JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed assailing the orders under Annexures-4 to 6 passed by the opposite party Nos.2 to 4 in exercise of power under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960. 2. Short background involved in the case is that the father of the opposite party Nos.5 & 6 being a scheduled caste person sold the disputed land to one Iswar Das-opposite party No.8 by executing a registered sale deed dated 11.4.1969. The said Iswar Das being a Scheduled Tribe person and remaining in possession of the disputed land sought for permission from the competent authority for sale of the land in favour of the present petitioner. It further reveals that obtaining permission the opposite party No.8 sold Ac.0.59 decimals of land to the petitioner by executing a sale deed on 4.4.1970. The opposite party No.5 filed a petition under Section 23 of the O.L.R Act bearing O.L.R case No.12 of 1999 in the year 1999 for declaring the sale deed at the instance of his father as void and thereby, also sought for declaration of the subsequent sale deed as void. The opposite party No.2 allowed the O.L.R Case declaring that the Annexure-1 since involved a transfer of a property from a scheduled caste person to a scheduled tribe person taking place in the year 1969, contravenes the provisions contained in Section 22 of the O.L.R Act. The petitioner filed an appeal registered as O.L.R appeal case No.26/1999. The appeal was dismissed vide Annexure-5. A revision was also preferred by the petitioner and by the opposite party No.8. The revision was registered as O.L.R Revision Case No.1/2000 and the revision was dismissed on 23.9.2000 as appearing at Annexure-6. Smt. Sujata Jena, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. B.N. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the impugned order submitted that though the sale vide Annexure-1 did not have any permission but looking to the long possession of the petitioner by the time of initiation of the proceeding in the year 1999, petitioner had already got the possession over twelve years and therefore, following the provisions contained in Section 23(B)(I) of the Act, Smt. Jena, claimed that the petitioner has got the right by way of adverse possession. It is under the above circumstances, Smt. Sujata Jena, learned counsel claimed for setting aside the impugned orders. 3. Mr. It is under the above circumstances, Smt. Sujata Jena, learned counsel claimed for setting aside the impugned orders. 3. Mr. Maheswar Mohanty, learned counsel for the private opposite party Nos.5 & 6 being the sons of the original vendor challenging the claim of the petitioner, referring to the provisions contained in Section 23(B)(I) of the O.L.R Act submitted that the petitioner’s case since falls under the provisions contained in Section 23(B)(II), the petitioners should have thirty years of possession. Sri Mohanty, learned counsel thus submitted that assuming that the petitioner purchased the property in the year 1970 and for the introduction of Section 23(B)(II) of the Act vide Orissa Act 8 of 91 the petitioner had hardly twenty-one years of possession, therefore, no right accrued in favour of the petitioner by way of adverse possession and under the circumstance, there is no illegality committed by any of the authority involved in the impugned orders leaving any scope for interfering in the impugned orders. 4. Mr. K.K. Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate supported the contentions raised by Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos.5 & 6 and consequently, justifies the impugned orders. 5. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, this Court finds, there is no dispute that the first sale vide Annexure-1 between the father of the opposite party Nos.5 & 6 and Iswar Das the opposite party No.8 took place on 11.4.1969. For the restrictions imposed under Section 23 of the O.L.R Act and since the aforesaid provision came into effect by the Orissa Act 13 of 1965, the transaction made in the year 1969 involving a property of a Scheduled Caste community without having permission remains void. For the transaction vide Annexure-1 being declared as void, this Court observes that the transaction between the opposite party No.8 and the petitioner even though having a permission for sale but for having no right to sale with the opposite party No.8, the second sale also becomes void. 6. For the transaction vide Annexure-1 being declared as void, this Court observes that the transaction between the opposite party No.8 and the petitioner even though having a permission for sale but for having no right to sale with the opposite party No.8, the second sale also becomes void. 6. Coming to consider the claim of the petitioner on the basis of his right being accrued by way of adverse possession for having possession of more than twelve years by the time of introduction of the restriction under Section 23, this Court finds, the provision contained in Section 23(B) of the O.L.R Act reads as follows: “[23-B. Burden of proof and amendment of Limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceedings under Section 23-(1) If any proceedings under Section 23, the validity of the transfer of any holding or any part thereof is called in question, or if such proceedings are for the recovery of possession of such holding, or part thereof, the burden of proving that the transfer was valid shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, lie on the transferee. (2) In the Limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceeding under Section 23-B, 2[ahd under Section 23-A] in the Schedule, after the words “twelve years” occurring in the Second Column against Article 65 of the words, brackets and figures “but thirty years in the case of immovable property belonging to a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Scheduled Caste, specified in relation to the State of Orissa in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 or the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, as the case may be,” shall be inserted.]” 7. Reading of the restrictions in the above provisions, this Court observes that the provisions contained in Section 23-B (2) of the Act has the application to the present case. Taking into consideration the provision contained in Section 23-B(2) of the Act, being original introduced vide Orissa Act 44 of 1976 requiring minimum of possession of 12 years by the time of introduction of the provision in the year 1976, this Court finds, creation of a right by virtue of adverse possession having continuous possession of thirty years was introduced in the O.L.R Act vide Orissa Act 8 of 91. Thus, the legal position as in the year 1976 has a clear requirement of possession of twelve years in the case of immovable property belonging to a member of the scheduled caste. Taking into consideration the rival contentions, materials available on record and reading of the provisions contained in Section 23-B(2) of the Act, this Court finds since the petitioner’s possession over the disputed property came by virtue of second sale deed dated 4.4.1970 by 1976 on introduction of Section 23(B) in its original forum in 1976, petitioner had no twelve years of possession to claim his right by virtue of adverse possession. 8. Considering a similar situation, a Bench of this Court decided a matter in a case in between Ghanashyam Meher vrs. Bhima Ganda alias Kumbhar (having died), Lakhapati Kumbhar and others as reported in 2000(II) OLR-275 referring to several other decisions in paragraph No.3, which reads as follows: “3. It is not disputed that the land was initially Chaukidar Jagir land of opposite party No.1 and subsequently after coming into force of the Orissa Offices of Village Police (Abolition) Act, 1964, the land vested in the State government and subsequently it was settled on raiyati basis with opposite party No.1 by the order dated 28.8.1968 and Patta was issued on 25.7.1970. The authorities who have decided the matter have not come to any clear-cut finding as to the date since when the petitioner had remained in possession. Even assuming that the petitioner was in possession from 1943 and his possession was adverse to that of the owner, namely, original opposite party No.1, Bhima Ganda, the very fact that the land ahd been settled with Bhima Ganda in a proceeding under the Orissa Offices of Village Police (Abolition) Act, created a new title in favour of original opposite party No.1 and adverse possession, if any, of the present petitioner prior to the date of settlement of the land with opposite party No.1 would be of no avail. However, if the petitioner continued in possession in spite of limitation would start and such possession would continue to be adverse and after expiry of twelve years of such adverse possession; right of opposite party No.1 would be lost keeping in view the principle envisaged under Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act. However, if the petitioner continued in possession in spite of limitation would start and such possession would continue to be adverse and after expiry of twelve years of such adverse possession; right of opposite party No.1 would be lost keeping in view the principle envisaged under Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act. Initially, in the Orissa Land Reforms Act, there was no provision for recovery of possession from person in unauthorized occupation of land belonging to a member of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and the remedy was to file appropriate civil suit. However, in the year 1976, under Orissa Act 44 of 1976 by way of amendment provision was introduced in shape of Sec.23-A for recovery of possession from a person in unauthorized possession of land of a raiyati belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as the case may be. However, the period of limitation available under the Limitation Act had not been changed. As such, it was held in series of cases that if a person remains in unauthorized occupation for a period of more than twelve years, the right of the original owner is lost. (See.62(1986) CLT 281 (Siani Nag v. Gobardhan Ganda and others). Subsequently, Sec.23-B was introduced in the year 1991 under Orissa Act 8 of 1991 where the period of limitation became thirty years. However, if any person had already perfected his title by adverse possession by the time of incorporation of Sec.23-B in the Orissa Land Reforms Act, his right acquired by way of adverse possession is not defeated by such subsequent provision enhancing the period of limitation. This position is clear in view of the decision reported 65 (1988) CLT 360 (Madhia Nayak v. Arjuna Pradhan and others). Though this decision was rendered with reference to a similar provision contained in Sec. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, the ratio of the said decision is squarely applicable. Similar view has been expressed in the decision of this Court reported in 71(1991) CLT 281 (Butu Naik v. Ainla naikani and another). Though this decision was rendered with reference to a similar provision contained in Sec. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, the ratio of the said decision is squarely applicable. Similar view has been expressed in the decision of this Court reported in 71(1991) CLT 281 (Butu Naik v. Ainla naikani and another). In fact, in view of the observations made in the latter decision pointing out the anomally relating to provision of limitation applicable under Sec.23, and Sec.23-A of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, the Legislature thought if fit to subsequently amend the provision by introducing Sec.23-B.” For the factual scenario discussed hereinabove, and the settled legal position by this Court through the referred judgment, this Court finds, there is no illegality in any of the impugned orders and all the Courts have rightly adjudicated the issue and thereby, rightly dismissed the claim of the petitioner leaving any scope for this Court to interfere in the same. 9. This writ petition stands dismissed but however, there is no order as to cost.