may be ordered, the first category being disposal on compromise and the other disposal on admission. The subordinate clause runs as follows: “When a suit or appeal is compromised or when a suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation.” The clause takes in disposal of suits as well as appeals on compromise, but does not take in disposal of appeal on admission. In other words, the phrase ‘on the admission of the parties without any investigation’ applies only to suits and not appeals. The reason for not including appeals in the cases on admission of the parties is that there is already a decree passed after investigation by the trial court and no investigation is contemplated in appeal. This appears to be the view taken by the Division Bench in Ramakrishnan’s case (supra) and that is the reason for its observation that the decision in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case - as well as in Peirce Leslie India was not applicable to the facts of the case considered by it. This appears to be the view taken by the Division Bench in Ramakrishnan’s case (supra) and that is the reason for its observation that the decision in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case - as well as in Peirce Leslie India was not applicable to the facts of the case considered by it. I find no reason to disagree with the view taken in Ramakrishnan’s case that disposal of appeals on admission is not covered by Section 69 of the Court Fees Act. 16. Assuming that Section 69 of the Court Fees Act takes in not only disposal of appeals on compromise but on admission also, I shall examine the nature of the disposal of the appeal in which this reference has been made, for which the import of certain words used in the Section has to be understood properly. 17. In Peirce Leslie India’s case an argument was advanced that the use of the word parties’ in the expression ‘on the admission of the parties’ appearing in Section 69 of the Act implies that the admission contemplated in the section need not be confined to an admission by the defendant but would include an admission by the plaintiff. The learned Judge has observed: “There is no doubt about this. When there is a counter-claim by the defendant in the same suit and there is an admission by the plaintiff, the defendant who paid court-fee on the counter-claim is entitled to a refund thereof for which purpose the written statement filed by him will be treated as a plaint. The use of the word ‘parties’ is also attributable to the fact that the section mentions both plaint and memorandum of appeal There may also be cases where there are more than one plaintiff or appellant. Hence no assistance is available from the word ‘parties’ for deciding whether the petitioner is entitled to refund.” This stands to reason. The expression ‘on the admission of the parties’ can only mean on the admission of the party/parties concerned. 18. The pivotal question is whether a statement by the plaintiff/appellant alone that the dispute has been settled by him and the defendant/respondent and hence the suit need not be proceeded with amounts to an admission. 19. The expression ‘on the admission of the parties’ can only mean on the admission of the party/parties concerned. 18. The pivotal question is whether a statement by the plaintiff/appellant alone that the dispute has been settled by him and the defendant/respondent and hence the suit need not be proceeded with amounts to an admission. 19. In Peirce Leslie India’s case the learned Judge took support from the provisions in Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act and Rules 1 and 6 in Order 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the reason for which one can find in paragraph 6 of the order. It is quoted below: “The Civil Procedure Code, the Indian Evidence Act and the Court Fees Act are statutes in the field of procedure. The provisions of the Court Fees Act are supplementary in character to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to the formalities to be complied in the filing of suits and appeals and, therefore, it can be safely inferred that the word ‘admission’ is used in the Court Fees Act in the same sense as is used in the Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act.” 20. On the other hand, in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case the learned Judge took a contrary view. “It is not necessary to go to Section 17 of the Evidence Act to ascertain whether the statement by the plaintiff before court that he does not want any relief against the defendant is an admission or not. The plaintiff who had come to court with the suit was making a statement against his own interest that he does not want any relief in the suit.” His Lordship observed: “According to me it is enough if the word ‘admission’ is understood in the dictionary sense.” 21. In Philomina Joseph’s case the Division Bench expressed the opinion that a purposive and progressive interpretation is necessary. It observed: “Reference to other statutes is necessary only if the meaning of the word is not clear or ambiguous. Here literal or popular meaning of the word ‘admission’ as adopted in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case (supra) is harmonious with the object which the Legislature has in view while enacting Section 69 of the Act.” 22. It observed: “Reference to other statutes is necessary only if the meaning of the word is not clear or ambiguous. Here literal or popular meaning of the word ‘admission’ as adopted in Aravindaksha Prabhu’s case (supra) is harmonious with the object which the Legislature has in view while enacting Section 69 of the Act.” 22. The Supreme Court has had occasion to examine the circumstances in which the meaning given to a term in one statute may be relied on in interpreting a term in another statute. “It has long been a well-established principle to be applied in the consideration of Acts of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously been ascribed to it.” In Diwan Bros vs. Central Bank of India, (1976) 5 SCC 800 after quoting the above observation of Lord Buckmaster in Barras vs. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Company, 1933 AC 402 the Apex Court has observed: “Craies further points out that the rule as to words judicially interpreted applies also to words with well-known legal meanings, even though they have not been the subject of judicial interpretation. Thus applying these principles in the instant case it would appear that when the Court Fees Act uses the word “decree” which had a well-known legal significance or meaning, then the Legislature must be presumed to have used this term in the sense in which it has been understood, namely, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure even if there has been no express judicial interpretation on this point.” 23. In no uncertain terms the Supreme Court held: “the Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure are more or less complementary to each other.” In Peirce Leslie India’s case the learned single Judge rightly relied on the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure to interpret the word ‘admission’ used in Section 69 of the Court Fees Act. The view taken by the learned single Judge in Aravindhaksha Prabhu’s case and the Division Bench in Philomina Joseph’s case that dictionary, or literal or popular meaning of the word ‘admission’ should be accepted is erroneous. 24. The view taken by the learned single Judge in Aravindhaksha Prabhu’s case and the Division Bench in Philomina Joseph’s case that dictionary, or literal or popular meaning of the word ‘admission’ should be accepted is erroneous. 24. A suit may be disposed of either on contest or without contest. A disposal without contest takes place in the following three situations: (a) When both parties enter into a compromise. (Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C.) (b) When the defendant admits the facts pleaded by the plaintiff (Order 12, Rule 6 CP.C.) (c) When the plaintiff abandons the suit (Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C.) The terms abandonment’, ‘admission’ and ‘compromise’ are used in different senses in law which is clear from the provisions referred to above. They cannot be used interchangeably. 25. In State of Punjab and Others vs. Phulan Rani and Another, AIR 2004 SC 4105 , the Apex Court examined the meaning of compromise while interpreting the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act. The court has observed: “The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are “compromise” and “settlement.” The former expression means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Terms de la Ley, “compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy. As per Bouvier it is “an agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can agree upon”. The word “compromise” implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender (See Re MFU Development Trust Ltd. (1973) 1 All. E.R. 135 (Ch.D). A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. Settlement” is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent.” 26. The following observation of the Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major and Others, 1995 (3) R.R.R. 541 : AIR 1996 SC 196 is relevant. E.R. 135 (Ch.D). A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. Settlement” is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent.” 26. The following observation of the Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major and Others, 1995 (3) R.R.R. 541 : AIR 1996 SC 196 is relevant. “It may also be pointed out that the first suit cannot really be said to have been decreed on the basis of compromise as the suit was decreed in view of the written statement filed by the defendant admitting the claim of the plaintiff to be correct.” 27. In the case of compromise if the plaintiff does not want an executable decree against the defendant because of the settlement arrived at between them, they may request the court to dismiss the suit, in which case the terms and conditions of the settlement need not be disclosed in the petition filed to record the compromise. In his order Justice V. Chitambaresh has mentioned the conditions which should be satisfied before the court can record a compromise. In the case before us no application was filed to record compromise, nor the provisions in Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. complied with. 28. Black’s Law dictionary defines admission as an acknowledgment that facts are true. Admissions are specifically dealt with in Order 12 C.P.C. Rule 6 sub-rule (1) runs as follows: “Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or if its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.” 29. Sections 17 to 20 of the Indian Evidence Act together define admission and Section 21 of the Act declares admission of a party relevant. These provisions are not relevant for the present purpose because the admissions referred to in these sections are evidentiary admissions, which are out of court admissions. They have to be proved in a case just like any other fact, which means that they should be tendered in evidence. To put it differently, those provisions are relevant only in the course of a trial, which presupposes a contested proceedings. They have to be proved in a case just like any other fact, which means that they should be tendered in evidence. To put it differently, those provisions are relevant only in the course of a trial, which presupposes a contested proceedings. Evidentiary admissions are not conclusive and they may be shown as wrongly made. 30. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, which is extracted below is the foundation on which judgment on admission is made. “No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto- or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.” 31. When one party admits a fact pleaded by the other party, the rule of evidence contained in Section 58 dispenses with proof of that fact which the latter is otherwise required to prove before he can be granted the relief prayed for against the former. This type of admission is called judicial admission and it is not required to be proved as the maker waives its proof. It is conclusive unlike evidentiary admission. It is judicial admission that is referred to in Order 12 R.6 sub-rule (1) C.P.C. The opening words of the sub-rule are relevant.” Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise.” ‘Or otherwise’ only indicates that even after the filing of the pleadings a party may admit the facts pleaded by the opposite side. A conjoint reading of Section 58 of the Evidence Act and Order 12 R.6 sub-rule (1) C.P.C. makes it crystal clear that only a fact pleaded by one party can be admitted by the other. When the plaintiff submits that he does not want a decree as the matter has been settled by him and the defendant, the former does not admit any fact pleaded by the latter. The judgment passed on such submission is not a judgment on admission. 32. Abandonment is relinquishment, the meaning of which is giving up. The plaintiff may relinquish any one or more of the claims, or all the claims made in his pleadings. The judgment passed on such submission is not a judgment on admission. 32. Abandonment is relinquishment, the meaning of which is giving up. The plaintiff may relinquish any one or more of the claims, or all the claims made in his pleadings. Relinquishment of a portion of the claim is covered by O.11 R.2 sub-rule (2) C.P.C. When he relinquishes all his claims, it is abandonment of the suit. When he submits to the court that his suit may be dismissed because the dispute between him and the defendant has been settled, it is neither admission, nor compromise, but abandonment of the suit, the provision for which is made in O.XXIII R.1 C.P.C. 33. In Ramakrishnan vs. Thanka, 2000 (3) KLT 886 a learned Judge of this Court held: “Abandonment can be either through positive submission or through silence leading to lapse. If one allows his suit to go for default, that will be abandonment by silence. It is also open to him to abandon the suit by making a direct request to the court after due appearance. By stating “not pressed” in the instant case what the plaintiffs have achieved is actually abandonment of the suit...........” 34. Admission is a unilateral act while compromise is a bilateral act. An admission made by a defendant should always result in a decree in favour of the plaintiff (unless there is a legal impediment) while a compromise need not. Like admission abandonment of a suit also is a unilateral act, the result of which is dismissal of the suit. 35. I fully agree with the view taken by Justice V. Chitambaresh that the decision in Ramakrishnan K. vs. Venugopalan, 2013 (2) KLT 98 : 2013 (2) KHC 71 is the correct one and the decision in Philomina Joseph vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 591 is erroneous.