JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is preferred to issue writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari and to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 17.08.2009 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Banaskantha, Palanpur in Motor Accident Claim Petition Review Application No. 2 of 2007, whereby the judgment and order dated 20.07.2006 is rectified that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation to the petitioner-claimant. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of present petition are that the deceased Abbasbhai was traveling in jeep bearing registration No. GUM-7939 on 27.03.1995. He was going to Satlasna. Jeep driver was driving the jeep at high and excessive speed, as a result, the jeep had tossed up on the speed-breaker. As a result, the deceased fell down on the road and sustained fatal injuries. The petitioners filed Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 414 of 1995 to claim compensation in respect of the death of their son. The claim petition was partly allowed by the judgment and award dated 20.07.2006 and the respondent Insurance Company along with the owner and driver of the offending jeep was directing to pay a sum of Rs. 1,83,000/- with 7.5% interest to the petitioner jointly and severally. 3. The respondent - Insurance Company filed Review Application being M.A.C.P. No. 2 of 2007 for exonerating it from the liability of payment of compensation on the ground that the offending jeep was covered by Act and "Act only Policy" and therefore, the deceased being third party, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay any compensation. The Tribunal, while allowing the review application by the impugned order, exonerated the Insurance Company. The petitioner has therefore, challenged the impugned award in this petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Jayneel S. Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Palak H. Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent. 5. Mr. Jayneel Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the review application was not maintainable and the respondent-Insurance Company ought to have challenged the impugned judgment and award by filing an appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. Jayneel S. Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Palak H. Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent. 5. Mr. Jayneel Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the review application was not maintainable and the respondent-Insurance Company ought to have challenged the impugned judgment and award by filing an appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. It is his further contention that the review application preferred by the respondent was not within the fours of the provision of Order 41 Rule 1. He therefore, submits that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction entertaining and allowing the review application and therefore, the petition may be allowed and the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent - Insurance Company has vehemently opposed the present application and has supported the impugned order of the Tribunal. He submits that the present petition is not maintainable and remedy of appeal to challenge the impugned order is available to the petitioner. 7. Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent further submits that the Division Bench of this Court has permitted the Insurance Company to raise a question of law though it was not raised before the Tribunal. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of this Court dated 07.02.2012 in First Appeal No. 2214 of 1999. In the case of National Insurance Company Limited Versus Smitaben Wd/O Bhogilal Jiagjivandas Gadhia and others. In support of his submission, he has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh Versus National Insurance Company Limited, 2003(3) SCC 524 . It is his further submission that the Tribunal has committed an error of law, and therefore, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned order. It is his further submission that the respondent raised a specific defence that the respondent is not liable to pay compensation as the Insurance policy is of "Act only Policy". The Tribunal, in the main judgment and award, has recorded the defence, but thereafter, it has not given any finding on it and thereafter, the Tribunal has rightly corrected this error in review application. He, therefore, urges that the petition may be dismissed. 8. In rejoinder, Mr. The Tribunal, in the main judgment and award, has recorded the defence, but thereafter, it has not given any finding on it and thereafter, the Tribunal has rightly corrected this error in review application. He, therefore, urges that the petition may be dismissed. 8. In rejoinder, Mr. Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akram Ansari versus Chief Election Officers and Others, 2008 AIR SCW 416, submits that the main judgment and award does not indicate that this defence was pressed into service at the time of final arguments and therefore, it is to be presumed that this defence was abandoned by the respondent. He, therefore, submits that the respondent cannot be permitted to raise this issue in the review application. 9. The core issue, which is involved in the present petition, is whether the Tribunal has committed any error in entertaining the review application for correcting the main judgment and award under which the respondent was held liable to pay compensation to the petitioner jointly and severally with the owner of the offending vehicle. 10. At this juncture, it would be relevant to consider the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 which are as under: "R. 1 Who may be joined as plaintiffs All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where - (a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise." 11. It can thus be seen that the scope of review application is very limited and can be invoked only in the eventuality mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code that (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which the party seeking the review could not produce at the time when the earlier order sought to be reviewed was made despite exercise of due diligence. (b) Existence of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and (c) Existence of any analogous grounds. 12. (b) Existence of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and (c) Existence of any analogous grounds. 12. It is therefore, manifestly clear that the respondent was required to demonstrate before the Tribunal that though the issue of Act only Policy was raised and pressed into service at the time of hearing of the claim petition out of mistake or inadvertence the Tribunal missed it in the main judgment and award. 13. In the above context, the averments made in the review applications are required to be examined and find out whether it is stated in the review application that the issue of "Act only Policy" was raised and pressed into service at the time of the hearing of the claim petition but the tribunal has not recorded any findings on it. The perusal of the review application reveals that it is only stated therein that offending vehicle was insured under "Act only Policy" and therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Tilak Singh and Ors., 2006 ACJ 1441 , the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation. 14. It is true that the Insurance Company has raised the issued of Act only Policy in its written statement, but it is nowhere reflected in the judgment and award that this defence was pressed into service at the time of hearing of the claim petition. 15. The Supreme Court in the Case of Mohd. Akram Ansari Versus Chief Election Officers and Ors., 2008 AIR SCW 416, in paragraph 14 has observed as under : "14. In this connection we would like to say that there is a presumption in law that a Judge deals with all the points which have been pressed before him. It often happens that in a petition or appeal several points are taken in the memorandum of the petition or appeal, but at the time of arguments only some of these points are pressed. Naturally a Judge will deal only with the points which are pressed before him in the arguments and it will be presumed that the appellant gave up the other points, otherwise he would have dealt with them also. Naturally a Judge will deal only with the points which are pressed before him in the arguments and it will be presumed that the appellant gave up the other points, otherwise he would have dealt with them also. If a point is not mentioned in the judgment of a Court, the presumption is that that point was never pressed before the learned Judge and it was given up. However, that is rebuttable presumption. In case the petition contends that he had pressed that point also (which has not been dealt with in the impugned judgment), it is open to him to file an application before the same learned Judge (or Bench) which delivered the impugned judgment and if he satisfies that Judge (or Bench) that the other points were in fact pressed, but were not dealt with in the impugned judgment, it is open to the concerned Court to pass appropriate orders, including an order of review. However, it is not ordinarily open to the party to file an appeal and seek to argue a point which even if taken in the petition or memorandum filed before the Court below, has not been dealt with in the judgment of the Court below. The party who has in this grievance must approach the same Court which passed the judgment, and urge that the other points were pressed but not dealt with." 16. It is thus very clear in absence of any specific averments in the review application that the defence of "Act only Policy" and the liability of respondent-Insurance Company was pressed into service at the time of hearing of the claim petition. I am of the view that the respondents cannot be heard to contend that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record of the main judgment and award which is rectified by the Tribunal by the impugned order in review application. 17. The contention of Mr. Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner at the review application has not maintainable cannot be countenance and relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Rajnikant N. Dave Versus Lilaben Wd/o. Kheldas Ghanshyamdas Tilvani, First Appeal No. 277 of 1983. 18. 17. The contention of Mr. Parikh, learned advocate for the petitioner at the review application has not maintainable cannot be countenance and relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Rajnikant N. Dave Versus Lilaben Wd/o. Kheldas Ghanshyamdas Tilvani, First Appeal No. 277 of 1983. 18. Unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Smitaben (Supra) wherein prior question of liability is allowed to be permitted cannot came to the rescue of the respondents Insurance Company. The scope of appeal and the scope of review are different. Appeal is considered to be the continuation of the proceedings of the lower Court and therefore, in appeal the appellate Court is required to re-appreciate the evidence and can also consider the question of liability which was not raised before the lower Court. Whereas the scope of review is very circumscribed and limited and can be invoked only in the eventuality as explained by this Court in the Case of Rajnikant N. Dave Versus Lilaben (Supra). 19. It does not emerge from the impugned judgment and award that though the defence of "Act only Policy" was raised in the written statement but thereafter, it was pressed into service therefore, the only option available with the respondent - Insurance Company was of preferring an appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act and the review application, in my opinion was not the proper remedy available to the respondents. 20. The Tribunal without appreciating the subtle distinction, has only on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Tilak Singh and Ors. (Supra), and without recording any finding whether any inadvertent error or mistake has crept in the main judgment and award allowed the review application and exonerated the respondent-Insurance Company from its liability to pay compensation. The Tribunal has grossly exceeded its jurisdiction. 21. In view of the above the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed the impugned order dated 17.08.2009 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Banaskantha, Palanpur in Motor Accident Claim Petition Review Application No. 2 of 2007 is hereby quashed and set aside. 22. Rule made absolute. 23. Record and proceedings, if summoned, be remitted to the trial Court. 24. In the facts of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs. 22. Rule made absolute. 23. Record and proceedings, if summoned, be remitted to the trial Court. 24. In the facts of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition Allowed