JUDGMENT : 1. The present second Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 15th July, 2005 passed by the learned Judge, Bench- IX, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Appeal No. 09 of 2004 affirming thereby the decree dated 9th June, 2003 passed by the learned Judge, 3rd Bench, Presidency Small Causes Court in Ejectment Suit No. 960 of 2000. 2. The Plaintiff in the Suit Shri Kashi Nath Bardhan is the Respondent and Shri Tushar Kanti Mondal and Tarun Kanti Mondal the Defendants in the Suit are the Appellants herein. 3. Plaintiff/Respondent’s case in the Suit may be summarised as follows:- 4. The Plaintiff/Respondent purchased the Suit premises being premises No. 104, Raja Ram Mohan Sarani, P. S.- Amherst Street, Kolkata- 700 009 by a registered deed dated 18th June, 1979 and sometimes after such purchase, he inducted the Defendant/Appellants in the Suit premises as a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 200.00 payable according to English Calendar month. The Defendant/Appellants, during their occupation of the Suit premises as the tenants, sublet the Suit premises illegally without the consent of the Plaintiff/Respondent. The Plaintiff/Respondent reasonably required the Suit premises for the use of his own family. Hence the Plaintiff/Respondent served a notice of eviction upon the Defendant/Appellants terminating the tenancy thereby and asking the Defendant/Appellants to vacate the Suit premises, in terms of such notice. The Defendant/Appellants refused to do so. Hence, the Plaintiff/Respondent filed the Suit for the eviction of the Defendant/Appellants from the Suit premises being Ejectment Suit No. 960/2000. 5. The Defendant/Appellants contested the Suit filing their written statement denying therein all the material allegations in the plaint. It was their specific case, inter alia, that their father was running a printing press under name and style ‘M/s Naba Gouranga Press’ as a tenant in the Suit building, since prior to the purchase of it by the Plaintiff/Respondent and after the death of their father they inherited the said business as well as the tenancy. Subsequently on the basis of a tenancy agreement dated 18th August, 1982, they surrendered a portion of their original tenancy and continued their business in a portion of the Suit building which, is the present Suit premises, under the Plaintiff/Respondent, as a tenant at an increased rent. Subsequently on the basis of a tenancy agreement dated 18th August, 1982, they surrendered a portion of their original tenancy and continued their business in a portion of the Suit building which, is the present Suit premises, under the Plaintiff/Respondent, as a tenant at an increased rent. They further alleged that they never sublet the Suit premises to anyone and the Plaintiff/Respondent did not require the Suit premises for any bonafide purpose of his personal requirement as, such requirement stood satisfied after a portion of the original tenancy was surrendered in terms of the tenancy agreement entered into subsequently. With such defence, the Defendant/Appellants prayed for dismissal of the Suit. 6. Parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence during the trial. Considering the evidence thus adduced, the Trial Court came to the conclusions that the Plaintiff/Respondents’ claim of subletting as well as personal requirement were proved and hence the Trial Court passed decree of eviction in the Suit. 7. Being aggrieved by the decision and judgment of the Trial Court, the Appellant/Defendants filed the Title Appeal being Title Appeal No. 9 of 2004. The Appellate Court was also of the view that the case of subletting was proved and hence the Appellate Court affirmed the decree of eviction on such ground. However, the Appellate Court did not express any view in respect of the issue of personal requirement. 8. Being also dissatisfied with such finding of the Appellate Court, the Defendants in the Suit filed the present appeal, challenging, inter alia, the legality of the decisions of both the Courts below. 9. At the time of admission of the appeal the Division Bench by its order dated 20th December, 2005 formulated the following substantial question of law for hearing of the appeal. (I) In granting a decree for eviction on the ground of subletting, whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in not taking into consideration the fact that one of the Defendants is the owner of the printing business and the alleged subtenants are the employees of the said business. (II) Whether learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in granting a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement by not considering the question of partial eviction in terms of the Section 13 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 10. (II) Whether learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in granting a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement by not considering the question of partial eviction in terms of the Section 13 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 10. By the aforesaid order dated 20th December, 2005, the Division Bench stayed all further proceedings of the execution case in the Trial Court, on condition that the Appellants would vacate one room in the first floor and one room in the ground floor in favour of the landlord within a prescribed period. The order of such partial eviction by the Court was complied with by the Appellants and the order of stay of further proceeding of the Execution case continued. Thereafter, the Appellants by an application being CAN No. 7506 of 2016 prayed for considering the aforesaid development of facts during the pendency of this appeal. The said application has also been heard along with the appeal. 11. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhattacharya appearing for the Appellants has submitted that although the Trial Court has passed a decree of eviction on both the grounds of subletting as well as personal requirement, but the first Appellate Court has not scrutinised at all, the decision of the Trial Court on the point of personal requirement. He has further submitted that the decision of the first Appellate Court is against the principles of law relating to the point of subletting as well as against the evidence on record, and for all such reasons, the decision of the first Appellant Court suffers from gross illegality and perversity as well, calling for interference in this second appeal. Mr. Bhattachary has further pointed out some subsequent events during the pendency of this second appeal for which the personal requirement of the landlord stands legally satisfied, according to him. 12. Mr. Bhattacharya has cited the following decisions in his support (1) (1984) 2 SCC 590 (Jagdish Prasad – versus – Smt. Angoori Devi), (2) (1987) 4 SCC 161 (Dipak Banerjee – versus – Lilabati Chakraborty) and (3) (1996) 1 SCC 25 (Dev Kumar – versus – Swaran Lata & Others). 13. In reply, learned Advocate Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the Respondent has argued that since there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below, there is hardly any scope for interference with the findings of the Courts below, in this second appeal. 13. In reply, learned Advocate Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the Respondent has argued that since there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below, there is hardly any scope for interference with the findings of the Courts below, in this second appeal. However, Mr. Chatterjee has also expressed his view that even in a case of concurrent findings of the Courts below, the second Appellate Court may interfere, where it is found that the findings of the Courts below are totally illegal or perverse, but in the present case there is no such gross illegality or perversity either in the judgment of the first Appellate Court or in the judgment and findings of the Trial Court. Hence, such judgments of the Courts below should not be interfered with. 14. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that the Appellants have themselves admitted during evidence that both of them do reside in their respective own houses, constructed by them in some other places and as such they have parted with their possession in favour of the persons now found residing in the Suit premises and the Appellants have also failed to explain under what rights or circumstances those persons are now possessing the Suit premises. So, the Appellants having failed to discharge their onus, the case of subletting of the Suit premises by the Appellants stands automatically proved. 15. Mr. Chatterjee has cited the following decisions in his support. (1) 1994 Supp (3) SCC 697 (Dial Singh – versus – Amrish Kumar and others), (2) 89 CWN 447 (Nandalal Chowdhury – versus – Monika Banerjee), (3) 1996 (5) SCC 353 (Prativa Devi (Smt) – versus – R. V. Krishnan), (4) 86 CWN 938 (Santosh Kumar Bhattacharjee – versus – Sachindra Nath Saha), (5) (2016) 3 SCC 78 (Damodar Lal – versus – Sohan Devi and others) and (6) 1994 (4) SCC 325 (Nihal Chand Rameshwar Dass and another – versus – Vinod Rastogi and others). 16. Admittedly, the Appellants were in possession of the Suit premises when the Respondent purchased the suit building by a registered deed dated 18th June, 1979. It is also an admitted fact that subsequent to such purchase, an agreement of tenancy was made on 18th August, 1982 by the parties in the Suit. 16. Admittedly, the Appellants were in possession of the Suit premises when the Respondent purchased the suit building by a registered deed dated 18th June, 1979. It is also an admitted fact that subsequent to such purchase, an agreement of tenancy was made on 18th August, 1982 by the parties in the Suit. The said agreement has been produced and marked Exhibit – A. from the said document it is found that the father of the Appellants Late Dhirandra Nath Mondal had been running a Printing press under the name and style of “M/s Naba Gouranga Press” and had been residing also in a part of the Suit building. It is further found from the said document that the present Suit premises were let out to the Appellants for the purpose of continuing their business of Printing press and also for the purpose of their residing in a portion thereof. The first Appellate Court’s finding that the Suit premises was let out to the Appellants for the residential purpose only is, therefore, absolutely wrong and against the evidence on record. 17. The Appellants claim that they are still occupying the Suit premises for the purpose for which it is let out to them in terms of the agreement of tenancy. However, Appellant No. 2 Tarun Kanti Mondal while deposing for both the Appellants, admitted during his cross- examination that both he himself as well as his elder bother have constructed their separate residential houses at two different places where they are residing. However, at the same time he also stated that he occasionally resides in the Suit premises also under their occupation. He has further stated that they are running their press in the Suit Premises, through their employees. 18. The Respondent allege that the Appellants have sublet the Suit premises without his consent to one Tamal Kumar Ghosh, Mohit Karak and Srikanta Roy who are now occupying the Suit premises. In the electoral roll of the locality (Exhibit-7) the Suit premises is noted as the address of the aforesaid three persons. Respondent in his evidence stated that he found the Appellant No. 2 collecting money from those three sub-tenants and that one of them, i. e., Mohit Karak approached to accept him as a direct tenant. In the electoral roll of the locality (Exhibit-7) the Suit premises is noted as the address of the aforesaid three persons. Respondent in his evidence stated that he found the Appellant No. 2 collecting money from those three sub-tenants and that one of them, i. e., Mohit Karak approached to accept him as a direct tenant. On this point, the Appellant No. 2 in his evidence-in-chief stated that the said Tamal Kumar Ghosh is their employee as a computer operator and Mohit Karak is also their employee since the days of their father and Srikanta Roy is their nephew who occasionally visits the Suit premises. It should be noted here that the Respondent during his cross-examination also admitted that Tamal Ghosh is a computer operator working for the Respondents. The Respondent in his cross-examination further admitted that the Appellant No. 2 occasionally resides in the Suit premises. 19. Mohit Karak has been examined by the Appellants. He has stated that he is an employee of “M/s Naba Gouranga Press”, owned by the Appellants. He has further stated that Tamal Kumar Ghosh is also an employee of the press as a computer operator and Srikanta Roy is a nephew of the Respondent and that none of them is a subtenant under the Appellants. He denied having ever paid any rent to the Appellant No. 2 or having approached the Respondent for becoming a direct tenant under the Respondent. So, his evidence on oath contradicts the claim of the Respondent on the point of subletting. It is true that no salary register or salary certificate has been produced by the Appellants, but oral evidence is also a good evidence in this case especially when there is no corroboration to the claims of the Respondent on the point. 20. The Suit was filed in the year 2000. From Exhibit B it is found that the Appellants have renewed their trade licence for their press in the Suit premises up to 01st July, 2002. From Exhibit – C (series) it is further found that the Appellant No. 1 in his Income Tax Return for the assessment year 2001/02, has shown an amount of Rs. 3,479.55/- (rupees three thousand four hundred seventy-nine and fifty-five paisa only) as income from his business. 21. From Exhibit – C (series) it is further found that the Appellant No. 1 in his Income Tax Return for the assessment year 2001/02, has shown an amount of Rs. 3,479.55/- (rupees three thousand four hundred seventy-nine and fifty-five paisa only) as income from his business. 21. From the evidence on record discussed above, it is found that Appellant No. 2 occasionally visits the Suit premises, to look after their business. The business was in running condition when the Suit was filed. The Respondent himself has admitted that one of the occupants of the Suit premises, Tamal Ghosh, is an employee of the Appellants as a computer operator. The other occupant, i.e., Mohit Karak has deposed in the case (D.W. 2). He has stated that he is an employee in the Appellant’s printing business since the year 1962. He has further stated that the other occupant Tamal Ghosh is also an employee of the Appellants and other occupant Srikanta Roy is a son of the Appellants’ sister. He categorically stated that none of them is a sub-tenant under the Appellants. His evidence on the point stands unshaken. The business of the Appellants in the Suit premises was in running condition at the time of the filing of the Suit. 22. So, from the evidence on record it is quite clear that the Appellants never parted with their exclusive possession or control over the Suit premises, although they do not reside in the Suit premises continuously. 23. It has been clearly laid down in Jagadish Prasad’s case (supra) “it is only when a person other than the tenant sits in the shop in exercise of his own right that the presumption of subletting can arise. As long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed”. Similar view has also been expressed in the Dipak Banerjee’s case (supra). As discussed above, in the present case the Appellants have proved that they have never parted with their exclusive possession and control over the Suit premises. So, the decisions reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 697, (1994) 4 SCC 325 , 89 CWN 447 and 86 CWN 938 cited for the Appellants are not applicable in the present case. 24. As discussed above, in the present case the Appellants have proved that they have never parted with their exclusive possession and control over the Suit premises. So, the decisions reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 697, (1994) 4 SCC 325 , 89 CWN 447 and 86 CWN 938 cited for the Appellants are not applicable in the present case. 24. First Appellate Court was of the view that the Suit premises was let out for the residential purpose only, which is totally against the evidence on record (Exhibit - A). Both the Courts below have held that the alleged subletting has been proved because of the fact that some persons other than the Appellants have been residing in the Suit premises and while coming to such conclusion both the Courts below did not take into consideration, the point whether the Appellants parted with their complete control over the Suit premises in favour of the employees of the Appellants. The decisions of both the Courts below are, therefore, perverse and against the evidence on record considered together. In fact, the Respondent has failed to prove the issue of subletting. So, the decision of both the Courts below in the issue is not sustainable in law. 25. The Trial Court passed decree of eviction also on the ground of reasonable requirement of the landlord, i. e., the Respondent. Admittedly two rooms, a kitchen and a separate ‘Thakurghar’ was in the occupation of the Respondent at the time of filing of the Suit. 26. The Division Bench by the order dated 20.12.2005, while admitting the appeal and formulating the substantial question of law, passed an order staying all further proceedings of the Execution Case in the Trial Court on condition that the Appellants would vacate one room in the first floor and one room in the ground floor in favour of the Respondent. The said order has been complied with as admitted by the learned Advocates on both sides, during the hearing of the appeal. So, during the pendency of this appeal the Respondent got possession over two additional rooms, one in the ground floor and the other in the first floor. So, the Respondent is now occupying four rooms, a kitchen and a ‘Thakurghar’. 27. At the time of filing of the Suit the Respondent’s family consisted of the Respondent, his wife and their one unmarried daughter. So, the Respondent is now occupying four rooms, a kitchen and a ‘Thakurghar’. 27. At the time of filing of the Suit the Respondent’s family consisted of the Respondent, his wife and their one unmarried daughter. The unmarried daughter of the Respondent is now married as admitted. 28. So, the reasonable requirement of the Respondent may be assessed as follows:- one bedroom for the Respondent and his wife, one bed room for the married daughter of the Respondent. The Respondent is a retired Bank Officer. So, according to his status, he requires a separate Dining room and a Sitting room. The Respondent has claimed a separate guest room to accommodate his married brother and sisters who occasionally visit his house. According to the Appellants no such relative does pay visit in the Respondent’s house. In our society, visit of brothers and sisters in the house of their elder brother is not rare. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has expressed his view that such casual visitors may be accommodated in the bed room of the married daughter of the Respondent. The view, according to me, is not logical. So, the Respondent’s claim of a separate room for his guests is quite reasonable. The Respondent, therefore, requires at least five rooms of reasonable size. 29. The two rooms under the occupation of the Respondent at the time of filing of the Suit are of reasonable size as found from the Commissioner’s report, (Exhibit- 9) which can be used as Bed rooms. The room in the first floor surrendered by the Appellants during the pendency of this appeal may be also used as a bed room or as a drawing room. The room in the ground floor surrendered by the Appellants during the pendency of the appeal is a room of a very small size. The Appellants in their written statement have described the said room as “very small divided half portion of a room which cannot be used for any purposes”. The fact being so, the said room cannot be used either as a bed room or as a dining or as a drawing room. It can be, at best, used as a store room or for any other similar purpose. So, the minimum requirement of the Respondent does not stand satisfied even after the surrender of a portion of the Suit premises by the Appellants during the pendency of the Suit. It can be, at best, used as a store room or for any other similar purpose. So, the minimum requirement of the Respondent does not stand satisfied even after the surrender of a portion of the Suit premises by the Appellants during the pendency of the Suit. After such surrender, only one room in the ground floor is under the occupation of the Appellants at present. So, the question of partial eviction does not arise now, in the case. 30. The Trial Court passed decree of eviction also on the ground of reasonable requirement of the Respondent. The facts and circumstances considered by the Trial Court has not been substantially changed even after a partial surrender of a portion of the Suit premises by the Appellants during the pendency of the Appeal. So, the eviction of the Appellants on the ground of personal requirement of the Respondent is justified. It is surprising to note that the First Appellate Court has not considered the issue at all. So, the judgment of the First Appellate Court is perverse and not sustainable in law on such ground also. 31. To conclude, the findings and decisions of both the Courts below on the issue of subletting are perverse and against the principles of law. The First Appellate Court has not considered at all the issue of personal requirement. The Trial Court has passed a decree on the ground of personal requirement also, which is justified. Hence, the decisions of both the Courts below on the issue of subletting are set aside. The judgment and decree of eviction by the Trial Court on the ground of personal requirement being justified, is affirmed. The order of stay of further proceedings of the Execution Case pending in the Trial Court is vacated and the Trial Court is to proceed with the Execution Case according to law. The questions of law formulated are answered accordingly and the present second appeal is also disposed of accordingly. 32. No separate order is needed in C. A. N. 7506 of 2016 and it is disposed of accordingly. 33. Let the Lower Court records be returned to the Lower Courts along with copies of this judgment and order. 34. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Counsels for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.