JUDGMENT : Alok Aradhe, J. 1. In these intra Court appeals, the appellants have assailed the validity of the order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the learned single judge by which the writ petitions preferred by the respondent have been allowed and the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal has been set aside. In order to appreciate the issues involved in this writ appeal, we set out the facts which are stated infra. 2. The respondent is a company registered with the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act 1956. The respondent introduced Voluntary Separation Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the scheme) from time to time giving option of voluntary retirement to its workers on the terms and conditions indicated in the scheme. It is the case of the respondent that the employees were given the option under the scheme in pursuance of which 40, 15, 18, 66, 53 and 17 employees opted under the scheme for voluntary retirement in the year 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995, respectively, as each year, benefits under the scheme were different depending upon the prevailing pay scales and all the aforesaid employees voluntarily availed all the respective schemes and signed the documents including the resignation letter, memorandum of settlement under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which clearly specified that the amount shall be paid in two installments, letters sent to Deputy Labour Commissioner for registration of settlement, duly executed receipts and declaration of non-employment. The aforesaid employees received all the amounts due under the respective schemes as well as their terminal benefits after fulfilling the necessary formalities. On 17.05.1996, 235 employees opted for voluntary retirement under the scheme pursuant to which they were paid the enhanced amount as the salaries of the employees had increased in the year 1996. The employees who had opted for voluntary retirement in the year 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 were given lesser monetary benefits than the employees who had opted voluntary retirement in the year 1996. Being aggrieved, they approached the Conciliation Officer, Jammu. The Conciliation Officer forwarded the matter to the State Government seeking reference to the Labour Court. The State Government, however, refused to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ petition namely OWP No. 938/1998. 3. Being aggrieved, they approached the Conciliation Officer, Jammu. The Conciliation Officer forwarded the matter to the State Government seeking reference to the Labour Court. The State Government, however, refused to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ petition namely OWP No. 938/1998. 3. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the Learned Single Judge vide order dated 04.02.1999 and the State Government was directed to make reference in terms of Section 10 of the Act within a period of two months. In compliance of the order passed by this Court, the State Government on 18.06.1999 vide SRO 236 made a reference, which is reproduced below for the facility of reference: “GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR LABOUR AND EMP. DEPARTMENT. NOTIFICATION Srinagar, the 18th of June 1999. SRO 236:- Whereas, the Government is of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists between the Management of Hindustan Lever Limited, Jammu and its workers through Parshotam Singh regarding the matters herein-after appearing. Whereas, the Government considers it desirable to refer the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (C) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), the Government of Jammu and Kashmir hereby refer the dispute to the Labour Court constituted vide notification SRO 767 dated 21.10.1972 for adjudication in respect of the matters specified below: (i) Legality or otherwise of the action of the management of Hindustan Lever Limited, Jammu, as regards the payment of compensation to its workers under Voluntary Separation Scheme. (ii) Onward appropriate relief to the said workers in case the illegality of the action of the said management was established.” By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Comm./Secretary to Government Labour & Emp. Department. 4. Before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellants filed their statement of claim. The respondent resisted the sustainability of the reference made by the State Government inter-alia on the ground that appellants having resigned from services after accepting and availing all the benefits prevalent in the scheme had ceased to be workmen in terms of Section 2(s) of the Act and therefore their claims for higher benefits granted similar to the employees who had opted for voluntary retirement under the Scheme of 1996 was not cognizable under the provisions of the Act, before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by an award dated 28.02.2003, inter-alia held that the respondent did not follow the basic principles of equity, fair play and good conscience while dealing with the appellants and they did not disclose the scheme to the appellants and did not take into consideration, the basis of length of service, the salary and status of workers which they claimed to have followed. It was further held that non- consideration of the aforesaid relevant factors has resulted in grant of lesser benefits to the appellants and the negotiations between the parties had not been free, frank fair and at equal level. On the basis of the material available on record, the Tribunal returned the finding that some of the appellants were subjected to harassment, coercion and were forced to agree to separate from the company at the dictates of the respondent. It was also held that the appellants were subjected to discrimination and were paid varied amounts and the respondent has failed to justify the aforesaid action. To buttress the aforesaid conclusion, the Tribunal has referred to the examples of various employees in its award. 5. While dealing with the issue whether after receiving the compensation, the appellants can still be termed as workmen under Section 2(s) of the Act and the claim referred for adjudication to the Tribunal is maintainable, the Tribunal held that the scheme claimed to have been introduced by the respondent to separate the workers from the service of the respondent was not shown the light of the day and same was neither notified nor displayed. It was further held that the respondent acted in a concealed manner and made the workers to agree to separate themselves from the services of the company by using dubious means and even by extending the false promises of payment of further claims later on as was alleged to have been paid to the employees of the other unit of the respondent. The respondent did not pay any differential amount to the appellants thereafter and the transaction between the appellants and the respondent though culminated in the form of documents such as resignation letters, memorandum of settlements and even the receipts of full and final payment but all such documents were executed under misrepresentation before disclosing the correct facts to the appellants. The respondent did not pay any differential amount to the appellants thereafter and the transaction between the appellants and the respondent though culminated in the form of documents such as resignation letters, memorandum of settlements and even the receipts of full and final payment but all such documents were executed under misrepresentation before disclosing the correct facts to the appellants. It was held that under such circumstances, the aforesaid resignation letters, memorandum of settlements and the receipts of full and final payments were vitiated in law and could not bind the appellants. Accordingly, the reference was answered and it was held that the action of the respondent in making payment of compensation to the appellants under the scheme was illegal, bad in law and the appellants are entitled to compensation equal to the highest paid to similarly placed on the basis of their status, length of service and the grade. The aforesaid award was challenged by the respondent in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. 6. The learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 29.09.2009, inter-alia, held that from perusal of the statements of claims filed by the appellants as well as respondent before the Tribunal, it is evident that the dispute related only to the benefits which were payable by the respondent to the appellants on their voluntary retirement. It was further held that the appellants had not questioned their voluntary retirement from the company and their grievance was only for more financial benefits and seeking parity with the workers who had proceeded on the voluntary retirement from the services of respondent in the year 1996. The learned Single Judge while placing reliance on decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Everestees vs. District Labour Officer, (1999) 11 LLJ 851, inter-alia, held that the appellants could not be covered under the expression Workmen as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act, as they had proceeded on voluntary retirement. It was further held that since the State Government had not referred the dispute with regard to voluntary retirement of the workers, therefore, the same could not be termed as an industrial dispute in terms of Section 2(k) of the Act and the reference made by the State Government to the Labour court was without jurisdiction and was incompetent. Accordingly, the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal was quashed. Accordingly, the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal was quashed. In the aforesaid factual background, these intra court appeals have been filed. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that since the dispute was referred by the State Government in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court passed in OWP No. 938/1998, therefore, the validity of the scope of reference could not be examined by a co-ordinate bench. It is further submitted that the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal has been set aside only on the ground that the reference was incompetent. It is also submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is self-contradictory. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Bombay vs. K.P. Krishnan, AIR 1960 SC 1223 ; Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. and Others vs. The Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 948 ; M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh vs. State of M.P. and Another, AIR 1985 SC 860 ; Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116 and Man Singh vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and Another, 2011 (6) Supreme 207 . 8. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that from the order of reference, it is evident that there was no dispute between the workmen and the management with regard to termination of their services. The only dispute which was referred for adjudication was whether the compensation awarded to the appellants under the schemes was proper. It is also submitted that the appellants accepted the severance of their services voluntarily which resulted inconsequent cessation of relationship of the employer and employee and never questioned the same, therefore, they cannot be treated as the workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the respondent has referred to decisions in the cases of Everestee (supra), Purandaran vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (2001) 2 LLJ 52 (Ker), A.K. Bindal vs. UOI and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 163 , HEC Voluntary Retired Employees Welfare Society and Another vs. Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, (2006) 2 LLJ 245 , Retired Employees Association vs. The Govt. of A.P. 2008 (4) ALD 204 . 9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. of A.P. 2008 (4) ALD 204 . 9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It is well settled in law that though the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is confined to the terms of reference, but at the same time it is empowered to go into the incidental issues. (See: Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2014) 1 SCC 536 . In the instant case, the Tribunal while passing the award took note of the aforesaid well settled legal position and held that it can go into the incidental issues and framed Issue No. 3, which reads as under: Issue No. 3: Whether the petitioners have singed the bilateral settlement with the management by virtue of which they received the compensation fully and were given in substantial benefits under the VSS as such under section 18 sub-section (1) of the I.D. Act the petitioners are precluded from taking up this plea again before this Tribunal, thus their claim as is referred for adjudication to this Tribunal is not maintainable under law? 10. It is pertinent to mention that in the proceeding before the Tribunal also, the respondent herein had resisted the claim of the appellants on the ground that in the absence of jural relationship of employer and employee, the reference itself is invalid. From the perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant extract of the order, which reads as under: “Learned counsel was critical of the omission of the Labour Court to address itself on the vital question of its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute projected by the Company’s retired employees, raised and canvassed before it, by the Company. Keeping in view that facts and circumstances of the case and additionally because the parties had already spent about ten years in the litigation, it was not considered appropriate to remand the case to the Labour Court and the learned counsel for the parties were heard, on the question as to whether or not the Reference made by the State Government to the Labour Court was valid, and if so, what was its effect on the Labour Court’s Award.” 11. Thus, it is axiomatic that taking into account the fact that the parties had spent nearly 10 years in the litigation, learned counsel for the appellants as well as the respondent addressed the learned Single Judge with regard to validity of reference and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge vide order impugned in these appeals held that the reference was invalid. Therefore, at this stage, the learned senior counsel for the appellants cannot be permitted to argue that it was not open for the learned Single Judge to have examined the validity of the scope of the reference. In other words, having abandoned the plea that issue with regard to validity of reference cannot be examined, before the learned Single Judge, the appellants cannot be allowed to re-agitate this plea in these Letters Patent Appeals. (See: State of U.P. and Another vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ). 12. We may now examine the issue whether the appellants are workmen as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. The issue with regard to cessation of jural relationship consequent to availing the scheme has been subject matter of interpretation in various decisions of the Supreme Court. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of Section 2(s) of the Act which reads as under: “2(s). “Workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute, but does not include any such person.” 13. The Kerala High Court in the case of Everestee (supra) while interpreting Section 2(s) of the Act held that a person who voluntarily tenders his resignation pursuant to a scheme for voluntary retirement, the resignation having been accepted by the management and all the benefits arising out of such resignation having been paid to such person, he cannot be treated as workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. Similar view was taken in the case of Purandaran (supra). 14. Similar view was taken in the case of Purandaran (supra). 14. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we may advert to the facts of the cases. In the instant cases, admittedly, the appellants had applied under the scheme and had signed the resignation letters, memorandum of settlement under Section 18 of the Act, which clearly specified that amount is to be paid in two installments, letter sent to the Deputy Labour Commissioner for registration of settlement, duly executed receipts and declaration of non-employment. The appellants received the amount due under the respective schemes as well as their terminal benefits after fulfilling the requisite formalities. It is pertinent to mention here that after a period of six years, for the first time, they raised a dispute that they are entitled to payment of compensation as was paid to the employees under the scheme in the year 1996. It is also noteworthy that the appellants at no point of time had questioned their voluntary retirement in any forum and had accepted the benefits of voluntary retirement and, therefore, they could not be treated as workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. Therefore, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this regard. 15. From the perusal of the terms of reference, it is axiomatic that the dispute which was referred for adjudication was with regard to payment of compensation to the appellants under the scheme and the consequent relief to the appellants in case, any illegality is established in the action of the management. It is pertinent to note that each year benefits under the schemes were different depending upon the prevalent pay scales and therefore, the employees who had opted for voluntary retirement between the years 1990-95 could not claim parity in the matter of payment of compensation under the scheme with the employees who had opted for the voluntary retirement under the scheme in the year 1996 and to whom higher wages were paid consequent to pay revision. The aforesaid employees cannot claim parity in the matter of payment of compensation with the workers who had opted for voluntary retirement under the scheme in the year 1996, as they belong to different classes and, therefore, similar treatment could not be given to them in the matter of grant financial benefits, as the compensation depends upon the wage structure which was different in each year. For this reason also, the reference could not have been answered in favour of the appellants. 16. Reverting to the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in setting aside the award merely on the ground that the reference was incompetent and that the validity of the scope of reference could not be examined by the Co-ordinate Bench, suffice it to say that having argued the matter threadbare before the learned Single Judge with regard to the validity of the scope of reference, it is not open for the appellants now to contend that the aforesaid issue could not have been examined by the learned Single Judge. The reliance placed on behalf of the appellants in the case of State of Bombay (supra) is misconceived in the fact situation of the case. In the aforesaid decision, Supreme Court dealt with the scope of Section 10 of the Act. In the case of Hindustan Antobiotics Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the question whether wage structure including the dearness allowance of a Government Undertaking in the Public Sector should be of a pattern different from that of an Undertaking in Private Sector. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is also of no assistance to the appellants in the fact situation of the case. In the case of M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh (supra), the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of Section 10 of the Act held that adjudication of the demands made by the workmen should be left to the Tribunal to be decided. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is also of no relevance in the fact situation of the case. In Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the Labour Court had passed the award for reinstatement with 50% back wages, which was substituted with compensation by the High Court on the assumption that the employee was employed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was held by the Supreme Court that in the absence of challenge to the initial appointment, no interference was called for with the award made by the Tribunal. Therefore, the aforesaid decision has also no bearing on the controversy involved in these appeals. Similarly, in the case of Man Singh (supra), the workman had raised a dispute that he was made to take voluntary retirement under duress, which is not the case here. Therefore, the aforesaid decision has also no bearing on the controversy involved in these appeals. Similarly, in the case of Man Singh (supra), the workman had raised a dispute that he was made to take voluntary retirement under duress, which is not the case here. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is also of no assistance to the appellants. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any ground to differ with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.