ORDER 1. Though, the matter is posted today for interim relief but, with the consent of parties writ petition is heard finally and decided. 2. Petitioner serving on the post of Sales Promotion Organizer with Gwalior Dugdh Sangh has approached this Court with a grievance that without departmental enquiry and opportunity of hearing impugned order of termination has been passed purportedly under regulation 21(2) of Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Dairy Federation Employees Recruitment, Classification and Service Condition Regulation 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulations”). 3. It is submitted that earlier also the petitioner was visited with penalty of termination without departmental enquiry and opportunity of hearing. The petitioner had challenged the aforesaid action before the Principle Seat at Jabalpur. The Division Bench of this Court by deciding Writ Petition No.7072/2015 on 14.8.2015 has quashed the termination order relying upon the judgment of Coordinate Division Bench in Writ Petition No.17611/2014(s) (Anand Kumar Tiwari v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others) decided on 10.3.2015. However, liberty was given to respondent to proceed against the petitioner by following due process of law as per the Regulations. 4. Thereafter, a skeleton charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 25.2.2017 (Annexure P-3) wherein, the petitioner was given to understand that he was suspended for the reason of registration of a criminal case against him by STF, M.P. under various provisions of IPC, Information Technology Act and M.P. Recognized Examinations Act and for that matter he having been put behind bars for more than 48 hours, therefore to show cause why his service may not be terminated. Petitioner has replied the same bringing to the notice of respondents that no specific charge has been framed against him for which reply could be submitted on merits. 5. Respondents have justified the impugned order reiterating what has been stated in the show cause notice with further stipulation that circumstances have not changed since the date of suspension on 17.1.2014, hence petitioner's services have been terminated. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that though petitioner was appointed on probation for two years but, still unless an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner under regulation 14(1) of the Regulations, the impugned order of termination which is stigmatic in nature, could not have been passed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that though petitioner was appointed on probation for two years but, still unless an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner under regulation 14(1) of the Regulations, the impugned order of termination which is stigmatic in nature, could not have been passed. It is submitted that mere registration of a case, by itself is not sufficient to form an opinion justifying the termination which has serious penal consequences. It is submitted that on one hand respondent have alleged that criminal case has been registered and on the other hand, no charge has been framed. Even otherwise, no inquiry has been conducted. Under such circumstances, respondents have not abide by the provisions contained under regulation 21 and regulation 48 before imposition of penalty of termination from service. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 7. Per contra, Shri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for the respondents contends that petitioner has secured his name in the select list on the basis of the test conducted by VYPAM by illegal and unfair means for which criminal case has already been registered against him. As such, his appointment on the post of Sales Promotion Organizer with Gwalior Dugdh Sangh is bad in law and the petitioner being a probationer cannot be permitted to continue in services in view of regulation 21(2) of the “Regulations”. It is submitted that consequent upon the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.7072/2015 (supra), the petitioner was afforded an opportunity and as the petitioner did not file reply on merits of the allegations, therefore, in the fitness of things, there was no occasion to hold enquiry, consequently, he has been terminated from service. Under these circumstances, no further indulgence is warranted, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on merits. 8. Heard. 9. True, it is that consequent upon his selection through VYPAM, petitioner has been appointed as Sales Promotion Organizer with respondent/Dugdh Sangh on probation and therefore, does not have lien to the post. 10. It is settled law that even if the petitioner is a probationer he is entitled for protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. True, it is that consequent upon his selection through VYPAM, petitioner has been appointed as Sales Promotion Organizer with respondent/Dugdh Sangh on probation and therefore, does not have lien to the post. 10. It is settled law that even if the petitioner is a probationer he is entitled for protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if he is visited with an order of termination having penal consequences without inquiry, such action stands vitiated for want of observance of rule of law and fair play in action taking into account the concept of principles of natural justice. The aforesaid cardinal principle applies to the case of the petitioner more forcefully, in view of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.7072/2015 (supra), wherein respondents were directed to act in accordance with due process of law under the service regulations. 11. Admittedly, no formal charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner, instead a notice has been issued calling upon petitioner to reply to the fact of registration of criminal case by the STF M.P. Bhopal under various provisions of IPC, Information Technology Act and M.P. Recognized Examinations Act. The petitioner was suspended on 17.1.2014 consequent upon his arrest and having remained in jail for more than 48 hours. In fact, in the aforesaid notice, the contents of the suspension order has been bodily incorporated with an addition calling upon the petitioner to file the reply. There is no formal charge made against the petitioner which may be enquired in that departmental enquiry under regulation 21 read with regulation 48 of the service Regulations. The respondents, in fact have resorted to lip service while issuing the notice Annexure P-3 followed by the impugned termination order, which is again reproduction of the notice justifying termination. 12. In the opinion of this Court, respondents have not acted in accordance with the directions issued by Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.17611/2014 (supra). Mere registration of a criminal case by MPSTF, that by itself does not constitute ''misconduct'' as the alleged allegations made against the petitioner are yet to be tried and established. More so, the word ''misconduct'' defined in appendix 4-A appended to the Regulations do not spell out aforesaid circumstances as a ''misconduct'' for disciplinary action. Mere registration of a criminal case by MPSTF, that by itself does not constitute ''misconduct'' as the alleged allegations made against the petitioner are yet to be tried and established. More so, the word ''misconduct'' defined in appendix 4-A appended to the Regulations do not spell out aforesaid circumstances as a ''misconduct'' for disciplinary action. Respondents have not framed charges and have not held any inquiry, hence, the issuance of impugned termination order, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be said to be under regulation 21(2) of the Regulations as regulation 21(2) provides for certain attributes of constituting ''misconduct'' warranting disciplinary action. Nevertheless, such conducts are required to be proved in an enquiry before having acted upon. That has not been done. Therefore, the impugned action cannot be said to be under regulation 21(2) of the Regulations. Consequently, the impugned termination order having been found stigmatic in nature cannot be sustained in the eye of law, accordingly, quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith. However, respondents are at liberty to frame specific charges in terms of regulation 21(2) of the Regulations and thereafter proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Regulations/law. 13. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the case.