Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal is directed against the concurrently recorded renditions of both the learned Courts below, whereby, his suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants, with respect to the suit land stood decreed. In sequel thereto, the defendants/appellants herein are driven to institute the instant appeal herebefore. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the land comprised in khewat No. 39, Khatauni No. 47, Khasra Nos. 272, 273, 274, 279, 281, 291, 293, 294, 322, 325, 333 and 334, measuring 62 kanal 13 marla, situated in Jandoor village in Tapaa Machhali, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P., has been averred to be jointly owned and possessed by plaintiff Achhroo (since deceased) and his brother Beloo Ram as owners. It has been averred that formerly he and his brother Beloo Ram held the suit land as non-occupancy tenants, and that they became owners thereof on coming into operation of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. According to the plaintiff, the defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit land. However, about a week anterior to the institution of the suit, the defendants held out threats to interfere with the suit land and take possession thereof forcibly. It has been averred that the defendants have threatened to raise construction on the suit land as also threatened to cut and remove the trees standing on the suit land. The plaintiff, therefore, sought a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the suit land and taking forcible possession thereof. 3. The defendants contested the suit and filed written statement, wherein, they have denied the claim of the plaintiff qua his being in possession of the suit land. They have admitted the plaintiff to be a co-owner of the suit land to the extent of half share and averred that on February 13, 1980, he entered into an agreement to sell his share in the suit land in favour of Prabhu (predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1-A, 1-B and 1- C) and delivered possession of the land under sale to the prospective vendee after receiving from him Rs.10,000/-. With the prospective vendee having thus stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff, the latter according to the defendants, was left with no right, title or interest in the suit land. With the prospective vendee having thus stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff, the latter according to the defendants, was left with no right, title or interest in the suit land. The plaintiff is averred to have no locus standi to bring action against the defendants nor does he has any enforceable cause of action against them. 4. The plaintiff/respondent herein filed replication to the written statement of the defendants/appellants, wherein, he denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and re-asserted the averments, made in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for?OPP 2. Whether this suit is bad for misjoinder of parties, as alleged?OPD 3. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable?OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has transferred ½ share in the suit land with possession to defendant No.1, as alleged, if so, its effect?OPD. 4A. Whether the sale agreement dated 13.2.1980 was never executed by Sh. Achhru in faovur of the defendants as alleged?OPP 4B If issue No.4 A is not proved, whether the alleged sale agreement is a result of fraud, mis-representation, coercion and thus is suspicious document, as alleged?OPP 4C Whether the plaintiffs have no enforceable cause of action and locus standi to file the suit?OPD 5. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent herein. In an appeal, preferred therefrom by the defendants/appellants before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. Now the defendants/appellants herein, have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, wherein they assail the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission, on 17.11.2008, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted by the defendants/appellants against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the impugned judgment and decrees stand vitiated being contrary to the provisions of order 20 Rule 5 CPC? 2. Whether document Ext. Whether the impugned judgment and decrees stand vitiated being contrary to the provisions of order 20 Rule 5 CPC? 2. Whether document Ext. D-1 and D-2 having been proved in accordance with law, but just owing to misreading and mis appreciation of evidence the learned Courts below non suited the defendants? 3. Whether in view of provision of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, defendants are entitled for protection as envisaged in the said provision in view of agreement to sell Ex. D-1 dated 13.2.1980, but courts below mis-appreciated the said aspect thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees? Substantial questions of Law No.2 and 3: 8. Ex. D-1 embodies the purported agreement to sell, purportedly executed qua the suit land inter se the plaintiff Achhroo (since deceased) with the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1A to 1C, namely, one Prabhoo. Ex. D-2, is the receipt, wherein, a purported display is made with respect to a sum of Rs.10,000/- standing received by the plaintiff, as part of the total sale price of Rs.12,000/-, with respect to the suit land, as reflected in Ex.D-1. For resisting the suit of the plaintiff, the defendants had relied upon the provisions of Section 53-A, of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). For resisting the suit of the plaintiff, the defendants had relied upon the provisions of Section 53-A, of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “53A Part performance.- Where any person contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.” 9. For availing strength therefrom, the learned counsel appearing for the defendants/appellants, canvasses before this Court, that since in pursuance to Ex. D-1, they had obtained possession of the suit land from the plaintiff, factum whereof occurs in Ex. D-1, thereupon with within the ambit of Section 53-A of the Act, theirs provenly performing their part of the contract embodied in the relevant agreement, rendered its provisions being attracted qua them, hence, the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, claimed with respect to the suit land by the plaintiff, warranted dismissal. For determining the fact whether both Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2, stand aptly, pronounced by the learned Courts below, to be holding no vigour, for enhancing the plea of the defendants, qua theirs holding possession of the suit property, the factum of (a) jamabandi with respect to the suit land borne on Ex. For determining the fact whether both Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2, stand aptly, pronounced by the learned Courts below, to be holding no vigour, for enhancing the plea of the defendants, qua theirs holding possession of the suit property, the factum of (a) jamabandi with respect to the suit land borne on Ex. P-1 and Khasra girdawaries with respect thereto, both displaying the suit land to be jointly possessed by the plaintiff and Bailu Ram in equal shares, displays whereof hold a rebuttable presumption of truth, whereas, with no cogent evidence existing on record for displacing the presumption of truth enjoyed by the relevant displays occurring in Ex. P-1 and in the apposite khasra girdawari, both exhibits whereof appertain to the suit land, rather does constrain this Court to impute conclusivity to the aforesaid displays occurring therein also this Court is constrained to repel the contention of the defendants, that they in pursuance to Ex. D-1, had obtained possession of the suit land from the plaintiff, hence, they are entitled to avail the benefit of the provisions embodied in Section 53-A of the Act, nor hence they hold any leverage for resisting the suit of the plaintiff wherein he claimed a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction. (b) The further reason for outweighing the vigour of Ex.D-1, emanates from Ex. PW3/A, exhibits whereof comprises, a copy of the plaint instituted by one Bailu Ram against Prabhu, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, wherein he had pleaded that with Achhru leaving the village also with his never personally cultivating the suit land and that hence aforesaid Prabhu taking forcible possession of the suit land. In the suit aforesaid instituted by one Bailu Ram, against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1(a) to 1(c), namely, one Prabhu, the latter instituted an apposite written statement, wherein, he espoused that one Bailu Ram and his brother Achhru Ram are in joint possession of the suit land, in the capacity of non occupancy tenants, on payment of rent to owners thereof. During the pendnecy of the suit, one Achhru had been joined as a party thereto and he averred qua his holding joint possession with respect to the suit land along with Bailu Ram, as a non occupancy tenant, hence, the learned trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, wherein he claimed that he was holding exclusive possession of the suit land. Consequently, evidently a perusal of the written statement furnished by the predecessor-in-interest of the aforesaid defendants, in the suit previously instituted with respect to the suit land against him by Bailu Ram, written statement whereof is borne on Ex.PW4/A, reveals that it contains an espousal qua his working as a labourer under Achhru and his getting wages from him. His testification borne on Ex.PW4/B underscores, that he had been helping Achhru in cultivating the suit land, given the arm of Achhru being amputated. The statement borne on Ex.PW4/B stood recorded on 05.12.1987. Now, with the previous suit with respect to the suit property standing instituted in the month May, 1980, hence, in close proximity to the execution of the relevant agreement to sell comprised in Ex. D-1, besides Ex. D-1 being evidently executed with respect to property holding apparent analogity with the suit khasra numbers herein, “whereas”, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant concerned, not producing Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2 before the trial Court concerned, rather his contrarily making disclosures, in his written statement, comprised in Ex.PW4/A, furnished before it also in his testification borne on Ex.PW4/B, that he was helping Achhru in cultivating the suit land, given the arm of Achhru standing amputated, does rear an inference that the pleadings borne on Ex.PW4/A and his testification borne on Ex.PW4/B, comprising his admission with respect to the manner, of hence Achhru holding possession of the suit property jointly along with one Bailu Ram. Consequently, he is estopped, to contend that since the execution Ex. D-1, execution whereof occurred prior to the institution of the previous suit also when is with respect to analogous suit property herein, as also, when it occurred prior to his furnishing a written statement to the earlier suit comprised in Ex. PW3/A, that he in pursuance to Ex. D-1 holds possession of the suit property. In aftermath, he is also estopped from contending that he in part performance of Ex. D-1 has received possession of the suit property from the plaintiff and that he is entitled to avail the statutory benefit of the doctrine of part performance, embodied in Section 53-A of the Act. Furthermore, the fact of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants concerned, not producing, before the learned trial Court, either Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-1 has received possession of the suit property from the plaintiff and that he is entitled to avail the statutory benefit of the doctrine of part performance, embodied in Section 53-A of the Act. Furthermore, the fact of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants concerned, not producing, before the learned trial Court, either Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2, during the pendency of the previous suit instituted by one Bailu Ram with respect to analogous suit property herein also brings home, a conclusion that his contriving their respective preparation. In addition apart from the aforesaid espousal standing concluded to be working against the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants concerned, its further effect is that it also constrains an inevitable conclusion, that the reflections occurring in the jamabandi borne on Ex. P-1 and in the khasra girdawaries, depicting the fact of the defendants not holding possession of the suit property, hence, enjoying conclusivity, corollary whereof, is that the doctrine of part performance being reinforcingly, not available for its leveraging by them. 10. Be that as it may, after termination of the previous lis inter se Bailu Ram and Achhru and Prabhu, the latter filed an application for correction of revenue entries with respect to the possessory column, borne in the apposite jamabandi qua the suit land. Application whereof, as stood preferred before the Assistant Collector stood dismissed also the appeal carried therefrom, comprised in Ex. P-4, before the learned Divisional Commissioner, also stood dismissed. Consequently, the efficacy of the relevant reflections occurring in the possessory column of the Jamabandi prepared with respect to the suit land, wherein, the defendants are not recorded to be in possession of the suit property, hold renewed conclusive vigour, hence, also the espousal of the defendants that their predecessor-in-interest, in pursuance to agreement to sell, borne on Ex. D-1 was holding possession of the suit property, hence, they are entitled to repulse the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction agitated by the plaintiff with respect to the suit property, warrants its standing rejected. 11. Be that as it may, as aptly concluded by both the learned Courts below, Ex. D-1, “apart from” the reasons ascribed hereinabove, not holding its vigour, the fact of, its at the apt concluding portion occurring at page 2' thereof 'not' holding the signatures or thumb impression of either of the purported executants thereto, renders it to be not completely executed. D-1, “apart from” the reasons ascribed hereinabove, not holding its vigour, the fact of, its at the apt concluding portion occurring at page 2' thereof 'not' holding the signatures or thumb impression of either of the purported executants thereto, renders it to be not completely executed. The purported agreement to sell borne on Ex. D-1, recorded inter se Achhru and the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants concerned, is not, hence, amenable for any reliance, rather reliance thereupon is both feeble as well as frail. Receipt Ex. D-2, whereon the thumb impression of Achhru occur, though stand proven by its scribe and a witness thereto, yet what casts a grave suspicion qua its genuineness, is aroused by the fact of only one witness thereto, who is real brother of the defendants, proving its recitals, whereas, the other witness Gain Singh not being examined by the defendants in proof thereto, hence, constraining this Court, to derive a firm conclusion that hence the interested testimony of Taru, the witness to Ex.D-2 not overcoming the suspicion qua the authenticity of Ex. D-1, suspicious whereof ingraining it, arises for all the reasons aforestated. 11. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court as also by the learned trial Court are based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court have not excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the defendants/respondents and against the plaintiff/appellant. 12. In view of above discussion, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. In sequel, the judgments and decrees rendered by both the learned Courts below are maintained and affirmed. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.